Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-501

A commission qualifies as a wage when it was promised as compensation for work performed; an expired compensation plan did not establish such a promise for later work.

Cosgrove v. Epsilon Data Management LLC · filed 2025-06-05(c)

The court concludes that Cosgrove has failed to plausibly plead that his unpaid commissions are “wages” for purposes of the MWPCL.

Section 3-501(c)(1) defines wages as all compensation due to an employee for employment, so compensation not owed under the governing compensation plan is not recoverable as wages under the Maryland Wage Law.

Naden v. Saga Software, Inc. · filed 2001-06-15(c)(1)

Finally, Naden’s wage claim fails because, as stated above, Naden was not entitled to recover any commissions under the Platinum Plan and thus was not "due" any wages, as that term is defined in the Maryland Wage Law. See Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(c)(1) (defining wages as "all compensation that is due to an employee for employment" (emphasis added)).

Section 3-501(c) treats commissions, bonuses, fringe benefits, and other remuneration as wages only when they are promised for service.

Martignetti v. International Business Machines Corporation · filed 2019-09-30(c)

The term “wages” is defined in the statute to include commissions, bonuses, fringe benefits, and “any other remuneration promised for service.” Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(c). ... Only benefits which are promised to the employee constitute wages under the MWPCL. ... In this case, the disclaimers in the May 2017 IPL foreclose any claim that commission payments under the Plan constitute “wages” under the MWPCL. ... This language alone indicates that the commission payments were not “promised for service” as wages under the MWPCL must be. ... This wide latitude to modify or withhold payments indicates that the commissions were not “promised” at all.

Section 3-501 defines wages as compensation due for employment, including any other remuneration promised for service; repayment of an employee's loan to an employer is not wages.

Nolet v. APS Solutions, Inc. · filed 2021-09-30

However, under the MWPCL, wage is defined as “all compensation that is due to an employee for employment” and includes bonuses, commissions, fringe benefits, overtime wages, and “any other remuneration promised for service.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501 (emphasis added). Repayment of a loan made by an employee to an employer does not fall into this definition. Therefore, the Court does not consider the $19,000 that Defendants failed to repay Plaintiff Nolet as unpaid regular wages, and the $19,000 is not part of Plaintiff Nolet’s damages calculation.

Section 3-501(c)(2) treats compensation due for employment, including a bonus, as a wage only when it is promised in exchange for the employee’s work; a discretionary, employer-performance-dependent bonus is not a wage.

Ridgell v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company · filed 2024-02-12(c)(2)

Section 3-501 of the MWPCL defines “wage” as “all compensation that is due to an employee for employment,” including “(i) a bonus; (ii) a commission; (iii) a fringe benefit; (iv) overtime wages; or (v) any other remuneration promised for service.” ... However, not every bonus is a wage. ... Instead, “a bonus constitutes a wage only if given in exchange for an employee’s work.” ... If the payment is “dependent on conditions other than the employee’s efforts, they lie outside the definition” of a wage. ... If a bonus is discretionary—with respect to whether it will be granted or the amount—it is not considered a wage. ... For two independent reasons, Ridgell’s bonus is not a wage under the MWPCL: Because the bonus was discretionary and because it depended in part on her employer’s performance overall.

Section 3-501(c) defines wages to include all compensation due to an employee for employment, including gratuities.

Sparks v. BlackDiamond Restaurant LLC · filed 2025-02-10(c)

As a preliminary matter, the MWPCL’s definition of “wages” includes “all compensation that is due to an employee for employment.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(c). Thus, I find that gratuities are wages under the MWPCL.

A bonus is a wage under § 3-501(c)(2) only when it is compensation promised in exchange for the employee's work; a discretionary bonus is not a wage.

Lanasa v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP · filed 2023-03-15(c)(2)

Even though the MWPCL definition of wage includes bonuses, not every bonus is considered a wage. ... Instead, “a bonus constitutes a wage only if given in exchange for an employee’s work.” ... If the payment is “dependent on conditions other than the employee’s efforts, they lie outside the definition” of a wage. ... Relevant here, if a bonus is discretionary—with respect to whether it will be granted or in what amount—it is not considered a wage. ... The bonus Lanasa seeks does not constitute a wage under the MWPCL.

