N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-8-4

Section 56-8-4 limits judicially imposed interest to 8% when the contract expresses no interest rate.

Rodriguez v. Horton · filed 1980-07-03

This section limits the judicially imposed interest rate to 8% if there is no rate expressed in the contract. The 8% rate ordered on the judgment by the lower court is proper.

Section 56-8-4(B) does not limit prejudgment interest to judgments for the payment of money.

Trego v. Scott · filed 1998-04-28(B)

Subsection A of the statute refers to judgments for the payment of money in relation to post-judgment interest. Subsection B, which relates to prejudgment interest, is not so limited.

Section 56-8-4 leaves an award of interest on a judgment to the trial court’s discretion.

Gonzales v. New Mexico Department of Health · filed 2000-09-27(A)

First, an interest award under Section 56-8-4 is not an absolute right, but rather is a matter to be left to the discretion of the trial court.

Section 56-8-4(A)(2) requires 15 percent post-judgment interest on judgments based on torts, including trespass, regardless of whether the tort was intentional.

Holcomb v. Rodriguez · filed 2016-06-16(A)(2)

We agree with Plaintiffs that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to award Plaintiffs post-judgment interest at 15 percent. ... Since trespass is a tort, see McNeill v. Rice Engineering & Operating, Inc., 2010-NMSC-015, ¶ 9, 148 N.M. 16, 229 P.3d 489, it is subject to a 15 percent rate of post-judgment interest.

Section 56-8-4(A) allows post-judgment interest on an award of costs because the award is a judgment for the payment of money.

Aquifer Science v. Verhines · filed 2022-12-15(A)

Section 56-8-4(A) provides for interest on “judgments and decrees for the payment of money.” Is this the statutory authorization in New Mexico that addresses the exception to the general rule that costs are not subject to interest? We conclude that it is.

Section 56-8-4 makes a judgment bear 10 percent interest, including on interest incorporated into the judgment.

SOUTHERN UNION, ETC. v. Wynn Exploration · filed 1981-01-13

The unpaid balance bears interest at 10 percent pursuant to the contract; the judgment amount would also bear interest at 10 percent. See § 56-8-4, N.M.S.A. 1978 (1980 Cum.Supp.). ... Any interest included within the judgment amount bears interest at 10 percent, but that is because the judgment bears interest.

Section 56-8-4 makes a judgment bear 10 percent interest, including on prejudgment interest incorporated into the judgment amount.

Southern Union Exploration Co. v. Wynn Exploration Co. · filed 1981-01-13

The unpaid balance bears interest at 10 percent pursuant to the contract; the judgment amount would also bear interest at 10 percent. See § 56-8-4, N.M.S.A.1978 (1980 Cum.Supp.). Interest accrued to date of judgment may be properly included within the judgment amount. O’Meara v. Commercial Insurance Company, 71 N.M. 145, 376 P.2d 486 (1962). Any' interest included within the judgment amount bears interest at 10 percent, but that is because the judgment bears interest.

Section 56-8-4(A) sets the postjudgment interest rate at fifteen percent.

Grynberg v. Roberts · filed 1985-04-16(A)

The postjudgment rate of interest is set by statute at fifteen percent. NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4(A) (Cum.Supp. 1984).

Section 56-8-4(D) does not allow postjudgment interest on final judgments against the State under the Tort Claims Act.

Fought v. State · filed 1988-10-11(D)

We interpret both the Tort Claims Act and Section 56-8-4(D) to deny an award of postjudgment interest on final judgments entered against the State.

Under the version governing this case, Section 56-8-4(A) requires postjudgment interest at the statutory rate from entry of judgment unless the judgment rests on a written instrument bearing a different rate.

Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque, N.A. v. Colucci · filed 1994-03-10(A)

We agree that the court erred by awarding a variable rate of postjudgment interest. Post-judgment interest on judgments and decrees for payment of money is mandatory and accrues at the statutory rate from the date of entry of judgment, unless the judgment is based on a written instrument bearing a different rate.

The 15 percent postjudgment interest rate requires record support that the judgment was based on tortious conduct, bad faith, or intentional or willful acts.

Cordova v. Cline · filed 2021-03-01(A)(2)

Defendants fail to direct our attention to evidence or findings in the record supporting their contention that the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint constituted conduct that was tortious, intentional, or in bad faith as required by Section 56-8- 4(A)(2).

Section 56-8-4(A)(2) requires 15% postjudgment interest only when the judgment is based on tortious conduct, bad faith, or intentional or willful acts.

Dona Ana Mutual Domestic v. Westmoreland · filed 2023-02-01(A)(2)

As we have declined to do so, and because Plaintiff did not prevail on any cause of action other than simple breach of contract, the judgment in this case is not based upon bad faith or intentional or willful acts. Because 15% postjudgment interest is only mandatory under those circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Plaintiff 8.75% postjudgment interest in this case.

Section 56-8-4(A) does not govern postjudgment interest awarded in federal court; federal law governs instead.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2000-07-18(A)

The district court computed postjudgment interest pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-8-4(A) (Michie 1996). GOA contends the district court erred by awarding postjudgment interest pursuant to state law rather than federal law. We agree. See Adams-Arapahoe Joint Sch. Dist. No. 28-J v. Continental Ins. Co. , 891 F.2d 772, 780 (10th Cir. 1989). We therefore vacate the court’s award of postjudgment interest, and remand for a redetermination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

Section 56-8-4(A)–(B) authorizes prejudgment and postjudgment interest in New Mexico civil actions.

