Minn. Stat. § 541.05

The six-year discovery limitations period for an actual-fraud claim runs from when the facts constituting the fraud are discovered.

Kelley v. Boosalis · filed 2020-09-11Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6)

For a claw back claim under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), the Trustee must prove “that his predicate creditor did not know of or discover the fraud . . . at any time until within the six years before the date on which the bankruptcy petition was filed.”

Subdivision (6) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims, with accrual upon discovery of the facts constituting the fraud, and applies to Rule 10b-5 actions in Minnesota when common-law fraud is the closest substantive analogue.

Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. · filed 1973-09-06(6)

The statute which best fulfills the Vanderboom resemblance test is propounded by the plaintiff. Minn.Stat. § 541.05(6). ... Minnesota’s concept of common law fraud is the substantive cause of action which best comports with the Eighth Circuit’s definition of Rule 10b-5. Thus Minnesota’s fraud statute of limitations should be applied to Rule 10b-5 actions in this state.

Section 541.05(1) provides a six-year limitations period for contract claims that is not tolled until discovery of the breach or cause of action.

Juster Steel v. Carlson Companies · filed 1985-04-23(1)

While this language could suggest that the limitations period under section 541.05(1) is tolled until discovery of the breach, it is more probable that the reference to “discovery” is mere dictum. First, the tolling period of section 541.05(1) was not at issue in the case. Second, section 541.051 explicitly sets the limitation at within “two years after discovery * * Section 541.05(1) does not contain a similar provision.

Section 541.05(6) gives a person six years to bring a fraud claim from when the person discovers the fraud or should have discovered it through reasonable diligence.

Murphy v. Country House, Inc. · filed 1976-03-05(6)

Under Minn. St. 541.05(6), claims for relief on the ground of fraud must be commenced within 6 years from the time the aggrieved party discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, ought to have discovered the fraud.

Minnesota’s six-year limitations period for contract and related claims begins when the breach occurs, and the discovery rule does not toll it.

Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Petrucci · filed 2020-12-01subd. 1(1)

Under Minnesota law, the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim begins to run when the breach occurs.

Subdivision 1(1) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions, and an action to imply underinsured motorist coverage accrues on the date of the accident causing the injury.

O'Neill v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. · filed 1986-02-14(1)

Plaintiffs’ cause of action is to establish an implied-in-law contract for underinsured motorist coverage and to recover benefits under that coverage. We agree with the parties that this action sounds in contract and is governed by the 6-year statute of limitations for contracts. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1984). ... We hold, therefore, that in an action to imply underinsured motorist benefits in an insurance policy and to recover those benefits under the policy as amended, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the auto accident causing the injury.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), supplies the six-year statute of limitations for an uninsured-motorist coverage claim because the claim arises from contract.

Miklas v. Parrott · filed 2003-06-24(1)

The law is well established that the statute of limitations on a claim for uninsured motorist benefits begins to run on the date of the accident and is subject to the six-year limitation applicable to contract actions. Hughes v. Lund, 603 N.W.2d 674, 677 (Minn.App.1999) (stating that in Minnesota a claim for uninsured-motorist coverage is governed by six-year statute of limitations contained in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1)); Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn.App.1986) (stating that six-year statute of limitations for contract actions applies to uninsured-motorist-coverage claim because the liability arose from contract), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1987).

Section 541.05 does not bar an action for specific performance brought within six years after the plaintiff completes the lifetime care required by the contract.

Seitz v. Sitze · filed 1943-06-18

Appellants assert that plaintiff’s action matured immediately upon the death of his father in 1914 and hence is now barred by Minn. St. 1941, § 541.05 (Mason St. 1927, § 9191). We do not agree with this contention. The terms of the agreement provided that plaintiff would receive the property, not upon the death of the father, but upon the death of the survivor of his parents, and then only in the event he had performed his part of the contract by taking care of them during their lives. Had he sued for specific performance at the time of his father’s death, his suit would have been premature, since he then could not show complete performance. Under such circumstances, it was incumbent upon him to withhold suit until he had fully performed the contract by taking care of both of them throughout their lives. This he did, and within six years thereafter instituted this action.

Section 541.05 gives six years to bring a claim for money due under a contract, beginning when the debt matures.

Schueller v. Palm · filed 1944-11-24

This being true, the statute of limitations commenced to run as of that date, and plaintiff, had he a just and valid claim for money due him under said contract, failed to institute his action within the six-year period of limitations permitted. Minn. St. 1941, § 541.05 (Mason St. 1927, § 9191).

Section 541.05 allows six years to bring a contract action after it accrues; when the contract makes payment depend on an actual demand, the limitation period begins when that demand is made.

Bannitz v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. · filed 1945-01-26

This being an action on a contract, ordinarily it would be barred unless commenced within six years after the cause of action accrued. Minn. St. 1941, § 541.05 (Mason St. 1927, § 9191). Accepting the allegations of the complaint at their face value, they clearly indicate that a demand in fact was to be made before the money was to be paid. Therefore, the statute did not commence to run until such demand was made.

Under § 541.05(1), an insurance claim subject to a no-action clause accrues when judgment is entered against the insured.

Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad v. St. Paul Mercury-Indemnity Co. · filed 1964-06-26(1)

The general rule is that liability on an insurance contract containing such a “no action” clause does not accrue until judgment has been entered against the insured.

Section 541.05 gives a claimant six years to bring a pension claim, beginning when the claim is formally rejected.

Butler v. Minneapolis Police Relief Association · filed 1969-03-14

Plaintiff’s claim is also barred by the 6-year statute of limitations. Minn. St. 541.05. ... With respect to a pension, the statute starts running when the claim for the pension is formally rejected.

The six-year limitation for a liability created by statute begins when the claim accrues; a claim for a patient’s care costs under § 246.53 accrues upon the patient’s death.

In RE ESTATE OF MURPHY v. State Dept. of Pub. Welfare · filed 1972-06-09(2)

Since § 246.53 provides a cause of action accruing on the death of the patient, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claim accrues.

The six-year limitation period for a breach-of-contract claim based on an insurer’s duty to indemnify begins when the insurer refuses to indemnify after the insured becomes legally obligated to pay damages.

Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Carlson · filed 2006-03-07

Because Farmers was not required to immediately perform its duty to indemnify, the initial refusal to indemnify could not have been the basis for a breach of contract. Rather, as Northwestern National argues, the breach of contract occurred when Farmers refused to indemnify Carlson after the district court entered judgment against her, or after she was legally obligated to pay damages.

Section 541.05, subd. 1(6) delays accrual of a MUFTA claim until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting fraud; the predicate creditor's knowledge controls whether the discovery allowance applies.

In re Petters Company, Inc. · filed 2013-07-121(6)

The other, more obvious one is the possibility and the reach of the discovery allowance of Minn.Stat. § 541.05, Subd. 1(6). For the purposes of its statute of limitations, that statute defers the accrual of claims under MUFTA “until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” ... For this litigation, the aggrieved party is the predicate creditor. ... Thus, the actual knowledge of facts and circumstances held by the specific predicate creditor will be the key to whether the discovery allowance operates in any particular adversary proceeding in this docket.

For fraud claims, the six-year limitations period begins when the aggrieved party discovers—or, with reasonable diligence, could and ought to have discovered—the facts constituting the fraud.

In re: BCBS v. Rite Aid Litigation · filed 2021-02-09subd. 1(6)

Under Minnesota law, an action “for relief on the ground of fraud” must be commenced within six years, and “the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.”

Section 541.05, subd. 1(6) gives fraud claims a six-year limitations period that accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Jane Doe 43C v. Diocese of New Ulm · filed 2010-08-31(1)(6)

Minnesota law provides a six-year statute of limitations “for relief on the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud[.]” Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6).

The six-year limitations period for fraud begins when the aggrieved party discovers, or through reasonable diligence should discover, the facts constituting the fraud.

Ahlgren v. Muller · filed 2021-08-16(6)

The statute of limitations for fraud begins to run at the time of “discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Minn. Stat. § 541.05(6)

Section 541.05(6) gives fraud claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the aggrieved party actually or constructively discovers, or reasonably should discover, the facts constituting fraud.

Ericksen v. Winnebago Industries, Inc. · filed 1972-02-23(6)

The Minnesota statute of limitations governing fraud actions is found in Minn.Stat. § 541.05(6) and provides in relevant part as follows: “The following actions shall be commenced within six years: (6) For relief on the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud;” ... The Minnesota fraud statute is couched in terms of “discovery”, and the court in Universal Film Exchanges v. Swanson, 165 F.Supp. 95, 97 (D.Minn.1958), defines discovery as follows: “The word 'discovery’ as used in this statute has been construed to mean actual or constructive discovery, so that the six-year period commences to run from the time the facts constituting the fraud were discovered, or, from the time which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, they ought to have been discovered.” The six-year statute of limitations thus commenced to run in 1963 when plaintiff’s father acquired his preferred stock, and he was chargeable as a matter of law with knowledge of the articles of incorporation which had a callable provision for preferred stock, Count V is therefore barred by application of any of the various statutes of limitations.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(6), gives fraud claims a six-year limitation period that begins when the aggrieved party discovers, or through reasonable diligence should discover, the facts constituting the fraud.

Cohen v. Appert · filed 1990-12-11(1)(6)

Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (1989) provides a six-year limitation period [f]or relief on the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud. The limitation period begins running when the fraud is discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.

For fraud claims, the limitations period begins when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting fraud; actual knowledge of the injury and its cause prevented equitable tolling.

Klempka v. GD Searle and Co. · filed 1991-06-26subd. 1(6)

Ms. Klempka’s claims for fraud and for equitable tolling of the statutes of limitations due to fraud also fail because she has shown no connection between the evidence of fraud she presents and the delay in bringing this action. Minnesota law provides that the statute of limitation for fraud does not begin to run “until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting fraud.” Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6). Assuming the truth of Ms. Klempka’s evidence of fraud by Searle in the testing and marketing of the Cu-7, in this case she was told in 1977 that the Cu-7 had caused her to suffer chronic PID. She has not shown any connection between the fraud and her delay in bringing suit. Whatever fraud Searle may have committed before February 1977, at that time she had actual knowledge that she had been injured and had been told by her doctor that Searle’s Cu-7 caused her injury. Her cause of action for fraud accrued at this time and the relevant statutes of limitation should not be equitably tolled.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(6), gives fraud claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud; when discovery reasonably should have occurred is a fact question, and the plaintiff must prove delayed discovery despite reasonable diligence.

