Minn. Stat. § 604.01

Subdivision 5 does not apply to contract claims, including actions to determine insurance coverage.

Leamington Co. v. Nonprofits' Insurance Ass'n · filed 2003-05-27(5)

It did not address the issue raised here and does not stand for the proposition that subdivision 5 applies to contract actions. Instead, we look to the rule that the comparative-fault statute does not apply to contract claims.

Subdivision 1(a)'s comparative-fault rules do not apply to a buyer's warranty claim for damage to the product itself or incidental damages, although contributory fault may bar consequential damages.

Peterson v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc. · filed 1982-04-16(1)(a)

To sum up, we hold, in a buyer’s action for breach of warranty against the manufacturer of a product for damages to the product itself and for incidental damages, that the Comparative Fault Statute is not applicable and the buyer’s contributory fault is not a defense. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that plaintiff’s fault did not bar her recovery for nonconsequential damages, only for consequential damages.

Section 604.01 treats an unreasonable failure to mitigate damages as fault that may be apportioned, including when calculating consequential damages in a contract action.

Lesmeister v. Dilly · filed 1983-02-14(1a)

He was under a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages. Unreasonable failure to mitigate damages is “fault” which can be apportioned under the comparative fault statute. Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. la (1980).

Section 604.01's comparative-fault apportionment does not apply when the claims, even if some sound in tort, are rooted in contracts.

Zontelli & Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk · filed 1984-07-24

The trial court concluded the underlying nature of Zontelli’s claims lay in tort and therefore applied comparative fault principles under Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1982). ... While we can understand why the trial court wanted to apportion fault in this case, apportionment was not proper. Regardless of the fact that some of Zontelli’s claims sound in tort, the basis of each claim is rooted in a contract.

Section 604.01 includes negligent and reckless conduct in comparative fault; punitive damages against one party do not relieve another partly at-fault party of responsibility for compensatory damages.

Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co. · filed 1985-06-14subd. 1(a)

“Fault” includes “acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others * * * * ” Minn. Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1(a) (1984). ... That the jury found that Clark was willfully indifferent to others’ safety and assessed punitive damages for which U.S. Steel has no liability does not justify permitting U.S. Steel to escape all liability for the compensatory damages attributable to an injury for which it was partly at fault.

Section 604.01’s comparative fault rule operates alongside joint and several liability, so a defendant found 47% at fault may be liable for the full award.

Ketterling v. Spud Bar, Inc. · filed 1986-12-30subd. 1

Hosley indicates Minn. Stat. §§ 604.01 and 604.02 can peacefully co-exist and that the two are read together, even if only comparative negligence is stated to apply.

Section 604.01’s comparative-fault rules do not apply to specified family-member Civil Damage Act actions, while its former apportionment provision was transferred to § 604.02.

Pautz v. Cal-Ros, Inc. · filed 1983-11-23

Moreover, the subsequent history of §§ 604.01 and 340.95 confirm the accuracy of this conclusion. Effective April 15,1978, the comparative negligence statute became the comparative fault statute. ... The provision for the apportionment of damages among tortfeasors was deleted from § 604.01 and became a separate section, Minn.Stat. § 604.02 (1978). ... Thus, although we are constrained to hold aliquot contribution applicable in the present case, we are free to apply proportionate contribution in any action pursuant to the Civil Damage Act which occurs on or after April 15, 1978.

Section 604.01's comparative-fault bar applies when the plaintiff seeks recovery from the negligent person whose fault is being compared, and it does not bar a third-party tortfeasor's contribution claim against a negligent employer when the employee could not recover from the employer in a direct suit.

Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc. · filed 1982-08-31(1)

The comparative-fault statute does not affect the apportionment procedure set out in Johnson. The statute addresses situations in which plaintiff brings an action against a negligent defendant and is barred from recovery because his fault is as great as the fault “of the person against whom recovery is sought.” Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (emphasis added). Hudson did not seek recovery from Olsen. Rather, the action against Olsen is a third-party action by Perfection and Snyder for contribution or indemnity. The special verdict apportioning Olsen’s negligence could have been for no purpose other than ascertaining contribution, since Hudson was precluded from recovery from Olsen regardless of Olsen’s degree of negligence. ... We therefore hold that a third-party tortfeasor may recover contribution from a negligent employer under the principles of Lambertson and Johnson whether or not the employee, in a direct suit, would have been barred from recovery under the comparative-fault statute.

Section 604.01 requires negligence and other fault contributing to an injury to be accounted for through comparative fault rather than automatically barring recovery.

Bilotta v. Kelley Co., Inc. · filed 1984-03-16

As respondent urges, the negligence of McGrath and the violations of OSHA should not preclude recovery as a matter of law. Rather, they are adequately taken into consideration in the comparative-fault formula, Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1982).

Section 604.01 is part of Minnesota’s modified comparative-fault system, which does not eliminate the disproportionality prerequisite for contribution by adopting pure comparative fault.

Bekis v. Schilling · filed 1984-11-06

The state’s argument presumes that ours is a pure comparative negligence system. Rather, the legislature created a modified comparative fault system which cotnprises liability and contribution. Minn.Stat. § 604.01 to 604.06 (1982). Other statutory considerations may take precedence over the jury’s assessment of negligence. ... The Minnesota Supreme Court has refused to engraft a pure comparative fault contribution exception upon the Minnesota comparative fault statute. ... Likewise, we decline to create a pure comparative fault contribution system by overruling the disproportionality prerequisite to contribution.

Section 604.01 bars recovery when a plaintiff’s apportioned negligence is greater than the defendant’s.