THI of New Mexico at Vida Encantada, LLC v. Lovato · filed 2017-07-25(A)-(B)

In civil actions, New Mexico law allows the costs and interest awarded by the arbitrator in this case. See N.M. R. Civ. P. for Dist. Cts. 1-054(d) (authorizing costs other than attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties and describing recoverable costs); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-8-4(A)-(B) (authorizing pre- and post-judgment interest). Thus, the arbitrator had authority under New Mexico law, as incorporated by the NAF Code, to award costs and interest.

Section 56-8-4’s amendment allowing discretionary prejudgment interest on a trespass claim applies prospectively; the earlier statute did not authorize that award.

North v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico · filed 1984-03-15

Although a recent amendment to NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4 (Cum.Supp.1982) would allow the trial court in its discretion to award prejudgment interest on the trespass claim from the date plaintiff served his complaint upon defendant, the earlier statute applicable in this case does not give the trial court that power. ... We hold that the recent amendment applies prospectively. Thus, the trial court should not have awarded prejudgment interest.

Section 56-8-4 leaves prejudgment interest to the trial court’s discretion; it is not awarded as a matter of right.

Waksman v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1984-11-20

Plaintiffs recognize that under current and earlier versions of NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4 (Cum.Supp.1984), the award of prejudgment interest is a question of law solely within the sound discretion of the trial court. Navajo Tribe v. Bank of New Mexico, 700 F.2d 1285 (10th Cir.1983). Such interest is not a matter of right under this section. Trujillo v. Beaty Electric Co., 91 N.M. 533, 577 P.2d 431 (Ct.App.1978). We are unable to say there was a clear abuse of discretion here.

Section 56-8-4(B) allows a trial court to award prejudgment interest in its discretion after considering unreasonable delay caused by the plaintiff and reasonable, timely settlement offers.

Gonzales v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. · filed 1986-11-04(B)

NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4(B) (Repl.1986) permits an award of prejudgment interest in civil actions in the discretion of the trial court. The statute requires that the court consider whether plaintiff was the cause of unreasonable delay and further requires the court to consider whether reasonable and timely offers of settlement were made. ... By virtue of our disposition of the wage calculation issue, the basis for the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest no longer stands.

Section 56-8-4 provided a 6% simple interest rate at the time the suit was filed; monthly compounding produced an award above that rate.

Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Southern Union Co. · filed 1987-07-09

The trial court intended to award 6% simple interest, the statutory amount in effect at the time the suit was filed. See NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4 (Repl. Pamp.1986). Consolidated concedes that the trial court incorrectly computed the interest award from a calculation incorporating monthly compounding. The result was an award of interest in excess of the statutory rate, contrary to the holding of this Court in Shaeffer v. Kelton, 95 N.M. 182, 188, 619 P.2d 1226, 1232 (1980). ... The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the cause remanded for the sole purpose of recalculating the amount of prejudgment interest.

Section 56-8-4(B) permits a discretionary award of prejudgment interest when a contract does not preclude interest.

State Ex Rel. Hooten Construction Co. v. Borsberry Construction Co. · filed 1989-02-21(B)

Moreover, where a contract does not preclude interest, an award of prejudgment interest under Section 56-8-4(B) remains within the court’s discretion. See City of Farmington v. Amoco Gas Co., 777 F.2d 554, 566 (10th Cir.1985); see also O’Meara v. Commercial Ins. Co., 71 N.M. 145, 376 P.2d 486 (1962). In our opinion, the district court exercised its sound discretion in ordering Borsberry to pay prejudgment interest from the fixed date to the date of entry of judgment and thereafter until paid.

Section 56-8-4(B) requires a court to consider the statutory factors before awarding prejudgment interest.

Cano v. Smith's Food King · filed 1989-09-26(B)

The district court awarded prejudgment interest. It could have done so only under NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4(B) (Repl. 1986); however, as the Fund points out, there is no indication that the court considered the necessary factors to award prejudgment interest under that statute.

Section 56-8-4(B) permits a trial court to award prejudgment interest on tort judgments, including nonpecuniary and unliquidated losses.

Southard v. Fox · filed 1992-04-21(B)

We hold that Section 56-8-4(B) permits the trial court to award prejudgment interest on judgments for tort actions, including those amounts for nonpecuniary and unliquidated losses, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Section 56-8-4(B) requires a court deciding whether to award prejudgment interest to consider its listed factors and permits consideration of other appropriate factors.

Winters v. Union Texas Petroleum Corporation · filed 1992-08-17(B)

In making its determination, the court shall give explicit consideration to the nonexclusive statutory factors set forth in N.M.Stat.Ann. § 56-8-4(B), as well as such other factors as it may in its sound discretion deem proper.

Section 56-8-4(B) permits a trial court to award prejudgment interest in its discretion, including in an action against the insurance guaranty association.

Aztec Well Servicing Co. v. Property & Casualty Insurance, Guaranty Ass'n · filed 1993-05-10(B)

We disagree because we do not believe that specific authority within the Act itself is necessary to award prejudgment interest. While we would certainly abide by an express prohibition in the Act against an award of prejudgment interest, the absence of an express allowance did not deprive the court of authority to make such an award. On the contrary, the trial court had that authority under either NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-3 or Section 56-8-4(B) (Repl.Pamp. 1986).

Section 56-8-4(B) does not require the trial court to make findings on its listed factors when deciding prejudgment interest.

Charter Servs. v. PRINCIPAL MUT. LIFE INS. · filed 1994-01-12(B)

Nor do we believe that the trial court was required to make findings concerning the factors set forth in Section 56-8-4(B)(1) and (2). The statute itself does not require findings.

