Minn. Stat. § 549.09

Section 549.09 does not impose liability for interest on the State under chapter 549, so a victim of a governmental tort cannot recover such interest under that chapter.

Lienhard v. State · filed 1988-02-24

The language of Minn.Stat. §§ 549.04 and 549.09 is clear and unambiguous. There is nothing in these sections or indeed in the whole of chapter 549 which would indicate that any liability can be imposed upon the state for costs and interest. We conclude, therefore, that these items cannot be awarded to a victim of a governmental tort under chapter 549.

Section 549.09 preserves prejudgment interest otherwise allowed by law, and its exclusion for court-added costs and attorney fees does not apply when those costs and fees are the compensatory damages themselves.

Seaway Port Authority of Duluth v. Midland Insurance Co. · filed 1988-10-11(1)(b), (1)(b)(6)

Section 549.09 provides for prejudgment interest and limits on prejudgment interest “except as otherwise provided by contract or allowed by law.” Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (1986). ... It was settled law before the 1984 amendments to Section 549.09 that where defense costs are awarded against an insurer, prejudgment interest must be paid from the time the bills for the defense costs were first submitted to the insurer for payment. ... The trial court properly computed prejudgment interest according to this formula. ... It is clear that Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b)(6) applies only to costs and attorney fees added to a judgment by a court. The judgment in this case is for compensatory damages for the insurers’ breach of insurance policies. It is true that the judgment is intended to reimburse SPAD for costs and attorney fees spent in connection with other actions. However, the costs and fees for which SPAD is reimbursed have not been “added by the court” to this judgment, they are the subject matter of the judgment itself. It was proper for the trial court to award prejudgment interest on the judgment.

Section 549.09 treats pre-verdict interest as an additional compensatory sum attached to the verdict.

Lienhard v. State · filed 1988-11-23(1)(b)

Because pre-verdict interest awarded pursuant to section 549.09 attaches to the verdict an additional compensatory sum, we hold that pre-verdict interest is subject to the limitation set by section 3.736, subdivision 4, on the State’s liability on any tort claim.

Section 549.09 allows pre-verdict interest only when the prevailing party's offer is closer to the judgment than the opposing party's offer; pre-verdict interest is subject to the applicable damages cap, while post-verdict interest may be added after that cap is applied.

Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal · filed 1989-10-25(1)(b)

Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (1988) provides that a prevailing party can receive pre-verdict interest only if the amount of its offer is closer to the judgment than the amount of the opposing party’s offer. ... We find the reasoning of Lien-hard applicable to the damages cap set by Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1. In view of the compensatory nature of pre-verdict interest, the trial court erred in assessing it. The city’s maximum liability is 40% of the judgment after deduction of collateral sources. That figure is $599,154.08 plus costs and disbursements. Under Lien-hard, however, post-verdict interest may be added to that figure.

Section 549.09 requires pre-verdict interest on pecuniary damages from the date the case commences, but bars interest on the portion representing future damages unless otherwise provided by contract or allowed by law.

Johnson v. Washington County · filed 1993-10-25(1)(b)

Pre-verdict interest on pecuniary damages shall be computed from the date the case commences. Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (1988). However, “except as otherwise provided by contract or allowed by law,” pre-verdict interest shall not be awarded on judgments for future damages. Id. ... Under these facts, we remand to the trial court to recalculate the interest award to exclude interest on the portion of the verdict that represents future damages.

Section 549.09 requires prejudgment interest to be calculated only after the damages award is reduced by applicable collateral sources.

Jewett v. Deutsch · filed 1989-03-28(1)(a)

Welker argues that prejudgment interest was erroneously calculated on damages which were subject to reduction of collateral sources. We agree. According to the June 20, 1987 order for judgment, the trial court awarded prejudgment interest on all past damages. The proper method of calculating prejudgment interest is to first reduce the award by the amount of the collateral sources.

Section 549.09 allows preverdict interest on pretrial compensatory damages but excludes judgments for future damages and punitive or other noncompensatory damages.

Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp. · filed 1990-01-23(1)(b)

Because preverdict interest applies only to Wirig’s pretrial damages and not to punitive or future damages, we must remand to the trial court to recalculate the interest award.

