N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-54

Section 52-1-54(D)(2) requires courts setting attorney fees to consider the present value of the worker’s award, excluding speculative future medical expenses.

Board of Education of the Espanola Municipal Schools v. Quintana · filed 1985-02-27(D)(2)

NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(D)(2) directs the trial court to take into consideration “[t]he present value of the award made in the workman’s favor.” ... Similarly, a trial court should not consider future medical expenses in the present value of the workman’s compensation award for purposes of determining attorney fees.

Section 52-1-54(D)(2) measures the present value of a worker’s award for attorney fee purposes as of the date of the compensation award.

Davis v. Homestake Mining Co. · filed 1986-08-19(D)(2)

For these reasons, we hold that the “present value of the award made in the workman’s favor” means the value computed as of the date of the award to the workman.

Section 52-1-54 authorizes the Workers’ Compensation Division to award attorney fees; using the wrong version of the section does not deprive it of jurisdiction over the award.

Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight) · filed 1988-10-13

In the case at hand, both statutes gave to WCD the authority to award attorney fees. ... WCD’s possible error in awarding the attorney fees under the wrong statute does not make the award error for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 52-1-54(D)(2) requires consideration of the award’s present value when setting a reasonable attorney fee; past benefits count only if counsel recovered or preserved them for the worker.

Highlands University v. Baca · filed 1991-09-11(D)(2)

Because Highlands’ payment of temporary disability benefits over a four-year period was voluntary and preceded any involvement by worker’s attorney, worker’s attorney cannot be credited with recovery of those past benefits. Nevertheless, if counsel preserved past benefits for worker, those benefits may be included in determining the present value of the award for the purpose of computing attorney fees.

Section 52-1-54(F) makes a request for claimant’s appellate attorney fees premature until a compensation award has been made.

Hammonds v. Freymiller Trucking, Inc. · filed 1993-03-03(F)

This request is premature because no compensation award has yet been made. See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54(F) (Repl.Pamp.1991) (in determining reasonable attorney fees for a claimant, judge shall consider only those benefits attorney is responsible for securing); Ortiz v. Ortiz & Torres Dri-Wall Co., 83 N.M. 452, 455, 493 P.2d 418, 421 (Ct.App.1972) (denying request for attorney fees for successful appeal in workers’ compensation case because no award of compensation has yet been made). We thus decline to award Worker attorney fees for this appeal at this time.

Section 52-1-54(D) sets out factors courts must consider when awarding attorney fees; failing to consider them is an abuse of discretion.

Gearhart v. Eidson Metal Products · filed 1979-02-06(D)

In Keyser v. Research Cottrell Co., 84 N.M. 173, 500 P.2d 997 (Ct.App. 1972) this court held that § 52-1-54(D), N.M.S.A. 1978, sets forth the elements which must be considered in awarding attorney fees and it is an abuse of discretion if the trial court fails to consider them. ... From the above, it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff attorney fees of only $200.

Section 52-1-54 requires courts setting a worker’s attorney fee to consider its statutory factors alongside the Fryar factors, without treating any one factor as controlling.

Manzanares v. Lerner's, Inc. · filed 1985-03-04

The statutorily-mandated factors of NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54 and the factors specified by Fryar v. Johnsen, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718 (1979), must also be considered. Although no one of these considerations is controlling by itself, they are useful as guides in determining the real value of the attorney’s service.

Section 52-1-54(D) makes the present value of the worker's award one factor in setting a reasonable attorney fee.

Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. · filed 1978-12-19(D)

The amount of recovery, being the present value of the award, is only a factor to be considered in determining the amount of the fee to be allowed the claimant's attorney.

Section 52-1-54(D) requires a refusal to pay compensation and collection of that compensation through court proceedings before attorney fees may be awarded.

Tafoya v. Leonard Tire Co., Inc. · filed 1980-07-31(D)

For an award of attorney fees under § 52-l-54(D), supra, there must have been a refusal to pay compensation benefits. ... For an award of attorney fees under § 52-l-54(D), supra, plaintiff must have collected compensation through court proceedings.