Section 56-8-4(B) does not require findings on its listed factors when a trial court decides whether to award prejudgment interest.

Charter Services, Inc. v. Principal Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1994-01-12(B)

Nor do we believe that the trial court was required to make findings concerning the factors set forth in Section 56—8—4(B)(1) and (2). The statute itself does not require findings.

Section 56-8-4(B) gives the court discretion to award prejudgment interest, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

DeLisle v. Avallone · filed 1994-01-27(B)

Because Section 56-8-4(B) specifically allows the district court to exercise its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest, absent abuse, the court’s decision should be allowed to stand.

Section 56-8-4(B) gives courts discretion to award prejudgment interest to encourage settlement, including in divorce cases.

Jurado v. Jurado · filed 1995-02-09(B)

The second type of situation is that covered by NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4(B) (Repl.1986 & Cum.Supp. 1994), pursuant to which the award is discretionary and designed to encourage settlement in all types of cases.

Section 56-8-4 provides a 15% annual rate that may be used for an equitable award of prejudgment interest.

Pens. Plan Guide P 23909w · filed 1995-12-31

Applying these standards, we hold that the district court's award of prejudgment interest pursuant to 56-8-4 NMSA (1978) did not constitute an abuse of discretion inasmuch as the award of prejudment interest served to compensate Biava and was not otherwise inequitable, Overbrook Farmers Union v. Missour Pacific Railroad, supra, and the rate of interest was in accord with Alabama case law that the place of performance regulates and controls the rate of interest.

Prejudgment interest awarded under Section 56-8-4(B) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Garcia v. Mayer · filed 1996-05-07(B)

Husband also challenges the district court’s awards of prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees. We will set aside such awards only if the district court abuses its discretion. See NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4(B) (Cum.Supp.1995) (prejudgment interest); Lebeck v. Lebeck, 118 N.M. 367, 375, 881 P.2d 727, 735 (Ct.App.1994) (attorney’s fees). After reviewing the record we find no abuse of discretion.

Section 56-8-4(B) leaves prejudgment interest to the trial court’s discretion even when the plaintiff caused no unreasonable delay and the defendant made no reasonable and timely settlement offer.

Abeita v. Northern Rio Arriba Electric Cooperative · filed 1997-08-15(B)

Plaintiffs argue that because they were not the cause of unreasonable delay, and because no reasonable and timely offer of settlement was made, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to award prejudgment interest. We disagree.

Section 56-8-4(B) gives the trial court discretion to set the prejudgment interest rate up to ten percent.

Kennedy v. Dexter Consolidated Schools · filed 1998-04-02(B)

We note that the New Mexico statute regarding prejudgment interest also grants the trial court discretion with respect to the interest rate. ... Given that the district court necessarily exercised discretion, we see no basis to disturb the prejudgment interest rate set by the court on the compensatory damage award.

Section 56-8-4(B) gives courts discretion to award prejudgment interest after considering nonexclusive factors concerning delay and settlement offers.

Iles v. Autozone Stores Inc. · filed 2001-03-29(B)

Because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the progress of the case and the conduct of the parties regarding the non-exclusive factors contained in § 56-8-4(B), we defer to the district court’s exercise of discretion.

Section 56-8-4(B) lets a court consider the plaintiff’s delay and the defendant’s settlement offer when deciding whether to award prejudgment interest.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance · filed 2004-06-22(B)

The trial court, in determining whether prejudgment interest should be awarded, may consider whether State Farm caused unreasonable delay in adjudication of its claims and whether Farmers had previously made a timely and reasonable offer of settlement to State Farm.

Section 56-8-4(B) requires a court deciding whether to award prejudgment interest to consider both unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and whether the defendant made a reasonable, timely settlement offer.

Fort Knox Self Storage, Inc. v. Western Technologies, Inc. · filed 2006-01-26(B)

Without such information, we are unable to assess whether the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion because both factors must be considered in order to determine whether the purpose of prejudgment interest is fulfilled in a given case.

Section 56-8-4(B) permits a discretionary award of prejudgment interest of up to ten percent from service of the complaint and requires the court to consider the plaintiff's delay and the defendant's settlement offer.

Fort Knox Self Storage v. Western · filed 2006-08-29(B)

Consequently, unreasonable delay is only one of the two criteria to be considered by a trial court in determining whether to award prejudgment interest. NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4 (1993) provides: B. The court in its discretion may allow interest of up to ten percent from the date the complaint is served upon the defendant after considering among other things: (1) if the plaintiff was the cause of unreasonable delay in the adjudication of the plaintiff's claims; and (2) if the defendant had previously made a reasonable and timely offer of settlement to the plaintiff. Western has not presented us with any information regarding the second factor. Without such information, we are unable to assess whether the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion because both factors must be considered in order to determine whether the purpose of prejudgment interest is fulfilled in a given case.

Section 56-8-4(B) directs courts deciding whether to award prejudgment interest to consider, among other factors, a timely and reasonable settlement offer and any unreasonable delay caused by the plaintiff.

Bird v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2007-05-31(B)

The trial court is instructed to consider, among other things, whether the defendant previously made a timely and reasonable settlement offer and whether the plaintiff was the cause of unreasonable delay.

A request for prejudgment interest in a complaint can support an award under Section 56-8-4(B) without a renewed request after trial.

