N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-4

Section 37-1-4’s four-year residual limitations period does not govern § 1983 claims in New Mexico; the three-year personal injury period applies.

Wilson v. Garcia · filed 1985-04-17

In addition to the 2-year statute of limitations in the Tort Claims Act, two other New Mexico statutes conceivably could apply to § 1983 claims: § 37-1-8, which provides a 3-year limitation period for actions “for an injury to the person or reputation of any person”;4 and § 37-1-4, which provides a 4-year limitation period for “all other actions not herein otherwise provided for.”5 ... In view of our holding that § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the 3-year statute of limitations governing actions “for an injury to the person or reputation of any person.” N. M. Stat. Ann. §37-1-8 (1978).

Section 37-1-4 provides a four-year limitations period for property-damage claims but does not cover personal-injury claims.

Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co. · filed 1980-03-19

All parties agree that N.M.Stat.Ann. § 23-1-4 (1953 Comp.) (currently, N.M.Stat.Ann. § 37-1-4 (1978 Comp.)) controls U.V. Industries, Inc.'s and The Hartford's claim for property damage. This statute prescribes a four year period of limitations. Lee contends that the same section also covers his action for personal injuries. We disagree.

Section 37-1-4 does not govern an insurer’s assigned claim arising from an employee’s personal injuries; the personal injury limitations period applies.

American General Fire & Casualty Co. v. J.T. Construction Co. · filed 1987-07-07

Because there is only a single cause of action in the employee for personal injuries caused by the third party, Reed v. Styron, the trial court’s decision to apply Section 37-1-4 must be reversed.

Section 37-1-4 allows a separate cause of action to accrue with each new injury to property.

Valdez v. Mountain Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1988-04-28

Based on these authorities and the facts alleged, we hold that Section 37-1-4 allows a separate cause of action to accrue with each new injury to plaintiff’s property.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitation does not cut off a fully performing contract vendee’s claim of title unless the claim is barred by the adverse possession statutes.

Tres Ladrones, Inc. v. Fitch · filed 1999-03-31

Plaintiff argues that the four-year statute of limitations in NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880), precludes any claim of title by Zimmerly to the property in question, and that Zimmerly did not possess any instrument investing him with color of title. We deem this contention, however, to be controlled by our Supreme Court’s decision in Garcia v. Garcia, 111 N.M. 581, 808 P.2d 31 (1991). ... Unless the equitable owner’s claim is barred by NMSA 1978, Sections 37-1-21 or -22 (Repl.Pamp.1990) (our statutes on adverse possession), we hold that a contract vendee’s claim of title, where the vendee has fully performed and whether or not he or she is in possession, is not cut off by the running of a statute of limitations. ... Under the circumstances shown here, the trial court could properly determine that Zimmerly possessed a superior claim to the property in question to that asserted by Plaintiff.

Section 37-1-4 provides the four-year New Mexico limitations period borrowed for CEA claims that accrued before the CEA adopted its own limitations period.

Michelson v. MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE FENNER & SMITH · filed 1987-09-02

There appear to be no published decisions which have applied a New Mexico rule of limitation to a CEA claim, and neither the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals nor the federal district court in New Mexico has definitively answered the question of whether the statute of limitations for common law fraud, N.M.Stat.Ann. § 37-1-4 (1978) (four years), or that for a state securities law violation, N.M.Stat.Ann. § 58-13-42A (1978) (two years),[25] governs a federal securities law violation. ... Consequently, the most appropriate New Mexico rule of limitation is the four-year period governing common law fraud actions.

Section 37-1-4 provides a four-year limitations period that applies to federal securities claims involving fraud when New Mexico's fraud limitations period is borrowed.

Titus v. Geo-Engineering · filed 1992-01-23

Thus, the four-year limitations period contained in N.M.Stat.Ann. § 37-1-4 controls at least some of the federal claims asserted herein, and even under Defendants' view of the accrual date of this action (in May 1984), Plaintiffs commenced suit within this time period.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Rassam v. San Juan College Bd. · filed 1997-05-15

Plaintiffs' fraud claim is subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Production, LLC · filed 2015-03-19

The statute of limitations for fraud, under New Mexico law, is four years.

Section 37-1-4 gives fraud claims a four-year statute of limitations.

Kuykendall · filed 2026-02-09

In New Mexico, fraud claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-4.