Section 3-501(c)(1) defines a wage broadly as all compensation due to an employee for employment, so a promised commission can qualify as a wage.

John Macsherry, Jr. v. Sparrows Point, LLC · filed 2020-09-01(c)(1)

Defendants contend separately that they’re entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Macsherry’s MWPCL wage claim because the alleged commission isn’t a compensable “wage” under the statute. They are wrong. The commission fits comfortably within the statute’s definition of a wage, which includes “all compensation that is due to an employee for employment.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(c)(1). See also Medex v. McCabe, 811 A.2d 297, 302 (Md. 2002) (“Commissions are clearly within the scope of the Act . . . .”). Macsherry testified that the commission was intended to be a part of his overall compensation package. That is enough to dispose of defendants’ contention that the commission was unenforceable because it was gratuitous.

Section 3-501(c)(2)(v) treats compensation as wages when it is promised in exchange for an employee's service.

Moon v. Veritas Technologies LLC · filed 2022-08-12(c)(2)(v)

To be “wages” under the statute, “the wages must have been ‘promised for service.’” Id. (quoting Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(c)(2)(v)). ... Based on these provisions and the detailed guidance governing incentive pay, the Court cannot conclude that the commissions were so clearly discretionary that they were a mere gratuity or gift. ... Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he is owed “wages.”

Section 3-501(c)(2) treats a salary increase promised as compensation for new duties as wages recoverable under the MWPCL.

Hobson v. Local 689, Amalgamated Transit Union AFL-CIO · filed 2022-08-01(c)(2)

Taking the allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, where Hobson has alleged that he was promised an increase in salary as compensation for his new duties when he accepted the Chief of Staff position, “by agreement effective January 3, 2019,” id. § 58, and that Local 689 refused to pay him at the promised rate despite his continued performance, such an adjustment in salary could fairly construed to be “remuneration promised for service” and thus constitute “wages” recoverable under the MWPCL.

Section 3-501(c) includes overtime pay in wages, but a claim for promised overtime requires proof that the employer promised that pay.

Craighead v. Full Citizenship of Maryland, Inc. · filed 2020-09-23(c)

The MWPCL defines “wages” as “all compensation that is due to an employee for employment,” and includes in that term “overtime wages” and “any other remuneration promised for service.” ... The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorably to the non-movant Defendants, simply does not unequivocally determine that FCI promised to pay overtime sufficient to establish an MWHL “promise to pay” violation. The trier of fact must decide who has the better argument. Summary judgment on this count is denied.

The Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law does not require compensation for overnight sleep time that is not compensable under the FLSA; its on-call-time protections are no broader than the FLSA.

Clayton v. Delmarva Community Services, Inc. · filed 2020-03-23

Plaintiffs’ state law claims under the MWHL and the MWPCL fail for the same reasons as their FLSA claim. ... Therefore, there is no basis to conclude that the definition of on-call time under the MWHL and the MWPCL is any broader or more generous than on-call time under the FLSA. ... Accordingly, for the same reasons that Plaintiffs’ time is not compensable under the FLSA because it was time spent “waiting to be engaged,” so too is that time not compensable under the MWHL and the MWPCL.

Section 3-501 does not provide broader on-call compensation than the FLSA; time spent waiting to be engaged or sleeping is not compensable.

Watkins v. United Needs & Abilities, Inc. · filed 2021-07-12

Just as in Clayton, the Plaintiff’s state law claims in this case under Maryland Wage and Hour Law, Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401, et seq. (“MWHL”), and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501, et seq. (“MWPCL”) fail for the same reasons as his claims under the FLSA. 447 F. Supp. 3d at 418. ... Both the FLSA and Maryland law distinguish between time “engaged to be waiting,” which is compensable, and “waiting to be engaged,” which is not. ... This Court can simply not conclude “that the definition of on-call time under the MWHL and the MWPCL is any broader or more generous than on-call time under the FLSA.” Clayton, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 418. Accordingly, for the reasons detailed above, as the Plaintiff’s time was not compensable under the FLSA because it was time spent “waiting to be engaged” or, alternatively, “sleep time,” so too was that time not compensable under the MWHL and the MWPCL.