Alden Wells Veterinarian Clinics, Inc. v. Wood · filed 1982-08-31

In apportioning negligence at trial, however, the jury determined that the plaintiff was 55% negligent and that greater negligence precludes any recovery. See Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1980).

Section 604.01, subdivision 1 bars recovery against a defendant whose fault is less than the plaintiff’s and reduces damages only by the plaintiff’s proportionate fault, so it does not authorize a pure comparative-fault contribution exception.

Horton Ex Rel. Horton v. Orbeth, Inc. · filed 1984-01-13(1)

Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1982) provides (a) that the plaintiff cannot recover from one whose degree of fault is less than the plaintiff’s, and (b) that the damages shall be reduced only in proportion to the plaintiff’s fault. ... We now decline to engraft a pure comparative fault contribution exception to the statutory system.

Section 604.01 reduces a plaintiff's recoverable damages in proportion to the plaintiff's fault.

Ottem Ex Rel. Ottem v. United States · filed 1984-08-17

The court finds, however, that the damages for pain and suffering should be reduced to reflect his proportionate fault.

Section 604.01 generally does not apply to fully contractual claims, but an unreasonable failure to mitigate consequential damages is fault that may be apportioned under comparative fault.

Mike's Fixtures, Inc. v. Bombard's Access Floor System, Inc. · filed 1984-09-11(1a)

However, as to items of consequential damage, the unreasonable failure to mitigate damages is “fault” which can be apportioned under the comparative fault statute. Minn.Stat., § 604.01, subd. la (1980).

Section 604.01 requires a jury’s damages award to be reduced in proportion to the negligence attributable to the party recovering.

Lesueur Creamery, Inc., a Minnesota Corporation v. Haskon, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Hercules, Inc., a Delaware Corporation · filed 1981-09-17

The Minnesota comparative fault statute governing in this case requires that in actions involving negligence “any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.” Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1969). ... The trial court’s refusal to reduce the damages awarded in proportion to LeSueur’s own negligence was erroneous. Minnesota law explicitly requires that a jury’s damage award be proportionally reduced by the amount of negligence attributable to the prevailing party. ... he must apply the statute and reduce the damages awarded in proportion to the prevailing party’s own fault.

Section 604.01 requires a plaintiff’s fault to be compared with each defendant individually and generally bars recovery when the plaintiff is more at fault than that defendant.

Tester v. American Standard, Inc. · filed 1999-04-06(1)

Minnesota law generally requires the plaintiffs fault to be compared against each defendant individually, and it does not permit aggregating fault of multiple defendants when applying the comparative fault statute, Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1.

Section 604.01 adopts modified comparative fault: a plaintiff’s recovery is reduced in proportion to the plaintiff’s fault, and recovery is barred when the plaintiff’s fault exceeds the defendant’s.

Hernandez v. Ecolab, Inc. · filed 2023-06-13(1)

However, Minnesota applies principles of modified comparative fault that diminish a plaintiff’s recovery in proportion to the plaintiff’s own fault, and ultimately preclude recovery where the plaintiff’s fault is found to be greater than the defendant’s. Minn. Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1.

Section 604.01 does not displace the common-law rule allowing parties to allocate liability by express contract when a contribution clause applies.

Ploog v. Ogilvie · filed 1981-08-14

We note that the comparative fault statute, Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1980), is rendered inapplicable to this case by the contribution clause. Section 604.01 reveals no intent to negate the common law rule whereby parties may allocate liability by express contract.

Sections 604.01 and 604.02 are read together and can coexist, so comparative-fault principles do not eliminate joint and several liability.

Fette v. Peterson · filed 1987-04-28

Hosley indicates Minn.Stat. §§ 604.01 [comparative fault] and 604.02 [joint and several liability] can peacefully co-exist and that the two are read together, even if only comparative negligence is stated to apply. ... Accordingly, Redning’s claim that joint and several liability does not apply in dramshop claims is without merit.

Section 604.01, subdivision 1a, treats conduct subjecting a person to strict tort liability as “fault,” allowing that liability to be compared with a co-tortfeasor’s negligence.

Clark v. Connor · filed 2014-01-21subd. 1a

Even if the jury had found the dog owners hable solely on the basis of statutory liability, we find no persuasive support for appellant’s argument. The comparative-fault statute allows the allocation of fault based on “acts or omissions that are in any measure neghgent” and fault based on “acts or omissions ... that subject a person to strict tort liability.” Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. la. The dog-attack statute “leaves the dog owner ... with the strict liabihty of an insurer.” Lavalle v. Kaupp, 240 Minn. 360, 363, 61 N.W.2d 228, 230 (1953). Accordingly, the comparative-fault statute allows comparing a dog owner’s liability stemming from the dog-attack statute with a co-tortfeasor’s negligence.

Section 604.01 treats secondary (unreasonable) assumption of risk as comparative fault, while preserving express consent and primary assumption of risk as complete defenses.

T.H.S. Northstar Associates v. W.R. Grace & Co. · filed 1995-09-25subd. 1a

The comparative fault statute excludes “express consent or primary assumption of the risk.” Thus, consent and primary assumption of risk remain complete defenses. ... Thus, this was a case of secondary assumption of risk, which is covered by Minnesota’s comparative fault statute and which therefore relieves Grace of liability only to the extent the jury finds comparative fault in THS’s assumption of the risk.

Section 604.01 treats an unreasonable failure to avoid injury or mitigate damages as fault considered only in determining damages, and requires the comparative-fault issue to be submitted to the jury when evidence supports it.