Section 37-1-4 bars a claim to rescind a contract for fraudulent representations four years after the claim accrues.

Rito Cebolla Investments, Ltd. v. Golden West Land Corp. · filed 1980-02-12

It is established law that a cause of action for rescission of contracts based upon false representations are barred four years after the action shall have accrued.

Section 37-1-4 gives a party four years to bring an action seeking relief for fraud.

Beneficial Finance Co. v. Alarcon · filed 1991-08-19

Section 37-1-4 provides that actions seeking relief on the basis of fraud must be brought within four years. NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-7, provides that actions for relief on grounds of fraud shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered by the party aggrieved. Although the forgery occurred in April 1981, Pedro was unaware of the forger’s identity until October 1985, when Enriquez admitted to the forgery in his deposition. The cross-claim against Enriquez for fraud was filed August 27, 1987, well within the statute of limitations.

Section 37-1-4 gives four years to bring a fraud action, subject to the discovery rule in Section 37-1-7.

Continental Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc. · filed 1993-08-10

Fraud actions must be brought within four years of the event, NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-4 (Repl.Pamp.1990), or from the time the fraud is discovered, Section 37-1-7.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitations period for deceit claims.

Duncan v. Campbell · filed 1997-02-24

The statute of limitations for deceit is four years. Section 37-1-4; ... Plaintiffs 1994 complaint was filed within four years of 1991, and thus this aspect of the complaint was erroneously dismissed.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitation period for damages claims alleging fraud, conspiracy to defraud, or breach of fiduciary duty.

Durham v. Southwest Developers Joint Venture · filed 1999-12-03

Under NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880), the statute of limitations for bringing an action for damages based upon allegations of conspiracy to defraud and fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty is four years.

Section 37-1-4 gives fraud claims a four-year limitations period.

Montoya v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc. · filed 2012-05-30

The Plaintiffs’ fraud cause of action has a four-year statute of limitations in New Mexico. See Wilde v. Westland Dev. Co., Inc., 148 N.M. 627, 634, 241 P.3d 628, 635 (Ct.App.2010) (“The statute of limitations for causes of action sounding in fraud or conversion is four years from the date that the cause of action accrues.”) (citing N.M. S.A.1978, § 37-1-4).

Section 37-1-4 gives fraud claims a four-year limitations period.

Salazar v. PennyMac Mortgage Investment Trust Holdings I, LLC · filed 2019-09-17

In New Mexico, the fraud statute of limitation is four years. ... Clearly, the fraud statue of limitation bars any 2019 fraud claim based on representations made at the time of the Note origination in 2007.

Section 37-1-4 gives causes of action sounding in fraud or conversion four years from accrual.

Wilde v. WESTLAND DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. · filed 2010-08-13

The statute of limitations for causes of action sounding in fraud or conversion is four years from the date that the cause of action accrues.

Section 37-1-4 generally provides a four-year limitation period for claims involving injuries to property.

Yurcic v. City of Gallup · filed 2013-01-24

Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-4 (1880), a four-year statute of limitations generally applies to claims “brought for injuries to property.” Plaintiff concedes and we agree that a four-year statute of limitations generally applies to this suit under this statute.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitation period for actions asserting fraud.

N.M. Note Holding LLC v. Bethel · filed 2023-12-05

The statute of limitations for actions asserting fraud is four years. NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880). Thus, the statute of limitations ran on June 19, 2012, unless tolled.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Martinez v. Martinez · filed 1997-08-12

Thus, the trial court could reasonably determine that the statute of limitations relied upon by Defendants did not begin to run until 1994. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-7 (Repl. Pamp.1990) (cause of action for fraud or mistake is not “deemed to have accrued until the fraud [or] mistake ... complained of, shall have been discovered by the party aggrieved”); see also NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (Repl.Pamp.1990) (specifying four-year statute of limitations for fraud).

Section 37-1-4 requires claims founded on unwritten contracts to be brought within four years of the breach.

Jeffers v. Butler · filed 1990-05-14

Claims founded upon unwritten contracts must be brought within four years of the date the cause of action accrues. N.M. Stat.Ann. § 37-1-4 (1978). ... I, therefore, find that plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim is barred by the statute of limitations and is, therefore, dismissed.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitations period for claims based on unwritten contracts or fraud.

