Statute Annotations › Minnesota › Minn. Stat. § 8.31

Minn. Stat. § 8.31

Attorney general enforcement and private remedies: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Minnesota
Case notes
135
Cited in passing
54
Citing cases indexed
221
Case dates
1983–2026
Screened through
2026-03-18
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

189 citing cases reviewed of 221 in the citation index: 135 interpreted the section (annotated below), 54 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-03-18 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Minn. Stat. § 8.31?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Attorney general enforcement

Section 8.31 extends the attorney general’s authority over unfair business practices to insurance companies.

State Ex Rel. Hatch v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2000-04-04subd. 1

Appellant argues that, while the attorney general may otherwise be able to pursue violations of these statutes, the attorney general has limited authority over the insurance industry. We disagree. This argument is contrary to the plain language of Minn.Stat. § 8.31 (1998).
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3, allows the attorney general to seek an injunction for a past, current, or threatened violation of a law it enforces.

State Ex Rel. Hatch v. Cross Country Bank, Inc. · filed 2005-09-13(3)

And the enforcement statute provides that the attorney general may seek and have injunctive relief upon a showing that the statute has been, is currently being, or is about to be violated. Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3.
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Subdivision 3a permits an injured person to bring a private damages action after the attorney general has acted, without making that person a representative of the state.

Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc. · filed 2010-12-28subd. 3a

Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a, plainly provides that “[i]n addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person injured by a violation” of the listed consumer-protection statutes “may bring a civil action” for such injuries. The statute does not limit such actions to situations in which the state has failed to act to enforce consumer-protection laws or provide that a person pursuing such an action becomes a representative of the state.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a allows the attorney general to seek equitable relief, including restitution, for a consumer fraud violation.

State v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc. · filed 2018-06-04(3a)

The attorney general may bring a civil action for violation of the statute, and may receive "equitable relief as determined by the court." Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (2016).6 This includes seeking restitution under the doctrine of parens patriae.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 1, is broad enough to authorize the Attorney General to pursue a claim based on unlawful firearm sales.

State of Minnesota v. Fleet Farm LLC · filed 2024-03-05(1)

The phrase “other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade” is broad enough to include the unlawful sale of firearms.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 1 lets the Attorney General bring a civil enforcement claim under the Minnesota Gun Control Act even though that Act has no standalone civil cause of action.

State of Minnesota v. Fleet Farm LLC · filed 2024-05-23(1)

Thus, the absence of a civil cause of action in the MNGCA does not bar the Minnesota Attorney General from enforcing the MNGCA pursuant to its broad authority under section 8.31, subdivision 1.
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Section 8.31 does not give the Attorney General general authority to enforce every statute that lacks a named enforcement entity.

AbbVie, Inc. v. Ellison · filed 2025-04-03

Section 8.31 authorizes the Attorney General to “investigate violations of the law of [Minnesota] respecting unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade[.]” There is no indication that this provision is meant to be a catch-all to authorize the Attorney General to enforce any statute that does not name an enforcement entity.
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Section 8.31 does not give the Attorney General blanket authority to enforce statutes that do not name an enforcement entity.

AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP v. Ellison · filed 2025-04-03

There is no indication that this provision is meant to be a catch-all to authorize the Attorney General to enforce any statute that does not name an enforcement entity.
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Section 8.31 gives the attorney general broad power to obtain an injunction when the state shows a statutory violation and the injunction serves the statute’s purpose.

State ex rel. Swanson v. Integrity Advance, LLC · filed 2014-03-31(3)

The attorney general’s power to obtain injunctions under Minn.Stat. § 8.31 (2012) is broad. ... The district court need only consider whether the state has shown that Integrity violated the statutes involved and whether injunc-tive relief would fulfill the legislative purpose of the statutes.
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Section 8.31 requires a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief to allege an irreparable injury.

Johnson v. Bobcat Co. · filed 2016-03-30(3a)

In order to state a claim for injunctive relief under the Private AG Statute, a plaintiff must allege an “irreparable injury.”
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3 allows the Attorney General to obtain a permanent injunction by proving that a listed law has been, is being, or is about to be violated, without showing irreparable harm or satisfying equitable injunction factors.

State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc. · filed 2017-07-26subd. 3

Accordingly, a permanent injunction sought under Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3, does not, by the terms of the statute, require a showing of irreparable harm, inadequacy of other remedies, consideration of equitable principles, or analysis of the Dahlberg factors. The Legislature has provided a statutory remedy that is distinct from an equitable injunction, meaning the Attorney General’s burden to obtain a permanent injunction under the statute is limited to the statutory condition: proving that a listed law “has been or is being violated, or is about to be violated.”
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Investigative demands

Section 8.31, subdivision 2 permits the attorney general to obtain investigative discovery when information already in hand provides reasonable grounds to believe a state law violation exists or may occur.

Kohn v. State Ex Rel. Humphrey · filed 1983-07-15subd. 2

Thus, to obtain discovery, our statute requires only that the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe there is or may be a violation of state law. It is enough to show, on the basis of information the Attorney General already has, that it is reasonable for the investigation to continue.
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Section 8.31 does not authorize the Attorney General to enforce a civil investigative demand when the conduct under investigation is clearly exempt from antitrust law and no enforcement action could follow.

Minnesota Twins Partnership v. State Ex Rel. Hatch · filed 1999-04-29subd. 2

A claim of exemption from antitrust laws defeats an otherwise validly issued civil investigative demand only when the activities being investigated are clearly covered by the exemption. ... Enforcement of the CIDs against the Twins is therefore outside the scope of the Attorney General’s authority because no enforcement action could follow.
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Section 8.31 permits the attorney general to issue a civil investigative demand before filing suit and allows the district court to decide compliance and confidentiality in a separate proceeding.

In Re GlaxoSmithKline Plc · filed 2005-07-142, 2a

We view a CID order differently. The attorney general is authorized to serve a CID “without commencement of a civil action,” and the district court is authorized to order compliance with CID procedures. Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subds. 2, 2a (2004). In a CID proceeding, the ultimate remedy to be provided by the court is the ordering of the production of discovery, which includes any determination of the public or confidential nature of discovery documents. The CID proceeding is not merged into any subsequent litigation, and discovery produced pursuant to a CID may or may not lead to a separate action.
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Litigation over a civil investigative demand issued under section 8.31 tolls the limitations period for a related Attorney General enforcement action when both concern the same alleged unlawful practice; serving the demand alone does not toll it.

State of Minnesota Office of the Attorney General v. Madison Equities, Inc. · filed 2026-01-07(2)

We hold that the litigation over the CID tolled the applicable limitations period. Thus, the court of appeals erred by affirming the district court’s dismissal. Our holding today applies narrowly to a situation where the Attorney General exercises authority granted by the Legislature under Minnesota Statutes section 8.31 to investigate and enforce violations or suspected violations of statutes specifically mentioned in section 8.31, subdivision 1, or any other laws respecting unfair, discriminatory or other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade. Additionally, it is the litigation over the CID that tolls the limitations period—not simply the service of the CID that triggers tolling—and, for tolling to apply, the CID and subsequent litigation must concern the same alleged unlawful practice.
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Private action and remedies

Section 8.31 allows a private party to seek damages for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act.

Sadeghi-A v. Daimler Trucks North America LLC · filed 2021-03-08subd. 3a

Although the Minnesota Attorney General has primary responsibility for enforcing the MCFA, see Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 1, a private party may “bring a civil action” to recover damages from violations of the MCFA, id. § 8.31, subd. 3(a).
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Law changed since The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed this court of appeals ruling on 1986-05-02, holding that § 8.31 does not create a private Unfair Claims Practices Act claim.

Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, provides a private remedy for violations of laws against unfair business practices, including the Minnesota Unfair Claims Practices Act.

Morris v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1985-10-24subd. 3a

Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (1984) creates a private remedy for persons injured by violations of law referred to in section 8.31, subd. 1. Subdivision 1 refers to laws dealing with unfair and deceptive business practices, which include the provisions of the Minnesota Unfair Claims Practices Act.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, does not give a private person a cause of action for a violation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act.