Moorhead Economic Development Authority v. Anda · filed 2010-09-02(1a)

An “unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages” is one type of fault described and required to be considered under the comparative fault scheme articulated by the Act. Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. la. Such fault is different from negligence that causes the accident or the injury-inducing event. ... And such fault “may be considered only in determining the damages to which the claimant is entitled. It may not be considered in determining the cause of an accident.” ... We conclude that the issue of comparative fault should have been presented to the jury because all of the foregoing evidence tends to demonstrate MHA may have been at fault by “unreasonably] failfing] to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.” ... Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred when it refused to submit a comparative fault instruction and question to the jury.

Section 604.01 treats an unreasonable failure to avoid injury or mitigate damages as fault and permits comparative fault to be submitted to the jury when supported by evidence.

McKay's Family Dodge v. Hardrives, Inc. · filed 1992-01-281a

“Fault” includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others * * *. The term also includes * * * unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. ... Respondents clearly had a duty to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent or mitigate damages. Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. la. The evidence presented at trial allowed a reasonable inference that respondent could have prevented or mitigated its damages by more regularly washing its cars. ... This fact could have allowed a jury reasonably to find that respondent could have prevented or reduced its damages through more frequent washings.

Subdivision 1 requires the jury to make separate findings of each party’s comparative fault and the total damages without considering fault, after which the court apportions the damages according to those fault findings.

Norman v. Crow Wing Cooperative Power & Light Company · filed 2016-02-22subd. 1

The statutory language clearly assigns separate tasks to the jury and the court. The jury is to make separate findings as to (1) the comparative negligence of each party (and any identified third parties); and (2) the damages suffered by the plaintiff. Importantly, the damages finding is made without regard to comparative fault.

Contributory fault, including unreasonable assumption of risk and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury, bars recovery only when it is greater than the fault of the party from whom recovery is being sought.

Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc. · filed 1982-08-31subd. 1a

Contributory fault, including “unreasonable assumption of risk” and “unreasonable failure to avoid an injury,” bars recovery only when it is greater than the fault of the party from whom recovery is being sought.

Section 604.01 abolishes last clear chance and subsumes unreasonable assumption of risk into the comparative-fault analysis.

Jenkins v. Immedia, Inc. · filed 2019-06-161a

Additionally, the Minnesota Legislature expressly abolished some of these doctrines (last clear chance) and subsumed others into the comparative fault equation (unreasonable assumption of the risk).

Section 604.01 allows a plaintiff’s ordinary contributory negligence to be compared with a defendant’s strict liability under Minnesota’s comparative-fault law, subject to the statute’s limits.

Omnetics, Inc. v. Radiant Technology Corp. · filed 1989-05-231, 1a

The settled rule in Minnesota is that the ordinary contributory negligence of a plaintiff can be compared with the strict liability of defendant under the state’s comparative fault law.

Section 604.01 requires a comparative-fault jury instruction only when evidence supports submitting the issue, and it treats an unreasonable failure to mitigate damages as fault for the jury to consider.

Independent School District No. 622 v. Keene Corp. · filed 1993-04-20subd. 1; subd. 1a

Consequently, evidence supporting the submission of comparative fault to the jury must exist before a trial court is required to give such an instruction. ... The comparative fault statute expressly provides that unreasonable failure to mitigate damages is a type of fault the jury should consider.

Section 604.01 requires a trial court to submit a party’s comparative fault to the jury only when evidence tends to demonstrate that party’s fault, and its mitigation provision concerns conduct that could have limited damages when the injury occurred.

Independent School District No. 622 v. Keene Corp. · filed 1994-01-14subd. 1; subd. 1a

Therefore, before a trial court may submit the issue of a party’s fault to the jury, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 604.01, evidence must exist tending to demonstrate the party’s fault.

Section 604.01 allows a factfinder to assign 100% of the negligence to one party; such an allocation does not mean the comparative-fault statute was not applied.

Croxen v. Salhus · filed 1985-11-19

The trial court found that appellant was 100% negligent in the two-car accident of the parties. This finding does not mean the trial court failed to apply the comparative fault statute, Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1984). Negligence and its apportionment present factual issues.

Section 604.01, subdivisions 1 and 1a, do not require insurance coverage or prohibit household exclusions.

Godfrey v. State Farm Fire and Casualty · filed 2021-08-24subdivs. 1 and 1a

But we find no language in those provisions, or any other Minnesota law, addressing mandatory coverage or household exclusions beyond Minnesota’s statutory mandates for automobile liability insurance that were at issue in Hime.

Section 604.01 does not make a workers’ compensation employer’s negligence attributable to the injured employee or permit a third-party tortfeasor to assert the employer’s contributory negligence under these facts.

Sargent v. Axel H. Ohman, Inc. · filed 1972-06-12subd. 1

To permit defendant to litigate the issue of the employer’s alleged negligence against a $25,000 medical claim of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and its subrogation right as an involuntary plaintiff would tend to confuse the jury and might seriously prejudice plaintiff’s claim referred to in Nyquist, supra, as “seriously impairing the preferred status of the employee or his dependents.” (p. 571). It is clear that the percentage, if any, of the employer’s negligence is not attributable to plaintiff so as in effect to charge him with contributory negligence. Nyquist, supra; Froysland, supra. If the defendant is free from any negligence or if such is not the proximate cause of the injury or there be a supervening cause, this is of course a complete defense whether or not the employer is joined. It seems clear, however, from the cases above cited, and particularly from the quoted language from Keefer above that the defense of contributory negligence is not available under the facts of this case to this defendant against the employer PrestonHaglan Company or its insurer Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.