Section 52-1-54 permits attorney’s fees only when the claimant successfully recovers workers’ compensation or related benefits.

Garcia Ex Rel. Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District · filed 1983-04-12

Under the facts herein there can be no award of attorneys fees. An award of attorneys fees must be based upon a successful recovery of workmen’s compensation or other related benefits. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Guerra, 92 N.M. 47, 582 P.2d 819 (1978); Montoya v. Anaconda Min. Co., 97 N.M. 1, 635 P.2d 1323 (Ct.App.1981); § 52-1-54, N.M.S.A.1978.

Section 52-1-54(D) allows a reasonable fee for only one attorney, excludes time spent on unsuccessful claims, and permits appellate fees when a claimant successfully defends a compensation award.

Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1986-09-09(D)

We hold that this award for double representation was impermissible under NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(D) which speaks of “attorney” in the singular. While there is no restriction on the number of attorneys a worker may engage, a reasonable fee will be allowed only for single representation. ... We, therefore, hold the trial court erred in considering time and effort expended in pursuit of unsuccessful claims. ... Here, defendant did refuse to pay compensation for total disability and plaintiff thereafter collected compensation in the trial court, and she sustained this award on appeal. Thus, she is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

Section 52-1-54 does not allow attorney fees for compensation arrearages when the employer has not refused to pay them.

Redhouse v. Public Service Co. · filed 1988-04-19

Plaintiffs also make no claim that defendant refused to pay these arrearages. Consequently, plaintiffs have no right to attorney fees for these arrearages. See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54 (Orig.Pamp.) (revised in 1987).

Under the Interim Act version of § 52-1-54, a worker generally pays his own attorney fees but may recover reasonable fees from an employer in specified circumstances, including an unreasonable denial of an injury on which the worker prevails.

Urioste v. Sideris · filed 1988-10-20

It provided that “[a] workman shall be responsible for the payment of his own attorneys’ fees, except that a workman shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys’ fee from an employer” where the employer has refused the payment of medical benefits under certain circumstances, without a reasonable basis, where the employer without a reasonable basis denies that an injury has occurred and the workman prevails on that issue, or where the employer has “acted in bad faith” with regard to handling the workman’s claim.

Section 52-1-54’s attorney fee factors permit an award amounting to 63% of benefits when sufficient findings support the fee; the percentage alone does not determine whether the award is proper.

Fuyat v. Los Alamos National Laboratory · filed 1991-04-25

Here the record reflects that the statutory factors, NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54 (Cum.Supp.1985), and those factors set out in Fryar v. Johnsen, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718 (1979), were considered. The percentage of the award is not the single most determinative factor in deciding the propriety of the award. ... There were sufficient findings made to support the award of $30,000 in attorney fees.

Section 52-1-54 provides for consideration of attorney fees in workers’ compensation proceedings.

Curliss v. B & C AUTO PARTS · filed 1993-11-02

In considering whether Worker should receive compensation in addition to that received for the loss of Worker’s eye, the judge, on remand, should, under NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54 (Repl.Pamp.1987), also consider an award for attorney fees.

Section 52-1-54(D) requires compensation to be collected before attorney fees may be awarded in a workers’ compensation case.

Collado v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1995-09-15(D)

The statute authorizing the award of fees in workers’ compensation cases requires that compensation be collected.

When reconsidering attorney fees, a workers’ compensation judge should consider the attorney’s work on appeal.

Chavez v. S.E.D. Laboratories · filed 2000-11-20(I)

In reconsidering the attorney’s fees issue, the WCJ should consider the efforts of Chavez’s attorney on appeal. See § 52-1-54(1).

Under the pre-2013 version of Section 52-1-54(J), the worker and employer shared the worker’s attorney fees equally; a regulation could not shift all of those fees to the insurer.

