N.Y. Exec. Law § 290

Section 290 identifies eliminating and preventing discrimination in educational institutions as a purpose of the Human Rights Law.

Ithaca City School District v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2011-06-30(3)

SDHR has “general jurisdiction and power” to, among other things “eliminate and prevent discrimination ... in educational institutions” (Executive Law § 290 [3]) and we are unpersuaded that anything in the statutory language of the Human Rights Law, or its legislative history, dictates the exclusion of public schools from that broad mandate.

Section 290 states that New York’s Human Rights Law is intended to protect people within the state and its inhabitants and to promote their equal opportunity and general welfare.

Hoffman v. Parade Publications · filed 2010-07-01(2), (3)

The Legislature enacted that law through its invocation of “the police power of [New York State] for the protection of the public welfare, health and peace of the people of this state” (Executive Law § 290 [2] [emphasis supplied]). The law declares that the State of New York “has the responsibility to act to assure that every individual within [New York State] is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life,” and that failure to afford equal opportunity “threatens the peace, order, health, safety and general welfare of the state and its inhabitants” (Executive Law § 290 [3] [emphasis supplied]).

Section 290(3) identifies the Human Rights Law’s purpose as promoting individual opportunity by preventing discrimination based on personal attributes such as religion.

Bruno v. Pembrook Management, Inc. · filed 1995-07-10(3)

Rather, the purpose of the Human Rights Law is to promote individual opportunity by barring discrimination against persons based upon such personal attributes as religion.

Section 290(3) identifies eliminating discrimination in basic opportunities as the predominant purpose of the Human Rights Law.

Broad Elm Auto Centers, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1990-03-16(3)

Elimination of discrimination in the provision of basic opportunities is the predominant purpose of the Human Rights Law (see, Executive Law § 290 [3]; Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442).

Section 290 expresses a legislative intent to protect every individual from discrimination, including white Americans.

Travis v. Carlisle Corp. · filed 1979-01-16

The court cannot accept defendant’s contention that the antidiscrimination legislation does not apply to white Americans. Such a holding would construe to create discrimination the very law which was adopted to prevent it. The purpose is clear. The language is plain. The preamble avows that “the legislature hereby finds and declares that the state has the responsibility to act to assure that every individual within this state is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life”. (Executive Law, § 290.)

The NYSHRL permits employment-discrimination claims for failure to accommodate religious beliefs under standards that are the same as or more employee-friendly than Title VII's standards.

Gaskin-El v. 1199SEIU National Benefit Fund · filed 2025-02-19

It follows from the Court’s decision on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims must also be denied, “as the standards applicable to those claims are either the same or more employee-friendly than the standards applicable to Title VII.”

Section 290(3) expresses a legislative purpose to eliminate discrimination in basic opportunities, including discrimination by the State; it does not support a shorter limitations period for claims against the State.

Koerner v. State of New York · filed 1984-06-29(3)

Indeed, the Legislature, in enacting the Human Rights Law, specifically found that “the state has the responsibility ... and threatens the peace, order, health, safety and general welfare of the state and its inhabitants” (Executive Law, § 290, subd 3). Clearly, the elimination of discrimination in the provision of basic opportunities is the predominant purpose of this legislation; all the more invidious is such discrimination when it is practiced by the State. We cannot discern any intent on the part of the Legislature to subject the injured person to a shorter limitations period when the wrong was committed by the State.

Section 290 states the Human Rights Law’s purpose of securing equal opportunity without discrimination; it does not provide redress for a broken promise of marriage and its after-effects.

Fletcher v. Greiner · filed 1980-12-17

The stated purpose of the “Human Rights Law” is to afford an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life and to obtain employment without discrimination because of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or marital status (Executive Law, §§ 290,291; see City of Schenectady v State Div. of Human Rights, 37 NY2d 421). It was not enacted to afford redress for breach of promise of marriage and its after-effects which, as plaintiff has cogently revealed, lies at the root of this action.

Section 290 recognizes a right to an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life, including for people with disabilities.

Goldsmith v. New York Psychoanalytic Institute · filed 1980-02-21

Nevertheless, on this record, it is clear that the rejection of complainant’s application constituted a violation of complainant’s right to "an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life” (Executive Law, § 290).

Section 290(3) gives the Division of Human Rights general jurisdiction to prevent discrimination in educational institutions, including discrimination in admissions.

New York University v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1975-04-25(3)

The Legislature then created in the same subdivision, the respondent Division "to eliminate and prevent discrimination * * * in educational institutions” and the Division "given general jurisdiction and power for such purposes.” ... All of the above provisions are meaningless if the "use of facilities” does not embrace admission policies. In the court’s view the Education Department and the Division of Human Rights have concurrent jurisdiction.