Barry v. Barry · filed 1996-04-19(1)(6)

We next address the Barrys' and Twin City's argument that Lieberman's fraud claim is barred by Minnesota's six-year limitations period for such claims. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (1992). We find that a factual question exists as to whether Lieberman could have discovered with reasonable diligence that Barrys gave her false financial figures. ... The six-year limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud. See Estate of Jones v. Kvamme, 449 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Minn.1989). The question of when discovery could or should have reasonably been made is one of fact. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she could not, through reasonable diligence, have discovered the facts constituting the fraud until within six years of the commencement of the action. Blegen v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 356, 357 (Minn.Ct.App.1985).

Subdivision 1(6) gives fraud claims a six-year limitations period, accruing when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

John Doe 76C v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis · filed 2011-06-27(1)(6)

Minnesota law provides a six-year statute of limitations “for relief on the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Minn.Stat. § 541.05, *210subd. 1(6).

Section 541.05’s fraud discovery rule does not apply to professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, or breach of fiduciary duty claims.

Jtf v. Cliftonlarsonallen · filed 2019-07-02(1)(6)

However, Peggy Rose is distinguishable because it addressed a fraud claim, for which Minnesota has enacted a statutory discovery rule not applicable to JTF and Freer’s claims. ... The Minnesota Supreme Court held the contract provision was not reasonable because it was inconsistent with a statute under which a fraud claim does not accrue until discovery of the facts. Id. at 607; see Minn. Stat. § 541.05(1)(6).

Section 541.05(6) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims, with accrual delayed until the injured party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Bailey v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. · filed 1976-06-03(6)

The general fraud statute of limitation, which was adopted by the court in Klapmeier, must also be rejected. The changes in the law of scienter in 10b-5 cases in the Eighth Circuit as a result of Hochfelder substantially erode the rationale of the court. A reworking of the Vanderboom resemblance test has shown a sufficient similarity between the Minnesota Blue Sky Law and the federal securities law, and clearly a commonality of purpose, to justify the application of the Blue Sky Law’s limitation provision to this action.

Section 541.05 supplies a six-year limitation period governing the action when the policy limitation and the two-year fire-insurance limitation do not apply.

Henning Nelson Construction Co. v. Fireman's Fund American Life Insurance Co. · filed 1985-04-15

Since neither limitation of suit clause in the policy nor Minn.Stat. § 65A.01 apply, the six year limitation period in Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (1978) governs to allow Henning’s suit.

The six-year limitations period in section 541.05, subdivision 1(6), does not apply to an objection to a bankruptcy homestead exemption based on fraud when no fraudulent-transfer action is being pursued.

In Re Curry · filed 1993-11-19subd. 1(6)

In a case involving fraud, the statute of limitations is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(6) (1992). This is not applicable in the present case since the trustee is not pursuing a fraudulent transfer action. Rather, the trustee is merely asserting that Debtor is not entitled to a claimed exemption based upon fraud. This court merely looks to UFTA to determine the standard of fraud in Minnesota.

The six-year contract limitations period applies only when no other limitation is expressly prescribed, so parties may agree to a shorter reasonable period.

Olmsted Medical Center v. Continental Casualty Company · filed 2022-01-13subd. 1(1)

And Minnesota Statute § 541.05 provides a general six-year limitation period for contracts but applies only “upon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed.” Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1). “[A]bsent a specific statute to the contrary, parties to an insurance policy can reasonably modify the limitations period;” and section 541.05, subd. 1(1)’s six-year statute of limitations does not prevent parties from contracting for a shorter limitations period.

Minnesota Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) provides the six-year general personal-injury limitations period borrowed for Title IX and § 1983 claims.

Sacks v. University of Minnesota · filed 2022-04-261(5)

Title IX and § 1983 claims are subject to the forum state’s general personal-injury statute of limitations, and here that’s six years pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5).

Claims arising in December 2012 were untimely under the applicable statute of limitations.

Otto v. Schmitt · filed 2022-05-11Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)

The R&R concluded that Otto’s claims, if any, arose as of December 2012, and thus are untimely under the relevant statute of limitations. ... Whether reviewed de novo or for clear error, this conclusion is undoubtedly correct.

Subsection 1(5) provides the six-year limitations period applied to bar the negligence claim.

Olson v. Amatuzio · filed 2020-01-03Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)

Olson did not file his complaint until 2018, well after Minnesota’s six-year statute of limitations had run.

The standard six-year period applies to actual- and constructive-fraud claims under MUVTA, with accrual upon discovery of the fraud.

Ahlgren v. Capital One Financial Corporation · filed 2020-02-10Minn. Stat. § 541.05

Thus, the standard six-year statute of limitations period applies to claims for actual and constructive fraud brought under MUVTA. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05; Finn II, 860 N.W.2d at 658 (stating six-year limit on claims for actual fraud); Finn I, 838 N.W. 2d at 594 (stating six-year limit on claims for constructive fraud).

Minnesota’s six-year limitations period applies to a legal-malpractice claim.

US Bank NA v. Glogowski Law Firm · filed 2021-08-03Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)

the Court relies on Minnesota’s statute of limitations for U.S. Bank’s legal malpractice claim, which is six years. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05. Therefore, a six-year statute of limitations applies, and Defendants do not argue that this term would serve as a bar for U.S. Bank’s claims.

Subdivision 1(5) imposes a six-year statute of limitations on legal-malpractice claims.

Lovlie v. United States · filed 2025-01-13Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)

Under Minnesota law, legal malpractice claims are governed by a six-year statute of limitations.

Subdivision 1(5) provides a general six-year limitations period for tort causes of action.

Lovgren v. Peoples Elec. Co., Inc. · filed 1986-02-07subd. 1(5)

Therefore, the only issue left to be decided by this court is whether the current section 541.051 should be retroactively applied or whether Lovgren’s cause of action is governed by the general 6-year statute of limitations for tort causes of action in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (1984). If the current statute were to be retroactively applied, Lovgren’s claim would be barred as of September 9, 1977. However, we find that we have no grounds for inferring that the legislature intended the retroactive application of the current section 541.051 to claims existing when it was enacted in 1980. We hold that Lovgren’s claim was governed by the general 6-year period. Since Lovgren brought suit against Peoples Electric within 6 years of accrual, we reverse the court of appeals and the district court and remand the case for trial.

Section 541.05's six-year limitations period covers wrongful interference with business relationships, including tortious interference with contract claims based on denial of contract rights.

Wallin v. Minnesota Department of Corrections · filed 1999-08-03

Wallin argues and respondents concede that the district court erred in determining that Wallin’s tortious interference with contract claims were also time-barred under a two-year statute of limitations. See Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 446-47, 234 N.W.2d 775, 793 (1975) (holding wrongful interference with business relationships is included in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, the six-year statute of limitations). ... Wal-lin’s claims deal with denial of his rights under the settlement agreement. Under Wild, these claims are governed by the six-year statute of limitations for contract claims. Wild, 302 Minn. at 446-47, 234 N.W.2d at 793. Therefore, the claims were not time-barred.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), imposes a six-year limitations period on breach-of-contract claims, running from the time of the alleged breach.

OmegaGenesis Corp. v. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research · filed 2015-09-21subd. 1(1)

Breach of contract claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1). A cause of action for breach of contract accrues— and the statute of limitations begins to run — “at the time of the alleged breach.” Jacobson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Teachers Ret. Assn., 627 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn.Ct.App.2001) (citing Pederson v. Am. Lutheran Church, 404 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Minn.Ct.App.1987)).

Section 541.05’s limitations period may be equitably estopped when a defendant’s promises to repair induce the plaintiff to delay filing a negligence action.

Bethesda Lutheran Church v. Twin City Construction Co. · filed 1984-10-09

All parties agree that the six-year statute of limitations, Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (1978), applies here. ... We hold that equitable estoppel applies to the statute of limitations on Bethesda’s negligence claim.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1 provides a six-year limitations period, and a valid oral extension of a promissory note postpones the start of that period until the agreed payment event.

In Re the Estate of Giguere · filed 1985-04-16subd. 1

The applicable statute of limitations is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 (1982). Accordingly, any proceeding to enforce the note would be barred if brought after October 10, 1975. ... The oral extension between Iliff and Gi-guere was a valid and binding modification of the promissory note. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run on the date the Elk Lake property was sold.

Subdivision 1(1) provides a six-year limitations period for UIM contract claims, running from the accident date unless the policy specifies a different accrual date.

Johnson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1999-06-01(1)

Absent a contractual accrual date, the statute of limitations on a UIM claim begins to run on the date of the accident causing injury. Therefore, the Johnsons are precluded from bringing their UIM claim more than six years after the accident.

For an uninsured-motorist arbitration claim under a policy with no contractual deadline, the six-year limitations period begins only after the insured demands arbitration and the insurer refuses.

Hughes v. Lund · filed 1999-12-28(1)

Where the policy contains a specific arbitration clause, and there is no contractual restriction on when arbitration must be demanded, the six-year statute of limitations on arbitration of claims does not commence until there has been a demand and refusal to arbitrate.

For fraud actions, the six-year limitations period does not accrue until discovery of the fraud, but reasonable diligence charges a party with discovery when the facts could and ought to have been discovered.

Blegen v. Monarch Life Insurance Co. · filed 1985-04-09(6)

Appellants’ cause of action is time-barred by the six year statute of limitations as a matter of law because appellants were put on notice of the less-than-promised return upon receipt of the Monarch materials in 1971. They did not take formal legal action until 1979; this is inconsistent with their duty of reasonable diligence and is an unmistakable portrait of negligence. Minn.Stat. § 541.05(6) bars any cause of action based on fraud as a matter of law.

Section 541.05, subd. 1(1)'s six-year limitations period does not govern a Pine River wrongful-discharge claim treated as a wages action under section 541.07(5).