Romero v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc. · filed 2015-09-25(J)

We conclude that 11.4.4.13(B), (D) NMAC (6/13/2003) cannot be read in a manner consistent with Section 52-1-54. Accordingly, we reject Worker’s argument that the W C J abused his discretion by failing to assess attorney fees entirely to Insurer under the regulation.

Section 52-1-54 provides for a separate attorney's fee award for successful representation in a workers' compensation claim, but no fee is recoverable when no compensation benefits remain available after the worker's death.

Brazfield v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. · filed 1979-08-14

In workmen's compensation suits, attorneys fees awarded for successful representation of injured claimants are recoverable against the employer as a separate and distinct award, apart from the workman's award. Section 52-1-54(B), (C), (D) and (E), N.M.S.A. 1978. ... If there were no benefits available to Mr. Brazfield's estate after his death, there could be no separate fee recovery available to his attorney. Section 52-1-54, N.M.S.A. 1978.

Section 52-1-54(D) permits attorney's fees when a claimant collects compensation through court proceedings after payment is refused, even without a judicial award of compensation.

Rumpf v. Rainbo Baking Co. · filed 1981-03-12(D)

The statute does not require that the judge make an award; it provides only that when payments are refused, "claimant * * * thereafter collect compensation through court proceedings."

Section 52-1-54(D) permits a district court that has entered judgment on a WCD supplemental compensation order to award additional attorney’s fees without a new WCD order.

Martinez v. Southwest Moving Specialists · filed 1990-05-16(D)

We find that the district court is thus a “court upon appeal” for this purpose. Once it enters judgment on a supplementary compensation order, it retains jurisdiction to award additional attorney’s fees and additional medical expenses on that order.

An attorney fee award requires sufficient facts for the workers’ compensation judge to evaluate the request, but no specific fee application is required.

Vinyard v. Palo Alto, Inc. · filed 2012-11-02(E)

Employer directs us to no legal requirement for a specific application for fees. In fact, the authority cited by Employer supports a conclusion that evidentiary support for a fee award requires the presentation of sufficient facts for the WCJ to rule whether at a hearing or not.

An attorney's fee award under § 52-1-54(D) has sufficient evidentiary support when the attorneys' reports and the trial court's knowledge of their work and its outcome support the amount awarded.

Gonzales v. Bates Lumber Co. · filed 1981-04-28(D)

The attorneys' reports and the trial court's first-hand knowledge of the attorney's work on the issues and proceedings, and the outcome of that work, is sufficient evidentiary support for the award under Fryar.

Section 52-1-54’s attorney’s fee provisions apply in the version in effect when the worker was injured, even if judgment is entered after a later version takes effect.

Bateman v. Springer Building Materials Corp. · filed 1989-05-11

Specific to this question, the Act provides for the amount, method of payment, and burden of proof required for an award of attorney’s fees to a claimant. See § 52-1-54. ... Accordingly, the benefits available to claimant are the benefits of the interm Act which was in effect on December 16, 1986, when Bateman’s accidental death occurred.

Section 52-1-54(E) authorizes the court to award attorney's fees for an appeal.

Gambrel v. Marriott Hotel · filed 1991-08-15(E)

Pursuant to our authority under NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(E) (Cum. Supp. 1986), we hereby order employer to pay widow $2000 dollars for this appeal.

Section 52-1-54(G) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees to a claimant on appeal.

Crespin v. Consolidated Constructors, Inc. · filed 1993-09-02(G)

Pursuant to Claimant’s request, we award attorney’s fees on appeal to Claimant in the amount of $1925. See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54(G) (Repl.Pamp.1987).

Section 52-1-54(1) implicitly authorizes a workers’ compensation judge to require an employer’s counsel to disclose hours worked and legal fees charged.

Jurado v. Levi Strauss & Co. · filed 1996-10-09(1)

We determine that a WCJ has implicit authority under Section 52-1-54(1) to require an employer’s counsel to file a pleading stating the number of hours expended on a case and the amount charged as legal fees as a means of facilitating the legislative policy behind Section 52-1-54.