Rodeo v. Columbia · filed 2009-08-20(B)

Although Appellees did not request prejudgment interest after trial, their third-party complaint and amended complaint contain explicit requests for prejudgment interest. Columbia has provided no authority to suggest that a party’s pre-trial request for prejudgment interest precludes such an award after trial when no other request has been made. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Appellees’ request for prejudgment interest as set forth in their complaints.

Section 56-8-4(B) permits a court to consider relevant equitable factors when deciding whether to award prejudgment interest; it does not require comparison of settlement offers with the final award.

Frederick v. Swift Transportation Co. · filed 2010-08-10(B)

Accordingly, we do not think the district court committed an error of law by not considering the difference between Swift’s settlement offers and the Fredericks’ ultimate award at trial.

Section 56-8-4(B) gives the district court discretion to award prejudgment interest and permits it to consider factors beyond those specifically listed.

Adenauer v. Conley's Landscaping · filed 2012-04-23(B)

Moreover, Section 56-8-4(B) specifically allows the district court to exercise its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest for the reasons mentioned by Plaintiff, “among other things.”

Section 56-8-4(B) does not require specific factual findings when a trial court denies prejudgment interest.

Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central New Mexico Electric Cooperative, Inc. · filed 2013-04-18(B)

The trial court is not required to make specific factual findings when denying prejudgment interest under Section 56-8-4(B).

Section 56-8-4(B) permits a court to deny prejudgment interest when the defendant made reasonable and timely settlement offers.

Behrens v. Gateway Court, LLC · filed 2013-07-31(B)

Under these circumstances, Defendant’s settlement offers were not untimely and do not indicate that the district court abused its discretion in not awarding prejudgment interest.

Section 56-8-4(A)(1) applies only to postjudgment interest and cannot support an award of prejudgment interest.

Kuckelman Pump Service-Acculectric, Inc. v. Hacienda Del Cerezo, Ltd. · filed 2014-01-30(A)(1)

Section 56-8-4 applies only to postjudgment interest.

Section 56-8-4(B) permits discretionary prejudgment interest of up to ten percent from service of the complaint, guided by settlement conduct, delay, and other equitable considerations.

Villalobos v. Villalobos · filed 2015-11-24(B)

Section 56-8-4(B) is designed to facilitate settlement and prevent delay. ... Consequently, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest in the amount of $325,873.48 and reverse the district court on this issue.

Subsection (B) permits discretionary prejudgment interest of up to 10 percent from service of the complaint when a defendant fails to make a reasonable and timely settlement offer; the award may require reassessment if judgment against some defendants is set aside.

Wirth v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc. · filed 2016-09-15(B)

The court then awarded interest under NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4(B) (2004), which allows a discretionary award of prejudgment interest of up to 10 percent from the date the complaint is served when a defendant fails to make a reasonable and timely settlement offer. ... But we set aside the judgment against the other defendants and remand for a corresponding reassessment of prejudgment interest.

Section 56-8-4(B) permits up to ten percent prejudgment interest after the court considers factors including unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and a reasonable, timely settlement offer by the defendant.

Rivera v. McCoy Corp. · filed 2017-03-06(B)

The Court may award up to ten percent prejudgment interest from the date Defendant was served with the complaint “after considering, among other things: (1) if the plaintiff was the cause of unreasonable delay in the adjudication of plaintiffs claims; and (2) if the defendant had previously made a reasonable and timely offer of settlement to plaintiff.” § 56-8-4(B). ... Given these considerations, the Court finds ten percent an appropriate prejudgment interest rate.

Case complexity does not excuse a defendant from making a reasonable and timely settlement offer when the court considers prejudgment interest under Section 56-8-4(B).

Morga v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. · filed 2018-02-06(B)

Although the complexity of a case may preclude reaching a settlement, Section 56-8-4(B) requires Defendants to make a reasonable and timely offer of settlement in order to avoid an award of prejudgment interest, irrespective of complexity.

Section 56-8-4 permits a discretionary ten percent prejudgment interest award on attorney fees and costs, but not on punitive damages.

Smith v. Lucero · filed 2018-05-24(B)

This Court concludes that Defendants were not entitled to prejudgment interest on the punitive damages portion of the award. ... Prejudgment interest is authorized by NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4 (2004). ... We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Defendants ten percent prejudgment interest.

Section 56-8-4(A) sets an 8.75 percent annual rate for interest on money judgments, which a court may use to calculate prejudgment interest.

Calderon v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co. · filed 2019-02-12(A)

Conversely, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-8-4(A) provides that "[i]nterest shall be allowed on judgments and decrees for the payment of money from entry and shall [generally] be calculated at the rate of eight and three-fourths percent per year." ... In calculating interest, the Court sees no reason to deviate from the 8.75 percent provided in New Mexico law.

Section 56-8-4(B) permits prejudgment interest on a compensatory attorney fee award, and interest under Section 56-8-4 must be calculated at a simple rate.

Guest v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 2023-06-12(B)

Prejudgment interest may be awarded under Section 56-8-4(B) and is intended to compensate a plaintiff whose recovery may otherwise be diminished by dilatory tactics. ... Accordingly, we disagree with Allstate’s argument that we should view the attorney fee award as entirely punitive, and prejudgment interest was permissibly added to Guest’s attorney fees. ... We therefore reverse the district court and remand for recalculation of pre and post-judgment interest at a simple interest rate.

Section 56-8-4(B) permits a court to deny prejudgment interest despite a plaintiff’s settlement offer when legitimate disputes made settlement difficult and neither party caused trial delay.