Subdivision 1 requires contribution among jointly liable tortfeasors in proportion to each tortfeasor's percentage of negligence, while preserving several liability to the plaintiff.

Lange Ex Rel. Lange v. Schweitzer · filed 1980-07-03subd. 1

At that time, however, Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1976) required determination of the percentage of negligence attributable to each party and further provided that contribution to awards from persons who are jointly liable should be in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each. Although the statute also provided that each tortfeasor remained severally liable to the plaintiff, the provision that the tortfeasors were to pay the award made in amounts proportionate to their negligence clearly contemplates that among themselves each was entitled to contribution for any payment made in excess of the amount proportionate to his fault.

Section 604.01 permits recovery when the claimant's negligence is less than the defendant's and, for an indivisible injury, requires the defendant to pay the full damages reduced only by the claimant's share of negligence.

Jack Frost, Inc. v. Engineered Building Components Co. · filed 1981-04-10(1)

The trial court applied the comparative negligence statute, Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1976), and concluded that Jack Frost is entitled to recover 70% of the damages. It held Hydro-Air liable to Jack Frost for that amount. ... The comparative negligence statute provides, in relevant part: ... Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. ... Jack Frost’s causal negligence was not as great as Hydro-Air’s causal negligence. Therefore, Jack Frost can recover damages from Hydro-Air. ... The extent of Hydro-Air’s liability is not affected by the fact that only 55% of the causal negligence was attributed to Hydro-Air. Jack Frost suffered an indivisible injury as a result of its own negligence and that of EBCO and Hydro-Air. Hydro-Air is therefore liable for the entire amount of Jack Frost’s damages diminished, as section 604.01, subd. 1, requires, by 30%, the proportion of the causal negligence attributed to Jack Frost.

Section 604.01 generally permits comparison of a plaintiff’s negligence with a defendant’s statutory strict liability, but preserves absolute-liability exceptions when the underlying statute requires recovery of the full injury regardless of contributory fault.

Seim Ex Rel. Seim v. Garavalia · filed 1981-06-19subd. 1a

The 1978 legislation significantly broadened the scope of the comparative negligence statute in an expansive definition of the word “fault,” which replaced the word “negligence” in the statute: ... “Fault” includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent, misuse of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault. ... Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. la (1980) (emphasis added). By including “strict tort liability” in the definition of fault, the legislature appears to have included all types of strict liability within the realm of the statute. ... Although section 347.22 was not enacted to protect a limited class of persons unable to protect themselves, we hold that the legislature intended to impose absolute liability upon a violator of the law for two reasons. ... Second, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act indicates that those who violate statutes such as section 347.22 cannot have their liability reduced due to the negligence of the plaintiff. ... Our application of the absolute liability doctrine during this era of comparative fault recognizes the principle that the legislative body that enacted the comparative fault statute has the authority to carve out or preserve exceptions to the statute in the interest of public policy. We reverse and remand with directions to restore the full jury verdict.

Section 604.01 applies comparative-fault principles among dramshop tortfeasors, even when the dramshop claim is brought by a dependent of an intoxicated person, but the intoxicated person's fault cannot reduce that dependent's dramshop recovery.

Jones v. Fisher · filed 1981-08-21

Although this cause of action arose prior to the 1977 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 340.95 (1980), requiring allocation of damages in accordance with Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1980),7 we believe that it is appropriate to apply comparative fault concepts in the same manner as we did in Busch v. Busch Const., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn.1977),8 noted in 5 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 517 (1979). In such cases, then, the fault of the decedent, the negligent tortfeasors and the dramshops is all taken at 100% and compared in one comparative fault question.

Section 604.01 applies comparative-fault principles: recovery is allowed only when the claimant's negligence is not greater than the other person's, and damages are reduced in proportion to the claimant's fault.

Mary Grant, as Trustee for the Heirs of Gregory Grant, Deceased v. The City of Duluth, a Municipal Corporation, and Jeff Vollman · filed 1982-03-11subd. 1

Furthermore, Minnesota applies principles of comparative fault in negligence actions. Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1978). Recovery is permitted only from persons whose negligence is greater than that of the person seeking recovery. Damages must “be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the person recovering.”

Section 604.01 makes each jointly liable defendant responsible for the entire recoverable award, while allowing contribution among defendants in proportion to their percentages of negligence.

Maday v. Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis · filed 1981-11-06(1)

This common-law rule has been incorporated into our comparative negligence statute: “When there are two or more persons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided, however, that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award.” Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1976). We have consistently applied § 604.01 to hold each defendant liable for a plaintiff’s total recoverable damages even when a jury finds that defendant only partially at fault.

Section 604.01's comparative-fault provisions do not apply to tortious acts occurring before the act's effective date.

Vikse v. Flaby · filed 1982-02-26

Appellants sought a special verdict that would have applied comparative fault to the compensatory damages. Denial of such a request was certainly proper because the alleged fraudulent acts occurred in 1972, six years prior to the effective date of the comparative fault act. Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1978).

Section 604.01 generally requires comparing a plaintiff’s fault with each defendant’s fault without aggregating defendants’ fault, absent an economic joint venture, and it does not contain a pure-comparative-fault exception.

Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc. · filed 1982-08-31

Absent proof of an economic joint venture, current Minnesota law is clear that defendants’ fault is not to be aggregated in applying our Comparative Fault Statute, Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1980). In Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973), we allowed aggregation where the four criteria for a joint adventure were met. In Marier v. Memorial Rescue Service, 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706 (1973), we refused to extend joint adventure aggravation to cases where defendants are merely “concurrently negligent,” since “[sjuch an extension would clearly be a change in the substantive rule established by our statute and is properly a function of our legislature.” Marier, 296 Minn. at 246, 207 N.W.2d at 709. ... It may be that there are instances in addition to Krengel where aggregation of fault would be appropriate, but this is not one, and we do not believe, in view of the plain wording and history of section 604.01, that we should engraft a pure comparative fault exception to that statute.

Section 604.01 requires comparative fault to be submitted only as to a person against whom recovery is sought; a party removed from the trial by summary judgment or directed verdict is not included.

Dahlbeck v. DICO Co., Inc. · filed 1984-09-04

Section 604.01 only requires submission of fault as to any “person against whom recovery is sought.” Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1982). Once removed from the trial, either by summary judgment or directed verdict, there was no basis for such submission.

Section 604.01(1a) defines fault broadly enough to include strict tort liability and unreasonable assumption of the risk, so complicity in a dram-shop action is compared as fault rather than treated as an absolute bar.

Herrly v. Muzik · filed 1984-10-02(1a)

Complicity, as a form of assumption of the risk, should also be compared as fault rather than be an absolute defense. ... The order dismissing the defendant bars was in error since whatever complicity Herrly may have been guilty of must be compared as fault, rather than work as an absolute bar to his case.

Section 604.01 does not convert a plaintiff’s complicity in illegally furnishing liquor into comparative fault in a Dram Shop action; complicity remains an absolute bar to recovery.

Herrly v. Muzik · filed 1985-09-27

The sole issue presented is whether complicity remains an absolute bar to recovery in Dram Shop actions after the incorporation of Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1984) into the Civil Damage Act. ... Examining the effect of these several changes, the Court of Appeals concluded that complicity is no longer an absolute defense in a Dram Shop action, but rather fault to be compared with the fault of those others — i.e., the bars — that illegally furnished the liquor. We cannot agree.

Subdivision 1a includes acts or omissions that subject a person to strict tort liability within the comparative-fault statute’s definition of “fault,” allowing product defect to be compared with the user’s fault.

Employers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Oakes Manufacturing Co. · filed 1984-10-231a

The comparative fault statute, however, includes within the term “fault,” “ * * * acts or omissions * * * that subject a person to strict tort liability.” Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. la (1982).

Section 604.01's comparative-fault provisions do not apply to an action for negligent misrepresentation.

Florenzano v. Olson · filed 1984-11-27subd. 1 and subd. 1a

This is a case of first impression. The Minnesota Comparative Fault Act applies to “an action by any person * * * to recover damages for fault resulting in death or injury to person or property.” Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1982). Fault is defined as “acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property.” Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. la (1982). Broad as this language is, we nonetheless rule that it does not apply to an action for negligent misrepresentation.

Section 604.01 permits comparative responsibility principles to reduce recovery in a negligent-misrepresentation action.

Florenzano v. Olson · filed 1986-05-09

Do the principles of comparative responsibility, as set out in the Comparative Negligence Act, apply to negligent misrepresentation? ... We agree with these commentators and with the majority of states that have considered the issue. This court has long favored the concept of comparative negligence as a just way to apportion liability. We applied the Comparative Negligence Act expansively, even extending it to many causes of action not traditionally within the scope of negligence. We hold that the principles of comparative responsibility apply to negligent misrepresentation and that the trial court appropriately applied those principles in this case.

Section 604.01's comparative-fault instruction is sufficient when accompanied by counsel's commentary explaining the effect of the jury's fault apportionment.

Yates v. Hanna Min. Co., Inc. · filed 1985-04-09

Yates requested that, in the event that the court’s restrictive rule on comment withstood review, we find the jury instructions on comparative fault to be insufficient. Inasmuch as this issue may resurface upon remand, we address it and find that the court’s instruction on comparative fault, which nearly tracks Minn.Stat. § 604.01 and JIG 148-S verbatim, was sufficient, when accompanied by counsel’s commentary.

Section 604.01 treats secondary assumption of risk as an aspect of contributory negligence measured under comparative fault, rather than as a complete bar to recovery; fault includes unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting express consent.

Thompson v. Hill · filed 1985-04-23(1a)

In light of our comparative negligence statute, Minn.Stat. § 604.01, secondary assumption of risk is no longer a complete bar to a plaintiff’s recovery. Instead, it is an aspect of contributory negligence. ... “Fault,” as used in our comparative fault statute, “includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent, misuse of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.” Minn.Stat. § 604.-01, subd. la (1982).

Section 604.01's comparative-fault regime does not abolish primary assumption of risk, which remains an absolute bar when the defendant owed no duty of care.

Swagger v. City of Crystal · filed 1985-12-24

Appellants argue the court erred in granting respondent’s motion for JNOV because the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk is no longer valid since the enactment of the comparative fault act, Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1984). ... Appellants are mistaken as to the viability of the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk. ... Appellants argue that primary assumption of the risk should not bar their claim. However, the supreme court’s holding in Springrose indicates that primary assumption of the risk is an active doctrine, despite the enactment of the comparative fault act.

Subdivision 5 requires a claimant's recovery to be reduced by the amount of fault attributable to the injured party before any offset for payments previously received.

LeBaron v. Hanson · filed 1985-09-10(5)

Section 65B.51, subd. 1 must be read in conjunction with Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 5 (1984), which mandates a reduction of recovery by the amount of fault attributable to the injured party prior to any offset for payments previously received.