Section 549.09(1)(b)(2) bars preverdict, pre-award, or prereport interest on judgments or awards for future damages.

Muehlhauser v. Erickson · filed 2000-12-26(1)(b)(2)

Except as otherwise provided by contract or allowed by law, preverdict, pre-award, or prereport interest shall not be awarded on the following: ... (2) judgments or awards for future damages. The co-trustees conceded at oral argument that the trial court erred in allowing interest on the entire amount of damages. The interest award is reversed, and the issue is remanded for recalculation.

Section 549.09 permits preverdict interest even when the amount of damages cannot be ascertained before the verdict.

Myers v. Hearth Technologies, Inc. · filed 2001-01-22

The court’s discussion of section 549.09 and the ascertainability rule was necessary to its ultimate holding; because preverdict interest can be awarded even when the amount of such interest cannot be ascertained until fixed by verdict, the supreme court held that preverdict interest is not “conventional interest,” but instead an additional element of compensatory damages subject to a statutory cap on damages awarded against the state. ... Lienhard thus considered and decided the question of the continued applicability of the ascertainability rule in a context where the issue was necessary to the holding in the case. Because the supreme court has held that preverdict interest is available “irrespective of a defendant’s ability to ascertain the amount of damages,” id. at 865, we conclude that post-Lienhard cases that apply the ascertainability rule, including those cited by Hearth, are incorrect.

Section 549.09 allows pre-verdict interest for a prevailing party when its offer is closer to the verdict than the opposing party’s, permits that interest on the liable defendant’s proportionate share, and allows post-verdict interest as well.

Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal · filed 1990-03-30(1)(a), (1)(b)

A prevailing party can receive pre-verdict interest only if the amount of its offer is closer to the verdict than the amount of the opposing party’s offer. Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (1988). ... Awarding pre-verdict interest on only respondent city’s share of the judgment was correct. Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b). ... The trial court awarded post-verdict interest from June 3, 1988, to September 27, 1988 (the date of entry of judgment). Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a) (1988). ... We hold the trial court’s award of both pre- and post-verdict interest was proper, however, but must remand for pre-verdict interest on the increased judgment against respondent city.

Section 549.09 requires pre-verdict interest to be computed from the commencement of the action when a later written settlement demand occurs after the action begins.

Chabot v. City of Sauk Rapids · filed 1987-11-24(b)

The trial court erred in awarding pre-verdict interest from December 9, 1985, on the assumption that Chabot was entitled to interest only from the time the offer was made. The offer does not control the computation of interest because it occurred after commencement of the action.

When reallocation makes a previously unenforceable share of a jury award payable, post-verdict interest under § 549.09 begins on the date of the reallocation order rather than the date of the verdict.

Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud · filed 2013-04-29(1)(a)

“When a judgment or award is for the recovery of money,” a party is entitled to “interest from the time of the verdict, award, or report until judgment is finally entered.” ... It was not until Alice Staab moved the court for reallocation and the district court made a finding of uncollectibility that the diocese was legally required to pay Richard Staab’s portion of the jury verdict. See Hosley I, 383 N.W.2d at 294 (noting that the reallocation provision requires both a motion to the court and a finding of uncollectibility before reallocation can occur). Thus, interest did not begin to accrue until Alice Staab became entitled to the use of the money upon the district court’s order for reallocation.

Section 549.09, subdivision 1(b), generally starts preverdict or prejudgment interest on pecuniary damages at commencement of the action or the time of a written settlement demand, whichever occurs first.

Dallum v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. · filed 1990-11-13(1)(b)

An award of prejudgment interest is governed by Minn.Stat. § 549.09, which provides, in pertinent part: ... Except as otherwise provided by contract or allowed by law, preverdict or prere-port interest on pecuniary damages shall be computed as provided in clause (c) from the time of the commencement of the action, or the time of a written settlement demand, whichever occurs first, except as provided herein. ... Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (1988). ... The trial court specifically and properly found, however, that both the original complaint and the amended complaint set forth a cause of action based on promissory es-toppel. As a result, the trial court correctly awarded prejudgment interest from November 5, 1985, the date the cause of action was commenced by service of the first summons and complaint upon Cenex, until December 20, 1989.

Section 549.09 makes interest on a personal injury verdict run against a defendant only from the verdict establishing that defendant's liability, even when an earlier verdict fixed damages.