Eslin v. Levy · filed 2024-04-16(B)

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court’s decision to deny prejudgment interest did not amount to an abuse of discretion under the circumstances presented here. ... First, the district court noted that the parties “had genuine and legitimate differences of opinion on the strength of the claims asserted.” Second, it noted that Plaintiffs did not prevail on most of their claims and “there were legitimate disputes between the parties that made it a difficult case to resolve.” And third, the district court noted that trial was delayed through no fault of either party. The district court’s ruling is not without logic.

Section 56-8-4(B) allows a court to award up to ten percent prejudgment interest from service after considering delay and the reasonableness and timing of settlement offers.

Woodall v. Western Express, Inc. · filed 2025-07-11(B)

Accordingly, the Court will award prejudgment interest, calculated at a rate of five percent, for the period between October 4, 2023, and May 8, 2025.

Section 56-8-4(B)(2) allows a court to consider the parties’ settlement offers when deciding whether to award prejudgment interest; a substantial gap between their positions may support weighing that factor in neither party’s favor.

Atkins v. Taos Living Ctr., LLC · filed 2025-09-04(B)(2)

Given the parties’ differing opinions on punitive damages, and the significant disparity in the amount of their respective settlement offers, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not weighing the second factor in favor of either party.

Section 56-8-4(B)(2) requires a court to consider exchanged settlement offers when exercising its discretion to award prejudgment interest.

LM Insurance v. I Do ABQ · filed 2022-12-19(B)(2)

Defendants’ failure to raise the issue in the district court is unsurprising, given that the district court must consider the settlement offers that were exchanged in order to exercise its discretion to award prejudgment interest.

Section 56-8-4(B) permits discretionary prejudgment interest in cases outside Section 56-8-3, with consideration of unreasonable delay caused by the plaintiff and timely settlement offers by the defendant.

State Ex Rel. Bob Davis Masonry, Inc. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America · filed 1994-09-30(B)

Section 56-8-4(B) allows prejudgment interest in all other cases “in the discretion of the court after the court considers, among other things, whether the plaintiff was the cause of an unreasonable delay in the adjudication of his or her claims and whether the defendant had previously made a reasonable and timely offer of settlement.” Id. at 377, 872 P.2d at 350. ... Because the claim in this case arose from a dispute over money due Davis under a written contract, Section 56-8-3 applies.

Section 56-8-4 gives the court discretion to award prejudgment interest and determine when it begins to accrue.

Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1999-08-10

In Connecticut, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Tennessee, the Court is given full discretionary authority to determine the appropriate time from which prejudgment interest may be awarded.

Section 56-8-4(A) allows a judgment to bear interest at a rate other than 15% when a written instrument specifies that rate.

New Mexico Tire & Battery Co. v. Ole Tires, Inc. · filed 1984-06-06(A)

The allowance of 18% on a judgment for Yearwood until the debt is paid would be proper because there is “a written instrument” having a different rate of interest than the 15% permitted by Section 56-8-4. Whether the same would apply to Tire Company’s account might possibly be inferred from the Exhibit A ledger cards, but ledger cards are not statements to a customer, and such records are by no means conclusive, in the absence of any evidence that defendant was notified, or agreed by “a written instrument,” that its open account was subject to an interest charge of 18% per year.

Section 56-8-4(A)(1) allows post-judgment interest at the rate permitted by a written agreement when its interest provision covers post-judgment interest.

State ex rel Solsbury Hill, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 2011-10-07(A)(1)

The contract interest rate provision is broad enough to cover post-judgment interest as well as prejudgment interest. We see no reason why the rationales and authorities permitting prejudgment interest and attorney fees to be awarded should not also apply to post-judgment interest. We hold that Neumark is entitled to post-judgment interest in the amount permitted under the credit agreements.

When a judgment is rendered on a written instrument specifying a different interest rate, Section 56-8-4(A)(1) permits post-judgment interest at a rate no higher than the rate in the instrument.

State Ex Rel. Solsbury Hill v. Liberty Mut. · filed 2012-03-23(A)(1)

The contract interest rate provision is broad enough to cover post-judgment interest as well as prejudgment interest. We see no reason why the rationales and authorities permitting prejudgment interest and attorney fees to be awarded should not also apply to post-judgment interest. We hold that Neumark is entitled to post-judgment interest in the amount permitted under the credit agreements.

Section 56-8-4(A)(2) requires 15 percent post-judgment interest when a judgment is based on tortious conduct or intentional acts.

Stromei v. Rayellen · filed 2012-04-23(A)(2)

The 15 percent interest rate is mandatory where a judgment is based on tortious conduct or intentional acts.

Section 56-8-4(A) makes post-judgment interest on money judgments mandatory at the statutory rate from the date judgment is entered.

Romero v. Progressive NW Ins. Co. · filed 2013-06-04(A)

We find no error in the award of post-judgment interest consistent with Section 56-8-4(A). Colucci, 117 N.M. at 379, 872 P.2d at 352 (“Post[-]judgment interest on judgments and decrees for payment of money is mandatory and accrues at the statutory rate from the date of entry of judgment[.]”).

Section 56-8-4(A)(2) sets post-judgment interest at 15 percent when a judgment is based on tortious conduct, bad faith, or intentional or willful acts; otherwise the rate is 8.75 percent.

Vinyard v. Palo Alto, Inc. · filed 2019-02-21(A)(2)

Because the WCJ did not abuse his discretion in declining to find that the Employer acted in bad faith, Worker’s request for additional interest is not based on any of the conduct enumerated in Section 56-8-4(A)(2). We therefore affirm the WCJ award of post-judgment interest at the rate of 8.75 percent to Worker’s attorney fee award.