Griffin v. American Motors Sales Corp. · filed 1985-10-04(1)

Given that Minnesota law governs this action, the next issue before the Court is whether the two-year limitations period of Minn.Stat. § 541.07(5) or the six-year limitations period of Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) applies in a Pine River wrongful discharge chase. ... The fact that some of the terms of the contract are drawn from defendant’s written manuals and policy statements on the strength of Pine River does not alter the conclusion reached in Kohout and progeny that a claim under an oral contract of employment is essentially a wages claim and not a contract action.

Subdivision 1(5) sets a six-year limitations period for the personal-injury claims to which it applies, but it does not control § 1983 actions in Minnesota federal court.

James W. v. Dakota County · filed 1986-05-29(1)(5)

This directive is complicated in Minnesota by the fact that under Minnesota law there are two statutes which apply to personal injury actions. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) specifies a six-year limitations period and Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) specifies a two-year limitations period. ... Accordingly, it is settled law in this district that the statute of limitations in a section 1983 action is two years.

The six-year contract limitations period in § 541.05, subd. 1(1), does not govern a Pine River wrongful-discharge action when § 541.07(5)’s two-year period applies.

Portlance v. Golden Valley State Bank · filed 1987-05-08(1)

Does the two-year limitations period of Minn.Stat. 541.07(5) or the six-year limitations period of Minn.Stat. 541.05, subd. 1(1) govern in a Pine River wrongful discharge case? ... Therefore, we answer the certified question by holding that the two-year limitation period of Minn.Stat. § 541.07(5) (1986) governs an action for wrongful discharge based on an oral contract of employment allegedly modified by an employees’ manual or handbook.

Subdivision 1(1) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions, running when the cause of action accrues; for written underinsured-motorist coverage, accrual occurs on the contractually specified settlement date.

Sargent v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1992-06-02subd. 1(1)

The statute of limitations is six years for actions on “contracts or other obligation, express or implied.” Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1990). ... We thus adopt the accrual date agreed upon by the parties in their insurance contract, which in this case is the date on which Duerkop paid Sargents the $50,-000 settlement.

Section 541.05, subd. 1(5) makes an insurer’s derivative subrogation claim subject to a six-year limitations period running from the accident, and a 30-day settlement notice period does not extend it.

Hermeling v. Minnesota Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1996-05-30(1)(5)

We conclude that Minnesota Fire’s cause of action in subrogation accrued at the time of the accident causing the injury, but was not ripe for adjudication until payment was made by substitution of its check for the settlement check of American States. An action in subrogation is subject to the same statute of limitations as though the action were sued upon by the insured. Minnesota Fire “stepped into the shoes” of Hermeling who was entitled to bring an action on the date of the accident, March 22, 1988, and for six years thereafter. Minnesota Fire’s third-party complaint is dated March 31, 1994, more than six years from the date of the accident causing Hermeling’s injury. Because the statute of limitations on Hermel-ing’s cause of action began to run on the date of the accident causing his injury, the statute of limitations on Minnesota Fire’s action in subrogation began to run on the same date. Therefore, Minnesota Fire’s action is barred because the six-year statute of limitations under section 541.05, subd. 1(5) expired prior to the commencement of the action.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), provides a six-year limitations period for contract-based obligations when no other limitation is expressly prescribed; here, the court held § 541.07(5), rather than § 541.05, governed the wage-related claim.

Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., James M. Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc. · filed 1997-05-02subd. 1(1)

It is undisputed that the time allotted in § 541.07(5) expired before Kulinsld filed this diversity action. Nearly four years passed between Medtronic’s alleged breach of contract in 1990 and the filing of Kulinski’s second action in 1994. Kulinski, however, argues that § 541.07(5) is not applicable because he does not bring a claim for “wages” within the meaning of that section. Instead, Kulinski argues that his action is covered by Minnesota’s six-year statute of limitations for actions based “[ujpon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed____” Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1990). We disagree.

Subdivision 1(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on actions upon a contract.

Windschitl v. Windschitl · filed 1998-06-16(1)

A six-year statute of limitations applies to this contract action. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1996) (action upon a contract). ... Under Honn, a separate cause of action arises on each installment due, and each installment has its own limitations period. 311 N.W.2d at 2. Holding that tender of an installment payment when due restarts the running of the limitations period on payments due earlier would conflict with the rule that each installment has its own limitations period. We, therefore, conclude that tender of an installment payment when due does not restart the statute of limitations on payments due earlier.

Section 541.05(1) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims.

Residential Funding Co. v. HSBC Mortgage Corp. (USA) (In re Residential Capital, LLC) · filed 2015-02-03(1)

Both states have six-year statutes of limitations for breach of contract claims. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05(1); N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 213(2).

Section 541.05's six-year period for injury to a person or another's rights not arising on contract does not govern intentional tort claims causing personal injury when § 541.07's two-year period for other torts resulting in personal injury applies.

Krause v. Farber · filed 1985-12-17(1)(5)

Krause argues that these claims are governed by the six-year statute of limitations provided in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 (1984), which states: ... Subdivision 1. Except where the uniform commercial code otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within six years: ... (5) For criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, ... and not hereinafter enumerated. ... Misrepresentation, as it is pleaded in Krause’s complaint, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are intentional torts resulting in injury to the person. Such claims are subject to the same two-year statute of limitations which governs claims in medical malpractice. Minn.Stat. § 541.07 (1984) provides: ... Except where the uniform commercial code or this section otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within two years: ... (1) For libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, ... or other tort, ... resulting in personal injury * * *. ... These claims are therefore barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(5), provides a six-year limitations period for an injury to a person or another’s rights that does not arise on contract and is not otherwise enumerated, and applies as the residual personal-injury period for § 1981 claims.

Woodson v. International Brotherhood of Electric Workers Local 292 · filed 1997-08-15(1)(5)

Owens and subsequent court decisions support the position that this court should apply the six-year statute of limitations period to the section 1981 claim. ... Thus, plaintiffs’ section 1981 claims are governed by the six-year statute of limitations. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5).

Section 541.05, subdivision 1 provides a six-year limitations period for the tort claims at issue, and it is not tolled merely because related administrative proceedings are pending when those proceedings do not determine the plaintiff’s injury or loss.

Hanna Mining Co. v. InterNorth, Inc. · filed 1986-01-07subd. 1

Appellant claims the six-year statute of limitations in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1, applicable to its tort claims, was tolled until the' termination of requisite administrative proceedings. ... Here, the MPSC did not prescribe a reasonable rate for the period involved. ... The administrative proceeding did not determine appellant’s injury or loss. ... Appellant should have filed its action prior to conclusion of the administrative proceedings. Appellant should have preserved its claims by bringing suit when it became aware of its cause of action in 1977.

Section 541.05(1)'s six-year period does not begin to run on a bank certificate of deposit payable on demand or return until payment is demanded.

State v. Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis · filed 1945-04-13(1)

The general rule, sustained by the great weight of authority in -this country, is that such statute does not begin to run against an action upon such certificate where, as here, it is issued by a bank, payable on demand or on return of the certificate properly endorsed, until a demand for its payment is actually made.

Section 541.05’s six-year limitations period runs separately from each installment’s due date; for a debt payable only on demand, it generally begins when demand is made, subject to the parties’ agreement to an indefinite delay.

In Re the Estate of Dahle · filed 1986-04-08(1)(1)

Appellants assert that enforcement of the 1966 promissory note is barred by the six-year statute of limitations. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1984). However, where a money obligation is payable in installments, the statute of limitations begins to run against each installment when it becomes due. Honn v. National Computer Systems, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.1981). The statute of limitations therefore bars only Lindahl’s claim to those $100 yearly installments which became due more than six years before she filed her claim. ... Lindahl’s numerous loans to the decedent from 1967-81 are implied contracts; enforcement of those made more than six years prior to claim may also be barred by the six-year statute of limitations. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1). However, where the contract indicates the debt is payable only upon demand, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until actual demand is made. Bannitz v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., Etc., 219 Minn. 235, 17 N.W.2d 372 (1945); Andrews v. Andrews, 170 Minn. 175, 212 N.W. 408 (1927). The demand must be made within a reasonable time, ordinarily six years or the period of the statute of limitations. But where the parties contemplate a delay in making the demand to some indefinite time in the future, the statutory period for bringing the action is not controlling. Id. The evidence in this case indicates the parties contemplated an indefinite delay. Lindahl lent her brother money continuously over many years and apparently never made a demand for repayment until 1983. Her claim based upon the unsecured loans is therefore not barred.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(5), provides a six-year limitations period for tort causes of action.

Schwardt v. Modern Grain Systems, Inc. · filed 1986-07-15subd. 1(5)

Thus the general 6-year statute of limitations for tort causes of action set out in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (1984) applies to appellants’ lawsuit.

Subdivision 1(5) imposes a six-year limitations period, and the period begins when damage occurs even if the ultimate damage is unknown or unpredictable; a contract's reduced value can be ascertainable damage when the contract is executed.

Grimm v. O'CONNOR · filed 1986-08-19subd. 1(5)

The trial court granted summary judgment because the action was not commenced within six years as required by the statute of limitations. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (1984). A right of action does not accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until damage occurs. ... The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action comes into being “even though the ultimate damage is unknown or unpredictable.” ... A contract for deed has an ascertainable market value, and one with an interest escalator clause during a period of inflation is of considerably greater value than one without. The Grimms, knowing their contract for deed had no interest escalator clause in 1973, were aware of an ascertainable damage. We therefore conclude that the Grimms’ action was barred by the statute of limitations and that the trial court properly granted summary judgment.

For legal-malpractice claims, the six-year limitations period begins when damage occurs, even if the ultimate damage is unknown or unpredictable; ignorance does not toll accrual absent continuing negligence, trespass, or fraud.

Sabes & Richman, Inc. v. Muenzer · filed 1988-11-29subd. 1(5)

The statute of limitations for a claim of legal malpractice is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (1986). A right of action does not accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until damage occurs. ... Ignorance of a cause of action does not toll the accrual of the cause of action absent allegations of continuing negligence, trespass or fraud. ... Furthermore, the statute of limitations begins to run after damage occurs, even though the ultimate damage is unknown or unpredictable.