Brown v. Centennial Precious Metals, Inc. · filed 2020-03-20

They also agree that the applicable statute of limitations is four years for causes of action based on unwritten contracts or fraud, as well as for breach of contract related to the sale of goods.1 See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 37-1-4 and 55-2-725(1). ... Applying the reasoning of the decisions above to the facts of this case as alleged by Brown, the Court concludes that Brown has not pled sufficient facts to support the discovery rule and his claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 37-1-4 provides a four-year limitation period for actions based on an unwritten contract.

Sparks v. Melmar Corp. · filed 1979-08-23

The statute of limitations for an action based on an unwritten contract is four years. § 37-1-4, N.M.S.A.1978.

Section 37-1-4 gives a party four years to sue on an unwritten contract, beginning when the contract is breached.

Smith v. Galio · filed 1980-09-23

In denying the statute of limitations defense, in ruling the contract was enforceable, in finding that Smith’s delay in demanding performance was reasonable and in finding that it was not financially possible for Galio to buy Smith’s stock until a reasonable time after the SBA loan was paid off, the trial court, in effect, ruled that a reasonable time had not elapsed by March 8, 1975 and a complaint filed on March 8, 1979 was not barred by § 37-1-4. We agree.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limit governs an action seeking to void a written agreement for defects in its formation rather than for breach of the agreement.

Schwartz v. New Mexico Medical Board · filed 2015-10-06

Rather than allege that NMMB breached the agreement, Appellant’s claims seek to void the entire agreement on the basis of alleged defects in formation. Accordingly, Appellant’s action for declaratory judgment was governed by Section 37-1-4 .

Section 37-1-4 gives a plaintiff four years from the breach to bring an oral contract claim.

Baldonado v. Romero · filed 2022-07-07

In this case, the district court’s finding that Defendants breached the oral agreement in February 2014 is undisputed. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs’ contract claim accrued at that time. Under Section 37-1-4, Plaintiffs had four years from that date to bring their contract claim.

Section 37-1-4 allows four years from the breach to bring an action to enforce an unwritten contract.

Read v. TJ O'Conner Cattle Co. · filed 2023-06-01

As stated in our proposed summary disposition, because that breach occurred in 2017 and Plaintiff brought suit in 2020, Plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880) (stating that the statute of limitations for bringing an action to enforce an unwritten contract is four years); Smith v. Galio, 1980-NMCA-134, ¶ 4, 95 N.M. 4, 617 P.2d 1325 (“In a breach of contract action, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the breach.”).

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitations period for Unfair Trade Practices Act and unfair insurance practices claims.

Hollis v. Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2025-03-19

Because the Unfair Trade Practices Act claim is founded on a violation of statute, the claim falls within New Mexico’s “other unspecified actions” four-year statute of limitations period. ... Unfair insurance practices claims also fall under the four-year statute of limitations set forth in NMSA 1978 § 37-1-4.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limit for claims on unwritten contracts; the period runs from the date of breach.

Ewing v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1998-04-24

State Farm first argues that the Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is barred by the four-year limitations period applicable to unwritten contracts, see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-4 (Michie 1990 Repl. Pamp.). The limitation period on claims runs from the date the cause of action accrues, and on contract claims that is the date of the breach. ... Merely because the successor agency manager did not “disagree[ ] that she was in the' pool for the Farmington district,” id., does not create a material issue of fact as to when the alleged breaches occurred, see Tull v. City of Albuquerque, 120 N.M. 829, 907 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Ct.App.1995) (applying single wrong theory), or her knowledge of those breaches, see Duncan v. Campbell, 123 N.M. 181, 936 P.2d 863, 864-65 (Ct.App.) (knowledge of problem allows for accrual of cause of action and running of limitation period), cert, denied, 123 N.M. 168, 936 P.2d 337 (1997).

Section 37-1-4 provides a four-year limitations period for statutory claims when the governing statute specifies no limitations period.

Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Production, LLC · filed 2014-05-16

The fourth cause of action, violation of the NMOGPPA, is subject to the four-year limitations period that N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-4 provides for “all other actions not herein otherwise provided for,” because the NMOGPPA has no internal provision or specified external provision setting forth a limitations period.

Section 37-1-4 gives New Mexico UTPA claims a four-year limitations period.

Ahern v. Apple Inc. · filed 2019-10-11

New Mexico UTPA claims have a four- 8 year statute of limitations.

Section 37-1-4 provides a four-year limitations period for an employer’s reimbursement claim against the Subsequent Injury Fund when no specific limitations period applies.