Section 52-1-54(I) permits an additional attorney’s fee award for bad faith but does not require a worker to pay the employer’s attorney’s fees.

Carrillo v. Compusys, Inc. · filed 2002-07-16(I)

Thus, Section 52-1-54(1) cannot be the basis for shifting Employer’s attorney’s fees to Worker.

Section 52-1-54 permits a court to consider a percentage of the compensation award when setting a reasonable attorney fee, but the percentage cannot be the sole factor.

Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co. · filed 1985-02-20(D)(2)

Clearly, then, according to Section 52-1-54 and Fryar I, a trial court is not to base attorney fees purely upon some percentage of the workman’s recovery, but neither is a trial court prohibited from using a percentage of the recovery as a factor in its determination of what shall constitute a reasonable fee.

Section 52-1-54(D) does not authorize an attorney fee based on a percentage of the worker's recovery.

Johnsen v. Fryar · filed 1981-06-25(D)

Because a fee based on a percentage of the award is not authorized either by § 52-1-54(D), supra, or by the additional factors listed in Fryar v. Johnsen, supra, judicial notice of a custom to award such a fee was judicial notice of a custom contrary to law.

Section 52-1-54 authorizes reasonable attorney fees for a claimant’s attorney’s services on appeal, payable by the Subsequent Injury Fund.

LEA CTY GOOD SAMARITAN VIL. v. Wojcik · filed 1988-11-17

Reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $1,200.00 are awarded to claimant for the services of his attorney on appeal payable by the Fund. See Herndon v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools, 92 N.M. 287, 587 P.2d 434 (1978); Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 104 N.M. 769, 727 P.2d 77 (Ct.App. 1986); NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54 (Orig.Pamp.).

Section 52-1-54 permits an award of reasonable attorney fees for a claimant’s appeal, payable by the Subsequent Injury Fund.

Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik · filed 1988-11-17

Reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $1,200.00 are awarded to claimant for the services of his attorney on appeal payable by the Fund. See Herndon v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools, 92 N.M. 287, 587 P.2d 434 (1978); Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 104 N.M. 769, 727 P.2d 77 (Ct.App.1986); NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54 (Orig.Pamp.).

Section 52-1-54(F) limits an attorney’s fee award to benefits the attorney secured for the worker.

County of Bernalillo v. Sisneros · filed 1994-12-01(F)

Under Section 52-1-54(F), the WCJ “shall consider only those benefits to the worker that the attorney is responsible for securing.” We remand to the Workers’ Compensation Administration for determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee award consistent with the actual benefits secured by Worker’s attorney.

Section 52-1-54 authorizes attorney fees when a worker recovers benefits, including fees for work on appeal.

Souter v. Ancae Heating & Air Conditioning · filed 2002-05-30

Therefore, we remand this matter to the WCJ (1) to determine the amount of TTD benefits to which Worker is entitled for the period from December 29, 1998, through August 9, 1999, taking into account the amount of PPD payments that Worker has already received for this time period; and, (2) in light of worker’s recovery of benefits pursuant to this opinion, to award attorney fees, pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54 (1993) including fees for work incident to this appeal.

Section 52-1-54(C) authorizes a reasonable attorney fee for a settled compensation claim; subsection (D), which governs tried claims, does not apply.

Morgan Ex Rel. Estate of Morgan v. Public Service Co. · filed 1982-10-05(C)

The award of attorney fees to plaintiff was pursuant to a settlement of a compensation claim under § 52-l-54(C), and not after trial under § 52-l-54(D). Paragraph D is not applicable. The trial court had “power” to fix a reasonable attorney fee under Paragraph C. The trial court did not lack jurisdiction to award an attorney fee.

Section 52-1-54(D)(1)(c) makes the timing of a written settlement offer relevant to an attorney fee award when the offer was made thirty days or more before trial.