Section 604.01 requires comparative fault to be submitted to the jury when requested, applies to negligence and fraud claims, and does not permit fault to be compared on a breach-of-contract claim.

Rediske v. Minnesota Valley Breeder's Ass'n · filed 1985-12-11subd. 1(a)

“Fault” includes negligence. Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1(a). Here, where the record reveals a demand by appellant’s counsel for submission of Benson’s and respondents’ fault to the jury, the trial court erred in not submitting the question to the jury. There was an arguable basis to submit comparative fault of any party: the trial court should not have denied appellants’ request. ... However, when submitting the comparative fault of the parties to the jury, the court must bear in mind that fault in breach of contract cases cannot be compared under Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1980): ... On remand the trial court should separate out in the special verdict form which damages are attributable to breach of contract and which to negligence and fraud, and compare fault only on the negligence and fraud claims, not on the contract claim.

Section 604.01's comparative-fault instruction did not warrant reversal where the jury found the defendant not negligent and the instruction did not prejudice that determination.

Bowen v. Arnold · filed 1986-01-21

Spande argues that the trial court abused its discretion in submitting the case to the jury under the comparative negligence statute, Minn.Stat. § 604.01. The jury was instructed that a client must use reasonable care to protect her own financial interests, given the information and legal alternatives made known to her. ... Although we question whether there was sufficient evidence of negligence on her part to go to the jury, its submission was not reversible error.

Minn. Stat. § 604.01's comparative-fault rule does not apply to intentional tort actions.

Kelzer v. Wachholz · filed 1986-02-11

Because the ease was tried purely as an intentional tort case, appellant’s arguments must fail. Intentional tort actions are not subject to the comparative fault statute. See Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1984).

Subdivision 1 requires a comparative-fault issue to be submitted when the evidence reasonably supports negligence by multiple parties.

Yule v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1986-07-15(1)

Appellants claim that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the comparative fault of all three parties. See Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1984). On remand the trial court should submit the issue to the jury if warranted by the evidence submitted at trial. Maday v. Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis, 311 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn.1981) (“Where the facts reasonably tend to show negligence on the part of both defendants, submission of a comparative negligence question is proper.”)

When multiple persons are jointly liable, contribution to the award is apportioned according to each person's percentage of negligence, while each remains jointly and severally liable for the whole award.

Walton v. Fujita Tourist Enterprises Co. · filed 1986-01-14(1)

The comparative negligence statute in effect at the time provided as follows: When there are two or more persons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided, however, that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award. Minn.Stat. § 604.01 subd. 1 (1976). A finding of 30% negligence of Northwest reflects its indirect involvement in ground arrangements. Similarly, in Krengel, where the plaintiff was injured when she tripped over a riser in the photo booth, the negligence was apportioned between the three defendants. See Krengel, 295 Minn. at 210, 203 N.W.2d at 847. Here, the trial court’s apportionment of responsibility between the three parties was reasonable and not clearly erroneous.

Section 604.01 does not require comparative-fault apportionment when the trial court finds the parties solely liable for separate harms.

Craft Tool & Die Co., Inc. v. Payne · filed 1986-04-01

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to determine, as requested, the percentage of fault attributable to each party in the event appellant were found liable for any damages. See Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1984). We find this argument unpersuasive. The trial court apparently found appellant solely liable for the roof failure and HRDC solely liable for the replacement of flashings. Consequently, there was no need for the trial court to compare fault.

Section 604.01(1) reduces a claimant's damages only by the claimant's own contributory fault, rather than by the fault of another claimant.

Steinbrecher v. McLeod Cooperative Power Ass'n · filed 1986-09-02(1)

Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1984), states in part: Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action * * * to recover damages for fault resulting in death or in injury * * * if the contributory fault was not greater than the fault of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the person recovering. ... The trial court erred in not ordering judgment for each decedent for the full amount of the verdict less 20.8%.

Section 604.01, subdivision 1, permits recovery when the claimant’s fault is equal to or less than the opposing party’s, while reducing damages in proportion to the claimant’s fault.

Van Gordon v. Herzog · filed 1987-08-18(1)

Under the comparative negligence statute, if a plaintiff’s negligence was equal to the defendant’s, recovery was barred. However, under the comparative fault statute, appellant’s recovery would only be precluded if his negligence was greater than respondents’. Neither the facts in this case nor the applicable law conclusively establish that appellant’s negligence was greater than respondents. Appellant is entitled to advance his theories to a jury and an opportunity to prove his negligence was at most equal to respondents.

Minn. Stat. § 604.01's comparative-fault regime does not eliminate the common-law doctrine of primary assumption of risk.

Henkel v. Holm · filed 1987-08-25

Primary assumption of the risk is still applicable in Minnesota, despite the enactment of the comparative fault act, Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1986).

Subdivision 5 does not apply to Pierringer settlements, so their payments need not be credited against the judgment.

Fire Insurance Exchange v. Adamson Motors · filed 1994-04-12(5)

Appellant believes the amount of the Pierringer settlement must be credited against the final judgment, citing Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 5 (1992). However, the supreme court has held that subdivision 5 does not apply to Pierringer settlements.

Subdivision 5 does not allow a nonsettling defendant to offset the full amount of a settling defendant’s payment; only the settling defendant’s percentage share of the judgment should be offset.

Rambaum v. Swisher · filed 1988-06-29(5)

The statute is ambiguous at best. ... We do not think this case is distinguishable from Anunti. Though O’Neill’s Bar was found negligent and the settling defendant in Anunti was not, the equities are still the same: It would be unfair to allow the nonsettling defendant to benefit from the plaintiff’s bargain. ... Accordingly, the trial court erred in crediting the full amount of the $200,000 settlement against the judgment. Only ten percent of the judgment, representing O’Neill’s Bar’s percentage of fault, should be offset.