Hernandez v. Levi Strauss, Inc. · filed 1988-08-25

Prior to 1988, there was no specific period of limitations for actions against the Fund contained in the Subsequent Injury Act and an employer’s claim for reimbursement from the Fund is not sufficiently analogous to either a claim for personal injuries or an unwritten contract so as to justify invocation of the statute of limitations on these theories. Therefore, we determine that the four-year limitations period in Section 37-1-4 for “all other actions not * * * otherwise provided for and specified” is the applicable statute to the present action.

Before the 1988 amendment to the Subsequent Injury Act, Section 37-1-4’s four-year period applied to claims against the Subsequent Injury Fund; absent statutory authority, a worker’s delay in signing a certificate did not toll it without fault by the fund.

City of Roswell v. Chavez · filed 1989-05-09

As noted above, such fault on the part of the fund is a prerequisite to the tolling of the limitations period, absent express statutory authority for the tolling. Thus, the statute of limitations was not tolled and therefore expired in 1986. See Hernandez v. Levi Strauss, Inc. (prior to 1988 amendment to Subsequent Injury Act providing for two-year limitations period, see NMSA 1978, Section 52-2-14 (Supp.1988), limitations period applicable to claims against the fund was four-year period provided in NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-4).

Section 37-1-4’s four-year period for pre-1988 employer claims against the Subsequent Injury Fund begins when the employer knew or should have known, through due diligence, that the subsequent disability was materially and substantially greater than the injury alone would have caused.

Aragon v. Furr's, Inc. · filed 1991-06-27

In summary, we hold that for claims arising under the law as it existed prior to the 1988 amendments to the Subsequent Injury Act, the four-year statute of limitations begins to run when the employer knew or should have known that it had a claim against the Fund. An employer does not meet this standard until it knows or should know, in the exercise of due diligence, that the subsequent disability is materially and substantially greater than would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone.

Section 37-1-4 supplies the four-year limitations period for an employer’s Subsequent Injury Fund claim that accrued before March 8, 1988.

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Chavez · filed 1992-01-14

However, because this section applies only to causes of action accruing after its effective date of March 8, 1988, see Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 110 N.M. 201, 793 P.2d 1354 (Ct.App.1990), and employer’s claim accrued before that date, the four-year limitations period provided for in NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-4, is the applicable statutory provision in this appeal. ... Employer’s claim was therefore filed within the four-year limitations period.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitation does not apply to actions for past child support under the Uniform Parentage Act.

Padilla v. Montano · filed 1993-09-29

In reading the Act as a whole, we conclude that the trial court erred in applying the general statute of limitations, Section 37-1-4, to the action for support.

Section 37-1-4 supplies a four-year filing limit for property tax schedule correction actions under Section 7-38-78, which sets no time limit of its own.

Federal Express Corp. v. Abeyta · filed 2004-01-13

Section 7-38-78(B). This section does not contain a time limit for filing the request for a change in the property tax schedule, and therefore the general statute of limitations of four years pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880) applies.

Section 37-1-4 provides the four-year limitations period for private actions under the Trade Practices and Frauds Act.

Martinez v. Cornejo · filed 2008-11-14

We affirm the district court and hold that NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880), the four-year “catch-all” statute of limitations for actions not otherwise provided for, applies to the private right of action provision of the TPFA.

Section 37-1-4 bars IPRA enforcement actions when more than four years have passed since the records request was denied.

Edenburn v. New Mexico Department of Health · filed 2012-12-11

The third category consists of those who requested records over four years ago, were denied, and did not initiate an enforcement action. Enforcement actions by this group are barred by the statute of limitations. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880).

A claim subject to Section 37-1-4 must be brought within four years after it accrues.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Schuchmann · filed 2002-09-16

Under the New Mexico statute of limitations, First American should have initiated its state law claims by June 24, 1989, to be within the four-year statutory period. N.M.Stat.Ann. § 37-1-4.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitations period for claims on unwritten contracts, prima facie tort, and wrongful discharge.

Hill v. Cray Research, Inc. · filed 1991-07-11

For prima facie tort and wrongful discharge, the relevant limitations period is, again, four years. § 37-1-4 NMSA 1978 (1990 Repl.). Since Plaintiff was terminated on August 25, 1989 and filed his Complaint on April 16, 1990, Plaintiffs claims are not barred by either statute of limitations.