Holloway v. New Mexico Office Furniture · filed 1983-02-22(D)(1)(c)

The ultimate fact is whether a settlement offer was made in writing thirty days or more prior to trial. Section 52-1-54(D)(1)(c), N.M.S.A.1978. That ultimate fact is contained in the unchallenged part of the above finding, the finding as to when the coverage issue was decided and settlement on the trial date.

An ambiguous settlement offer does not establish that a worker failed to recover compensation exceeding the offer; an offer cannot be divided between compensation and medical benefits when attorney fees may be awarded for both.

Aguilar v. Penasco Independent School District No. 6 · filed 1984-01-05(D)

The settlement offer is not to be broken down between compensation and medical benefits, because attorney fees may be awarded for the recovery of both. See Schiller v. Southwest Air Rangers, Inc., 87 N.M. 476, 535 P.2d 1327 (1975). Because of the ambiguity of the offer, it cannot be held that plaintiff failed to collect compensation in excess of the amount offered.. NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54(D).

A recommended resolution accepted by an employer can count as a written settlement offer; a claimant who recovers less than that offer is not entitled to attorney fees.

Davis v. Los Alamos National Laboratory · filed 1989-03-30(D)

Characterizing a recommended resolution accepted by an employer as an offer of settlement is consistent with the intent of the statute. ... Because this amount was less than that offered through the recommended resolution, claimant was not entitled to attorney fees.

Under the 1990 version of Section 52-1-54(F)(4), an employer must pay all of the worker’s attorney fees when it rejects the worker’s offer of judgment and the worker obtains a more favorable award.

Leo v. Cornucopia Restaurant · filed 1994-07-19(F)(4)

Accordingly, we hold that the word “employer” in Section 52-1-54(F)(4) was an obvious mistake, and that the legislature intended to use the word “worker.” See Helman, 117 N.M. at 354, 871 P.2d at 1360. Because Respondents rejected an offer of judgment from Claimant that was more favorable to them than the decision obtained by Claimant after the formal hearing, Respondents are required under the statute to pay 100% of Claimant’s attorney fees incurred in prosecuting his claim.

When a worker’s settlement offer is less than the amount awarded, the employer must pay all of the worker’s attorney fees; the comparison includes a bad faith penalty awarded after the offer.

Meyers v. Western Auto & CNA Insurance · filed 2002-06-06(F)(4)

Section 52-1-54(F)(4) does not require the WCJ to look into the elements of Worker’s offer; it shifts the responsibility for payment of fees “if the worker’s offer was less than the amount awarded by the compensation order.” In this case, Worker’s offer was less than the amount awarded by the compensation order and it makes no difference that the bad faith penalties were not contemplated at the time of the offer.

When the employer’s offer is not greater than the worker’s award, the employer remains responsible for its half of the worker’s attorney fees under the default rule in subsection (J).

Englett v. Bee Hive Assisted Living · filed 2013-02-06(F)(3)

Subsection (F)(3) provides that “if the employer’s offer was greater than the amount awarded by the compensation order, the employer shall not be liable for his fifty percent share of the attorney fees to be paid the worker’s attorney[.]” However, in the case at bar, Employer’s offer was not greater than the amount awarded to Worker, and therefore it did not obtain a more favorable result. Thus, the default provision in Section 52-1-54(J) applies.

Section 52-1-54(E) permits attorney fees in a disability modification proceeding to the extent the employer fails to establish a reduction in disability.

Jaramillo v. Kaufman Plumbing & Heating Co. · filed 1985-10-10(E)

To the extent that defendants' claim is unsuccessful, plaintiff has preserved a benefit for which attorney fees may be awarded.

Section 52-1-54(C)(2) requires economic loss caused by an employer’s bad faith to recover attorney fees; a delay in payment alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp. · filed 1991-01-08(C)(2)

We hold that a delay in payment does not in itself constitute an “economic loss” within the meaning of Section 52-l-54(C)(2) and affirm the WCD’s denial of an attorneys’ fee pursuant to that section.