Section 604.01(5) credits a Pierringer settlement only for the settling defendant’s share of the plaintiff’s damages, not for any additional portion of the award.

Rambaum v. Swisher · filed 1989-01-13(5)

We hold, therefore, that the term “payments” as used in Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 5, with respect to Pierringer settlements, refers only to payment for that portion of plaintiff’s damages representing the settling defendant’s share of the liability. The settlement payment does not extend to any further portion of plaintiff’s award. In this case, only O’Neill’s 10 percent share of the award is to be deducted from plaintiff’s award.

Subdivision 5 requires settlements and payments made to an injured person with that person's permission to be credited against the final judgment, with a Pierringer settlement credited according to the settling defendant’s proportionate share of the damages.

Oelschlager v. Magnuson · filed 1995-02-28(5)

Our analysis is given further support by the language of Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 5 (1992). That statute provides in pertinent part that “all settlements and payments” made to an injured person with the permission of that person must be credited against any final judgment. In the case of a Pierringer settlement, the credit is calculated based on the settling defendant’s proportionate share of the damages. Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 22-23. Accordingly, the statutory language supports the conclusion .that appellant is required to take a credit against the judgment equal to the Northwest Conference’s proportionate share of the damages, regardless of the theory of judgment against Redeemer.

Subdivision 1 does not require comparative fault to be submitted for a mentally ill patient’s self-inflicted suicide when the hospital assumed the duty to prevent that foreseeable harm, in the specific circumstances described.

Tomfohr v. Mayo Foundation · filed 1990-01-12subd. 1

It seems to us, in the light of the facts of this case, that approach to analyzing the duty and causation issues was appropriate. When the jury has been asked, as it was here, to determine whether the suicide attempt was reasonably foreseeable, given the circumstances surrounding the patient’s admission and his mental state, it is not only unnecessary but also duplicative to again review the patient’s conduct to determine whether the patient’s volitional act requires the application of comparative fault. In this specific type of case, the mental condition of the patient exists prior to the hospital’s negligent act, and it is that condition which gives rise to the hospital’s duty of care and which defines the scope of that duty. The law has long recognized that a custodian of another person may be liable for consequences of harm to that person inflicted by a third person when that harm is reasonably foreseeable. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320 (1965). It seems to us logical to apply that same rule if the foreseeable harm is self-inflicted. Therefore, we answer the certified question in the negative.

Section 604.01 reduces damages only in proportion to fault attributable to the person recovering, so the intoxicated person's negligence cannot be imputed to innocent dependents.

Paulson v. Lapa, Inc. · filed 1990-01-23subd. 1, 1a

Only the negligence which is attributable to the person recovering may be applied to reduce damages awarded under the comparative fault provision, Minn.Stat. § 604.01.

The comparative-fault statute defines fault to include acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent toward the actor's property.

Computer Tool & Engineering, Inc. v. Northern States Power Co. · filed 1990-04-031a

Under the comparative fault statute, the term “fault” includes acts or omissions 'that are in any measure negligent toward the property of the actor. Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. la (1988). ... Under these circumstances, the submission to the jury of Computer Tool’s negligence was proper.

Section 604.01 broadly applies comparative fault in accountant-malpractice actions, allowing the client’s ordinary business negligence to be compared with the accountant’s fault.

Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co. · filed 1990-05-11

Because we have broadly construed the comparative fault act and applied it to.other professional malpractice actions, we reverse the court of appeals and hold that the trial court did not err in applying the principles of comparative fault in this action by a client against an accountant for negligent failure to discover embezzlements in the client’s business. The application of the broad definition of fault as set forth in the comparative fault statute can be particularly appropriate in such actions.

Section 604.01 treats complicity in an illegal alcohol sale as a comparative-fault factor rather than an absolute bar to recovery under the Civil Damage Act.

K.R. v. Sanford · filed 1999-02-03(1a)

The Minnesota comparative-fault statute, Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1998), continues to apply to CDA actions. See Minn.Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 3 (1998) (stating that CDA actions are governed by section 604.01). K.R. argues that she has a right of action under the CDA because in 1990 the legislature amended the definition of “fault” in the comparative-fault statute to include the “defense of complicity under section 340A.801.” K.R. contends that this amendment eliminates the judicially created bar against recovery under the CDA by complicit parties and makes complicity a factor to be considered in determining a party’s comparative fault. We agree.

Subdivision 1 requires, on request, separate jury findings on damages and each party’s percentage of fault in an action for damages resulting from death, followed by a proportional reduction of damages.

Sandborg v. Blue Earth County · filed 1999-11-23subd. 1

We, therefore, conclude the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on comparative fault under Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1.

Section 604.01, subdivision 1a, applies comparative fault principles when fault is based on negligent or reckless acts or omissions, not intentional torts.

Farmer's State Bank of Darwin v. Swisher · filed 2001-07-19(1a)

In contrast, Minnesota’s comparative fault statute applies when the fault is based on “acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless * * See Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1a; Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Minn.1986) (stating “[without question, principles of comparative negligence would not apply to an intentional tort; we have never so applied them”). As a result, under this record, Swisher is entitled to recover damages under her intentional tort claims against Johnson as the sole alleged intentional tortfeasor without having the jury verdict reduced by the Rule 68 judgment.

Section 604.01 treats complicity in a Civil Damages Act violation as comparative fault rather than a complete defense that bars the plaintiff’s action.