Morris v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1986-05-02(3a)

Legislative history indicates that subdivision 4 was repealed to make sure the Attorney General could investigate and take action on unfair claims practices of insurance companies, which subdivision 4 apparently forbade, not to create a cause of action for private persons. ... We hold, therefore, that a private person does not have a cause of action for a violation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, gives individuals injured by violations of Minnesota’s false advertising or consumer fraud statutes a private action for damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co. · filed 1988-02-01(3a)

■Individuals injured by either of the above-cited statutes have a private cause of action to “recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including the costs of investigation and reasonable attorney’s fees.” Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a.
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Section 8.31 allows an injured private party to recover damages and costs for a Consumer Fraud Law violation, with recovery measured by the party’s actual loss.

Estate of Riedel Ex Rel. Mirick v. Life Care Retirement Communities, Inc. · filed 1993-08-24(3a)

The plaintiffs injury stands as the measure of the defendant’s liability under the Consumer Fraud Law; the plaintiff may not recover anything separate from or additional to its damages and costs. See Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subds. 1, 3.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows a private citizen to sue for damages under the Consumer Fraud Act.

Alsides v. Brown Institute, Ltd. · filed 1999-04-13(3a)

Although Minn.Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1, does not specifically provide for money damages, Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a, provides that a private citizen has standing to bring suit under the Consumer Fraud Act for “damages.”
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Section 8.31(3) does not authorize restitution or disgorgement; the court reads its equitable relief provision as limited to injunctions and penalties under $25,000.

Federal Trade Commission v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1999-07-07(3)

... Minn. Stat. § 8.31(3) allows “other equitable relief’ but limits such relief to injunctions and penalties under $25,000.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, provides a private damages remedy only for violations of statutes listed in subdivision 1; the DTPA is not listed.

Dennis Simmons D.D.S., P.A. v. Modern Aero, Inc. · filed 1999-12-14subd. 3a

Appellant correctly states that section 8.31, subd. 3a, provides private damage remedies for violations of consumer protection statutes. Yet, subdivision 3a specifically limits its relief to those statutes referred to in subdivision 1, and the DTPA is not included in that list.
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Section 8.31 allows a person injured by a Consumer Fraud Act violation to seek damages and equitable relief in addition to costs and attorney’s fees.

Agre v. Rain & Hail LLC · filed 2002-04-15(3a)

Further, Minnesota Stat. § 8.31, which provides a civil cause of action for the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, includes relief beyond attorneys fees and costs: "[A]ny person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney's fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court.” Plaintiff's complaints do not limit their fraud count damage claims to attorney’s fees and costs.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires a private party seeking monetary relief under the MCFA to show the requisite action and injury and a benefit to the public.

301 Clifton Place L.L.C. v. 301 Clifton Place Condominium Ass'n · filed 2010-06-01(3a)

In order to obtain monetary remedies under the MCFA, a private party must show the requisite type of action and injury and that the action will benefit the public.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, addresses who may bring a private action; it does not expand the substantive scope of the consumer fraud statute.

Stephenson v. Deutsche Bank AG · filed 2003-09-08subd. 3a

However, as this Court has previously held, Group Health was directed at whether non-purchasers have standing under Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a, not the scope of the substantive provisions of Minn.Stat. § 325F.68-70, the consumer fraud statute.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows any person injured by a Consumer Fraud Act violation to sue and reflects Minnesota’s policy of redressing fraud occurring in the state regardless of where the consumer is injured.

Mooney v. Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America · filed 2007-05-10(3a)

By allowing “any person” to sue under the MPCFA, the Minnesota legislature has evinced a strong policy of providing redress for fraudulent business practices that occur within Minnesota’s borders, regardless of where a consumer’s injury occurs.
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Section 8.31 permits a private action only for violations of laws referred to in subdivision 1, which does not include section 65B.285.

Hara v. USAA Casualty Insurance · filed 2011-04-12(3a)

The private attorney general statute provides that “any person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages .... ” Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. Subdivision 1 does not reference § 65B.285, nor does it make any reference to any of the sections of Minnesota’s insurance laws. No private right of action is available for violations of § 65B.285 under the private attorney general statute.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits a private damages claim for consumer fraud; reliance is not a separate element, but the plaintiff must prove causation.

Wiegand v. Walser Automotive Groups, Inc. · filed 2003-10-28(3a)

The plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation, however, is not an independent, third element of a claim pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1, and Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a.
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Section 8.31 allows an injured third-party payor to maintain a private consumer protection action when the claim benefits the public.

Kinetic Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. · filed 2009-12-04subd. 3a

For the purpose of this motion, the Court finds Kinetic may maintain an action under Minnesota Statute § 8.31.
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Section 8.31 lets private parties seek damages for violations of the Consumer Protection Act.

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance v. Acute Care Chiropractic Clinic P.A. · filed 2015-02-133a

Although, generally, the Minnesota Attorney General enforces the CPA, see Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 1, a private party may “bring a civil action” to recover damages from violations of the CPA. See Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3(a).
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Section 8.31 permits an individual injured by a violation of Minnesota’s false advertising statute to bring a civil action.

Hall v. Capella University · filed 2018-07-16

An individual injured because of a violation of the statute may bring a civil action under Minn. Stat. § 8.31; see also LensCrafters, Inc. v. Vision World, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1481, 1491 (D. Minn. 1996).
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, does not require a private enforcement claim when a party invokes another statute only as grounds to deny equitable relief.

TCM PROPERTIES, LLC v. Gunderson · filed 2006-07-18(3a)

Because TCM did not seek private enforcement of Minn.Stat. § 58.13, subd. 1(13), and because, as discussed below, we hold that Menne did not violate the statute, we conclude that TCM’s argument was not precluded by its failure to establish a claim pursuant to the private-attorney-general statute.
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Section 8.31 permits actual, out-of-pocket damages or equitable remedies, but equitable remedies are available only when actual damages are inadequate.

Buetow v. A.L.S. Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2009-08-06

The Minnesota consumer-fraud statutes allow relief in the form of actual, out-of-pocket damages or other equitable remedies. Minn.Stat. § 8.31. However, equitable remedies are not available unless actual damages are inadequate.
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Section 8.31’s private civil action provision does not allow enforcement of the insurance fraud provisions in sections 60A.951-.956.

Allstate Insurance Company v. LINEA LATINA DE ACCIDENTES, INC. · filed 2011-02-16subd. 3a

The laws referred to in section 8.31, subd. 1, do not include sections 60A.951-.956, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Minnesota legislature intended sections 60A.951-.956 to be subject to the private civil action provision of section 8.31, subd. 3a.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a requires a private plaintiff seeking equitable relief to prove irreparable injury.

Buetow v. A.L.S. Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2011-08-18(3a)

Moreover, the grant of authority to “receive other equitable relief as determined by the *1185court” is plainly limited to relief that is consistent with principles of equitable remedies, which universally require proof of irreparable injury.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows an injured party to recover damages for conduct that violates the Consumer Fraud Act even if the same conduct violates another statute with no private cause of action, provided the party pleads and proves the consumer fraud claim.

Graphic Communications Local 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corporation · filed 2014-07-02subd. 3a

We conclude that an injured party may bring a consumer fraud claim and recover damages under the Private AG Statute for conduct that violates section 151.21, subdivision 4, of the Pharmacy Practice Act provided that the plaintiff pleads and proves the required elements of a consumer fraud claim. The fact that the Pharmacy Practice Act does not provide a private cause of action does not bar a plaintiff from bringing a consumer fraud claim, provided that the alleged conduct is proscribed under the CFA.
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Subdivision 3a allows a private consumer fraud action when the plaintiff shows prohibited conduct, reliance, and resulting damage; the reliance need not be justifiable.

Nelson v. American Family Mutual Ins. · filed 2018-08-02(3a)

Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a, creates a private cause of action for a violation of the MCFA. To prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant engaged in conduct prohibited by the statute; (2) the plaintiff relied upon the representations (there is no requirement, however, that the reliance be justifiable); and (3) the plaintiff was damaged thereby.
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Section 8.31 allows a private Consumer Fraud Act claim only if the plaintiff can show injury and a benefit to the public.

Great West Casualty Company v. Decker · filed 2019-01-07(3)(a)

As such, to proceed to trial on a CFA claim, a private plaintiff must point to evidence from which a reasonable juror could determine that “the defendant engaged in conduct prohibited by the statute[,] that the plaintiff was damaged thereby,” Grp. Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 12 (Minn. 2001), and that the alleged misconduct affected “the public,” Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314. ... First, in light of the Court’s summary judgment ruling that Decker is not entitled to no-fault benefits under Minnesota law, no reasonable juror could find that Decker suffered an “injury” by dint of Great West’s supposedly “fraudulent” misrepresentations.
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Subdivision 3a permits private litigants to seek restitution and disgorgement as equitable relief.