Integrity Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 1968-07-26

For the reasons stated, we therefore hold that Sprader's insurer, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, is liable to Mueller's insurer, Integrity Mutual Insurance Company, for contribution on interest only from the date of the October 14, 1964, verdict against Sprader, and the judgment awarding plaintiff $140.49 is therefore affirmed.

Section 549.09 does not authorize prejudgment interest on proceeds returned through rescission because those proceeds are not “pecuniary damages.”

Estate of Jones Ex Rel. Blume v. Kvamme · filed 1989-12-22subd. 1

Moreover, the statute contemplates an award of interest on “pecuniary damages.” Even a strained definition of that term would not encompass the return of proceeds upon rescission of the original transaction.

Section 549.09(1)(b) permits prejudgment interest on pecuniary damages, including disability and disfigurement damages treated as losses of services.

Frumkin v. Mayo Clinic, Paul Allen Frumkin v. Mayo Clinic · filed 1992-05-28(1)(b)

Minn.Stat. § 549.09 subd. 1(b) (1990) (amended effective July 1, 1991) allows for prejudgment interest on “pecuniary damages.” ... Although the district court characterized Frumkin’s damages for disability and disfigurement as non-pecuniary damages, Order of Oct. 10,1990, at 6, the term “disability” damages seems to refer to the loss of the ability to do things for oneself other than earn money (loss of the ability to earn money was submitted to the jury as “loss of earnings”). ... This sort of damage has been characterized as “pecuniary” under Minnesota law. Disfigurement damages are closely akin to. disability damages and should be categorized similarly. Therefore, prejudgment interest should have been awarded on the jury’s disability and disfigurement award.

Section 549.09, subdivision 1(b), starts prejudgment interest at commencement of the action for general damages, but for special damages starts interest when those damages were incurred if that is later.

Tyroll v. Private Label Chemicals, Inc. · filed 1993-01-28(1)(b)

Whether interest on the judgment accrues from the time the action is commenced or the time the damages were incurred depends upon the nature of the damages. “The prevailing party shall receive interest on any judgment or award from the time of commencement of the action * * *, or as to special damages from the time when special damages were incurred, if later, until the time of verdict.” Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (1990). Special damages have been defined as the natural, but not necessary, result of a wrongful act. ... In contrast, general damages are those damages that naturally and necessarily result from the act giving rise to the cause of action or that the law implies will result from the act. ... Calculation of prejudgment interest requires a determination whether damages are general or special damages. Only damages that result from the special character, condition, or circumstances of the injured person are special damages. Interest on an award of special damages does not begin to accrue until the time the special damages were incurred. If the trial court is required to calculate prejudgment interest following remand, the trial court must determine whether the damages awarded are special or general damages and calculate prejudgment interest accordingly.

Subdivision 1(b) allows prejudgment interest on pecuniary damages in a garnishment action from commencement of the garnishment action until entry of the garnishment judgment.

Alton M. Johnson Co. v. M.A.I. Co. · filed 1990-11-21(1)(b)

The stipulated judgment sought to be enforced under the garnishee’s indemnity policy does, however, represent pecuniary damages, and, consequently, it seems to us this is the kind of action where prejudgment interest applies from the time of the commencement of the garnishment action to entry of the garnishment judgment. Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (1990).

Section 549.09 has both substantive and procedural aspects, but its offer-counteroffer provision is predominantly procedural because it is designed to promote settlement.

Zaretsky v. Molecular Biosystems, Inc. · filed 1990-12-31(1)(b)

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1, contains both substantive and procedural aspects. ... With respect to procedure, the offer-counteroffer provision of the statute promotes the early settlement of cases between litigants. ... As a result, we conclude the trial court did not err in determining the statute to be more procedural than substantive in nature.

When calculating prejudgment interest, a prior settlement should be allocated between past and future damages in the same proportion as the jury's allocation, because allocating the entire settlement to past damages would undermine settlement and eliminate interest on future damages.