Section 56-8-4(A) starts post-judgment interest when an order approving a lump-sum settlement with payment language is entered, even if the order allows fifteen days for payment.

Higgins v. Advanced Tower Servs. · filed 2024-08-28(A)

We hold that the interest began accruing on the date the original order approving the settlement was entered because that order required Employer-Insurer to pay a lump sum to fulfill its obligations under the settlement.

Section 56-8-4’s prejudgment interest provision does not apply to a case filed before that provision took effect.

Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc. · filed 1985-06-27(B)

The provisions of Section 56-8-4 authorizing an award of prejudgment interest, therefore, are not applicable to the judgment obtained by plaintiff under the facts of the instant case because the provisions of Section 56-8-4 permitting an award of prejudgment interest were not in effect at the time of the filing of this case.

Section 56-8-4(B) gives the district court discretion to set the prejudgment interest rate and accrual date, subject to statutory limits.

Van Deventer v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London · filed 2023-09-26(B)

Under Section 56- 8-4(B), both the rate of prejudgment interest and the date on which it begins to accrue are discretionary matters, subject to statutory ceilings. The interest rate has a ceiling of 10%, and the date upon which it begins to accrue may occur, at the earliest, when the complaint is filed (unless a statute or common law permits a different time for accrual).

Section 56-8-4(A) requires post-judgment interest on sums due under a workers’ compensation judgment; interest on an installment begins only when it becomes due.

Candelaria v. General Electric Co. · filed 1986-12-17(A)

The district court’s judgment is proper because, in accordance with Section 56-8-4(A), it awards interest on sums due pursuant to the judgment, from and after the entry of the judgment. Thus, the judgment does not award interest on any amount until that amount becomes due.

Under the version of Section 56-8-4 in effect when the complaint was filed, pre-judgment interest was unavailable and post-judgment interest was limited to ten percent.

Lopez v. Smith's Management Corp. · filed 1987-10-15

The statute in effect at the time plaintiff's complaint was filed, however, did not allow for an award of pre-judgment interest. ... Thus, ten percent was the applicable rate for this judgment because the statute in effect at the time only allowed that amount.

Section 56-8-4 applies 15% post-judgment interest to final workers’ compensation orders, with interest beginning when payment is due.

Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission Systems · filed 1991-05-16(A)

Accordingly, we hold that there is a legislative intent to apply Section 56-8-4 to final compensation orders. ... Therefore, we hold that the WCJ correctly allowed a 15% post-judgment interest from the final compensation order. Any award of post-judgment interest under the award does not commence to run, however, until the time fixed for its payment.

Section 56-8-4(A) permits different post-judgment interest rates for different portions of one judgment, including fifteen percent for tort damages and eight and three-quarters percent for contract damages.

Teague-Strebeck Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Insurance · filed 1999-06-10(A)

To begin with, we do not read Section 56-8-4(A) as requiring a single post-judgment interest rate for the entire judgment. If, for example, a portion of a judgment is based on a tort cause of action and another portion is based on a contract cause of action, the interest rate on the first portion of the judgment could be fifteen percent and the interest rate on the second portion, eight and three-quarters percent.

Section 56-8-4(A) requires interest from entry on a final workers’ compensation order awarding a partial lump-sum payment, even when other benefits remain unresolved.

Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co. · filed 2013-08-19(A)

For the foregoing reasons, we reject Employer’s argument that the partial lump-sum award is not a “final order,” which accrues post-judgment interest under Section 56-8-4(A). ... Thus, our Legislature has expressly declared that all such judgments and decrees shall earn interest from the date of filing, and no exception is stated for workers’ compensation cases.

Section 56-8-4 permits discretionary postjudgment interest on compensation benefits owed by the Subsequent Injury Fund to an injured worker, but not on reimbursement owed to an employer or insurer.

Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Department · filed 1988-01-12(D)

Section 56-8-4 authorizes an award of interest on judgments in civil cases. ... The above provisions, we conclude, evince a legislative intent to permit the trial court in its discretion to allow interest on compensation benefits payable by the Fund and awarded to an injured or disabled workman. Allowance of interest, however, is limited to that portion of a judgment against the Fund in favor of an injured worker, and the Fund is not liable for the payment of interest on that portion of reimbursement payable by the Fund to an employer or its carrier.

Section 56-8-4(A) requires a trial court to apply post-judgment interest to an award of punitive damages.

Weststar Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson · filed 2002-01-15(A)

I concur in the majority’s holding that NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4(A) (1993) requires a trial court to apply post-judgment interest to an award of punitive damages.

Section 56-8-4 permits discretionary postjudgment interest on compensation awarded to an injured worker against the Subsequent Injury Fund, but not on reimbursement the Fund owes an employer or insurer.

Mares v. VALENCIA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT. · filed 1988-01-12(D)

Section 56-8-4 authorizes an award of interest on judgments in civil cases. ... The above provisions, we conclude, evince a legislative intent to permit the trial court in its discretion to allow interest on compensation benefits payable by the Fund and awarded to an injured or disabled workman. Allowance of interest, however, is limited to that portion of a judgment against the Fund in favor of an injured worker, and the Fund is not liable for the payment of interest on that portion of reimbursement payable by the Fund to an employer or its carrier.

Section 56-8-4(D) exempts the state from prejudgment interest in a workers’ compensation action unless another law provides otherwise.

Montney v. State Ex Rel. State Highway Department · filed 1989-01-10(D)

Thus we interpret Section 56-8-4(D) as containing an express exemption for the state from awards of prejudgment interest in favor of an injured worker in a workers’ compensation action.