Section 541.05's six-year limitations period applies to inverse-condemnation actions seeking compensation for access-related damage when the public authority is not in adverse possession of the landowner's property.

Beer v. Minnesota Power & Light Co. · filed 1987-02-13subd. 1

It was held that under the constitution of this state private property may not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without compensation and that where the action was not based on an actual taking of the property but on damage to the real property, the six-year statute of limitation, which is today found at Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 (1986), is applicable. ... Accordingly, although the 15-year limitation imposed by Minn.Stat. § 541.02 (1986) is applicable in cases in which there has been an actual taking of property, we hold that in actions for inverse condemnation or compensation for damages resulting from the limitation of access only, where the public authority is not in adverse possession of the landowner’s property, the six-year statute of limitations is applicable.

Section 541.05, subd. 1(3) supplies the general six-year tort limitation, but a more specific limitation in § 541.07(8) controls a claim for damage caused by negligent herbicide application.

Grossman v. Aerial Farm Services, Inc. · filed 1987-03-10subd. 1(3)

The trial court concluded that, on these facts, as between § 541.07(8), which provides a two year limitation in negligent spraying cases, and § 541.05, subd. 1(3), which is the general six year tort limitation, the more specific language of § 541.-07(8) controls. Damage caused by negligent application of herbicide is specifically addressed in § 541.07(8). That specific statute controls over the more general six year trespass statute.

Section 541.05(4) provides a six-year limitations period for trespass and conversion of personal property.

Herrmann v. Fossum · filed 1978-08-11(4)

Actually Minn. St. 541.05(4) provides a six-year statute of limitations for trespass and conversion of personal property.

Section 541.05, subd. 1(4) requires an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property to be brought within six years, measured from when the action can be commenced.

Franklin Auto Body Co. v. Wicker · filed 1987-10-27(1)(4)

A party must bring an action within six years “[f|or taking, detaining or injuring personal property * * Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(4) (1978). ... Robert's complaint fails to state a claim for conversion because it states the conver~ sion occurred "on or before July 1, 1979." Under Minn.Stat. § 541.05, a conversion action commenced after July 1, 1985, would be barred. Robert served the complaints on July 3, and July 8, 1985. Accordingly, by the very terms of the complaint, the cause of action is stale.

Fraudulent concealment may toll the six-year limitations period for a contract claim.

Cherne Contracting Corp. v. Wausau Insurance Companies · filed 1997-12-16subd. 1(6)

Furthermore, even if the normal six-year contractual statute of limitations applies, Cherne has presented sufficient evidence to create a fact issue on whether the statute should be tolled because Wausau fraudulently or intentionally concealed from Cherne its failure to communicate settlement demands and to pursue third-party recoveries.

Section 541.05 supplies a possible six-year limitations period for intentional interference with contractual relations, subject to tolling for fraudulent concealment that could not have been discovered through reasonable diligence.

Olson v. City of Cambridge, Jay T. Squires, Lisa Iverson, ... · filed 2024-09-30

A two- or six-year statute of limitations applies to a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775, 793 (Minn. 1975) (citing Minn. Stat. §§ 541.05, .07 (2022)). ... Even taking as true the allegations in appellants’ amended complaint, the allegations are insufficient to show that the alleged concealment could not have been discovered sooner by reasonable diligence so as to invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to toll the statutes of limitations. Thus, the district court did not err by dismissing appellants’ tort claims as time-barred.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(6), does not toll the limitations period for fraudulent concealment when the injury itself reveals the alleged defect and permits discovery of the fraud.

Gregory ex rel. Gregory v. Honeywell, Inc. · filed 1987-12-10(1)(6)

His analysis of the issue is dispositive: ... The party claiming fraudulent concealment for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations has the burden of showing that the concealment could not have been discovered sooner by reasonable diligence on his part and was not the result of his own negligence. ... In this case, the existence of the alleged defect in the Honeywell valve constitutes the core of the “facts constituting the fraud” alleged by plaintiffs to have existed. See Minn.Stat. 541.05, subd. 1(6). No plausible argument can be made, however, that Honeywell concealed the existence of this defect, if it existed, beyond the date upon which the defect caused the explosion at the Paquette farmhouse. The explosion itself fully apprised the plaintiffs that the water heater was unsafe, and enabled them to discover the full contours of the fraud and deceit of which they now complain.

Fraudulent concealment can toll the applicable limitation periods; whether reasonable diligence would have revealed the concealed facts is generally a fact question, and a fiduciary relationship may excuse delay in discovery.

Appletree Square I Ltd. Partnership v. Investmark, Inc. · filed 1993-01-19

Fraudulent concealment of facts tolls limitation periods. ... Reasonable diligence is generally a question of fact. ... Where a fiduciary relationship exists, a delay in discovering the concealed facts may be excusable. ... We have found in the circumstances of this case a triable claim of breach of respondents’ fiduciary duty to appellants. ... Appellants presented sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on its fraudulent concealment claim.

The six-year limitations periods in subdivisions 1(1) and 1(5) may be equitably tolled for fraudulent concealment until discovery or a reasonable opportunity for discovery through ordinary diligence, and whether the claimant was reasonably diligent is a fact issue.

Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp. · filed 2009-07-14subd. 1(1) and 1(5)

See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subdivs. 1(1), 1(5). ... The statute of limitations period is tolled by fraudulent concealment “until discovery or reasonable opportunity for discovery of the fact by the exercise of ordinary diligence.” ... Therefore, the court determines that a fact issue remains as to whether equitable tolling is warranted because Best Buy was reasonably diligent in pursuing its claims once it had reason to challenge the nature of the charges.

Section 541.05 provides a six-year limitations period for actions on liability created by statute, and fraudulent concealment can toll that period for consumer-protection claims unless the Legislature has expressed a contrary intent.

Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc. · filed 2010-12-28(1)(2)

We hold that fraudulent concealment can toll the six-year statute of limitations for actions based on a violation of Minnesota’s consumer-protection statutes. But material-fact questions exist concerning whether Philip Morris fraudulently concealed facts that would have established appellants’ cause of action. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying respondents’ motion for partial summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.

Section 541.05(6) gives six years to bring a fraud action, with accrual postponed until the aggrieved party discovers, or reasonably should discover, the facts constituting the fraud.

Goellner v. Julius Butler, M.D., University of Minnesota · filed 1988-02-17(6)

The statute of limitations applied by the district court provides that actions for fraud shall be commenced within six years “in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Minn.Stat. § 541.05(6) (1986). Such facts are deemed to have been discovered “when with reasonable diligence they should and ought to have been discovered.”

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(6), provides that a fraud cause of action accrues when the fraud is discovered, triggering the six-year limitations period.

Palatine National Bank of Palatine v. Strom (In Re Strom) · filed 1989-03-14(1)(6)

However, I think § 541.05 supercedes Rounds. Section 541.05(1)(6) is clear in providing that a cause of action for fraud accrues when the fraud is discovered.

Subdivision 1(1) imposes a six-year limitation period for an unjust-enrichment action, running when the cause of action accrues and damage occurs; ignorance of the claim or mutual mistake does not toll the period absent fraud or deliberate misrepresentation.

Block v. Litchy · filed 1988-09-13subd. 1(1)

The applicable time limit for bringing an action in unjust enrichment is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1986). ... The statute of limitations begins to run when the right of action accrues and when damage occurs. ... In this case, respondent was damaged and had a cause of action for unjust enrichment when she began overpaying in 1979. ... Respondent’s ignorance of her cause of action does not necessarily toll the statute of limitations in the absence of fraud or deliberate misrepresentation. ... Plaintiff’s action is based upon the mutual mistake of the parties rather than fraud. The statute of limitations, Minn. Stat.Anot. § 541.05, is not tolled by the failure of a party to discover an alleged mistake upon which a contract action is based.

Section 541.05, subd. 1(2) is a catch-all six-year limitations provision for liabilities created by statute when the statute creating the liability does not specify a limitations period, but a more specific conflicting limitations statute controls.

Fagerlie v. City of Willmar · filed 1989-02-21subd. 1(2)

Section 541.051, subd. 1 is more particular than section 541.05, subd. 1(2) because it is limited to situations involving improvements to realty and is specifically designed to deal with the defective design and construction of such improvements. By contrast, section 541.05, subd. 1(2) is a catch-all provision applying generally to all actions for liability created by statute where the statute creating the liability does not specify a time limitation for the action. Therefore, since section 541.051 is more particular and specific, it controls over the more general statute of limitations under section 541.05, subd. 1(2).

Section 541.05 requires actions on liabilities created by statute to be commenced within six years.

Johnson v. County of Anoka · filed 1995-08-22

The Veterans Preference Act does not contain a statute of limitations provision. Thus, the county claims, the six-year statute of limitations applies. See Minn.Stat. § 541.01 (1992) (“Actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action accrues, except where a different limitation is prescribed * * * in special cases, by other statute.); Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (actions “[u]pon a liability created by statute” to be commenced within six years). The Veterans Preference Act requires employers to follow certain procedures and imposes liability if they fail to do so. ... Because these rights are statutorily-based, we hold the six-year limitations period applies to the Veterans Preference Act.

A statutorily created indemnity action by a no-fault insurer is subject to the six-year limitations period under section 541.05, subdivision 1(2).

State Farm v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2004-05-04subd. 1(2)

A claim of indemnity by a no fault insurer against a residual liability insurer under MinmStat. § 65B.53, subd. 1, when insured dies is not a cause of action covered by the wrongful death act. Even in those cases where the no-fault insurer’s insured dies, the claim, as a statutorily created action, is subject to the six-year statute of limitations under Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2).

Subdivision 1(5) supplies a six-year limitations period for section 1983 claims as Minnesota’s general or residual personal-injury limitations period.

Berg v. Groschen · filed 1989-03-14(1)(5)

Under the Supreme Court’s directive, we designate the six-year limitations period in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) as the applicable statutory limitations period for section 1983 claims.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(5), supplies a six-year residual limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims.

Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County · filed 1994-11-01(1)(5)

Actions for torts not elsewhere enumerated are governed by the residuary clause of section 541.05, subd. 1(5). ... The court agrees that the six year limitations period found in Minnesota’s residual statute for personal injury actions applies to section 1983 claims.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1, gives a six-year limitations period for a claim seeking compensation for a taking, and the period begins when the takings claim ripens upon the final administrative decision.