Section 52-1-54(D) permits attorney’s fees for counseling before benefits are terminated when the work reasonably relates to the recovered award.

Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission Systems · filed 1991-09-25(D)

In establishing the reasonable fee to which Sanchez’ attorney may be entitled on remand, the workers’ compensation judge may include time expended counseling Sanchez prior to termination of benefits where those efforts bear a reasonable relation to recovery of the award.

Section 52-1-54(G) requires a claimant alleging bad faith in handling a claim to show fraud, malice, oppression, or willful, wanton, or reckless disregard of the worker’s rights.

Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1993-09-07(G)

In order to prove bad faith under NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(G) (Repl.Pamp. 1987) of the 1987 Act, a claimant is required to show that the conduct of an employer "in the handling of a claim ... amounts to fraud, malice, oppression or willful, wanton or reckless disregard of the rights of the worker."

Section 52-1-54(G) permits additional attorney fees for an employer’s bad faith in handling a claim, defined as fraud, malice, oppression, or willful, wanton, or reckless disregard of a worker’s rights.

Murphy v. Duke City Pizza, Inc. · filed 1994-06-27(G)

Moreover, given that the judge can decide issues of bad faith based on the evidence presented at the formal hearing, id., we cannot say that it was irrational for the judge to reject Worker’s claims of bad faith. See § 52-l-54(G) (bad faith is defined as conduct by an employer in the handling of a claim that amounts to fraud, malice, oppression, or willful, wanton, or reckless disregard of worker’s rights). ... Accordingly, we affirm the judge’s finding of no bad faith.

Section 52-1-54 permits a judge to consider extra appellate work caused by misleading portions of an employer’s brief when deciding whether to increase an attorney fee for bad faith.

Lackey v. Darrell Julian Construction · filed 1998-06-19(1)

The judge may appropriately consider the extra work that Worker’s counsel had to perform on appeal in responding to misleading portions of Employer’s brief and consider whether that warrants an increase in the fee under the bad-faith provisions NMSA 1978, § 52-1-54(1) (1993).

Section 52-1-54’s attorney fee cap and equal fee sharing requirement withstand this constitutional challenge because the worker did not show that their combined effect lacked a rational relationship to the state’s objectives.

Martinez v. CITIES OF GOLD CASINO · filed 2009-04-24(I), (J)

While we acknowledge that Worker’s challenge to both the fee splitting provision in Section 52-1-54(J) and the attorney fees cap distinguishes his argument somewhat from that raised by the worker in Wagner, we nonetheless conclude that the outcome in Wagner is controlling and determinative. ... Similarly, aside from his bare assertions that the fee splitting and fee cap provisions render the attorney fees award provisions “unfair and unjust,” Worker has equally failed to adequately explain how the fee splitting provision in connection with the attorney fee cap is not rationally related to the purposes of the state’s objectives. Accordingly, we reject Worker’s arguments.

Section 52-1-54(I) allows one attorney fee cap per compensable accidental injury; a later injury resulting from that accident does not create another cap unless it is a separate compensable accidental injury.

Martin v. Risk Mangagement · filed 2020-06-24(I)

Simply because a subsequent injury stems from a compensable accidental injury does not, by itself, mean that the former constitutes a separate compensable accidental injury entitling the worker to an additional cap of attorney fees.

Section 52-1-54(J) permits shifting a worker’s attorney fees only when subsection (F)(3) or (F)(4) applies.

Cordova v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc. · filed 1995-12-11(J)

First, Section 52-l-54(J) only allows fee-shifting if the court finds Section 52-l-54(F)(3) or (4) applies.

Section 52-1-54(H) requires a judge setting attorney fees to consider the benefit of preserving a worker's tort recovery from an employer's reimbursement claim.