Casey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1991-01-081(b)

The trial court’s apportionment makes practical sense. In any recovery for personal injuries, some of the recovery will be for past damages, while other portions will be for future damages. State Farm’s argument that the entire amount of Caseys’ earlier recovery should be applied to past damages, and none to future damages, ignores this. A construction of section 549.-09 which would allocate the entire amount of any settlement to past damages, resulting in a forfeiture by the plaintiff of the right to recover prejudgment interest on any future recovery, would be a disincentive to settlement. Such a construction should be avoided.

Section 549.09, subdivision 1(b)(4), bars preverdict interest on punitive, fine, and other noncompensatory damages; for trebled damages, only the compensatory first third may bear interest.

Muehlstedt v. City of Lino Lakes · filed 1991-07-23(1)(b)(4)

Under Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b)(4) (1990), preverdict interest is not allowed for "punitive damages, fines or other damages that are noncompensatory in nature.” Thus, because Minn.Stat. § 561.04 allows recovery of "treble the amount of damages which may be assessed [for the destroyed trees]” only the first third of the trebled damages is compensatory. The remainder is at least "noncompensatory" and the trial court’s allowance of prejudgment interest on this amount must be reversed.

Section 549.09 allows preverdict interest on compensatory awards for past pain, disability, and emotional distress, even though those damages are noneconomic.

Skifstrom v. City of Coon Rapids · filed 1995-02-03(1)(b)

We first analyze the text of Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (1992), which provides that preverdict interest is recoverable on “pecuniary damages” subject, however, to certain exclusions. ... Thus, up to this point, our textual analysis of section 549.09 suggests allowing prejudgment interest on awards for past pain, disability, and emotional distress. ... The statute expressly excludes interest on “punitive damages, fines or other damages that are noncompensatory in nature.” ... We agree with appellants that they are outside the exclusion. ... Thus, “noncom-pensatory” must be restricted to damages “punitive” in nature and the exclusion of “noncompensatory” damages would not disallow preverdict interest on damage awards for harm that, though noneconomic, is real, like pain and suffering. ... The trial court erred in denying preverdict interest on damages for past pain, disability, and emotional distress.

Section 549.09 allows preverdict interest on damages for emotional distress and lost wages.

Cox v. Crown CoCo, Inc. · filed 1996-03-05(1)(b)

These eases specifically allowed pre-verdict interest in cases involving damages (pain and suffering, personal injury) similar to Cox’s here (emotional distress, lost wages). Based upon this authority, the trial court’s award of preverdict interest on the damages award is proper.

Section 549.09 allows interest on a money judgment from the verdict or report until judgment, while its pre-verdict exclusions for future or punitive damages do not apply when interest begins accruing after the verdict.

Pedro v. Pedro · filed 1992-08-11(1)(a), (1)(b)(3), (1)(b)(4)

Appellants claim the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest was improper. Interest on verdicts, awards and judgments is allowed: [w]hen the judgment is for the recovery of money * * * interest from the time of the verdict or report until judgment is finally entered shall be computed by the court administrator as provided in clause (c) and added to the judgment. Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a) (1990). Pre-verdict interest will not be allowed for future or punitive damages. Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b)(3), (4). Here the jury rendered its verdict on December 11, 1989 and the trial court awarded interest from that date forward. Because the interest only began accruing after the jury’s verdict, the exclusion for interest on future or punitive damages is inapplicable.

Section 549.09 requires prejudgment interest to be calculated as simple annual interest at the applicable statutory rate.

Ufe Inc. v. Methode Electronics, Inc. · filed 1992-10-021(c)

Prejudgment interest is to calculated pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 549.09, which states that "the interest shall be computed as simple interest per annum.” Subd. 1(c). For the years 1990 and 1991, prejudgment interest was to be calculated at a rate of 7.00%; for 1992, the figure is 5.00%.

Section 549.09(c)’s rounding formula does not bind a federal court setting prejudgment interest in a patent case.

ANCHOR WALL SYSTEMS v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc. · filed 2009-03-31(c)

As to the question of rounding, defendants rely on a formula in Minn.Stat. § 549.09(c). As Anchor points out, however, this Court is not bound by state law in setting the prejudgment interest rate.

Section 549.09, subd. 1(b) limits prejudgment interest when the losing party’s settlement offer is closer to the judgment than the prevailing party’s offer, allowing interest only on the lesser amount and only through the date of the losing party’s offer; an offer covering the employee and employer interests can be valid even without naming them.