Taqueria El Primo LLC v. Farmers Group, Inc. · filed 2023-09-13(3a)

By its clear and unambiguous language, the statute provides that “other equitable relief as determined by the court” is available to private litigants, and that the attorney general may obtain the same relief. Thus, it is the other way around—the Attorney General may seek restitution and disgorgement because private litigants may.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows a patient to seek declaratory or injunctive relief to compel timely disclosure of health records under the Minnesota Health Records Act.

Findling v. Group Health Plan, Inc., d/b/a Health Partners and Regions Hospital, ... · filed 2023-12-06(3a)

Accordingly, the Patients are persons injured by a violation of the laws referred to in section 8.31, subdivision 1. Therefore, they may bring a private action for equitable relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, to require the Providers to comply with their timely disclosure obligations under the Minnesota Health Records Act.
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Who may sue

Section 8.31, subdivision 3a permits a purchaser to bring a private action under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act.

Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc. · filed 2016-08-16(3a)

As to the claim brought under the Minnesota CFA, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “the plain and unambiguous language of the [Minnesota CFA] allows ‘any person’ to bring a private action for redress of violations of the misrepresentation in sales statutes,” whether or not the plaintiffs purchased the defendant’s goods. Grp. Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 2001); Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a. Here, Carlsen purchased GameStop’s goods in the form of his Game Informer subscription, and he thus has standing to bring his claim under the Minnesota CFA.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, does not make an insurer a “person injured” merely because it paid its insured and became a subrogee.

Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Brekke Fireplace Shoppe, Inc. · filed 1993-01-26(3a)

By contract and by statute, Farmers may recover only what it has actually paid to its insured. Thus, Farmers cannot assert that it was a “person injured” for purposes of the consumer protection statutes.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, gives a person injured by a violation of a law listed in subdivision 1 standing to bring a private action, including a health plan seeking to recover increased treatment costs.

State Ex Rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 1996-07-25subd. 3a

Standing to bring suit under all but one of the above-mentioned consumer protection statutes is found in the statute enabling and detailing the responsibilities of Minnesota’s Attorney General, which contains a provision allowing private actions to seek redress for violations of certain statutes.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows a person injured by a violation of the misrepresentation in sales laws to sue even if the person did not purchase the defendant’s products.

Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 2001-01-11(3a)

In Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a, the legislature authorized “any person” injured by a violation of the misrepresentation in sales laws to bring an action for damages. We conclude that, as long as the plaintiff alleges an injury by conduct that violates one or more of the substantive statutes, it is not necessary under subdivision 3a to plead that it is a purchaser of the defendant’s products.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits a person injured by a covered consumer law violation while residing in Minnesota to sue even after moving out of state.

Williams v. Total Life Changes, LLC · filed 2021-06-24(3a)

The Court holds that Plaintiff has standing to assert the statutory claims brought under Minnesota’s Private Attorney General Act, although she is not currently a Minnesota resident.
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Injury and causation

Section 8.31, subdivision 3a requires a plaintiff seeking monetary damages to prove a legal nexus between the complained-of acts and the alleged losses.

LeSage v. Norwest Bank Calhoun-Isles, N.A. · filed 1987-07-21(3a)

Here, appellants are not seeking an injunction but are seeking monetary damages under Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. Appellants, in bringing forth evidence at trial, will bear the burden of proving the proper legal nexus between the complained of acts and their alleged monetary losses.
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Section 8.31 treats the effects of deceptive practices and the need to defend against them as an injury that supports a private action.

Love v. Amsler · filed 1989-06-13(3a)

The effect of these practices and having to defend against them satisfies the requirement of “injury” under § 8.31.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a permits private damages actions for violations of section 325F.69.

Carlock v. Pillsbury Co. · filed 1989-08-09(3a)

Private damage actions are permitted to remedy violations of section 325F.69. Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a.
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Section 8.31 permits a private action for damages caused by a Consumer Fraud Act violation, but the claimant must establish an injury.

K.A.C. v. Benson · filed 1995-02-10(3a)

The sale of merchandise includes the sale of services, and a private citizen is entitled to bring a civil action for damages for injuries caused by violation of the Act. Minn.Stat. § 325F.68, subd. 2 (1994); Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 1 (1994); Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (1994). Unable to establish an "injury," plaintiff has no basis for recovery under the Consumer Fraud Act, Minn.Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1 (1994).
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits a private civil action for injuries caused by a Consumer Fraud Act violation, but the plaintiff must allege injury.

D.A.B. v. Brown · filed 1997-11-04(3a)

The sale of merchandise includes the sale of services, and a private citizen is entitled to bring a civil action for injuries caused by violation of the statute. Minn.Stat. § 325F.68, subd. 2 (1996); Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (1996). ... But, plaintiffs must prove the existence of an injury to sustain a cause of action under the statute.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires a causal connection between the alleged injury and prohibited conduct, supported by at least circumstantial evidence of reliance.

Flynn v. American Home Products Corp. · filed 2001-05-15subd. 3a

Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (1998) authorizes private action for violations of these statutes by “any person.” ... Thus, for appellant to prove causation, a necessary element of her statutory consumer fraud claims, she must at least present circumstantial evidence of some reliance on respondents’ alleged misrepresentations.
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Subdivision 3a’s causal nexus requirement is not defeated as a matter of law by a written contract that contradicts alleged oral misrepresentations.

Wiegand v. Walser Automotive Groups, Inc. · filed 2004-07-29(3a)

We held in Group Health that reliance is a component of the causal nexus requirement for a private consumer fraud class action under MinmStat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. ... We conclude that the existence of a written contract that contradicts Walser’s alleged oral misrepresentations does not, as a matter of law, negate any possibility of Wie-gand and potentially others proving a causal nexus between oral representations and consumer injuries.
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A private damages claim under section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires proof of a causal nexus between the alleged consumer protection violation and the injury.

Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Company · filed 2004-09-24(3a)

Even if the claims were timely filed and Mrs. Tuttle had standing to recover damages under Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (private attorney general statute) in a wrongful death action, we conclude her statutory claims fail for want of proof of a causal nexus between the defendants' conduct and Tuttle's injuries.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a requires admissible proof of a causal nexus between the prohibited conduct and the claimed damages, though direct evidence of an individual consumer’s reliance is unnecessary.

Tuttle Ex Rel. Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. · filed 2004-07-30subd. 3a

Although Mrs. Tuttle need not present direct evidence of Tuttle’s individual reliance, Mrs. Tuttle must establish some proof that the conduct of the smokeless tobacco manufacturers and the STC in failing to warn caused consumers to continue using smokeless tobacco and to sustain physical injury in reliance on the defendants’ conduct.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, does not require individual consumer reliance for a false advertising damages claim, but does require a causal link between the alleged violation and the damages.

Knotts v. Nissan North America, Inc. · filed 2018-10-10(3a)

A plaintiff seeking damages under Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a, for violations of Minn. Stat. § 325F.67, need not plead “individual consumer reliance on the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 13 (Minn. 2001). Rather, as an element of causation, the consumer “must establish a causal nexus between their alleged damages and the conduct of the defendants alleged to violate the statutes.” Id. at 15. Here, as noted, Knotts does not allege that he viewed the advertisement, much less whether he viewed it prior to purchasing his car, and whether a causal link existed between the two.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3(a), allows a private action for an assumed-name violation by a person injured by that violation.

Northland Temporaries, Inc. v. Turpin · filed 2008-02-05(3)(a)

And according to Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3(a), any person who is injured by a violation of Minn.Stat. § 333.01 “may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements ... and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court.” ... Furthermore, Northland has not alleged that the Turpins caused injury to Northland by using an acronym.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires a private claimant to show injury; producers who cannot show they were underpaid cannot recover for an alleged pricing misrepresentation.

Swift & Co. v. Elias Farms, Inc. · filed 2008-08-25(3a)

Even if this were true, however, the hog producers must show that they were injured. Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. Because the hog producers have not provided sufficient evidence to show that they were underpaid, they cannot show that they were injured.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits a person injured by a violation of an enumerated consumer protection statute to sue; the person must have an injury.