Martinez v. Eight Northern Indian Pueblo Council, Inc. · filed 1997-08-18(H)

Section 52-1-54(H) requires the judge, in setting the fee, to "consider only those benefits to the worker that the attorney is responsible for securing." The question we address in this case is whether a determination that Employer is not entitled to reimbursement under NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-17 (Repl.Pamp.1991) (effective January 1, 1991) is a benefit to Worker that should be considered by the judge in setting the fee. Under the facts of this case as demonstrated by the record below, we hold that it is.

Section 52-1-54(H) permits a reasonable attorney's fee for securing future medical benefits, but their value cannot be used to calculate the fee.

Buckingham v. Health South Rehabilitation Hospital · filed 1997-11-18(H)

In our view, this means the WCJ may calculate a reasonable award of attorneys' fees for procuring future medical benefits as long as that calculation is based upon reasonable factors, such as those set forth in Fryar I, 93 N.M. at 487, 601 P.2d at 720, but which do not include a percentage of "the value" of those future medical benefits.

Section 52-1-54(F)(4) does not require a worker to abandon claims omitted from an offer of judgment; attorney fee entitlement depends on comparing the offer with the final compensation order.

MacAislin v. Noah's Ark Children's Center · filed 2016-09-08(F)(4)

Section 52-1-54(F)(4), however, does not require a worker to permanently abandon all claims not sought in an offer of judgment.

To invoke subsection (F)’s fee shifting provision, an offer must refer to the statute or address each material requirement, including entry of a compensation order if accepted.

Rivera v. Flint Energy · filed 2011-10-24(F)

But at a minimum, if counsel’s aim is to invoke the provisions of Section 52-1-54(F), the document conveying the offer must refer to the statute explicitly or address each of its material requirements, including that if the offer is accepted a judgment is to be entered against Employer.

An offer of judgment does not support fee shifting when it leaves critical issues unresolved.

Chavez v. Lovelace Women's Hospital · filed 2016-05-25(F)(4)

Insofar as the initial offer of settlement did not address critical issues relating to ensuing developments, the WCJ properly concluded that it did not supply an appropriate basis for application of the fee-shifting provision.

Section 52-1-54(F) does not shift attorney’s fees to a worker when the employer’s offer is less than the benefits the worker is entitled to receive.

Medina v. Hunemuller Construction, Inc. · filed 2005-08-11(F)

Our disposition of Worker’s appeal in which we reinstated the Recommended Resolution with its weekly compensation rate of $440.00 has eliminated the factual predicate for Employer’s argument: Employer’s offer based on a weekly compensation rate of $246.63 was less than the amount that we have determined Worker should receive using the reinstated weekly compensation rate of $440.00. The fee-shifting mechanism of Section 52-l-54(F) therefore is unavailable to Employer.

A worker’s offer can support fee shifting when it unambiguously incorporates statutory credits and offsets without listing them individually.

Sanchez v. Intel Corp. · filed 2016-06-09(F)(4)

As previously stated, insofar as Section 52-1-25.1 clearly and specifically addresses crediting and offsetting and insofar as Worker’s offer unequivocally called for application of Section 52-1-25.1 without any stated limitation, Worker’s offer unambiguously allowed for crediting and offsetting. ... We perceive no need for greater specificity by reference to individual statutory sub-sections or otherwise.

A worker’s offer of judgment supports shifting attorney fees to the employer when it addresses all critical issues resolved by the compensation order and the final award exceeds the offer.

Thorne v. NMIMT & Risk Management Division · filed 2017-08-17(F)(4)

What is controlling, is the fact that Worker’s offer of judgment addressed all of the critical issues ultimately resolved by the compensation order. If Employer/Insurer had accepted that offer, the dispute would have expeditiously concluded at terms less favorable to Worker than the award ultimately provided by the compensation order. Under these circumstances, fee shifting is appropriate.

Section 52-1-54(F)(4) requires the employer to pay all of the worker’s attorney fees when a valid worker’s offer of judgment is rejected and the final award exceeds the offer.