Under the MWPCL’s definition of employer, an owner who controls an employee’s work may qualify as an employer and be personally liable for unpaid wages.

Carmona v. EBRR Logistics, LLC · filed 2024-05-10(b)

Bilo had a direct interest in the management and success of his company, and he controlled Carmona’s work to a sufficient degree to rise to employer status under the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL.

The MWPCL’s employer definition is assessed using the economic reality test, including control over hiring, schedules, pay, and employment records.

Mazariegos v. Pan 4 America, LLC · filed 2021-09-23(b)

And, “[w]hile the MWPCL and FLSA definitions of ‘employer’ are different, this Court has found that the ‘economic reality’ test guides the analysis under both statutes.”

Section 3-501 covers an individual as an employer when the workplace's economic reality shows an employer-employee relationship.

Guillen v. Armour Home Improvement, Inc. · filed 2023-06-05

An individual is a covered “employer” if the “economic reality” of the workplace suggests that an employer-employee relationship exists.

Section 3-501(b) defines an employer as any person who employs an individual in Maryland or that person's successor.

Sama v. Turning Point, Inc · filed 2024-01-10(b)

Moreover, the MWPCL defines “employer” as “any person who employs an individual in the State or a successor of the person.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(b). ... Noting Defendants’ lack of opposition otherwise, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that, considering the totality of the circumstances under the economic realities test, Rev. Williams exercises sufficient control and involvement in Turning Point such that he constitutes an employer within the meaning of the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL.

Section 3-501(b)'s definition of employer does not cover governmental employers for purposes of the MWPCL's overtime-related provisions.

Strange v. Prince George's County, Maryland · filed 2020-07-29(b)

As applicable to these provisions, the MWPCL’s definition of “employer” states that “‘Employer’ includes any person who employs an individual in the State or a successor of the person.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(b). ... Taken on their own terms, the relevant provisions of the MWHL and the MWPCL are thus most fairly read as not applying to governmental employers. ... In line with these decisions, and based on the analysis set forth above, this Court finds that the County is not covered by the provisions of the MWHL and MWPCL relating to overtime requirements.

Section 3-501(b) treats a person who employs an individual in Maryland, or a successor of that person, as an employer under the MWPCL; a successor that expressly assumes unpaid-wage liabilities can therefore qualify as the employee's employer.

Hencin v. Avant Diagnostics, Inc. · filed 2020-09-14(b)

With respect to a violation of the MWPCL, this requires Plaintiffs to allege that Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of the MWPCL and failed to pay Plaintiffs “wages” owed them. The MWPCL defines “employer” as “any person who employs an individual in the State or a successor of the person.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(b) (emphasis added). ... Here, Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to show Defendant, in an agreement to purchase “substantially all” of THI’s assets, expressly assumed the liabilities for the unpaid wages. See ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 6–8; ECF No. 10-2 at 15; ECF No. 12-4 at 10–11. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that Defendant is a “successor” to THI, and thus Plaintiffs’ “employer,” under the MWPCL.

Section 3-501(b) defines an employer as a person who employs an individual or is a successor of that person; the MWPCL’s employer-liability focus involves the duty to pay wages, not merely supervisory status.

Odjaghian v. HHS Technology Group, LLC · filed 2021-03-02(b)

The MWPCL focuses on “the [employer’s] duty to pay whatever wages are due on a regular basis and to pay all that is due following termination of the employment.” Friolo v. Frankel, 819 A.2d 354, 362 (Md. 2003). The MWPCL defines an “employer” as “any person who employs an individual . . . or is a successor of the person.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl., § 3-501(b).

Section 3-501(b) defines an employer under the MWPCL as any person who employs an individual, a narrower definition than the FLSA definition because it excludes persons acting indirectly in an employer's interest.