Krutsch v. Walter H. Collin GmBh Verfahrenstechnik Und Maschinenfabric · filed 1993-01-26(1)(b)

Under Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (1990), preverdiet interest is generally calculated from the time of the commencement of the action. ... Under this provision, if the losing party makes a settlement offer which is: closer to the judgment than the prevailing party’s offer, the prevailing party shall receive interest only on the amount of the settlement offer or the judgment, whichever is less, and only from the time the action was commenced or a written settlement demand was made * * * until the time the settlement offer was made. ... Here, Collin’s offer treats Krutsch and his employer Federal-Hoffman as one party. The offer does not mention Federal-Hoffman or Krutsch; rather, the offer simply states that Collin offers “to allow judgment to be entered against him for the sum of $100,000.” We conclude that Collin’s settlement offer is valid for the purposes of Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b).

Section 549.09, subdivision 1(b) applies retroactively to insurance cases pending on July 1, 1991, but does not require an insurer to pay pre-award interest that, when added to damages, exceeds the policy’s liability limit.

Lessard v. Milwaukee Insurance Co. · filed 1993-04-29(1)(b)

Generally, statutes are to have prospective, not retroactive, effect. ... Minn.Stat. § 549.09 expressly applies to “pending” matters. This language overcomes the statutory presumption against the retroactive effect of statutes. ... We hold that the amendments to section 549.09, subdivision 1(b) can and do apply retroactively even in cases involving insurance. ... We hold that an insurer is not liable for prejudgment interest, which when added to damages, exceeds the insurer’s liability limit.

Section 549.09 permits prejudgment interest on verdicts, awards, and judgments, but it does not apply when the plaintiff seeks return of property rather than recovery of money.

Dairy Fresh Foods, Inc. v. Ramette (In re Country Club Market, Inc.) · filed 1994-12-05subd. 1

The authority cited for the request of prejudgment interest is Minn.Stat. § 549.09 subd. 1. The statutory provision allows for a grant of “preverdict, preaward or prereport” interest on verdicts, awards and judgments. Id. ... Because the plaintiff does not request a judgment or award for the recovery of money, the statute is not applicable.

Section 549.09 controls the interest rate on property-tax refunds awarded to chapter 278 petitioners.

Arcadia Development Corp. v. County of Hennepin · filed 1995-03-03

Accordingly, we find no express or implied intent to change the rate of interest chapter 278 petitioners receive on their property tax refunds. The rate continues to be controlled by Minn.Stat. § 549.09, and the decision of the tax court is affirmed.

Section 549.09, subdivision 1, permits prejudgment interest when a judgment or award recovers money, but it does not support such an award when no judgment or award exists.

Warrick v. Graffiti, Inc. · filed 1996-06-25subd. 1

Thus, Great West I & II indicate that prejudgment interest is inappropriate in this case under both the new policy language and Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1, because there was no judgment or award that could serve as the basis for a prejudgment interest award.

A settlement offer stops prejudgment-interest accrual under § 549.09 only when it functions as a sufficiently precise offer of settlement covering the claims and relief at issue; an unspecified, contingent proposal with an extra condition does not.

Kennedy Building Associates v. Viacom, Inc. · filed 2004-08-18(1)(b)

Viacom's proposal did not function as an offer of settlement within the meaning of Minn. Stat. Ann. § 549.09 stopping the accrual of interest.

Section 549.09 provides that prejudgment interest is calculated from whichever occurs first: the start of the action, a demand for arbitration, or written notice of claim.

In Re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation · filed 2002-09-24(1)(b)

A court may order prejudgment interest on damages. Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1 (2000). Such an award serves two purposes: First, it compensates the plaintiff for loss of use of its money while depriving the defendant of any gain; and second, it promotes settlement. ... The interest is calculated from either the start of the action, demand for arbitration, or written notice of claim, whichever occurs first. Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b).

Section 549.09's policy-limit cap on prejudgment interest does not extend to interest awarded under Minn. Stat. § 60A.0811, because that interest serves both compensatory and penal purposes.