Thunanber v. Uponor, Inc. · filed 2012-08-14subd. 3a

The general enabling statute provides that “any person injured” by violation of the enumerated consumer statutes may bring a civil action. ... Despite the broad construction for standing under Minnesota’s and Indiana’s consumer protection laws, the essential element of an injury is required. As noted herein, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the necessary element of injury necessary to confer standing and their statutory consumer protection claims must be dismissed for this additional reason.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires a private plaintiff seeking damages under the MCFA to show that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s loss.

Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp. · filed 2008-02-22subd. 3a

We thus conclude that the MCFA’s requirement that a plaintiff be “injured by” conduct of the defendant does not allow for recovery unless a plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions proximately caused the plaintiffs losses.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires a private plaintiff seeking damages to show that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s loss.

Schaff v. Residential Funding · filed 2008-02-22subd. 3a

We thus conclude that the MCFA’s requirement that a plaintiff be “injured by” conduct of the defendant does not allow for recovery unless a plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions proximately caused the plaintiff’s losses.
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Section 8.31 requires a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s injury in private damages claims under the covered Minnesota consumer protection laws.

In Re: 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation · filed 2018-11-01subd. 3a

This dooms Plaintiffs’ claims under the above-referenced statutes, all of which require some form of causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s alleged injury.
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Private damages claims brought through § 8.31, subdivision 3a, require a causal connection between the challenged statement and the plaintiff’s injury.

In re 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. · filed 2018-11-01subd. 3a

The necessary implication is that Plaintiffs never consulted, let alone relied upon, the ingredient labels' assertion that cellulose was added to prevent caking. This dooms Plaintiffs' claims under the above-referenced statutes, all of which require some form of causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the plaintiff's alleged injury.
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A person targeted by a fraudulent demand who pays an attorney to investigate their liability has suffered an injury under the private attorney general statute.

Engstrom v. Whitebirch, Inc. · filed 2019-07-31subd. 3a

Because we conclude that a person who is targeted by a fraudulent demand and consequently pays an attorney to investigate his liability in response to that demand has been "injured" within the meaning of the private attorney general statute, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires a private plaintiff to show that the alleged violation caused the injury.

Distinctive Design Build, LLC v. Thomas Nelson, Installed Building Solutions II, LLC, ... · filed 2024-04-15subd. 3a

Causation of the alleged injury is a necessary element of an action under Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. ... Assuming without deciding that Greiman owed and breached duties to Nelson, we agree with the district court that Nelson failed to present evidence sufficient to establish causation for either claim.
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Public benefit requirement

Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows a private claimant to recover only if the cause of action benefits the public.

Ly v. Nystrom · filed 2000-08-03(3a)

Based on these considerations we hold that the Private AG Statute applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.
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Subdivision 3a allows reasonable attorney fees for a covered claim that benefits the public, even when relatively few people are shown to have been injured.

Collins v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc. · filed 2003-01-16(3a)

In Nystrom, we held that the private attorney general statute applies only to claimants who demonstrate that their claims benefit the public. ... We hold that respondents’ successful prosecution of their claims benefited the public and therefore respondents are entitled to reasonable attorney fees.
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Section 8.31(3a) permits a private action only when it would benefit the public at large.

Flora v. Firepond, Inc. · filed 2003-04-28(3a)

Since a private action would not benefit the public, plaintiffs have no private right of action under Minn.Stat. §§ 325F.68 and 8.31(3a).
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Section 8.31’s private remedy requires a claimant to show that the action benefits the public; a claim for a private loss does not satisfy that requirement.

Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc. · filed 2003-09-05(3a)

Even if the CFA claim were otherwise appropriate, we would, nonetheless, be obligated to grant Summary Judgment to the Plaintiff because the Minnesota Private Attorney General Statute, Minnesota Statutes Section 8.31, Subdivision 8(a), requires that the action, under its aegis, be for the public benefit. ... As a result of the absence of any public benefit attributable to the Defendants’ CFA Counterclaim, we find that an award of Summary Judgment to the Plaintiff, on that same ground, is also warranted here.
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Section 8.31 permits private damages and attorney fees for a consumer fraud claim only when the action benefits the public as a whole.

Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc. · filed 2004-06-15(3a)

But damages and attorney fees may be available through the private attorney general statute, Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subds. 1, 3a (2002). To proceed under this statute, the plaintiff is required to demonstrate that the action benefits the public as a whole, rather than the plaintiff alone.
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Subdivision 3a permits a private action under the covered statutes only if the action benefits the public; a claim about an individual transaction without evidence of misrepresentations to the public does not qualify.

Davis v. U.S. Bancorp · filed 2004-09-10(3a)

Davis may not bring claims under the Minnesota statutes she has addressed unless she has prudential standing as a party intended to be included as a claimant under the private attorney general statute, Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. ... But Davis can complain only about her individual experience with U.S. Bank, and she has not presented evidence that misrepresentations were made to the public at large. She is therefore barred from raising her claims under the particular state statutes she alleges were violated.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows a private action only when the claimant’s cause of action benefits the public.

Jensen v. Duluth Area YMCA · filed 2004-11-16(3a)

This statute, referred to as the Private Attorney General Statute, has been held to apply only to claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public. ... A successful prosecution of Jensen’s claim that the YMCA violated the act would not advance any state interest or be of any benefit to the public. Jensen’s claim cannot be considered within the duties and responsibilities of the attorney general to investigate and enjoin. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the YMCA on Jensen’s claim under the Private Attorney General Statute.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits a private claim only when the cause of action benefits the public; a private transaction does not qualify.

TIMELINE, LLC v. Williams Holdings 3, LLC · filed 2005-06-28(3a)

We therefore conclude that, because the transaction at issue here is a private one, Timeline is barred from pursuing a claim under the private-attorney-general statute.
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Section 8.31 requires a private claimant to show that the suit would benefit the public; claims concerning only the claimant’s loan application and personal damages do not satisfy that requirement.

Kivel v. Wealthspring Mortgage Corp. · filed 2005-11-02subd. 3a

Only claimants who can “demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public,” however, are proper claimants under the private attorney general statute. ... Plaintiffs have not established that the general public would benefit from successful prosecution of their claims. Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to Counts II, III and IV of plaintiffs’ complaint.
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Section 8.31 requires a private plaintiff bringing a Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act claim to show that the action benefits the public; a claim seeking damages for personal benefit alone does not meet that requirement.

Burns v. Bank of America · filed 2008-12-04(3)a

And, "[t]o bring a cause of action under [the MCFA, Minn.Stat. § 325F.69,] ... [Plaintiffs] must satisfy the requirements of the Private Attorney General Statute, Minn.Stat. § 8.31(3)a,” which requires that Plaintiffs "show that [their] cause[ ] of action benefits] the public.” ... Because “the damages that [Plaintiffs] request[] are for personal benefit only, [Plaintiffs] cannot meet this requirement, and [their MCFA] claim[ ] must be dismissed.”
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Section 8.31 permits private consumer protection claims when the litigation has sufficient potential to benefit the public; a request for injunctive relief is not required.

ADT SECURITY SERVICES, INC. v. Swenson · filed 2009-09-28(3a)

In sum, in light of the Court’s inability to conclusively assess the relationship between this action and ADT’s general sales practices in the context of a motion to dismiss, as well as the fact that customers nationwide rely on ADT’s security systems for protection, the Court finds that — at least for the purposes of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) — defendants’ litigation has sufficient potential to benefit the public to support invocation of the Private Attorney General statute.
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Private plaintiffs suing under § 8.31, subdivision 3a must show that their action benefits the public; a single misrepresentation to one person in one transaction does not suffice.

DeVary v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2010-03-25subd. 3a

The Court agrees with defendants that DeVary cannot sue for violation of the MDTPA because he is not suing to obtain a public benefit. Nothing in DeVary’s amended complaint suggests that defendants’ alleged violations of TILA or RES-PA have harmed anyone other than DeVary or are part of a broader pattern of illegal conduct. A misrepresentation made to only one person as part of a single transaction simply does not support a private-attorney-general action under the MDTPA.
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Section 8.31 requires a private claimant to allege facts showing that the action will benefit the public.