Section 290’s statement of legislative intent does not indicate that public employers are excluded from the Human Rights Law.

Board of Education v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1973-06-25

Neither the wide statement of the purposes of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, § 290), nor the definition of terms used (Executive Law, § 292), nor the provision of our Constitution which it fulfills (N. Y. Const., art. I, § 11) indicates an intent to exclude public employers from the sanctions directed toward discriminatory practices under the act.

Section 290 gives the State Commission for Human Rights general jurisdiction and power to eliminate and prevent racial discrimination in housing accommodations.

Neidich v. State Commission for Human Rights · filed 1967-04-28

In considering the plaintiffs’ arguments on the jurisdiction and statutory authority of the Commission, it should be noted first of all that the Commission has been “given general jurisdiction and power ’ ’ to eliminate and prevent racial discrimination in housing accommodations (among other things). (Executive Law, § 290.)

Section 290 gives the Commission for Human Rights general power to address employment discrimination in public education.

Board of Higher Education v. Carter · filed 1964-04-02

A report cast in these terms, and recommending a statute granting the new commission “ general jurisdiction and power ” for the purposes of eliminating discrimination in public employment, cannot easily be read as intending to exclude the field of public education.

Section 290’s statement of legislative purpose includes the protection of all New Yorkers, regardless of race.

Hobson v. York Studios, Inc. · filed 1955-10-18

The Law Against Discrimination states its purpose to be “ the protection of the public welfare, health and peace of the people of this state ” (Executive Law, § 290). This is inclusive of all people, white as well as Negro, The old cases which would limit the application of the Civil Bights Law to Negroes only are clearly negatived by recent legislative enactments.

Section 290(3) identifies eliminating and preventing employment discrimination as a public purpose of the Division of Human Rights, supporting the Division’s authority to prosecute employment-discrimination complaints in the state’s interest despite a private arbitration agreement.

Charter Communications, Inc. v. Jewett · filed 2021-11-16(3)

Here, the NYSDHR has the statutory authority to enforce the Human Rights Law’s prohibition against employment discrimination, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290(3), 293, and may file and pursue its own complaint against an employer in a proceeding before the NYSDHR. N.Y. Exec. Law § 295(6)(b).

Section 290 requires the Human Rights Law to be construed liberally to accomplish its purpose, supporting protection against discrimination based on a person's perceived sex.

Martin v. J.C. Penney Corp. · filed 2014-06-10

Plaintiffs also state valid claims for sex discrimination under NYSHRL. Unlike the NYCHRL, the language of the accommodation provision in the NYSHRL - does not explicitly provide protection for “actual or perceived” sex. It simply prohibits discrimination “because of sex.” Since the statute is to be “construed liberally” to accomplish its purpose, defendants should not be permitted to avoid responsibility for some discriminatory acts motivated by sex and not others. N.Y. Exec. Law § 290. Discrimination based on an individual’s perceived sex is discrimination “because of sex” in the same way that discrimination based on an individual’s actual sex is.

The NYSHRL defines disability more broadly than the ADA, and a medically diagnosable impairment can satisfy that definition.

Moretti v. Luxury Cars of Westchester LLC · filed 2024-04-24

Under the NYSHRL, the definition of disability is “significantly broader than the ADA definition.” ... “Any medically diagnosable impairment is sufficient.” ... Under the NYSHRL’s broader definition, Plaintiff plausibly pleads he suffers from a disability. Plaintiff alleges that he “had a diagnosed anxiety disorder that caused him to require medical leave.” ... Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds this sufficient for Plaintiff to plausibly allege he suffers from a “medically diagnosable impairment.”

Section 290 expresses the same public policy against sex discrimination as against racial discrimination.

Union Free School District No. 6 v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1973-11-26

The same statute and the same public policy apply to both racial and sexual discrimination (Executive Law, §§ 290, 296).

Section 290(3) reflects that the NYSHRL protects people from sex discrimination without distinguishing between men and women.

Conlan v. Liberty Mutual Group Inc. · filed 2024-11-13(3)

This is not required. The NYSHRL protects against discrimination because of one’s sex and its text draws no distinction between men or women receiving the benefit of its protection. See N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290(3), 296(1)(a).

For purposes of the NYSHRL's coverage of discrimination "within" New York, a discriminatory termination occurring in New York is sufficient even when the employee works elsewhere and feels the termination's effects there.