Kottschade v. City of Rochester · filed 2009-02-10(1)

It is undisputed that an action for compensation for a taking of private property is subject to the six-year statute of limitations set forth in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 (1998). ... Because the city council heard the appeal and had an opportunity to modify its earlier position, the January 3, 2001 decision became the final administrative decision. Appellant’s cause of action thus ripened on January 3, 2001. ... We conclude that (1) because appellant’s claim ripened in January 2001, not July 2000, the district court erred in holding that the statute of limitations for appellant’s claim had run and (2) the district court erred in holding that appellant’s claim was moot for failure to obtain a subsequent development approval within two years.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(5), sets a six-year limitations period for personal injury claims that governs § 1983 claims in Minnesota.

Blackwell v. City of Saint Paul · filed 2025-03-27subd. 1(5)

In Minnesota, claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are governed by the state’s six-year statute of limitations ... for personal injury claims. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5); Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 617-18 (8th Cir. 1995) (overruled on other grounds).

The six-year limitations defense under Minn. Stat. § 541.05 may be waived, and when a debt is payable on demand, the limitations period does not begin until demand for payment is made.

In Re Gregory A. Lemaire, Debtor. Paul Handeen v. Lemaire · filed 1989-07-05

Handeen relies on Minn.Stat. § 541.05 to argue that LeMaire’s parents’ claim based on a loan to their son of $3,600 in legal fees is barred by the six-year statute of limitations. We agree with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Lemaire waived the statute. ... Furthermore, under Bannitz v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 219 Minn. 235, 17 N.W.2d 372 (1945), the statute of limitations had not yet begun to run because the parents never demanded payment. Id. 17 N.W.2d at 373 (where parties agree either expressly or impliedly that a debt is payable on demand, debt does not begin to run until demand for payment is made).

Section 541.05, subd. 1(5) gives legal or professional-malpractice claims a six-year limitations period that begins when some legally cognizable damage occurs; for negligent failure to make or advise a Section 754 election, that is when the tax return is filed without the election.

Ames & Fischer Co. v. McDonald · filed 2011-05-09(1)(5)

Analogizing to the facts of the present case, we conclude that Ames & Fischer’s cause of action accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, when the tax returns were filed.4 At bottom, the alleged negligence consists of McDonald’s failure to advise to make and Larsen’s failure to make the Section 754 elections. To the extent Ames & Fischer were damaged, they were damaged when the returns were filed without the Section 754 elections, which resulted in the immediate overpayment of taxes and the loss of the use of those funds. Even if the overpaid taxes could be recovered by filing an amended return within 12 months, the loss of the use of those funds during that time would persist and the cost of filing an amended return would be incurred. Later opportunities to correct the error and mitigate damages cannot toll the statute of limitations. Because Ames & Fischer incurred some damage at the time the tax returns were filed, the cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run at that time.

Section 541.05’s limitation period for contract actions does not begin on a payor bank’s indemnity claim until the bank sustains the indemnified loss.

E.S.P., Inc. v. Midway National Bank of St. Paul · filed 1989-11-17(1)

But if they do, we hold that the payor bank who seeks indemnity from the collecting and depositary bank, under Minn.Stat. § 336.4-207(1) (1988), is not barred by the statute of limitations because the statute on that claim does not commence running until the payor bank has sustained loss.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1, gives contract claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the claim accrues—when it could survive a motion to dismiss—not when the injury is discovered.

Hempel v. Creek House Trust · filed 2007-12-31subd. 1

We reject appellant’s argument that the damage rule is inappropriate for a claim alleging a breach of a right-of-first-refusal agreement. A right-of-first-refusal agreement is a contract and the party with the right is damaged when it is breached. Here the district court correctly granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment because “in July of 1992 the [appellants] could have initiated a breach of contract action against Ingemann and that action would have survived a motion to dismiss.” Thus the six-year limitations period applicable to contract actions expired in July of 1998 and appellants’ subsequent attempt to bring forth a claim was time-barred. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), provides a six-year limitations period for actions on a contract or other obligation only when no other limitation is expressly prescribed.

Will & Appt of the Estate of: William C. Mackey, Dec'd · filed 2024-04-29subd. 1(1)

By its plain language, that general statute of limitations applies only to actions upon a contract or other obligation when “no other limitation is expressly prescribed.”

Section 541.05's six-year limitations period for contract actions does not apply when a specific insurance statute prescribes a different limitations period.

Ryan v. ITT Life Insurance Corp. · filed 1990-01-12(1)

Based on the specificity and code nature of section 62A.04, subd. 2(11) coupled with case law recognition of the application of express limitations provisions contained within specific statutes governing insurance policies, we hold that the six-year limitations period is inapplicable to an insurance policy governed by Minn.Stat. § 62A.04 and reverse the court of appeals on this issue.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(5), requires a personal-injury negligence action to be commenced within six years, and in a diversity case Minnesota's service-based commencement rule determines whether the period is tolled.

Winnie H. Walker v. Thielen Motors, Incorporated, Ted Thielen, Individually · filed 1990-10-10(1)(5)

Under Minnesota law, a negligence action involving personal injury must be commenced within six years of the accrual of the cause of action. Minn.Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(5). ... Under Minnesota rules, however, an action commences when the summons is served upon the defendant or delivered to the sheriff who then must serve the summons upon the defendant within sixty days. Minn.R.Civ.P. 3.01. ... Both Fischer and Sieg direct us to adopt the Minnesota rule in this case. ... Based on this sentiment and the law which flows from it, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants.

Section 541.05 requires a personal injury action to be commenced within six years after the claim accrues.

Long v. Moore · filed 1973-02-02

Minn. St. 541.05 provides that an action for personal injuries must be commenced within 6 years from the time of the accrual of the claim. ... Even if we give plaintiffs credit for the 6 months that a resident must be absent from the state to permit service under § 170.55, the statute of limitations would still have run.

Section 541.05(4) imposes a six-year limit on actions for taking or specifically recovering personal property.

Searles v. Searles · filed 1987-11-06(4)

Regarding her claim to recover her share of personal property in the form of bank accounts, the trial court correctly determined her claim is untimely. In 1971, Minnesota imposed a six-year limitation “[f]or taking * * * personal property, including actions for the specific recovery thereof.” Minn.Stat. § 541.05(4) (1971). We therefore affirm this portion of the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s claim regarding personal property.

Subdivision 1 provides a six-year limitations period for negligence and nuisance claims, while subdivision 2 provides a four-year limitations period for strict-liability claims arising from products.

Johnson v. Steele-Waseca Cooperative Electric · filed 1991-05-07subd. 1; subd. 2

Appellants argue, and we agree, that Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (1988), the general statute of limitations, should be applied to their common law tort claims. ... Under this statute, appellants had six years to raise negligence or nuisance claims against respondent. ... If, under one possible view of the facts, they discovered injuries which respondent’s stray voltage caused in January 1984, appellants, under the six-year statute of limitations, could have brought a timely action until January 27, 1990. ... The timeliness of appellants’ action for negligence arising from the manner in which respondent operated its electrical power distribution system should be evaluated under Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1. ... The four-year statute of limitations of subdivision 2 applies to defective "products.” We need not address the issue of whether electricity is a "product” because the cause of action for strict liability is barred four years after discovery of the injury. If electricity were a "product,” the statute of limitations began running at the time appellants discovered the harm to their cattle in 1980. As a result, Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 2, bars a 1989 claim based on strict liability.

Subdivision 1(5) gives legal and accounting malpractice claims a six-year limitations period that generally starts when malpractice damage occurs, and for ongoing malpractice may run from the last negligent act.

Anoka Orthopaedic Associates, P.A. v. Mutschler · filed 1991-09-25subd. 1(5)

Minnesota has a six-year statute of limitations for legal and accounting malpractice actions. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (1986). The limitation period begins to run on the date that the cause of action accrues; malpractice actions generally accrue when the damage caused by the negligence occurs. ... Based on the foregoing, the court determines that the analysis of May and Bonhiver should be followed to determine when the statute of limitations began to run in the present case. Applying that analysis, the court finds that plaintiffs’ damages would be ongoing because Flo embezzled funds throughout the period of time in which defendants allegedly had an ongoing duty to audit the Plans. The court further finds that it is unable to determine when defendants’ last act of negligence occurred on the basis of the record before it. ... Based on the foregoing, the court finds that material fact disputes exist concerning whether Lechner fraudulently concealed malpractice and when, under May and Bonhiver, the statute of limitations began to run, and thus denies both motions for partial summary judgment on this issue.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), gives a six-year limitation period for a UM-benefits action that begins on the date of the accident, so the action is barred if filed more than six years later.

Weeks v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1998-06-11(1)

Although Weeks’ cause of action was for UM benefits, not UIM benefits, our reasoning in O’Neill and subsequent cases applies equally to a cause of action for UM benefits. ... Because liability rather than the existence of coverage is the underlying substantive issue, the cause of action for either UIM or UM benefits accrues once the accident occurs, and the claimant then becomes entitled to seek a judicial determination of liability and to recover damages. ... We conclude that the cause of action for UM benefits accrues on the date of the accident. Because Weeks did not commence her action against American Family within six years of the date of her accident, her suit is barred by the statute of limitations.

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 applies a six-year limitations period to a MERLA claim, accruing under the common-law discovery rule when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the contamination.

Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Reilly Industries, Inc. · filed 2000-06-14subd. 1

In the present case, we conclude, as did the district court, that the Minnesota Supreme Court would apply the common law discovery rule for determining when to commence the six-year statutory limitations period for a MERLA claim. ... Therefore, because the state law commencement date is the same as the federally required commencement date, the six-year limitations period for UP’s MERLA claim commenced when UP knew or reasonably should have known of the creosote contamination at the UP site. ... In accordance with the well-supported factual finding that UP knew or reasonably should have known about the creosote contamination more than six years before it commenced this litigation, ... we hold that the district court did not err in dismissing UP’s MERLA claim as barred by the statute of limitations.

The statute imposes a six-year limitations period on the claims at issue, with accrual occurring no later than when the insurer required payments inconsistent with its representations.