Cummings v. Paramount Partners, LP · filed 2010-05-25(3a)

This Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ MCFA claims brought under the Private AG Statute must be dismissed because they have not sufficiently alleged facts that demonstrate that their action will benefit the public.
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Section 8.31 permits private claims under covered consumer protection laws when the claims benefit the public; a request for damages can qualify if the alleged misconduct poses an ongoing public safety threat.

In Re Levaquin Products Liability Litigation · filed 2010-11-08subd. 3a

This lawsuit may indirectly cause defendants to redress a public safety hazard, a result of obvious benefit to the public under the Private AG Statute. As plaintiffs have alleged ongoing threats to public safety, the Court denies defendants judgment on the pleadings with regard to plaintiffs' claims under the UTPA, CFA, and the FAA.
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Section 8.31 permits a private claim under covered consumer protection laws when the suit benefits the public, including by potentially prompting changes that address an ongoing public safety hazard.

Voss v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 2010-11-08subd. 3a

This lawsuit may indirectly cause defendants to redress a public safety hazard, a result of obvious benefit to the public under the Private AG Statute. As plaintiffs have alleged ongoing threats to public safety, the Court denies defendants judgment on the pleadings with regard to plaintiffs’ claims under the UTPA, CFA, and the FAA.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, does not require a claimant to seek equitable relief to establish a public benefit.

ADT Security Services, Inc. v. Swenson · filed 2011-03-21subd. 3a

As the Court made explicit in its order denying ADT’s motion to dismiss counterclaims under these consumer protection statutes, counter-claimants do not need to seek equitable relief in order to establish a “public benefit” under the Private Attorney General Statute.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a requires a private plaintiff to show a public benefit; a competitor’s suit to recover its own commercial losses does not qualify merely because the public may benefit incidentally.

Select Comfort Corp. v. Sleep Better Store, LLC · filed 2011-06-17subd. 3a

Because this action will redress Select Comfort’s commercial losses rather than vindicate harm to the public, the Court concludes that Select Comfort’s “injuries are too attenuated to permit recovery” under Minnesota’s private attorney general statute.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires a private party seeking monetary relief under the MCFA to show that the action benefits the public.

Baker v. Best Buy Stores, LP · filed 2012-02-21(3a)

And in order to obtain monetary remedies under the MCFA, a private party must show the requisite type of action and injury-and that the action will benefit the public. Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (2010); Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314 (holding that Minn.Stat. § 8.31 “applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public”). Here, appellants’ complaint is devoid of any allegations that the complaint was brought for the “public benefit” or how their action benefits the public.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits a private consumer fraud claim seeking only money damages when the claim benefits the public.

Khoday v. Symantec Corp. · filed 2012-03-12subd. 3a

Money damages may benefit consumers through providing compensation and a deterrent effect, and the plain language of the Private AG Statute allows for this type of recovery.
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Section 8.31 requires a private claim to benefit the public; courts consider the relief sought, and damages for past harm generally do not satisfy that requirement.

Buetow v. A.L.S. Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2012-08-17(3a)

Although there exists no hard-and-fast rule, a public benefit typically will be found when the plaintiff seeks relief primarily aimed at altering the defendant’s conduct (usually, but not always, through an injunction) rather than seeking remedies for past wrongs (typically through damages). This is because individual damages, generally speaking, merely enrich (or reimburse) the plaintiff to the defendant’s detriment; they do not advance a public interest.
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Subdivision 3a requires a private claimant to show that the cause of action benefits the public; a claim based only on a personal transaction does not meet that requirement.

Edeh v. Equifax Information Services, LLC · filed 2013-01-23(3a)

A private individual injured by a violation of Minnesota Statutes § 13C.016, subdiv. 4(e) may bring a civil action under Minnesota’s private attorney general statute, Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a. ... Edeh has presented evidence of only his personal transaction with Equifax, but there is no evidence in the record that this cause of action benefits the public.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows a private plaintiff to seek damages for consumer fraud if the action benefits the public; allegations of widespread, continuing overcharges can satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

Graphic Communications Local 1B Health & Welfare Fund "A" v. CVS Caremark Corp. · filed 2013-05-06(3a)

In order to obtain monetary damages under the private-attorney-general statute, a party must, in addition to proving a statutory violation, show that the action will benefit the public. ... Construing appellants’ complaint as true, as we must on review of a rule 12 dismissal, appellants’ allegations that respondents have deceptively overcharged purchasers of generic prescription drugs in Minnesota since 2003 involve a public benefit.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits a private action only when the claimant shows a public benefit; relief personal to the claimant does not suffice.

Christensen v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC · filed 2013-12-19subd. 3a

Third, even if plaintiff could establish that the statute applied to him, he has not pled a public interest sufficient to allow a private right of action under Minn.Stat. § 8.31.
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Section 8.31’s private remedy requires a public benefit; seeking an injunction does not establish one when the action primarily seeks to recover a competitor’s commercial losses.

Select Comfort Corp. v. Tempur Sealy International, Inc. · filed 2014-04-08subd. 3a

Thus, the Court finds that despite the fact that Plaintiff seeks an injunction, Plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts to establish a public benefit. Plaintiffs Counts Four, Five, and Six are therefore properly dismissed.
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Section 8.31 requires a private claim to benefit the public; seeking only damages for past wrongs weighs strongly against finding that benefit.

In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litigation · filed 2015-09-11(3a)

They have not sought injunctive or other forward-looking relief, and although that failure is not necessarily dispositive, ... it does weigh strongly against a finding of a public benefit here.
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Section 8.31 requires a claimant bringing a private consumer fraud action to demonstrate a public benefit; a competitor’s lost business alone is insufficient.

Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, Inc. v. Racheal L. Hooten f/k/a Racheal L. Jones · filed 2016-12-19(3a)

In order to use this “private attorney general” statute, however, a claimant must demonstrate that the cause of action benefits the public.
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Section 8.31 requires a private plaintiff to show a public benefit; a claim seeking only damages for a product no longer sold or advertised does not satisfy that requirement.

Pagliaroni v. Mastic Home Exteriors, Inc. · filed 2018-02-15

In this case, however, O'Brien has not established that her claim serves a public interest. Courts considering this question have not extended private standing under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 to plaintiffs who seek only monetary damages relating to products that are no longer sold, advertised or otherwise at risk of affecting the public.
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Section 8.31 requires a private claimant to show that the claim protects public rights; allegations of ongoing public advertising and safety risks can satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

Knotts v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. · filed 2018-10-10(3a)

For a private citizen to seek relief under the statutes in question, he or she must demonstrate that the cause of action "protect[s] public rights in the interest of the state." ... The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations sufficiently allege a public benefit. Knotts asserts that NNA has made misrepresentations about the CVTs on its website, (Compl. ¶ 3), that the representations are ongoing, (id. ), and that public safety is at risk. (Id. ¶ 26.)
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Section 8.31 allows a private claim for damages when the suit benefits the public; injunctive relief is not required.

In re FCA US LLC Monostable Elec. Gearshift Litig. · filed 2018-11-28(3a)

Contrary to the defendant's position, Minnesota does not limit a plaintiff suing under the state's Private AG Act to injunctive relief only. A request for injunctive relief is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for finding that the suit will confer a public benefit. Instead, the focus of the Minnesota courts has been on the degree to which the public at large was impacted by the defendant's conduct, and on whether the relief sought will redress harm inflicted on consumers other than the named plaintiffs.
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Section 8.31 permits a private plaintiff to seek civil remedies for consumer-protection violations only when the action serves a public benefit; allegations of advertising to the general public and a request for damages did not establish that benefit.

Gisairo v. Lenovo (United States) Inc. · filed 2021-02-02(3a)

A plaintiff may use the Private AG Statute to pursue civil remedies only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the action serves a “public benefit.” ... In summary, because Gisairo has alleged insufficient facts to establish that the action serves a public benefit, the Court grants Lenovo’s motion to dismiss Counts I, III, and V.
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Section 8.31’s private attorney general remedy requires a public benefit; a private employment conversation does not satisfy that requirement.

Cohen v. Consilio LLC · filed 2021-05-27subd. 3a

The claim arises out of a private conversation between Cohen and Consilio about Cohen’s prospective employment. The court cannot conclude that such conversation implicates the public interest.
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Section 8.31 permits an individual to seek damages under the Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act when the cause of action benefits the public.