Owatonna Clinic-Mayo Health System v. Medical Protective Co. · filed 2010-04-16(1)(b)

Section 60A.0811 is akin to § 65B.54. Both statutes lack the “except as otherwise provided by contract” exception of § 549.09. Unlike § 549.09, interest under § 60A.0811 is not purely compensatory, but encourages settlement. The award of interest from the date that an insured requests payment creates an incentive for a commercial insurer to resolve insurance coverage disputes quickly. Therefore, prejudgment interest under § 60A.0811 serves both a compensatory and a penal purpose, and the policy-limit cap on prejudgment interest under § 549.09 does not extend to § 60A.0811.

Section 549.09 prejudgment interest is treated as compensatory damages, and it may not be added to a UIM award when doing so would exceed the policy's liability limits.

Ricke v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co. · filed 1998-05-05(1)(b)

The Lessard court concluded that because prejudgment interest is an element of compensatory damages, * * * an insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage is not liable for that portion of preaward interest under Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b) (Supp.1991), which, when added to total damages, would exceed policy liability limits. ... Similarly, awarding Ricke prejudgment interest would compensate her for the lost use of money. But, as in Lessard, any prejudgment interest added to Ricke’s award would be in excess of the liability limits of her UIM policy.

Under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, a valid settlement offer must be written, served on the opposing party, and stated in clear and definite terms that completely dispose of the parties’ claims.

Archer Daniels Midland Company v. Aon Risk Services, Inc. Of Minnesota · filed 2004-01-211(c)(1)

In order for an offer to be valid under § 549.09, it "must be in writing and must offer, in sufficiently clear and definite terms, to dispose completely the claims between the negotiating parties." Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 840 (Minn.1988). ... In our view, the letter cannot be construed as a "straightforward" offer that would invite ADM's acceptance or rejection or provide an effective means of settling the dispute. On this basis, we conclude that the September 5, 2001 letter was not a "written offer of settlement" as contemplated by § 549.09, and the district court did not err in its award of prejudgment interest.

Section 549.09(1)(b)(4) bars preaward interest on an individual arbitration award of $7,500 or less, even when claims are consolidated into a larger award.

Garlyn, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. · filed 2012-03-26(1)(b)(4)

There is no conflict between Minn.Stat. § 572.15(a), which requires arbitration awards generally to include interest, and the specific limitation on preaward interest contained in Minn.Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b)(4). ... Given the supreme court’s plain holding in Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Glass Serv. Co., 683 N.W.2d at 804, that individual claims do not lose their individual character through consolidation and because no individual award in this case exceeded $7,500, the arbitrator was without authority to award preaward interest.

Under subdivision 1(c)(2), a deposit with the court is not established as paid for interest purposes without evidence that the funds were available to the judgment creditor.

Verros v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 2025-09-02(1)(c)(2)

Moreover, the record fails to establish that any money deposited with the district court by State Farm has been available to Verros—“paid” for purposes of subdivision 1(c)(2) of section 549.09—because the district court neither ordered disbursement nor made any findings about the availability of the funds.

Section 549.09 does not allow interest before an uncertain amount of liability is ascertained.

Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Morse · filed 1961-11-10

Where the amount of liability has not been ascertained, there is no liability for interest thereon prior to the time of its ascertainment. ... The right to interest here is governed by Minn. St. 549.09.

Section 549.09 provides interest from the date of the verdict when an appellate court reinstates a verdict the trial court erroneously set aside.

McCormack Ex Rel. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co. · filed 1968-08-30

We hold that interest is not, as defendant asserts, simply a penalty but is rather payment of a reasonable sum for the loss of the use of money to which plaintiff has been entitled since the time the verdict was rendered.

Section 549.09 makes interest on a money award run from the date a special verdict establishes liability, even if the award is later adjusted.

Bastianson v. Forschen · filed 1972-10-27

We hold that the question is controlled by Minn. St. 549.09, requiring interest to run from the date of the verdict.

Section 549.09(b)’s settlement offer limitation does not bind a federal court awarding prejudgment interest in a patent case.

Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc. · filed 2018-09-21(b)

Because this is a federal patent case, Section 549.09(b) is not binding, and the Court will not exercise its discretion to apply the settlement offer limitation.

Section 549.09 does not govern prejudgment interest on a trustee’s recovery under the federal Bankruptcy Code; federal law governs that award.

Kelley v. Boosalis · filed 2020-09-11

For this reason, the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest under Minnesota rather than federal law.