Section 37-1-4 gives four years to bring a tort or unwritten-contract claim; an insurer bad-faith claim for excess liability accrues when the judgment becomes final.

Torrez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1982-11-08

Apparently the applicable statute of limitations is § 37-1-4 N.M.S.A.1978. The statute bars suits involving a tort or unwritten contract brought more than four (4) years after the cause of action accrues. ... However, the cause of action for bad faith by State Farm did not accrue until the judgment was final on October 8, 1976.

Section 37-1-4 provides a four-year limitations period for malicious abuse of process claims.

O'Brien v. Montoya · filed 2016-07-05

Based on the November 2005 date of the complaint, the date of the newspaper article published five days later, O’Brien’s acknowledgment that he read the article, and O’Brien’s complaint filed in December 2011, Montoya met his burden of making a prima facie showing that O’Brien’s claim was outside the four years allowed by Section 37-1-4.

Even if § 37-1-4’s four-year period governs a legal malpractice claim, the claim is untimely when the client suspected counsel’s error more than four years before filing.

Spencer v. Sommer · filed 2004-01-08

New Mexico courts have not resolved whether the three-year statute for personal injury actions, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8, or the four-year statute for claims on unwritten contracts and “all other actions not herein otherwise provided for,” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-4, should apply in the legal malpractice context. ... Because both these dates precede the December 18, 1996 cutoff for the four-year limitations period, we conclude that Spencer’s claims are time-barred.

Section 37-1-4 gives a plaintiff four years from accrual to file a legal malpractice claim.

Cahn v. Word · filed 2020-01-06

Under New Mexico law, a legal malpractice claim must be filed within four years of the date of accrual.

Section 37-1-4 gives a plaintiff four years to bring a legal malpractice claim, measured from when the harm is ascertainable or discoverable.

Jaramillo v. Hood · filed 1979-09-05

However, the cause of action did not accrue until the harm or damage was ascertainable or discoverable. ... Therefore, the four year statute of limitations provided for in § 37-1-4 had elapsed and appellant’s complaint was properly dismissed.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year period for legal malpractice requires actual harm or loss before the claim accrues; negligent drafting alone is insufficient.

Sharts v. Natelson · filed 1993-06-30

Jaramillo and its underlying authority teaches that an invasion of a legally protected interest (an injury), without actual loss (harm), is insufficient to accrue a cause of action in legal malpractice for purposes of Section 37-1-4.

Section 37-1-4 gives a client four years to file a legal malpractice claim, beginning only after the client sustains actual injury and discovers, or reasonably should discover, the facts underlying the claim.

Brown v. Behles & Davis · filed 2004-01-14

The four-year limitation on filing a complaint alleging legal malpractice “commences when (1) the client sustains actual injury and (2) the client discovers, or through reasonable diligence should discover, the facts essential to the cause of action.” Sharts, 118 N.M. at 724, 885 P.2d at 645 (footnote omitted); § 37-1-4. The statute does not begin to run until the client both sustains injury and discovers or should discover the facts underlying the cause of action.

Section 37-1-4 gives a legal malpractice plaintiff four years from accrual, which occurs when the client suffers actual injury and discovers, or reasonably should discover, the facts essential to the claim.

Cahn v. Word · filed 2019-02-13

In New Mexico, a legal malpractice claim must be filed within four years from the date of accrual. Sharts v. Natelson , 1994-NMSC-114, ¶ 1, 118 N.M. 721, 885 P.2d 642 (citing NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 ). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim is untimely if it accrued before April 27, 2014. A malpractice claim accrues, and the four-year period begins to run, "when (1) the client sustains actual injury and (2) the client discovers, or through reasonable diligence should discover, the facts essential to the cause of action." Id. ¶ 11. ... The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim accrued by June 2013 at the latest.

Section 37-1-4 supplies the general four-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims; that period is not a jurisdictional condition for bringing the claim.

Rodriguez v. Sanchez · filed 2019-07-11

A cause of action for legal malpractice, however, is subject only to the general four-year limitations period provided in NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-4 (1880), and Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that our general limitations statutes are similarly jurisdictional.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitation bars a professional negligence claim filed more than four years after it accrues, even if the plaintiff labels it indemnification.

New Mexico Public Schools Insurance Authority v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. · filed 2007-08-20

The Authority pled a cause of action for professional negligence against Gallagher that was barred by the statute of limitations.