Miami Products & Chemical Co. v. Olin Corporation · filed 2021-06-24

Defendants are incorrect with respect to the MUDTPA—an individual may seek damages under the MUDTPA pursuant to Minnesota’s private attorney general statute, Minn. Stat. § 8.31, so long as the “cause of action benefits the public.” Tatone v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 821, 836 (D. Minn. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Weller v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., No. CIV. 08-2798 JRTSRN, 2009 WL 928522, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). The Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs’ allegations, accepted as true, support a plausible inference of benefit to the public in the event they are successful, because anticompetitive price fixing presents a public harm.
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Section 8.31 permits a private plaintiff to pursue civil remedies only if the action serves a public interest or benefit.

Cleveland v. Whirlpool Corporation · filed 2021-07-27(3a)

A plaintiff may use Minnesota’s Private Attorney General statute, Minn. Stat. § 8.31 (Private AG Statute), to pursue civil remedies only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the action serves a public interest or benefit.
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Section 8.31 requires a private plaintiff to show a public benefit; seeking primarily monetary relief for past wrongs does not satisfy that requirement.

Bechtel v. Fitness Equipment Services, LLC dba Sole Fitness · filed 2021-09-123a

Thus, plaintiffs fail to establish the public benefit required to seek remedies through Minnesota’s private attorney general statute, and plaintiffs’ claims under the MPCFA, MUTPA, and MFSAA must be dismissed.
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Section 8.31 permits a private claim for damages under the Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act when the claim benefits the public.

In Re Toyota Rav4 Hybrid Fuel Tank Litigation · filed 2021-12-09

Courts have allowed claims seeking damages under the MUDTPA pursuant to Minnesota’s private attorney general statute, so long as the cause of action benefits the public. ... Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, there is a plausible inference of benefit to the public because false advertising and unfair business practices can harm the public. ... Plaintiffs may amend the FAC and add a claim for Klinkhammer to seek damages under Minnesota’s private attorney general statute.
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Section 8.31 permits a private consumer-protection claim when the plaintiff alleges a public benefit, including false or misleading advertising directed to the public at large.

Barclay v. iFit Health & Fitness Inc. · filed 2022-02-17(3a)

Section 8.31 is available “only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.” ... Collins, binding here, answers whether Ovsak alleges facts plausibly showing a public benefit. He does. The Third Amended Complaint includes many allegations that Defendants directed false or misleading advertisements to the public at large.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits a private action only if successful prosecution would benefit the public.

Kellogg v. Watts Guerra · filed 2022-07-26(3a)

The Kellogg farmers had brought these claims under Minnesota’s private-attorney-general statute, Minn. Stat. § 8.31 subd. 3a. ... Under this statute, a private right-of-action exists only if successful prosecution of the claim would benefit the public.
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Section 8.31 requires a private plaintiff pursuing a Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act claim to show a public benefit; requesting an injunction alone may be insufficient.

Event Sales, Inc. v. TJX Companies, Inc. The · filed 2025-07-01(3a)

Moreover, the Court finds Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are insufficient to establish that the case has a public benefit sufficient to allow Event Sales to pursue its MCFA claim under the Private AG Statute.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires a private consumer-protection claim to benefit the public; allegations of only individual harm do not suffice.

Williams v. Midwest Bonding · filed 2025-12-01(3a)

Williams’ consumer-protection statutory claims also fall short because they do not allege any benefit to the public. See Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (2024) (authorizing claims under the consumer-protection act pursuant to the private attorney general statute).
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A private action under § 8.31, subdivision 3a must benefit the public; misleading labels used on widely sold products can satisfy that requirement even when plaintiffs seek damages and declaratory relief.

Kaufmann · filed 2025-12-29(3a)

This requirement applies to actions brought under Minnesota’s Private Attorney General statute. See In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076 (D. Minn. 2010); Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a. ... So Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a public benefit, and their MFSAA claims will survive the motion to dismiss.
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Subdivision 3a allows a private plaintiff to sue under the Consumer Fraud Act only if the action benefits the public.

In re Revlimid & Thalomid Purchase Antitrust Litigation · filed 2026-03-18(3a)

It follows that a private plaintiff who wants to bring a claim via the Minnesota Private AG statute must satisfy the same “public” test as the Attorney General.
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Attorney fees and costs

Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires courts setting attorney’s fees to consider the usual fee factors, the statute’s purposes, and how much the suit advances the public interest.

Liess v. Lindemyer · filed 1984-09-11subd. 3a

In addition to the Paulson factors, these are appropriate considerations in setting a fee under Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3(a), authorizes recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees for violations of the Consumer Fraud Statute.

Yost v. Millhouse · filed 1985-09-03(3)(a)

Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3(a) (1984) authorizes recovery of attorneys fees for violations of the Consumer Fraud Statute, Minn. Stat. § 325 F. 69 (1984). ... As a matter of law, the fraud constitutes a violation of the Consumer protection Act for which reasonable attorney’s fees are recoverable.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a allows attorney’s fees only upon a finding of breach of warranty.

Clapp v. Haferman Water Conditioning, Inc. · filed 1986-01-28subd. 3a

The Clapps argue that they are entitled to atttorney’s fees under the Minnesota Consumer Protection Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Attorney’s fees under these Acts are only recoverable upon a finding of breach of warranty.
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Subdivision 3a does not authorize attorney fees for a violation of section 72A.20 because subdivision 1 does not refer to that statute.

Mattson v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London · filed 1986-04-22(3a)

As the trial court pointed out, subdivision 1 of section 8.31 does not refer to this statute. Furthermore, the court found there was no evidence of a general practice of bad faith refusal to settle. Respondent has not shown the court’s decision to be error.
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Section 8.31 authorizes attorney’s fees for a violation of the prevention of consumer fraud act when the claimant proceeds under that provision.

Metag v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1986-04-22

Although Minn.Stat. § 8.31 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees for a violation of the prevention of consumer fraud act, appellant failed to proceed under this provision. Consequently, the general rule that attorney’s fees are not recoverable applies, and the trial court properly refused to award them.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees for violations of the Consumer Fraud Act.

Eager v. Siwek Lumber & Millwork, Inc. · filed 1986-09-02subd. 3a

Eager counter-moved for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and attorney’s fees under Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (1984), which authorizes the recovery of attorney’s fees for violations of the Consumer Fraud Act, Minn.Stat. § 325F.69 (1984). ... The trial court did not err in granting this motion.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits attorney’s fees for injury caused by a Consumer Fraud Statute violation; fees may be denied when no consumer fraud occurred.

Mattson v. Rochester Silo, Inc. · filed 1987-03-13subd. 3a

The Mattsons seek attorney’s fees under Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (1984), which allows fees to be awarded when a person is injured by a violation of the Consumer Fraud Statute, Minn.Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1 (1984). ... The jury found Rochester did not make a misrepresentation or use a deceptive practice during its relationship with the Matt-sons. That finding is supported by the evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there had been no consumer fraud and in denying attorney’s fees.
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Subdivision 3a authorizes attorney fees for the attorney general when at least part of an action falls within the laws covered by subdivision 1.

State Ex Rel. Humphrey v. Ri-Mel, Inc. · filed 1987-12-15(3a)

Thus, since all the claims against appellants were adjudicated by default and at a minimum, a portion of the action clearly fell within the parameters of Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 1, the court was authorized to award attorney fees pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, entitles a successful consumer protection claimant to costs and attorney fees, even if the claimant represented himself.

Wexler v. Brothers Entertainment Group, Inc. · filed 1990-06-12(3a)

If Wexler prevails at trial on one or both of his consumer protection claims, he is entitled to costs and attorney fees under Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. ... The fact that Wexler, a licensed attorney, acted as his own attorney, although perhaps relevant, does not eliminate his right to costs and attorney fees.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a allows a person injured by a violation of section 325F.67 to recover attorney fees and costs even when damages are more than nominal.

Kronebusch v. MVBA Harvestore System · filed 1992-08-11(3a)

Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a allows “any person injured” by a violation of Minn.Stat. § 325F.67 to recover attorney fees and costs. The statute’s plain language does not limit its application to cases involving nominal damages.
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Section 8.31 permits attorney's fees for a successful Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act suit, subject to the district court's discretion.