Rylott-Rooney v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa Per Azioni · filed 2008-04-14(3)

The Court sees no reason why a similar analytic framework should not govern anti-discrimination protection under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL, such that those laws apply either when the initial discriminatory act (for example, a termination) occurs in New York or when the original experience of injury, which occurs at the employee’s workplace, is in New York. ... Here, it is undisputed that the act of termination occurred in New York. That alone is sufficient to establish discrimination “within” New York, even if, as Alitalia argues, Rylott-Rooney felt the effects of this termination at her workplace in Minnesota.

The NYSHRL treats back pay as a legal remedy available for a jury determination and permits joint and several liability reaching individual employees who retaliated or aided and abetted retaliation, even when the immune public employer cannot be sued.

Dodd v. City University of New York · filed 2021-06-01

As defendants concede, back pay is a legal remedy, as to which Dodd is entitled to a jury verdict, under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. ... It is also undisputed that both laws provide for individual liability—under the NYSHRL, for “employers” who retaliate against the plaintiff or those who aided and abetted an employer, and under the NYCHRL for anyone who participated in retaliation, even if not an “employer.” ... Under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, however, courts have not limited back pay to those defendants who paid plaintiffs’ salaries out of their own pockets. Rather, courts often impose joint and several liability under these statutes, reaching both the plaintiff’s actual employer and the individual employees found to have acted against her. ... That such liability may not extend to CUNY itself, given the procedural bar imposed by immunity, does not insulate the non-immune individual defendants from liability under these laws. Thus, Dodd may present, to the jury, her claim for damages in the form of back pay, asserted under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL against Boudreau, Cronin, and Krinsky.

The NYSHRL permits an adequately alleged pregnancy-discrimination claim to proceed against a supervisor sued in her individual capacity, with the claim evaluated under the same standards as a Title VII claim.

Biondolillo v. Livingston Correctional Facility · filed 2023-03-23

Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiff’s NYSHRL pregnancy discrimination claim to be brought against Kennedy in her individual capacity. See Kravstov v. Town of Greenburgh, No. 10-CV-3142, 2012 WL 2719663, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2012). Because Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment defense is inapplicable and Plaintiff has adequately alleged a pregnancy discrimination claim under Title VII, Plaintiff’s NYSHRL pregnancy discrimination claim may proceed. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that Title VII and NYSHRL claims are evaluated under the same standards); see also Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2014).

For NYHRL purposes, whether an entity is a joint employer is assessed functionally by examining commonality of hiring, firing, discipline, pay, insurance, records, and supervision.

Weiss v. Premier Technologies · filed 2023-05-09

“The standard for whether an entity is a joint employer for Title VII and [NYHRL] purposes is ‘functional’ and requires the Court to ‘look at commonality of hiring, firing, discipline, pay insurance, records, and supervision.’”

Under the NYSHRL, front pay is a legal remedy for which the jury decides entitlement.

Chisholm v. MEMORIAL SLOAN-KETTERING CANCER CENTER · filed 2011-11-04

As an initial matter, Defendants contend that the jury’s finding that Chisholm is entitled to an award of front pay constitutes an advisory verdict that the Court should reject. The Court disagrees. Although front pay is an equitable remedy under Title VII, any form of money damages, including front pay, is a legal remedy to be decided by the jury under the NYSHRL.

For NYSHRL hostile work environment claims accruing before the 2019 amendment, the pleading standard is the same as under Title VII and § 1981, and repeated use of a racial slur by a supervisor in the presence of Black employees can suffice to survive dismissal.

Spencer v. Global Innovative Group, LLC · filed 2023-10-12

Drawing all inferences in Plaintiffs favor — as the Court must at this stage of the litigation, Kassner, 496 F.3d at 238 — the Court concludes that Plaintiff has — for purposes of his Title VII, Section 1981, and NYSHRL hostile work environment claims ~ pled “facts sufficient to support the conclusion that []he was faced with harassment... of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of h[is] employment altered for the worse.”

Section 290 requires a plaintiff alleging age discrimination to establish a prima facie case by showing protected-age status, qualification, adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Spataro v. Glenwood Supply · filed 2012-10-04

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under either the ADEA or the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must show “(1) that [he] was within the protected age group, (2) that [he] was qualified for the position, (3) that [he] experienced adverse employment action, and (4) that such action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”

Age-discrimination claims under the NYHRL are evaluated under the same standards as claims under the ADEA.

Mattera v. JPMorgan Chase Corp. · filed 2010-09-30

Age discrimination claims brought under NYHRL are evaluated under the same standards that govern the ADEA.

The NYSHRL requires a discrimination plaintiff to show protected-class membership, qualification, an adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Aiken v. MTA New York City Transit · filed 2021-09-29

Under Title VII and NYSHRL, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position at issue; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

The NYSHRL discrimination claims survived pleading where the allegations plausibly showed protected-class status, satisfactory performance, a materially adverse employment action, and a minimal inference of discriminatory intent; the constructive-discharge theory did not.