When Section 37-1-4 supplies the limitation period for a malpractice claim arising from liability to a third party, the claim accrues when that liability is imposed.

New Mexico Public Schools Insurance Authority v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. · filed 2008-11-26

Gallagher concedes, and the Authority apparently agrees, that the statute of limitation for the Authority’s professional negligence action is four years under Section 37-1-4. We accept this view without deciding it. ... For these reasons, we hold that in cases of malpractice where the professional’s alleged negligence has caused the plaintiff to be liable to a third party, the plaintiffs claim accrues when that liability is imposed.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Day-Peck v. Little · filed 2021-05-04

The summary judgment record establishes that Day-Peck’s claims accrued by January 2010, at the latest, as the district court held and that this action, filed well over four years later, is barred by the statute of limitations. See § 37-1- 4 (establishing a four-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims).

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitations period uses an objective discovery rule that does not account for the claimant’s mental incapacity.

Sweesy v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (USA) · filed 2016-03-30

We predict that, under these factual circumstances, the New Mexico Supreme Court would adopt an objective standard for the application of the discovery rule under § 37-1-4—specifically, one that does not take into account the subjective circumstances, including mental incapacity, of Mr. Lederhos.

The four-year limitation does not bar reinstatement of a timely filed complaint because reinstatement reactivates the existing case.

Meiboom v. Watson · filed 1998-07-07

Based on this date, the four-year statute of limitations under NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880), would have expired in March 1996. ... Because a new complaint is not filed, the running of the statute of limitations does not present a problem. ... Applying the Wershaw analysis to this case, we reverse the district court’s holding that the passage of the statute of limitations deprived it of jurisdiction to reinstate the case.

A technically defective amendment can relate back to the original complaint and toll the four-year limitation period.

Cottonwood Enterprises v. McAlpin · filed 1991-05-02

Accordingly, we hold that the 1984 amendment was timely filed despite its technical defect of not setting forth all matters in one entire pleading, and that it related back to the original complaint to toll the statute of limitation period, rendering the 1988 amended complaint timely.

Section 37-1-4 gives unjust enrichment claims a four-year limitations period.

Saini v. Hospital Care Consultants, Inc · filed 2024-07-30

The statute of limitations on an unjust enrichment claim is four years.

Section 37-1-4 gives an unjust enrichment claim four years from accrual; when payment was expected upon sale, the claim accrued when the owner sought to sell without paying.

Guinn v. Williams · filed 2024-04-22

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is four years, see NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880). ... Thus, Plaintiff’s claim was triggered in March 2020 when Defendant put the properties up for sale. Since Plaintiff filed his complaint in April of the same year, his cause of action for unjust enrichment was timely filed.

Section 37-1-4 gives a former spouse four years to sue for division of omitted community personal property; for monthly retirement benefits, the period runs separately from when each installment comes due.

Plaatje v. Plaatje · filed 1981-04-22

We hold that the four year statute of limitations of Section 37-1-4, applies to suits to divide personal proper7 ty brought under Section 40 — 4-20. ... For this reason, the statutory time limitations upon the plaintiff’s right to sue for her portion of each installment commences to run from the time each installment comes due.

Section 37-1-4 gives a spouse four years from each military retirement installment’s payment date to claim a share of that installment.

Berry v. Meadows · filed 1986-01-07

Plaatje held that the statute of limitations applicable to the receipt of payments for military retirement is a four-year statute and that it runs from the date of each installment of military retirement. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4. The right to receive each monthly installment accrued when each installment became due; thus, wife’s right to recover her portion of each installment commences to run from the time each installment is payable. Id. The statute of limitations would bar participation in those benefits which were paid and received by husband more than four years prior to the filing of wife’s action herein.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitation runs separately from the due date of each retirement benefit installment when a former spouse seeks to divide undivided benefits.

Gilmore v. Gilmore · filed 2009-12-15

Under Plaatje v. Plaatje, the four-year statute of limitations in Section 37-1-4 applies to actions seeking to divide undivided community property after the divorce. ... Following the reasoning of Plaatje, we conclude that because Husband’s PERA benefits are paid in monthly installments, Wife’s right to bring an action under Section 40-4-20 to divide the undivided PERA benefits received by Husband accrued, for statute of limitations purposes, with each installment when that installment was due, rather than at the time of the divorce.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitation applies only to actions for which no other limitation period is provided.