K.R. v. Sanford · filed 2000-02-03subd. 1a

From the language of the 1990 amendment and its legislative history we conclude that the legislature intended to eliminate complicity as a complete defense to actions brought under the CDA and, instead, allow complicity to be a comparative fault.

Section 604.01 includes unreasonable failure to avoid injury or mitigate damages in comparative fault, which requires a duty on the plaintiff’s part.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Greenwood · filed 1992-07-20

The similar defense of comparative fault also imposes a duty on the plaintiff. Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (“Fault” includes “unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages”). ... Since the RTC did not owe a duty to defendants, each of these defenses should be stricken.

Section 604.01 reduces an innocent third party's dram-shop award only to the extent of the third party's own negligence; the intoxicated person's fault is not imputed to the claimant.

Bushland v. Corner Pocket Billiard Lounge of Moorhead, Inc. · filed 1990-11-13

Thus, the effect of applying comparative fault to innocent third parties is to reduce their awards against a dram shop only to the extent that their own negligence contributed to the loss. If the legislature wishes the fault of the intoxicated person to be imputed to innocent plaintiffs, it may easily so specify by using the unambiguous word “impute.”

Section 604.01 permits a plaintiff's conduct, including unreasonable assumption of the risk, to be considered in strict-liability and breach-of-warranty actions.

Andren v. White-Rodgers Co. · filed 1991-01-221, 1a

Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subds. 1, la (1988) also provides a plaintiff’s conduct, including unreasonable assumption of the risk, can be considered in strict liability and breach of warranty actions.

Section 604.01 requires contributory-fault allocation to be computed after the applicable collateral-source deduction.

Casper v. City of Stacy · filed 1991-07-30subd. 1

The trial court properly deducted collateral sources under section 548.36 before computing the fault allocation under section 604.01.

Under § 604.01, subd. 1, fault attributable to the injured spouse diminishes the damages recovered by the spouse asserting a derivative loss-of-consortium claim.

O'NEIL v. Wells Concrete Products Co. · filed 1991-11-19subd. 1

The comparative fault, statute states, in part, that: [A]ny damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the person recovering. Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1990). Because a negligence action for loss of consortium is a derivative action, the fault of the injured party is “attributable to” the person recovering and must reduce the award of the spouse.

Upon a party's request, section 604.01, subdivision 1 requires the trial court to have the jury return separate special verdicts assigning fault to each party.

M.W. Ettinger Transfer & Leasing Co. v. Schaper Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 1992-04-29(1)

See Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1990) (upon a party’s request the trial court shall direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the fault attributable to each party). ... We conclude the trial court erred by directing the verdict in Ettinger’s favor. ... The jury therefore should have had the opportunity to consider the independent negligence of Ettinger in allocating fault to the parties.

Section 604.01's comparative-fault rule applies to common-law actions under Minn. Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 6, against social hosts who furnish alcohol to persons under 21.

VanWagner v. Mattison · filed 1995-06-20

We conclude that common law actions permitted by subdivision 6 are subject to comparative fault. ... We hold that the common law actions permitted under subdivision 6 do not involve absolute liability and are therefore subject to comparative fault.

Section 604.01's comparative-fault framework does not implicitly repeal the statutory bar on admitting seat-belt nonuse evidence.

Cressy v. Grassmann · filed 1995-08-22

Appellants further argue that the seat-belt evidence rule was implicitly repealed by the later enactments, specifically the mandatory seat-belt law in 1986 (Minn.Stat. § 169.686) and the comparative fault statute in 1969 (Minn.Stat. § 604.01). We find no inconsistency between the bar of seat-belt evidence and those later statutes. Thus, we hold that the legislature did not, with the enactment of the mandatory seat belt and comparative fault statutes, implicitly repeal section 169.685, subdivision 4.

Section 604.01 does not apply to Civil Damages Act actions brought by an intoxicated person's spouse, children, or other dependents.

Conde v. City of Spring Lake Park · filed 1980-01-11

However, that same statute specifies that section 604.01 “shall not be applicable to actions brought by a husband, wife, child, parent, guardian or other dependent of an intoxicated person.” Thus, section 604.01 only applies to actions brought by an employer or other nondependent person under section 340.95 and so does not apply in this case.

Section 604.01, subdivision 1, treats assumption of risk as part of comparative negligence, allowing the jury to consider it under a comparative negligence instruction.

Kantorowicz v. VFW Post, No. 230 · filed 1984-06-12subd. 1

Here, the court instructed the jury on respondent’s duty to exercise reasonable care for his own safety under a comparative negligence instruction. The jury was able to consider the evidence regarding respondent’s assumption of the risk within the framework of that instruction. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

Section 604.01 treats assumption of risk as part of comparative negligence; a separate assumption of risk instruction is discretionary when the jury is instructed to consider the plaintiff’s care for their own safety.

Johnson v. Alford & Neville, Inc. · filed 1986-12-16(1)

Here, as in Kantorowicz, the court instructed the jury on an entrant’s duty to exercise reasonable care, although the term “contributory negligence” was not used. Because Alford & Neville made no showing that Johnson could have taken a safer, alternative route from her car to the lounge, the court acted well within its discretion in declining to use Alford & Ne-ville’s proposed assumption of risk instruction.

Section 604.01, subdivision 1, supplies the modified comparative negligence rule for inter-company indemnity disputes under the no-fault statute.

Great West Casualty Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1999-04-06(1)

Inter-company indemnity disputes under Minn.Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 4, are subject to the modified comparative negligence rule as set forth in Minn.Stat. § 604.01, subd. 1.