Craven v. City Of New York · filed 2020-05-28

To establish a prima facie case under all provisions except the NYCHRL, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was competent to perform the job in question, or was performing the job duties satisfactorily; (3) she suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that give rise to a minimal inference of discrimination. ... Thus, to the extent that Craven’s discrimination claims are based on a theory of constructive discharge, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED; otherwise, the motion is DENIED.

Section 290 does not require a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil lawsuit.

Gokdogan v. Slap Shot Pizza Enterprises Ltd. · filed 2021-09-27

Unlike Title VII, the NYSHRL “does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to bringing a civil lawsuit.”

The NYSHRL does not provide relief for discrimination or retaliation claims arising from federal employment.

Sung v. DeJoy · filed 2024-09-05

Pursuant to this precedent, the Court agrees with the USPS Defendants that Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims must be dismissed.

Section 290 et seq. does not provide an employment-discrimination remedy to federal employees, whose claims must be brought under federal statutes.

Perkins v. United States Department Of The Treasury · filed 2022-01-03

The Court agrees with Defendants, as Plaintiff’s claims may only be brought under the federal statutes. Wilder v. Shulkin, No. 14-CV-10072 (RJS), 2017 WL 2889507, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2017) (“Title VII is ‘the exclusive remed[y] available to federal employees who allege employment discrimination’ on the basis of gender, color, or race.”) (internal citation omitted); McManamon v. Shinseki, No. 11 Civ. 7610(PAE), 2013 WL 3466863, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013) (stating the plaintiff’s “NYSHRL[] and NYCHRL claims [were dismissed] because those statutes do not provide relief for a federal employee’s [disability discrimination] claim against a federal agency”); Chmiel v. Potter, No. 09-CV-555(RJA), 2010 WL 5904384, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2010) (“[T]he Rehabilitation Act provides the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging discrimination on the basis of disability.”). Accordingly, summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claim.

The New York State Human Rights Law does not apply to the bi-state Port Authority because one state cannot unilaterally impose its law on the compact entity.

Meyers v. Port Authority of Trans Hudson (PATH) · filed 2023-08-25

Accordingly, I join the numerous courts that have similarly held that CEPA, NJLAD, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL are not applicable to the Port Authority. For this reason, I dismiss these claims against Defendants PATH, Port Authority, and the Individual Defendants.

Section 290(3) requires liberal construction of the NYHRL's remedial provisions, but a religious-accommodation claim still fails where the requested working conditions would violate Section 2.61 and impose an undue hardship.

Pastor v. Mercy Medical Center · filed 2024-06-17(3)

“Even accounting for that more liberal standard, courts routinely dismiss claims under the NYHRL (and parallel Title VII claims) premised on the failure to grant religious accommodations where the requested working conditions would have violated Section 2.61 and thereby imposed an undue hardship. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s NYHRL claim fails for the same reason her Title VII claim fails: the requested working conditions would have necessitated that MMC violate Section 2.61.”

Section 290's legislative purpose weighs against dismissing a discrimination complaint for agency delay when the complainant did not cause the delay.

State Division of Human Rights v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. · filed 1974-12-12

Such a result —visiting upon the complainant the sins of the administrative body—would, under the facts of this case, be repugnant to the purposes of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, § 290; Union Free School Dist. No. 6, Islip v. State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N Y 2d 371).

Section 290(3) states that the Human Rights Law aims to assure every individual an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life by eliminating and preventing discrimination in listed areas.

Gifford v. McCarthy · filed 2016-01-14(3)

The Human Rights Law was enacted “to assure that every individual within this state is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life” by “eliminating] and preventing] discrimination in employment, in places of public accommodation, resort or amusement, in educational institutions, in public services, in housing accommodations, in commercial space and in credit transactions” (Executive Law § 290 [3]).

Section 290(3) broadly protects individuals within New York under the state's Human Rights Law.

James v. Disney Studios Content · filed 2025-01-17(3)

The Court of Appeals has recently expanded the protections of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL to out of state residents in failure to promote and failure to hire cases based on a liberal construction of "inhabitants" and "individual within this state" found in Executive Law § 290(3) and Administrative Code § 8-101 1 (see Syeed v Bloomberg L.P., 41 NY3d 446, 453 [2024]). ... Interpreting "individual within this state" as broadly as possible, as this Court must, the Court finds that Defendants' issuance of a mailing address to Plaintiff in New ... York City, along with listing his "Organization Point" as New York City to constitute sufficient presence within New York State and New York City to invoke the NYSHRL and NYCHRL (see NYSCEF Doc. 35).