Section 56-8-4 does not allow prejudgment interest against a state agency.

Gonzales v. New Mexico Educational Retirement Board · filed 1990-02-23

Prejudgment interest also is not awardable as against a state agency. NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4 (Repl.1986); see also Bradbury & Stamm Constr. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 70 N.M. 226, 238, 372 P.2d 808, 816-17 (1962).

Section 56-8-4(D) does not bar post-judgment interest against the State in Tort Claims Act cases filed before the subsection took effect.

Folz v. State · filed 1993-05-24(D)

Therefore, we do not believe that Section 56-8-4(D) bars Appellants from recovering interest against the State under the circumstances of this case because the present causes of action were pending prior to the effective date of Section 56-8-4(D).

Section 56-8-4 does not authorize prejudgment interest in cases brought under the Occupational Disease Disablement Law.

Bryant v. Lear Siegler Management Services Corp. · filed 1993-04-08(B)

Thus, we conclude that Section 56-8-4 does not apply to decisions made pursuant to the ODDL.

Section 56-8-4 makes interest on a judgment accrue from its entry even while an appeal is pending.

Brunacini v. Kavanagh · filed 1993-12-16

Interest began to accrue on the judgment entered against the corporation from the date it was entered, even though the case was pending on appeal. NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4 (Repl.1986).

Section 56-8-4(B) permits discretionary prejudgment interest even when damages are not fixed or ascertainable.

Lucero v. Aladdin Beauty Colleges, Inc. · filed 1994-03-01(B)

Section 56-8-4(B), however, is not similarly limited by whether damages are fixed or ascertainable. See Southard, 113 N.M. at 778, 833 P.2d at 255. Because the language in Section 56-8-4(B) is general, the legislature must have intended that, to foster timely settlements, a discretionary award of prejudgment interest is allowed in all eases.

Section 56-8-4(B) does not allow prejudgment interest on punitive damages awards.

Weidler v. Big J Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1997-12-15(B)

Regardless of whether we view prejudgment interest under Section 56-8-4(B) as compensatory or not, we do not believe that punitive damage awards are subject to this interest.

Section 56-8-4(B) gives trial courts discretion to award prejudgment interest, but that interest does not extend to punitive damages.

Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1999-02-22(B)

Prejudgment interest serves two purposes, promoting early settlements and compensating persons; however, it was never intended to encompass an award of punitives.

Section 56-8-4(B) does not require specific factual findings when a court denies discretionary prejudgment interest; the court’s reasons must be ascertainable from the record and reasonable.

Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp. · filed 1995-05-25(B)

Under Section 56-8-4(B), the trial court does not need to make specific factual findings as is required under Section 56-8-3. The court’s reasons for denying prejudgment interest need' only be ascertainable from the record and not contrary to logic and reason.

Section 56-8-4(D) exempts political subdivisions from interest under Section 56-8-4, but does not bar prejudgment interest under Section 56-8-3.

City of Carlsbad v. Grace · filed 1998-09-24(D)

When reading both statues together, and when considering the separate policies furthered by each, we conclude that an award of prejudgment interest under Section 56-8-3 against a political subdivision is not exempt by the language in Section 56-8-4(D). The language in subsection D applies in those situations when the trial court considers settlement and delay.

Section 56-8-4(D) bars post-judgment interest against a school district absent express authority for the award.

Franco v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools · filed 2001-05-16(D)

Absent express authority for such an award, we determine that Section 56-8-4(D) prohibits an award of post-judgment interest against the District.

Section 56-8-4(A) provides a 15 percent post-judgment interest rate for judgments based on tortious conduct, bad faith, or intentional or willful acts; without a specific finding of intent or willfulness, the trial court may apply that rate when the defendant’s culpability warrants it.

Public Service Co. v. Diamond D Construction Co. · filed 2001-10-16(A)

In conclusion, if a plaintiff wants to insure that a judgment is assessed the higher 15 percent interest rate in a case not based in tort or bad faith, the plaintiff must specifically request that the factfinder make a finding of intention or willfulness. If such a finding is not made, and the evidence indicates that the defendant acted with a culpable mental state approximating intention or willfulness, the award of the higher interest rate will be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Section 56-8-4(A)(2) requires fifteen percent post-judgment interest on damages awarded for malicious abuse of process because the claim is based on tortious conduct.

Chapman v. Varela · filed 2008-06-25(A)(2)

Post-judgment interest is to be calculated at the rate of fifteen percent on Vincent’s malicious abuse of process damages.

Section 56-8-4(D) exempts the state and political subdivisions from post-judgment interest unless an explicit waiver authorizes it.

ALB. COMMONS PARTNERSHIP v. City Council · filed 2009-05-07(D)

We look to NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4(D) (2004), which exempts the state and political subdivisions from paying post-judgment interest unless otherwise provided by statute or case law. This statute has been construed narrowly, and in order for a prevailing party to recover post-judgment interest from the state or a political subdivision, our courts have required an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 56-8-4(A)(2) treats negligence as tortious conduct that qualifies a judgment for 15% post-judgment interest.

Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. · filed 2009-07-21(A)(2)

Nevertheless, we cannot escape the fact that the Legislature’s use of the word “tortious” in the interest statute must be considered in plain and customary usage to mean an act that constitutes a tort. Negligence comes within that meaning, as it is considered a tort.