Flake v. Water Street Tavern, Inc. · filed 2021-09-17(b)

The MWPCL, in turn, defines “employer” more narrowly than the FLSA as “any person who employs an individual.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(b); see Alvarez-Soto, 258 F.Supp.3d at 631 (“This definition is ‘narrower’ than the definition of employer under the FLSA, in that it does not include individuals who act ‘indirectly in the interest of an employer.’” (quoting Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 775 n.10 (4th Cir. 2017))). Accordingly, if an individual fails to qualify as an employer under the FLSA, he or she will not qualify under the MWHL, which tracks the analysis of the FLSA, or the MWPCL, which contains a narrower definition of “employer” than the FLSA and the MWHL. See McFeeley, 47 F.Supp.3d at 267 n.6; Alvarez-Soto, 258 F.Supp.3d at 631.

Section 3-501(b) defines an MWPCL employer as a person or company that employs at least one individual in Maryland; that status alone does not extend the statute to work performed entirely outside Maryland.

Poudel v. Mid Atlantic Professionals, Inc. · filed 2022-02-04(b)

As this Court has previously held, as a matter of the plain text of the statute, which defines an employer as “any person who employs an individual in the State,” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(b), an “employer” under the MWPCL includes any company that employs at least one employee in Maryland, which MAPI does.

Section 3-501(b) defines “employer” to include any person who employs an individual in the State, limiting MWPCL coverage to employment in Maryland.

Hearn v. Edgy Bees Inc. · filed 2022-05-26(b)

The MWPCL “defines ‘employer’ to ‘include[ ] any person who employs an individual in the State[.]’” Himes Assocs., Ltd. v. Anderson, 178 Md. App. 504, 535, 943 A.2d 30, 48 (2008) (quoting Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(b)). ... Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Edgy Bees “employed” him in Maryland or that his position had such a connection to Maryland that the presumption against extraterritoriality of the MWPCL does not apply.

Section 3-501(b) defines “employer” substantially similarly to the Maryland Workplace Fraud Act, with a definition that differs slightly from those in the FLSA and Maryland Wage and Hour Law.

Marlon Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC · filed 2017-01-25(b)

In fact, it is the Workplace Fraud Act and Wage Payment and Collection Law that share a substantially similar definition, which diverges slightly from the definitions included in the FLSA and the analogous Wage and Hour Law.

Section 3-501(b) allows a successor corporation to bear a predecessor's wage liabilities when an exception to the usual nonliability rule applies, including when the purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the selling corporation.

Orellana v. ACL Cleaning LLC · filed 2022-01-12(b)

But, exceptions exist under Maryland law which are also embraced by the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL. ... Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(b). One is relevant here: “the purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the selling corporation.” ... ACL II is the successor in liability to ACL I and is therefore liable to Ms. Orellana for the same violations and the same damages award as ACL I, $7,717.50.

Section 3-501(b) defines an employer broadly as any person who employs an individual in Maryland, permits multiple employers and individual joint-and-several liability when the individual meets the economic-reality test, and does not use that test to determine whether a business entity is an employer.

Long v. Get U Trucking, LLC · filed 2025-05-12(b)

An employer is defined as “any person who employs an individual in the State.” Id. § 3-501(b). ... An individual’s liability under the MWPCL turns on whether the individual qualifies as an “employer” under the statute. ... To determine whether an individual can be considered an “employer” under the MWPCL, Maryland courts employ the “economic reality” test. ... The “economic reality” test is used to determine whether an individual is an “employer” under the MWPCL and can be held personally liable for unpaid wages. ... Put another way, the “economic reality” test is not used to determine whether a corporate or business entity is an employer.

Section 3-501(b) covers an employer that employs any individual in Maryland, even if the claimant worked elsewhere; under § 3-501(c)(1) and (c)(2), promised travel reimbursements are wages, and an individual’s employer status is determined under the economic-reality test.

Roley v. National Professional Exchange, Inc. · filed 2020-07-22(b), (c)(1), (c)(2)

The MWPCL defines an employer as “any person who employs an individual in the State.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(b). ... Where travel reimbursements are fairly construed to be remuneration for services, they constitute wages recoverable under the MWPCL under the plain language of the statute. ... These two factors, along with the plain text of the statute, demonstrate that the travel reimbursements NPX promised to Roley are wages under the MWPCL. ... To determine whether an individual can be a considered an employer under this definition, Maryland courts use the “economic reality” test. ... Upon consideration of the economic reality test and its application in Campusano and Pinnacle Group, the Court finds that Bell was not Roley’s employer for purposes of the MWPCL.