DeVargas v. STATE EX REL. NM DEPT OF CORR. · filed 1981-10-01

The trial court ruled that the applicable limitation period was four years. This is incorrect. The four-year period, stated in § 37-1-4, N.M.S.A. 1978, applies only to actions "not * * * otherwise provided for".

Section 37-1-4 requires an action for conversion of personal property to be brought within four years.

Apodaca v. Unknown Heirs of the Following Persons Who Are Adjudged to Be Owners & Proprietors of the Tome Land Grant · filed 1982-09-07

An action based on conversion of personal property must be brought within four years. § 37 — 1—4, N.M.S.A.1978.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitation period for fraud actions.

Ambassador East Apts., Investors v. Ambassador East Investment · filed 1987-11-05

The statute of limitations for fraud in New Mexico is four years. NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4.

Section 37-1-4 does not bar claims brought about two and one-half years after the alleged wrongful repossession.

Nez v. Forney · filed 1989-12-05

Nez, in his docketing statement and brief-in-chief, argued that the New Mexico contractual statute of limitations, NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-3 or 37-1-4 should be applied. Because we find that Nez brought claims within the applicable New Mexico statute of limitations period under either statute, we do not decide which statute the district court should have applied. We simply hold that Nez’ claims were not barred under either statute.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitation applies only to actions for which no other limitation period is provided.

DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Department of Corrections · filed 1981-10-01

The four-year period, stated in § 37-1-4, N.M.S.A.1978, applies only to actions “not * * * otherwise provided for”.

Section 37-1-4 provides a four-year limitations period for these property-damage claims.

McNeill v. BURLINGTON RESOURCE OIL & GAS · filed 2007-02-09

This testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the causes of action on or after July 1, 1995. Thus, when Plaintiffs filed suit on June 1, 1999, they did so within the four year statute of limitations under NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880).

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitation does not bar the state’s action to enforce the Subdivision Act.

State Ex Rel. Stratton v. Alto Land & Cattle Co. · filed 1991-12-18

With respect to defendants’ statute of limitations argument, we agree with the state that its complaint in intervention was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations provided in Section 37-1-4.

Section 37-1-4 applies a four-year limitation period to claims founded on statutory violations when no other limitation period is specified.

Nance v. L.J. Dolloff Associates, Inc. · filed 2005-12-06

Because these claims were founded on violations of statutes, the claims fall within “other unspecified actions” under the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 37-1-4.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitation applies to a municipal water lien when the State is not the real party in interest.

Hurley v. Village of Ruidoso · filed 2006-02-27

We address only one legal issue in this appeal: whether or not the four-year statutes of limitations set forth in NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880), can be pleaded as a defense to a claim for a municipal water lien. ... Because the Village, a municipality, is a body corporate or politic and because it has not demonstrated that the State was a real party in interest in this case, the Village was subject to the four-year statutes of limitations set forth in Section 37-1^1.

Section 37-1-4 sets a four-year limitations period for claims involving accounts, unwritten contracts, injury to or conversion of property, fraud, and other actions.

Begay v. Public Service Co. of NM · filed 2010-04-15

Under New Mexico law, the statute of limitations for claims based on accounts, unwritten contract, injuries to and conversion of property, fraud, and other actions is four years.

Section 37-1-4 provides a four-year limit for unwritten contract claims and other actions without a specified limit; it does not govern claims for personal injury merely characterized as contractual.

Lymon v. Aramark Corp. · filed 2010-07-07

Section 37-1-4 provides a four-year limitations period for actions on unwritten contracts and “all other actions not herein otherwise provided for.” NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4. ... Construing the well-pleaded factual allegations in Lymon’s Second Amended Complaint as true, the allegations against Wexford, on their face, are for a personal injury it inflicted upon Lymon. There are no allegations of a breach of contract, express or implied, or injuries other than personal physical injury, arising out of such breach. The Court, therefore, finds that, to the extent Lymon has asserted his claims under state law, the applicable statute of limitations is two years, pursuant to § 41-4-5.

Section 37-1-4 gives the plaintiff four years to bring claims based on allegedly false or misleading statements.

Wetzel v. Diestel Turkey Ranch · filed 2023-10-02

Plaintiff’s claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-4 (1953).