Scott Fetzer Co. v. Williamson · filed 1996-11-29subd. 3a

A plaintiff may recover his attorney's fees resulting from a successful lawsuit for a violation of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act. Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 1, subd. 3a (1994). Under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, we review the district court's decision on whether to award attorney's fees for abuse of discretion. Hutchinson Utils. Comm'n v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 775 F.2d 231, 243 (8th Cir. 1985). For the reasons we have already set out above, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williamson an award of his attorney's fees under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3(a), does not award attorney fees to a claimant who does not prevail on a consumer fraud claim.

Scott v. Forest Lake Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge · filed 1999-08-24subd. 3(a)

Because he did not prevail on his consumer fraud claim, Scott is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3(a) (1998).
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows a private plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees and costs for an action involving fraud, misrepresentation, or deceptive practices.

Cashman v. Allied Products Corp. · filed 1985-05-15(3a)

Under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, Minn.Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1, and Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 1, subd. 3a, a private plaintiff may recover attorneys’ fees and costs for an action for fraud, misrepresentation, or deceptive practices. ... We thus decline to reverse the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a’s special factors for attorneys fees do not apply to fees awarded in this Data Practices Act action.

Nelson v. Ninneman · filed 1985-08-27(3a)

We do not find relevant to this case the special factors governing awards of attorneys fees under the private attorney general statute, Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (1984).
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows a person injured by consumer fraud to recover damages, investigation costs, and reasonable attorney fees.

Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc. · filed 1992-10-23(3a)

Minnesota's private attorney general statute authorizes any person injured by a violation of Minn.Stat. § 325F.69 to bring a civil action to recover damages together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney's fees and other equitable relief. Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (1990). ... The private attorney general statute was intended to cover just this type of case. Attorney fees and costs were properly awarded.
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Section 8.31 permits attorney fees when a suit benefits the public by stopping misleading advertising, regardless of the number of plaintiffs.

Collins v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc. · filed 2001-12-10(3a)

But because appellants’ claims did benefit the public, the district court erred in denying in its entirety appellants’ request for attorney fees under the private-attorney-general statute.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, allows an injured party to recover investigation costs and attorney fees on a consumer fraud claim.

Boubelik v. Liberty State Bank · filed 1995-04-27(3a)

Respondents’ claim under the Act is relevant because the Act, unlike common-law fraud, allows the injured party to recover the costs of investigation and attorney fees.
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Section 8.31 permits attorney fees for a qualifying false advertising claim, but a court may deny them when the claimant's conduct erases the action's public benefit.

Transclean Corporation, James P. Viken, Jon A. Lang, and Donald E. Johnson v. Bridgewood Services, Inc., Defendant/cross · filed 2002-07-02

The court determined that, while Transclean's cause of action against Bridgewood for false advertising was on its face one that qualified for attorney fees under the statute, Attorney Fees Opinion at 11, Transclean's own use of advertising that was arguably equivalent in falsity and Transclean's tolerance of Century's use of the same advertising when it licensed Transclean's patent erased any public benefit accruing from the successful action against Bridgewood, id. at 12-14. The district court's reasoning is sound, and we discern no abuse of discretion in its decision not to award Transclean attorney fees for its false advertising claim.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits recovery of attorney fees only in a civil action enforcing an enumerated consumer-protection statute.

In re Pera Salary Determinations Affecting Retired & Active Employees · filed 2012-08-06(3a)

Second, relators also contend that they are entitled to fees under the private attorney general statute, Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (2010). But that statute provides for recovery of attorney fees only in a "civil action” to enforce specifically enumerated consumer-protection statutes. This was an administrative proceeding, and none of the enumerated statutes was invoked.
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A bidder awarded bid-preparation costs under the UMCL must allege a viable additional claim under section 8.31 to recover attorney fees through its private attorney general remedy.

Rochon Corp. v. City of St. Paul · filed 2013-04-08(3a)

Because Rochon has already received bid-preparation costs under the UMCL, it must allege a viable additional claim falling within the Private AG statute to be eligible to recover under its provisions. Otherwise the UMCL’s prohibition of awarding attorney fees will govern.
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Section 8.31 does not authorize attorney fees merely because another party brought a frivolous motion.

Gary Otremba, Heidi L. Moegerle v. City of East Bethel · filed 2016-11-28(3a)

And although the private attorney general statute contemplates an award of attorney fees, it does not provide for an award of attorney fees on the ground that a party brought a frivolous motion. Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subds. 1, 3a (2014).
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Civil penalties

Section 8.31, subdivision 3, permits a court to impose a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, false advertising statute, or Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

State Ex Rel. Humphrey v. Alpine Air Products, Inc. · filed 1992-11-17subd. 3

A civil penalty may be imposed “in an amount to be determined by the court.” Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3 (1990). The state is entitled to civil penalties up to $25,000 for each violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, the false advertising statute and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
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Section 8.31 authorizes civil money penalties for violations of Minnesota consumer protection laws.

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Consumer Advocacy Center Inc. · filed 2023-07-07

By reason of Defendant Wen’s violations of the state laws set forth in this Order, and under Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17206, Minn. Stat. § 8.31, and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-15.2, Defendant Wen is liable for civil money penalties to each State, as set forth below.
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Joinder of necessary parties

A private action under section 8.31, subdivision 3a, does not excuse joining the commissioner of commerce when the commissioner’s interest is affected.

Unbank Co., LLP v. Merwin Drug Co., Inc. · filed 2004-04-06(3a)

And proceeding under the private-attorney-general statute does not- mean that it is unnecessary to join the commissioner of commerce when the commissioner’s interest is affected.
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Choice of law

Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, permits an injured person to sue for violations of Minnesota consumer protection statutes, but does not eliminate the choice-of-law analysis required for out-of-state plaintiffs.

Grovatt v. St. Jude Medical · filed 2005-10-12(3a)

The district court justified its decision not to conduct a conflicts analysis by relying on section 8.31 of the Minnesota Statutes. This section permits “any person injured by a violation of” Minnesota’s consumer protection statutes to bring suit. Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. ... State consumer protection standing statutes do not extinguish federal constitutional rights or relieve courts from performing the analysis required to safeguard those rights.
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Section 8.31 allows a person injured by a violation of Minnesota’s consumer protection statutes to sue, but its standing language does not eliminate the constitutional choice-of-law analysis for out-of-state plaintiffs.

In re St. Jude Medical, Inc. Silzone Heart Valve Products Liability Litigation · filed 2005-10-12subd. 3a

The district court justified its decision not to conduct a conflicts analysis by relying on section 8.31 of the Minnesota Statutes. This section permits "any person injured by a violation of" Minnesota's consumer protection statutes to bring suit. Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a. ... State consumer protection standing statutes do not extinguish federal constitutional rights or relieve courts from performing the analysis required to safeguard those rights.
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Attorney general settlements and private claims

Section 8.31 allows the attorney general, when acting in the state’s best interests, to settle and release private litigants’ subdivision 3a claims.

Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc. · filed 2012-05-30(3a)

It logically follows that the State AG has the authority to settle and release a private litigant’s subdivision 3a claims. As long as the AG is acting in the best interests of the state, we discern no legislative intent to limit the authority of the State AG to settle section 8.31 lawsuits, even to the extent of releasing potential claims of private litigants under subdivision 3a.
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Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, requires a private claimant to show that the action benefits the public and that the alleged statutory violation has a causal nexus to the claimed damages.

McDougall v. CRC Industries, Inc. · filed 2021-03-03(3a)

To avail themself of the Private Attorney General Act, a claimant must demonstrate that his “cause of action benefits the public,” Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000), and that there is a “causal nexus between the conduct alleged to violate [the statutes] and the damages claimed.” Grp. Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 2001). ... The Court accordingly finds that the pleadings and form of relief McDougall seeks are consistent with a public benefit. ... The Court finds that this is a plausible nexus and that McDougall has met his burden as to the claims brought under the Minnesota AG Act.
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Section 8.31 does not authorize a private attorney general action for a claim under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act because that Act is not listed in subdivision 1.