Section 56-8-4(D) allows a prevailing Section 1983 plaintiff to recover post-judgment interest from the state or its political subdivisions at the federal rate specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

Albuquerque Commons P'ship v. City Council · filed 2011-01-03(D)

We hold that the Legislature contemplated Section 1961 as law which "otherwise" provides for post-judgment interest against the "state and its political subdivisions" within the meaning of Section 56-8-4(D); accordingly, where a plaintiff prevails in a Section 1983 action, Section 56-8-4(D) incorporates the award of post-judgment interest from Section 1961. ... Accordingly, the floating rate for federal actions set out in Section 1961 and incorporated by reference in subsection (D) controls.

Section 56-8-4(D) permits post-judgment interest against the state and its political subdivisions on a successful Section 1983 claim by incorporating the award and interest rate provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

Albuquerque Commons Partnership v. City Council · filed 2011-01-03(D)

We hold that the Legislature contemplated Section 1961 as law which “otherwise” provides for post-judgment interest against the “state and its political subdivisions” within the meaning of Section 56-8-4(D); accordingly, where a plaintiff prevails in a Section 1983 action, Section 56-8-4(D) incorporates the award of post-judgment interest from Section 1961. ... Accordingly, the floating rate for federal actions set out in Section 1961 and incorporated by reference in subsection (D) controls.

Section 56-8-4(A)(2) requires 15% post-judgment interest when the judgment is based on tortious conduct, bad faith, or intentional or willful acts.

Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central New Mexico Electric Cooperative, Inc. · filed 2011-03-24(A)(2)

The judgment entered in this case on the basis of breach of contract was not based on culpable conduct requiring a 15% interest award.

Section 56-8-4(A)(2) requires 15% post-judgment interest when the judgment is based on culpable conduct.

Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. CENT. NM ELEC. CO-OP. INC. · filed 2011-05-17(A)(2)

The judgment entered in this case on the basis of breach of contract was not based on culpable conduct requiring a 15% interest award.

Section 56-8-4(A)(2) requires post-judgment interest at fifteen percent when a judgment is based on bad faith.

Martinez v. POJOAQUE GAMING, INC. · filed 2011-06-14(A)(2)

As a result, post-judgment interest for Worker’s successful bad faith claim should have been awarded and computed at the proper rate of fifteen percent.

Section 56-8-4(D) exempts school districts from post-judgment interest unless a statute or common law provides otherwise.

Rio Grande Sun v. Jemez Mountains Pub. Sch. Dist. · filed 2012-04-26(D)

As for post-judgment interest, NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4(D) (2004) prohibits such an award against a school district. That statutory provision states that “[t]he state and its political subdivisions are exempt from the provisions of this section [allowing post-judgment interest] except as otherwise provided by statute or common law.” Id. Because no statute authorizes post-judgment interest against a school district, such an award is not allowed.

Section 56-8-4(D) bars post-judgment interest against a school district when no statute authorizes the award.

Rio Grande Sun v. Jemez Mountains Public School District · filed 2012-08-02(D)

As for post-judgment interest, NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4(D) (2004)prohibits such an award against a school district.

Section 56-8-4 exempts the state and its political subdivisions from post-judgment interest unless another statute or common law waives that immunity; the NMHRA does not.

Nava v. City of Santa Fe · filed 2004-10-13(D)

Subsection A of that statute provides for mandatory post-judgment interest; however, subsection D of the same statute states “[t]he state and its political subdivisions are exempt from the provisions of this section except as otherwise provided by statute or common law.” ... In this case, Plaintiff is not entitled to post-judgment interest for her claim under the NMHRA because Section 28-l-13(D) does not explicitly waive the State’s immunity from post-judgment interest.

Section 56-8-4(D) exempts the state from post-judgment interest unless a statute or common law provides otherwise; an express waiver for interest on back pay includes post-judgment interest.

Velasquez v. Regents of Northern N.M. Coll. · filed 2020-09-28(D)

We hold that by explicitly making public employers liable for “interest on the back pay” in Section 10-16C-4(A), our Legislature waived sovereign immunity for post- judgment interest pursuant to Section 56-8-4(D).

The patient’s compensation fund is not “the state” under Section 56-8-4(D) and is not exempt from paying interest on medical malpractice judgments.

Siebert v. Okun, M.D. · filed 2024-09-23(D)

And because using PCF funds to pay interest on medical malpractice judgments would not deplete public funds, we conclude the PCF does not enjoy sovereign immunity from the payment of interest under Section 56-8-4(D).

The 1986 version of Section 56-8-4 supplied a 15% post-judgment interest rate for New Mexico royalty claims.

Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co. · filed 1987-02-25

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-8-4 (1986) 15% ... Accordingly, the interest payable to the royalty owners in this case is the rate of interest set forth in Phillips’ corporate undertaking with the FPC from the time Phillips first began holding royalties in suspense to the date of judgment entered by the district court, April 30, 1986, and post-judgment interest for royalty owners having leases in Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Wyoming at the statutory rates set forth above, and 15% post-judgment interest for royalty owners having leases in Kansas (K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 16-204[c]) and all other jurisdictions.

Section 56-8-4(B) requires a valid judgment as the basis for an award of prejudgment interest.

Martinez v. Friede · filed 2003-02-27(B)

In our view, Section 56-8-4(B) presupposes a valid judgment; and, therefore, a judgment that has been set aside for want of jurisdiction cannot be the basis for an award of prejudgment interest.

Section 56-8-4(C) preserves interest awards required by other statutes, including mandatory prejudgment interest for the Uninsured Employers’ Fund.

Pipkin v. Daniel · filed 2008-12-01(C)

Section 52-1-9.1(G), as the UEF argues, must be considered such an award “otherwise permitted by statute” as contemplated in Section 56-8-4(C).