James W. Parkhill, an Individual, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company · filed 2002-04-18subd. 1

Both parties agree that Parkhill’s breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory claims are governed by section 541.05’s six-year limitations period. ... Thus, as the district court concluded, the latest time that any of the claims could have accrued was the point at which Minnesota Mutual required Parkhill to make out-of-pocket payments that were inconsistent with Russo’s alleged representations regarding the policy. ... Because Parkhill did not file suit until February 1997, we conclude that the claims at issue here are time-barred.

Section 541.05(2)’s six-year period for statutory liabilities does not apply to a usury claim seeking penal forfeiture of the underlying debt.

Maus v. Toder · filed 2010-01-19(2)

The first option would be a six-year limitations period under Minn.Stat. § 541.05(2) for actions “upon a liability created by statute, other than those arising upon a penalty or forfeiture.” ... The Court finds § 334.01 and the accompanying remedy provisions in §§ 334.03 and 334.05 are penal in nature. Thus the two-year limitations period set out in § 541.07(2) applies to bar the Maus’s usury claim.

Section 541.05, subd. 1(2) provides a six-year limitation for statutory liabilities, but excludes liabilities arising from penalties or forfeitures and claims governed by a shorter period in section 541.07.

State, Department of Public Safety v. $6,276 in United States Currency · filed 1991-12-10(1)(2)

Under Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) (1990) there is a six-year statute of limitations [u]pon a liability created by statute, other than those arising upon a penalty or forfeiture or where a shorter period is provided by section 541.07. Under Minn.Stat. § 541.07(2) there is a two-year statute of limitations “[u]pon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture.” ... We disagree. The claimed distinction is meaningless.

Section 541.05, subd. 1(2), does not apply to a claim seeking to have a conveyance declared an equitable mortgage because that claim does not concern a liability created by statute.

Peterson v. Johnson · filed 2006-08-08(1)(2)

The Johnsons contend that Peterson’s right of action accrued when they recorded the deed in 1996 and is now time-barred. But Peterson’s suit to declare an equitable mortgage does not concern a liability created by statute; an equitable mortgage, by its very name, is an equitable creation. The limitation period prescribed by Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) does not apply to Peterson’s claim.

Subdivision 1(4) applies a six-year limitations period to tort claims for injury to personal property.

Elgharbawi v. Selly · filed 1992-04-07(1)(4)

The case involves a simple tort claim for personal property damage and the standard six-year time bar applies. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(4) (1990). Because the nine-month Carmack limitation is not applicable to these facts, the claim was timely.

Section 541.05(5) gives six years to bring a negligence-based personal injury action, measured from the date of injury.

American Mutual Liability Insurance v. Cleaners · filed 1963-06-07(5)

Here, the 6-year limitation period began to run against Roy on March 4, 1953, the date of the accident.

The six-year limitations period for an insured’s bad-faith failure-to-settle claim begins when the underlying judgment becomes final after the appellate process, because only then is the insured’s claim and resulting damages identifiable.

Amdahl v. Stonewall Insurance Co. · filed 1992-05-12(1)

Actions based on insurance contracts are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. ... The limitations period begins to run when an insured has an identifiable claim against the insurer. ... Because the final outcome of the original action is probative of the reasonableness of Stonewall’s refusal to settle, C & L did not know if it had a viable claim until the appellate process was complete.

Section 541.05(1) supplies the applicable time limit for an insured’s bad-faith claim against an insurer for refusing to settle within policy limits.

Strand v. Travelers Insurance Company · filed 1974-06-28(1)

The court further concluded the action had been commenced within the time limitations of Minn. St. 541.05(1), the applicable statute, ... We hold that the trial court rulings on matters of law were correct and that the jury’s verdict has sufficient evidentiary support.

Section 541.05 provides six-year limitations periods for contract actions and actions based on statutes that are not penalties or forfeitures.

Estate of Riedel Ex Rel. Mirick v. Life Care Retirement Communities, Inc. · filed 1993-08-24subd. 1(1) and subd. 1(2)

Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1992) prescribes a six-year limitations period for actions upon a contract. ... Specifically, a breach of contract action accrues at the time of the breach, even though actual damages occur later. ... Thus, the Consumer Fraud Law is not penal in nature, and is not subject to the two-year limitations period of Minn.Stat. § 541.07(2). Rather, we conclude actions brought under the Consumer Fraud Law are subject to a six-year limitations period under Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2).

Subdivision 1(2) gives claims based on liability created by Minnesota statute a six-year limitations period running from the date of sale, and discovery of the potential claim does not delay the period.

Thunanber v. Uponor, Inc. · filed 2012-08-14subd. 1(2)

According to Minnesota law, an action based upon a liability created by Minnesota statute is subject to a six year statute of limitation. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2). ... The six year limitations period begins to run on the date of sale and Minn.Stat. § 541.05 is not delayed based on the discovery of a potential claim.

Subdivision 1(2) gives a six-year limitations period to claims based on liability created by statute, without a discovery rule; for Minnesota Consumer Fraud Law claims, accrual occurs at the sale.

Veldhuizen v. A.O. Smith Corp. · filed 1993-12-14(1)(2)

The court concludes that Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2), which provides a six year limitations ■ period for claims based on liability created by statute, applies to claims under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Law. The court also holds that a cause of action accrues under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Law on the date of sale when the alleged statutory violations occurred. ... The court notes that subdivision 1(2) of Minn.Stat. § 541.05 does not include a discovery provision.

Subdivision 1(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions upon a liability created by statute, but it is not the most analogous period for ADA first-hire claims.

Ackerman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1994-04-05subd. 1(2)

Actions under the ADA arise solely by virtue of the right created by section 43(d) and, thus, are based upon a liability created by statute. That similarity alone, however, does not establish that Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) provides the most analogous statute of limitations. The gravamen of claims asserted under section 43(d) is the failure to hire a protected airline employee. The MHRA is a remedial statute which provides remedies for discriminatory failure to hire on the basis of improper factors, including sex, race, religion, age and marital status. The remedies sought by plaintiffs and envisioned by Congress are more analogous to remedies afforded to victims of employment discrimination. The elements of a cause of action under the EPP are kindred to a discrimination claim under the MHRA. The court holds that actions under section 43(d) are most closely akin to unfair discrimination actions under the MHRA.

Section 541.05, subd. 1(2), provides a six-year limitations period for actions upon liability created by statute, but it is too broad to serve as an appropriate limitations period for EPP claims.

Ackerman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1995-05-151(2)

The NLRA limitations period is also more analogous than the six year period provided by state law for actions “[u]pon liability created by statute, other than those arising upon a penalty or forfeiture_” Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2). Unlike that statute, the six month period in § 10(b) reflects an effort to balance the interests of employers and employees. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294. The Minnesota catchall statute is so broad that many types of actions *1399could arguably fit -within its language, but it does not offer a suitable analogy for EPP cases or an appropriate limitations period given the competing interests underlying the federal legislation.

Subdivision 1(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on claims based on liability created by statute, without a discovery allowance; the period begins when the statutory violation occurs.

Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp. · filed 1995-01-06subd. 1(2)

Minnesota Statute section 541.05 subd. 1(2) imposes a six year statute of limitations for claims based on liability created by statute. This provision does not include a discovery allowance as does the statute of limitations applicable to fraud claims.

Subdivision 2 imposes a four-year limitations period on actions based on a defendant’s strict liability arising from the manufacture, sale, use or consumption of a product.

Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. · filed 2000-09-28subd. 2

The strict liability statute of limitations applies, “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, [to] any action based on the strict liability of the defendant and arising from the manufacture, sale, use or consumption of a product.” Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 2. ... Because this is a wrongful death action predicated, in part, on strict liability and breach of warranty, all three statutes appear to apply. ... After careful examination of each statute, the Court concludes that despite its apparent breadth, the wrongful death limitations period cannot apply to Plaintiffs strict liability and warranty claims. ... Because Tuttle would have been unable to bring strict liability and breach of warranty claims after October 1997, the wrongful death statute of limitations cannot apply to Plaintiffs strict liability and warranty claims. ... Instead, the Court must turn directly to the strict liability and breach of warranty limitations periods to determine whether Plaintiff may maintain those claims. For the reasons just discussed, the Court concludes that the applicable limitations periods have run. The accrual dates, which cannot be tolled, expired in October, 1997, almost two years before the present case was filed. Plaintiffs strict liability and breach of warranty claims are accordingly dismissed with prejudice.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(2), provides a six-year limitations period for actions based on liability created by statute unless section 541.07 provides a shorter period.

Sipe v. STS Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2012-09-251(2)

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(2), establishes a six-year statute of limitations for “actions ... upon a liability created by statute, other than those ... where a shorter period is provided by section 541.07.” Therefore, because an employer’s liability under DATWA is created by statute, section 541.05’s six-year statute of limitations applies to DATWA claims unless a shorter period is provided by section 541.07.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(2), provides a six-year limitations period for actions based on liabilities created by statute, unless the action arises from a penalty or forfeiture or a shorter limitations period applies.

Sipe v. STS Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2013-07-31(1)(2)

Because Sipe’s claim under Minn.Stat. § 181.953, subd. 10, was created by statute and was not recognized at common law, it does not fall within section 541.07(1). Rather, it is subject to the six-year statute of limitations under section 541.05, subdivision 1(2), as a cause of action “upon a liability created by statute.” Therefore, we conclude that Sipe’s complaint is not time-barred.

Subdivision 1(5) gives a subrogated insurer the same six-year limitations period as the insured, running from the underlying accident rather than from the insurer's later payment.

Hermeling v. Minnesota Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1995-07-25subd. 1(5)

Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (1992) provides that actions “for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated” must be commenced within six years. ... We conclude that absent legislative action, we must adhere to the overriding principles of the doctrine of subrogation and recognize that: [T]he insurer, as the subrogee, is entitled to no greater rights than those which the insured-subrogor possesses at the time the subrogee asserts the claim, as the subro-gee merely “steps into the shoes” of the subrogor. Great N. Oil Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 291 Minn. 97, 99, 189 N.W.2d 404, 406 (Minn.1971). MFC “stepped into the shoes” of Hermeling, who was not entitled to bring an action on March 31, 1994.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(5), is not the applicable limitations period for a narrow federal disability-discrimination claim when Minnesota has a more closely analogous disability-discrimination statute; the analogous statute's period governs.

Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1997-02-06(1)(5)

We conclude that Wilson, Owens, and Goodman do not preclude adoption of the MHRA’s one-year limitations period. Most precisely, § 1374(c) of the ACAA is a disability discrimination claim and it has an obvious analog in Minnesota law. We do not believe that the Supreme Court has mandated that narrow disability discrimination claims against private parties must be artificially characterized as “personal injury” actions. In this case, as in most, analogy remains the borrowing rule. ... The narrow scope of § 1374(c) of the ACAA and its undeniable similarity to the MHRA require that a one-year limitations period govern Vaughn’s claim. See Wolsky, 1 F.3d at 224-25. ... Accordingly, we hold that Vaughn’s federal Air Carrier Access Act claim under 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1988) is untimely and was properly dismissed.

For a legal-malpractice claim based on exposing a client to a risk of harm, the limitations period begins when the harm manifests or the client otherwise suffers pecuniary loss.

Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson · filed 1998-10-20subd. 1(5)

In summary, we hold that as a general rule in a legal malpractice ease based on the attorney’s exposure of the client to a risk of harm, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the harm manifests in some form or the client otherwise suffers pecuniary loss.

For a legal-malpractice claim based on counsel’s causing a criminal conviction, the six-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff obtains relief from the conviction.

Noske v. Friedberg · filed 2003-02-05(1)(5)

Because it is inconsistent to simultaneously treat an existent conviction as both legal and wrongful, and because there are existing procedures that permit a convicted defendant to obtain relief from a conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, we hold that a cause of action for legal malpractice that is based on a claim that counsel’s acts were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs criminal conviction accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the plaintiff obtains relief from the conviction.

The six-year limitations period for legal malpractice begins when the claim can survive a motion to dismiss; for criminal-defense malpractice, accrual waits until the conviction is overturned because causation and damages cannot otherwise be shown.

Noske v. Friedberg · filed 2003-11-06(1)(5)

In order to survive a motion to dismiss a legal malpractice claim under these circumstances, a criminal defendant-plaintiff would have to show that the attorney caused the damages and that but for the attorney’s negligence the criminal defendant-plaintiff would have been acquitted. ... Put simply, until Noske was granted habeas corpus relief in 1999, his legal malpractice claim could not withstand a Rule 12.02(e) motion to dismiss because, absent the conviction being overturned, the conviction’s presumption of regularity prevented Noske from demonstrating that Friedberg proximately caused his damages and that but for Friedberg’s alleged negligence he would have been acquitted. ... Thus, we conclude that Noske’s legal malpractice claim did not accrue until he received habeas corpus relief in 1999, the point at which it was “possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.”

Subdivision (1) gives six years for a legal-malpractice action, and the period starts when an ascertainable, fixed monetary loss occurs rather than when the negligent legal advice is given.

Antone v. Mirviss · filed 2005-04-12(1)

A fair reading of Herrmann requires the conclusion that, when money damages allegedly caused by attorney negligence or breach of contract are the relief sought in a legal malpractice action, “some” ascertainable, fixed loss of money must occur before the statute of limitations will begin to run. It is not sufficient that damages are contingent, potential, or even probable. ... The Minnesota rule is in accord. The statute of limitations here began to run upon the date of the entry of the district court’s amended judgment. ... Because appellant suffered no damages until the district court awarded to his former spouse property that allegedly was to be reserved to him through the antenuptial agreement respondent prepared, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the time of the award, and appellant’s lawsuit three years later was timely.

Section 541.05 generally provides a six-year limitation period for wrongful interference with business relationships.

Wild v. Rarig · filed 1975-01-10

Accordingly, we think that wrongful interference with busi*447ness relationships is generally included in Minn. St. 541.05, the 6-year statute of limitations.

Section 541.05 provides a six-year limitations period for Minnesota tortious-interference-with-contract claims unless a more specific limitations period applies.

Randy's Sanitation, Inc. v. Wright County, Minn. · filed 1999-09-14

As a general matter, the statute of limitations for a tortious interference with contract claim in Minnesota is six years. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05. However, where a tortious interference claim is predicated on “defamatory” activity, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to libel or slander claims applies. See Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1); Wild v. Rang, 302 Minn. 419, 234 N.W.2d 775, 793 (1975); McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Minn.App.1989). The task in this case, then, is to identify the allegedly tortious activity about which Randy’s complains.

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(a), does not impose its six-year contract limitations period on a declaratory-judgment action or on a coverage defense.

State v. Joseph · filed 2001-03-27subd. 1(a)

The district court erred in two respects. First, there is no statute of limitations for declaratory judgment actions. Second, statutes of limitations apply to claims and not to defenses.

Section 541.05 provides a six-year limitations period for statutorily created claims such as nuisance and MERA claims, as well as trespass claims; continuing violations can prevent that period from expiring.

Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen's Club, Inc. · filed 2001-04-171(2), 1(3)

The trial court properly determined that the statute of limitations for respondents’ claims is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subds. 1(2) (statutorily-created claims such as nuisance or MERA), 1(3) (2000) (trespass).

Subdivision 1(2) and (3) generally impose six-year limitations periods for statutory nuisance actions and trespass claims.

Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co. · filed 2012-08-01subd. 1(2), (3)

But there is no statute of limitations difference in Minnesota. Generally, both trespass and nuisance have a 6-year statute of limitations. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2), (3) (2010) (creating a 6-year statute of limitations for statutory actions like nuisance and establishing a 6-year statute of limitations for trespass).

Subdivision 1(2) supplies a six-year limitations period for statutory liabilities that are not penalties or forfeitures.

Scott v. Forest Lake Chrysler-Plymouth Dodge · filed 2002-01-02subd. 1(2)

MMVRISA does not contain its own statute of limitations. Consequently, the applicable limitation period is either the two-year limitation found in Minn.Stat. § 541.07(2) (1994) or the six-year limitation found in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) (1994). ... A two-year limitations period will apply if the provisions provide for a penalty or forfeiture. Minn.Stat. § 541.07(2). Otherwise, a six-year limitation period will apply. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2). ... It cannot be denied that the language of the statute clearly classifies liability in terms of liquidated damages. The above factors considered in their totality, however, demonstrate that the liability provisions, despite their language, provide for a penalty. We conclude that a two-year statute of limitations applies to Scott’s non-signature claim.

For a common-law negligence claim, the six-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 541.05 is procedural, so Minnesota applies it as the law of the forum in a choice-of-law dispute.

Christian v. Birch · filed 2009-03-24

The district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis by failing to consider and determine whether the conflicting statutes of limitations were procedural or substantive. Because statutes of limitations are procedural, there was, and is, no need to engage in a substantive choice-of-law analysis utilizing the Milkovich choice-influencing factors. ... Minnesota’s statute of limitations governs this lawsuit.

Section 541.05 gives contract, fraud, and statutory claims a six-year limitations period.

A.P.I., Inc. v. Home Insurance · filed 2010-03-31subd. 1(1), 1(2), and 1(6)

The remaining claims, the Home Claims, have six-year statutes of limitations. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(1) (contract claims); id. § 541.05 subd. 1(6) (fraud claims); id. § 541.05 subd. 1(2) (statutory claims). Zurich was served with the amended complaint on March 25, 2009, and, therefore, any claim accruing prior to March 25, 2003, would ordinarily be time-barred.

Section 541.05’s limitations period begins when alleged negligence causes damage; ignorance of the claim generally does not delay accrual absent a continuing wrong or fraud.

Dalton v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 1968-04-19

An action for negligence cannot be maintained, nor does the statute of limitations begin to run, until damage has resulted from the alleged negligence. ... Under our statutes it has been determined that ignorance of a cause of action not involving continuing negligence or trespass, or fraud on the part of the defendant, does not toll the accrual of a cause of action.

Subdivisions 1(5)-(6) impose a six-year period for personal-injury and fraud actions, with product-injury accrual requiring a physical manifestation and causal connection; subdivision 1(2) has no discovery allowance and runs from the sale for consumer-statute violations.

Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Company · filed 2004-09-24(1)(2), (1)(5)-(6)

All parties agree the applicable statute of limitations for the common law negligence, fraud and conspiracy claims is governed by Minn.Stat. section 541.05, subd. 1(5)-(6), providing that actions for personal injury and fraud must be brought within six years from the date of accrual. Before a cause of action can accrue in cases involving injury caused by defective products, the Minnesota discovery rule requires a showing of two elements: "(1) a cognizable physical manifestation of the disease or injury, and (2) evidence of a causal connection between the injury or disease and the defendant's product, act, or omission." Hildebrandt v. Allied Corp., 839 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir.1987) (interpreting Minnesota law). ... These statutory claims are governed by the same six-year statute of limitations discussed above in Section IIA. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2). However, "[t]his provision does not include a discovery allowance as does the statute of limitations applicable to fraud claims." Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 875 F.Supp. 1342, 1352 (D.Minn.1995) (citing Minn.Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(2)), aff'd, 87 F.3d 231 (8th Cir.1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 179, 117 S.Ct. 1984, 138 L.Ed.2d 373 (1997). Therefore, the six-year limitations period commenced on the dates of sale, when the alleged violations of these consumer statutes occurred. See id. at 1352-53. We agree with the district court that the consumer protection claims depend on the purchase of a product within the applicable six-year limitations period, and Mrs. Tuttle's statutory claims are untimely.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(2), imposes a six-year limitations period for these statutory consumer-fraud claims, without a discovery allowance, beginning on the date of sale.

Buetow v. A.L.S. Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2009-08-06(1)(2)

The claims presented in this case are governed by a six-year statute of limitations. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2). “This provision does not include a discovery allowance as does the statute of limitations applicable to [common law] fraud claims.” Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 875 F.Supp. 1342, 1352 (D.Minn.1995) (Davis, J.) Therefore, the limitations period commences on the date of sale. Id. at 1352-53.

Subdivision 1(6) delays accrual of a fraud claim until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud, but the court held that the discovery rule does not apply to a failure-to-register claim.