Finstad v. Ride Auto, LLC · filed 2015-11-30(3a)

Subdivision 1 refers specifically to nine statutes but does not refer to the DTPA.
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54 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Kamrath v. Suburban National Bank, the court cited section 8.31 by analogy when assessing attorney’s fees under section 181.75. opinion →
US Liability Ins. Co. v. JOHNSON & LINDBERG, PA, the court cites a state appellate ruling about § 8.31 and dismisses the claim because the defendants showed no general business practice under § 72A.20. opinion →
Avery v. Solargizer International, Inc., the court cited § 8.31 as the source of a private remedy, then decided whether the plaintiffs had shown a Consumer Fraud Act violation. opinion →
In Re Rice Lake Auto, Inc., the court cites the section to describe the attorney general’s investigative demand while deciding whether an order concerning that demand is appealable. opinion →
Cardinal v. Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, Inc., the court reports the trial court's use of § 8.31 for recovery but reverses because it finds no unauthorized practice of law under § 481.02. opinion →
In Re Professional Financial Management, Ltd., the court cites § 8.31 to identify the private action available for a consumer fraud claim, then decides the claim under § 325F.69. opinion →
Cooperman v. R.G. Barry Corp., the court cites section 8.31(3a) as the source of a private remedy but dismisses the claim based on its interpretation of section 325F.69(1). opinion →
State Ex Rel. Humphrey v. Casino Marketing Group, Inc., the court mentions the section only as the authority for the state's temporary injunction motion. opinion →
Fogie v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., the court certified claims brought under § 8.31 under Rule 23 without deciding what § 8.31 requires or permits. opinion →
Bachovchin v. Stingley, the court distinguishes an earlier decision involving § 8.31 while deciding whether § 325E.16 allows costs and fees without actual damages. opinion →
Untiedt v. Grand Laboratories, Inc., the court cites the section for context while deciding what “recovery” means in the parties’ retainer agreement. opinion →
Boubelik v. Liberty State Bank, the court resolved the Consumer Fraud Act claim and therefore did not decide whether attorney fees were available under section 8.31. opinion →
STATE BY HUMPHREY v. Granite Gate Resorts, the court cites section 8.31 to describe the attorney general’s authority while deciding whether the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota. opinion →
Parkhill v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance, the court mentions § 8.31 in recounting an argument about damages, then resolves the claim based on remedies available under the Trade Act. opinion →
Williamson v. Guentzel, the court cites the section while recounting the federal court’s attorney fee ruling and decides only whether that ruling precludes a malicious prosecution claim. opinion →
Hall v. Walter, the dissent cites the section as an analogy while arguing about who may sue under Colorado’s consumer protection statute. opinion →
Ly v. Nystrom, the court mentions section 8.31 as the basis for an attorney-fee request but decides whether the Consumer Fraud Act applies to the transaction. opinion →
VanDanacker v. Main Motor Sales Co., the court mentions § 8.31 only while recounting the plaintiffs’ pleaded claims in a dispute over attorney fees and costs. opinion →
Connecticut Pipe Trades Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., the court cited § 8.31 to distinguish Minnesota consumer protection law while deciding a claim under Connecticut law. opinion →
Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women's Center, Inc., the court describes its earlier interpretation of section 8.31 to reject an analogy to the whistleblower statute. opinion →
Schwickert, Inc. v. Winnebago Seniors, Ltd., the court mentions the section while distinguishing a prior attorney-fee case because no statute allowed attorney fees for the claims before it. opinion →
Gardner v. First American Title Insurancr, the court mentions the section only as a basis for the relief Plaintiffs sought and decides their state law claims under other statutes. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Hatch v. Allina Health System, the court reports the district court’s reliance on the section but reverses on notice and summary judgment grounds without deciding its meaning. opinion →
In Re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation, the court mentions § 8.31 as a possible basis for the claim, then evaluates the allegations under other Minnesota consumer protection statutes. opinion →
Dabit v. Lynch, the court cites the section while deciding whether federal securities law preempts the Minnesota consumer protection claims. opinion →
Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the court cites § 8.31, subdivision 3a, as a source of the state statutory claims while deciding whether SLUSA preempts claims for annual fees. opinion →
In Re GlaxoSmithKline Plc, the court cites the section only as the authority for the civil investigatory demand and decides the dispute under other law. opinion →
O'NEIL v. Simplicity, Inc., the court cites subdivision 3a in a footnote supporting a damages requirement the plaintiffs conceded. opinion →
Equity Trust Co. Custodian FBO Heather Eisenmenger Ira v. Cole, the court held that the receiver was appointed under section 576.01 and the court’s equitable powers, so section 8.31 did not govern the challenged expansion. opinion →
Sayer v. Minnesota Department of Transportation, the court cites the section to identify the basis for the appellants’ action, then decides whether the bridge contract award complied with the bidding rules. opinion →
Tatone v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., the magistrate judge discussed the section’s public benefit requirement while recommending dismissal, but the opinion does not show the district court adopting that recommendation. opinion →
Delre v. Perry, the court lists the section among Harrison’s claims while deciding whether to consolidate the actions and appoint interim class counsel. opinion →
In re Niaspan Antitrust Litigation, the court lists § 8.31 in an et seq. citation while dismissing the Minnesota consumer-protection claim, without deciding any rule of that section. opinion →
Graves v. Michael Wayman, First Minnesota Bank, the court mentions § 8.31 while recounting Graves’s request for rescission but does not decide any rule under that section. opinion →
Kristen Harne and Sheila Foster, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. State of Minnesota, the court cites the section to identify the private claim appellants said the settlement extinguished, then decides when their takings claim became time-barred. opinion →
Moore v. CenterPoint Energy Resources Corporation, the court cited section 8.31 as a possible private remedy but declined to decide whether Moore qualified under it. opinion →
Finnegan v. SunTrust Mortgage, the court mentions the section only to identify it as Minnesota’s Private Attorney General Statute. opinion →
Berkson v. Gogo LLC, the court lists § 8.31 among state consumer protection statutes without deciding its rules. opinion →
Painters & Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., the court cites the section as the basis for Painters’ private claims while deciding whether to certify the Minnesota subclasses under Rule 23(b)(3). opinion →
Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the court dismissed the Section 8.31 claim because it depended on a TILA rescission claim that failed. opinion →
Foster v. State of Minnesota, the court recounts the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling on the Attorney General’s authority under the section while deciding this appeal on res judicata grounds. opinion →
BCBSM, Inc. v. Walgreen Co., the court lists the section among statutes cited for Minnesota consumer protection claims but does not decide any rule under it. opinion →
Heights Apartments, LLC v. Walz, the court cites the section as a source of potential penalties under the eviction order while deciding constitutional claims. opinion →
Ward v. Carlson, the court used the arbitration panel’s award under subdivision 3a to decide whether the attorney fee debt was dischargeable under federal bankruptcy law. opinion →
McDougall v. CRC Industries, Inc., the court mentions § 8.31 in its procedural history while describing statutory claims that were dismissed or withdrawn before this decision. opinion →
Rouse v. H.B. Fuller Company, the court mentions section 8.31 as the plaintiffs’ argument for applying other Minnesota statutes outside Minnesota, then dismisses those claims for lack of standing. opinion →
Rouse v. H.B. Fuller Company, the court mentions the section in recounting Plaintiffs’ argument, then dismisses their claims under other Minnesota statutes because they lack standing. opinion →
United Healthcare Services, Inc. v. AmerisourceBergen Corporation, the court lists § 8.31 as part of UHS’s consumer fraud claim but dismisses the claim as untimely under a separate limitations statute. opinion →
Knapp v. Compass Minnesota, LLC, the court cites the section to support its discussion of remedies for unlicensed practice of law while deciding whether to compel communication with a nonlawyer representative. opinion →
Boyd v. Target Corp., the court cites section 8.31 in recounting the plaintiffs’ argument and defers the standing issue until class certification without construing the section. opinion →
Dart Transit Company v. Paccar, Inc., the court dismissed the consumer fraud claim because Dart Transit was a merchant and did not reach the public-benefit issue under § 8.31. opinion →
Knox v. Impact MHC Management, LLC, the court uses interpretations of section 8.31 as an analogy to decide what “injured” means under the MCFA’s private right of action. opinion →
Minnesota Teamsters Service Bureau v. GoodRx, Inc., the court cites an earlier case involving section 8.31 as an example while deciding standing under a different statute. opinion →
Toth v. Arason, the court cites section 8.31 as a potential source of damages and attorney fees but decides that section 325F.64 makes the Truth in Repairs Act’s remedy provision inapplicable. opinion →

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