Baker v. Endeavor Servs., Inc. · filed 2018-09-06(F)(4)

We conclude that the workers’ compensation judge erred as a matter of law by declining to apply the fee-shifting provision, Section 52-1-54(F)(4) (2003), where Worker’s offer of judgment met all of the requirements to trigger fee-shifting under the statute.

Section 52-1-54(F)(4) shifts the worker’s attorney fees to the employer when the employer rejects a valid offer of judgment and the compensation order exceeds that offer.

Vinyard v. Palo Alto, Inc. · filed 2019-02-21(F)(4)

Because Worker did not make a valid offer of judgment, we hold that Worker is not entitled to fee-shifting pursuant to Section 52-1-54(F)(4) and affirm the WCJ’s order.

Section 52-1-54(F)(4) requires the employer to pay all of the worker’s attorney fees when the statutory offer-of-judgment conditions are met; a good faith defense does not create an exception.

Gallegos v. Office of the Attorney General · filed 2021-08-19(F)(4)

In light of the Legislature’s requirement that the fee-shifting provision “shall” be imposed if the statutory language is satisfied, the WCJ did not have the discretion to deny the award based on a “good faith” exception.

Section 52-1-54(F)(4) requires comparing an offer of judgment, including reserved future medical benefits, with the compensation award before shifting attorney fees.

Vasconselles v. University of New Mexico · filed 2023-08-31(F)(4)

In Worker’s case, this analysis would have required the WCJ to compare the speculative value of future medical benefits that Worker reserved in his offers of judgment to the $14,500 he received in exchange for waiving his right to future medical benefits under the Act.

Section 52-1-54(F)(4) shifts all of a worker’s attorney fees to the employer only if the worker’s rejected offer of judgment is less than the compensation award.

Pena v. State · filed 2025-12-18(F)(4)

For these reasons, Worker’s claim that he was “awarded TTD benefits in excess of the TTD benefits Worker offered to accept with his [o]ffer of [j]udgment” is not well taken. We accordingly affirm the WCJ’s decision not to shift 100 percent of Worker’s attorney fees to Employer pursuant to Section 52-1-54(F)(4).

A preliminary motion hearing does not start the trial for the compensation-offer deadline; when a timely employer offer exceeds the award, the worker pays all of the worker’s attorney fees.

Ruiz v. Los Lunas Pub. Schs. · filed 2013-03-26(F)(3)

The WCJ denied application of Section 52-1-54(F)(3) by finding that Employer had made an untimely offer of compensation. ... No opening statements were made, no evidence was presented, no witnesses were sworn in or gave testimony, and the depositions and exhibits that had been submitted to the WCJ prior to the start of the proceedings were returned to the parties. ... In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the WCJ erred in finding that trial began on March 28, 2011. ... Thus, we reverse the WCJ’s order requiring Employer to pay fifty percent of Worker’s attorney fees.

A preliminary motion hearing does not start the trial for purposes of the deadline to make an offer of compensation under Section 52-1-54(F).

Ruiz v. Los Lunas Pub. Sch. · filed 2013-05-20(F)

Employer challenges this finding, arguing that the facts do not establish that trial commenced on March 28, 2011, but rather on April 27, 2011, making its April 15, 2011 offer timely under Section 52-1-54(F). We agree with Employer. ... In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the WCJ erred in finding that trial began on March 28, 2011. ... Thus, we reverse the WCJ’s order requiring Employer to pay fifty percent of Worker’s attorney fees.

Section 52-1-54(I) permits a separate attorney fee cap for a primary workplace injury and each subsequent accidental injury flowing from it.

Hanrahan v. State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep't · filed 2025-07-09(I)

As applied here, we conclude that the record supports three single accidental injuries to Worker—one primary workplace injury and two subsequent injuries—under Section 52-1-54(I) (2013). Therefore, Worker is entitled to recover up to three attorney fee caps.