Ellering v. Sellstate Realty Systems Network, Inc. · filed 2011-07-13(1)(6)

Under that rule, a fraud claim does not accrue until “discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6). ... It is not clear to the Court, however, that the discovery rule applies to a failure-to-register claim. ... For these reasons, and in light of the reluctance of Minnesota courts to apply the discovery rule, ... the Court concludes that the discovery rule cannot apply to Plaintiffs’ failure-to-register claim.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(5), provides a six-year limitations period for negligence actions, which the court applied using a discovery rule requiring injury and evidence of causation.

Huggins v. Stryker Corp. · filed 2013-03-25(1)(5)

Federal courts applying Minnesota law have concluded that Minnesota applies a “discovery rule” in products liability actions, which mean that a cause of action does not accrue until two elements are satisfied: “(1) a cognizable physical manifestation of the disease or injury, and (2) evidence of a causal connection between the injury or disease and the defendant’s product, act, or omission.” ... Because Hildebrandt has not been repudiated by Minnesota courts and because Dalton, a product liability case, suggested that a plaintiffs knowledge of causation is relevant to the running of the limitations period, the Court will apply Hildebrandt’s rule in the present case. Thus, Huggins’ cause of action did not accrue until there was some “evidence of a causal connection between the injury or disease and the defendant’s product, act, or omission” such that Huggins “knew or should have known ... the causal relationship.”

Section 541.05, subdivision 2, imposes a four-year limitation on strict product-liability claims, with accrual governed by the discovery rule when a cognizable injury and evidence connecting it to the product are present.

Block v. Toyota Motor Corp. · filed 2014-03-18(2)

Under the discovery rule, a product liability cause of action does not accrue until two elements are met: “(1) a cognizable physical manifestation of the disease or injury, and (2) evidence of a causal connection between the injury or disease and the defendant’s product, act, or omission.” Hildebrandt v. Allied Corp., 839 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir.1987). ... Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs have established a genuine issue of fact with regard to whether Plaintiffs should have known about the causal relationship between the alleged defect and the subsequent injury. As such, Block, Trice, Adams, Plaintiff-Intervenors, and American Family have timely stated their claims for strict product liability.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(5), gives negligence claims a six-year limitations period that does not wait for discovery of the negligence.

Yang v. City of Richfield · filed 2023-04-28(1)(5)

Under Minnesota law, the limitations period for negligence claims is not tolled until the injured party discovers the negligence; rather, “[n]egligence-based claims are generally subject to the 6-year limitation of Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5), without regard to delayed discovery.” Lickteig v. Kolar, 782 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Minn. 2010). ... Because he did not file this lawsuit by July 9, 2021, his negligence claim is likewise untimely.

Subdivision 1 provides a six-year limitations period for negligence claims, and subdivision 2 provides a four-year limitations period for products-liability claims.

Glover v. Merck & Co., Inc. · filed 2004-10-08subd. 1 and 2

In Minnesota, the statute of limitations is six years for negligence, and four years for products liability. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 and 2. Under either provision, Ms. Glover’s claims would not be time barred in Minnesota.

Minn. Stat. § 541.05 provides a six-year limitations period that begins when a third party successfully asserts an adverse interest in the property, rather than when a defective deed is delivered.

Roth v. Weir · filed 2005-01-04(1), (2)

The delivery of a defective deed is not sufficient to start the limitations period, but the successful assertion of an interest in property contrary to the covenantee’s interest is sufficient to start the running of the limitations period.

Section 541.05, subdivision 1 requires breach-of-contract actions to be commenced within six years of the breach, with accrual at the time of breach.

Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Embrace Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2014-06-18subd. 1

Minnesota law requires that an action for breach of contract be “commenced within six years” of the breach. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1; see also Pederson v. Am. Lutheran Church, 404 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Minn.Ct. App.1987) (“A cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the alleged breach.”).... It is beyond doubt that the breaches of contract about which the Amended Complaint complains happened when Embrace sold each allegedly defective loan to RFC. RFC’s cause of action arising out of those breaches thus accrued at that time.... RFC may avail itself of § 108(a)’s tolling provision and its breach-of-contract claims arising out of loans sold to RFC on or before May 14, 2006, are timely. However, RFC’s breach-of-contract claim arising out of loans sold before May 14, 2006, will be dismissed with prejudice.

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) imposes a six-year limitations period for legal-malpractice claims that begins when any compensable damage occurs.

Antone v. Mirviss · filed 2006-08-17(1)(5)

The statute of limitations for legal malpractice is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (2004). ... Accordingly, we conclude that the rule that is the most logical and consistent with our precedent is that a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, on the occurrence of any compensable damage, whether specifically identified in the complaint or not.

For claims arising before August 1, 2004, Minnesota's statute of limitations applies as the law of the forum to actions properly commenced in Minnesota, even when the parties and events have no significant connection to Minnesota.

Fleeger v. Wyeth · filed 2009-09-03

We answer the certified question “yes.” ... The common law in Minnesota is clear. When directly faced with the issue, we have considered statutes of limitations to be procedural without exception. As a result, because we apply the lex fon to procedural conflicts, we have applied the Minnesota statute of limitations to cases properly commenced here regardless of whether those cases have any connection to this state. ... Here, we do not have a compelling reason to overrule our long-standing precedent that the Minnesota statute of limitations applies in cases properly commenced here.

Minn. Stat. § 541.05’s six-year limitations period is satisfied for a conciliation-court action when the statement of claim is filed before the period expires; service then follows the conciliation-court rules.

Zirnhelt v. Carter · filed 2014-03-03

The applicable statute of limitations in this ease is six years. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (2012). ... The accident occurred on October 12, 2006; Zirnhelt filed his claim in conciliation court on September 7, 2012. Thus, because Zirnhelt filed his statement of claim in conciliation court before the six-year statute of limitations expired, the case was timely commenced. Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 505.

Section 541.05's statutes of limitations govern judicial actions and do not limit PERA's administrative authority to adjust contributions and benefits or recoup overpaid benefits.

In re Pera Salary Determinations Affecting Retired & Active Employees · filed 2012-08-06subd. 1(1), (2), (4)

Relators also contend ' that the PERA board’s action is barred by statutes of limitations that are codified outside chapter 353 of the Minnesota Statutes. See Minn.Stat. §§ 541.05, subd. 1(1, 2, 4); .07(2), (5) (2010). Each of these statutes of limitations, however, governs “actions,” which refers “to judicial proceedings.” Har-Mar, Inc. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 300 Minn. 149, 152, 218 N.W.2d 751, 754 (1974). These provisions of chapter 541 do not apply to the PERA board’s ability to adjust contributions and benefits or to recoup overpaid benefits.

Section 541.05 gives six years from maturity to sue on a promissory note; a comaker’s part payment before the period expires interrupts the period for another comaker who authorized or ratified the payment.

Bernloehr v. Fredrickson · filed 1942-12-24subd. 1

An action on a promissory note is barred by Minn. St. 1941, § 541.05, subd. 1 (Mason St. 1927, § 9191, subd. 1), unless commenced within six years from maturity, Fletcher v. Spaulding, 9 Minn. 54 (64), except where the running of the statute has been tolled by act of the parties, such as a part payment, Erickson v. Husemoller, 191 Minn. 177, 253 N. W. 361. ... Consequently, a part payment upon a promissory note by one of two joint makers before the statute of limitations has run will not prevent the running of the statute of limitations as to the other maker, except where the part payment is made pursuant to the latter’s authority, or where, if he did not authorize such payment, he subsequently ratified it. ... The evidence supports a finding that defendant authorized one or more of the payments by Wessel subsequent to April 17, 1935.

Section 541.05’s six-year limitation bars a claim for profits payable in lieu of interest when the profits obligation is incidental to a time-barred principal debt.

Troup v. Rozman · filed 1970-01-30

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the running of the statute of limitations against any claim for principal barred plaintiffs’ suit for profits.

Section 541.05(1) does not bar arbitration of a contract claim, but its six-year limit applies to a court action to compel arbitration and begins to run upon demand and refusal to arbitrate.

Har-Mar, Incorporated v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc. · filed 1974-05-24(1)

Based upon the special nature of arbitration proceedings and both the statutory and common-law meaning of the term “action,” we feel compelled to hold that § 541.05(1) was not intended to bar arbitration of Thorsen’s fee dispute solely because such claim would be barred if asserted in an action in court. ... Clearly, an action in district court to compel arbitration is an action arising “upon a contract” and thus must be subject to the 6-year limitation prescribed by § 541.05(1). Such a cause of action accrues upon a demand for arbitration by one party and a refusal by the other.

Section 541.05(1) gives general contract claims a six-year limitation period, but an agreement that is essentially a wage contract falls outside that period.

Worwa v. SOLZ ENTERPRISES, INC · filed 1976-02-06(1)

There is a dispute as to whether plaintiff’s claim is one for wages or for a general breach of contract. The former has a 2-year statute of limitations under Minn. St. 541.07(5). The latter has a 6-year statute of limitations under Minn. St. 541.05(1). ... The alleged agreement was essentially a wage contract.

Section 541.05 gives six years to bring a contract-based uninsured motorist claim; when arbitration is demanded, the period begins after a demand and refusal to arbitrate.

Edwards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1986-12-30(1)(1)

In Spira v. American Standard Insurance Co., 361 N.W.2d 454 (Minn.Ct.App.), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. Mar. 29, 1985), this court determined that the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions applied to an uninsured motorist insurance claim because the liability arose from a contract. Id. at 456; Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1984). ... In the present case, the refusal to arbitrate occurred on November 17, 1984, and respondents’ action was brought well within the six year limitation period that began to run on that date.

Section 541.05’s six-year contract limitation does not govern warranty claims arising from transactions in goods; the four-year U.C.C. limitation applies.

Holstad v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc. · filed 1988-03-22subd. 1

Since section 541.051 was unconstitutional at the time of the contract, appellant claims the general six year contract statute of limitations should apply. ... The court in Valley Farmers dealt with and rejected this very argument. It held that a breach of warranty claim on a transaction in goods is governed by the four year limitation in section 336.2-725(1). ... Therefore, since the U.C.C. warranties apply to installation of the air bag, the four year U.C.C. statute of limitations applies.