Section 37-1-4 imposes a four-year limitations period on negligence and breach of implied warranty claims involving injury to property.

Schriek v. McWilliams · filed 2023-12-07

Plaintiffs’ negligence and breach of implied warranty claims against Defendant ECHO are subject to a four year statute of limitations.

The four-year limitation period for an action to impose a constructive trust begins when the trustee repudiates the trust.

Garcia v. Marquez · filed 1984-07-23

Under Miller, the four year limitations period would not have commenced until defendant’s earliest repudiation of the trust.

Section 37-1-4 provides a four-year limitation period for an equitable trust action, which begins to run when the trustee repudiates the trust.

Granado Ex Rel. Granado v. Granado · filed 1988-08-24

Although we agree that the statute of limitations is four years for this action, we do not agree with defendants on the date upon which it began to run. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that when suit is brought for imposition of an equitable trust, the statute of limitations does not run between a trustee and a beneficiary until there has been a repudiation of the trust, whether it be a constructive trust, Miller v. Miller, 83 N.M. 230, 235, 490 P.2d 672, 677 (1971); Garcia v. Marquez, 101 N.M. 427, 429, 684 P.2d 513, 515 (1984), or a resulting trust, White v. Mayo, 31 N.M. 366, 377, 246 P. 910, 914 (1926).

Section 37-1-4 gives a plaintiff four years to bring an accountant malpractice claim; receipt of an IRS final partnership adjustment notice can start that period.

Wiste v. Neff and Co., CPA · filed 1998-09-08

The limitation period in an accountant malpractice action is four years. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880); Chisholm, 86 N.M. at 708, 526 P.2d at 1301. ... We hold that Plaintiffs cause' of action accrued when the IRS issued its FPAA notice on August 21, 1989.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year period for accountant malpractice begins when the client suffers an actual injury and discovers, or reasonably should discover, the essential facts; an IRS deficiency notice is not required.

Haas Enterprises, Inc. v. Davis · filed 2003-09-24

It is undisputed in this case that the applicable statute of limitations is four years. NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880). ... The limitation period begins to run, and the accountant malpractice cause of action accrues when the client sustains an “actual injury,” and when “the client discovers, or through reasonable diligence should discover, the facts essential to the cause of action.”

The four-year limitation period for a malpractice claim begins when the plaintiff knows or should know the relevant facts, even if the plaintiff does not yet know those facts establish a legal claim.

Mueller v. Ferrel · filed 2022-08-22

Ultimately Plaintiff’s repeated assertions that his claim was not viable until he had the training manual are not responsive to this Court’s proposal that a legal cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knows or should know the relevant facts, whether or not the plaintiff also knows that these facts are enough to establish a legal cause of action.” Delta Automatic Sys., Inc. v. Bingham, 1999-NMCA-029, ¶ 29, 126 N.M. 717, 974 P.2d 1174 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The four-year limitation period applies to a veil-piercing claim, with the period triggered by the creditor’s discovery that the judgment debtor had no significant financial existence outside the entity.

Imming v. De La Vega · filed 2025-03-06

Defendants now concede that the longer, four-year limitation period in NMSA § 37-1-4 is the “best match” for Plaintiff’s piercing and “alter-ego” claims. ... Under the undisputed facts and based on Plaintiff’s claims as presented in her Second Amended Complaint, the “most logical triggering date” for the statute of limitations is Plaintiff’s alleged post-judgment discovery that De La Vega had no significant financial existence outside of MCI. ... In light of that evidence, and given that Defendants have not identified a limitation-period-triggering date the Court considers more appropriate than the date Plaintiff filed her motion to pierce the veil in state court, the Court will not reconsider its previous determination that Plaintiff’s piercing claim against MCI, now Count I of her Second Amended Complaint, is not time-barred.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitation does not govern a partner’s reimbursement claim brought as part of a partnership accounting; the limitation period for an accounting controls.

Sanchez v. Saylor · filed 2000-08-01

We are not persuaded that the specific four-year statute of limitations applies. The life of Saylor’s reimbursement claim in this action should be measured by the limitation period for an action for an accounting, rather than that for a specific claim outside of the partnership accounting action.

Section 37-1-4’s four-year limitation does not apply to an action for accounting and partition of real property.

Martinez v. Martinez · filed 2003-11-07

We therefore hold that the four-year statute of limitations in Section 37-1-4 does not apply to an action for accounting and partition of real property.