Md. Code Ann. Com. Law § 14-202

Section 14-202(8) bars a collector from enforcing a right to collect a debt without a required license; ignorance of the licensing requirement does not excuse the violation.

Fontell v. Hassett · filed 2012-06-28(8)

The management agent and its employees must have known they were not licensed as debt collectors in Maryland when they sent Plaintiff multiple collection notices and placed a lien on her property, and any ignorance about the licensing requirement is a mistake of law that does not immunize Defendants from liability under the MCDCA. ... As such, judgment will be entered in favor of Plaintiff for violation of the MCDCA by the management agent and its employees for operating as debt collectors without a license.

Section 14-202(8) makes individuals liable for damages when they knowingly participate in unlicensed attempts to collect a debt.

Fontell v. Hassett · filed 2012-09-12(8)

Specifically, the MCDCA provides that debt collectors may not “[cjlaim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist.” Md.Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-202(8). Accordingly, if Hassett and Gatling collected or attempted to collect Plaintiffs debt with knowledge that they were not licensed as collection agencies, they are liable for damages under the MCDCA.

Section 14-202 prohibits specified abusive debt collection practices, including threats, unreasonable communications, and attempts to enforce nonexistent rights.

Green v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-02-27

The MCDCA "prohibits debt collectors from utilizing threatening or underhanded methods in collecting or attempting to collect a delinquent debt.” Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 765 F.Supp.2d 719, 731-32 (D.Md.2011) (citing Md.Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-202). More specifically, it proscribes certain conduct in the collection of a debt, such as the use or threat of force or criminal prosecution, disclosure or threat of disclosure to third parties, communication at unusual hours or with unreasonable frequency, use of abusive language, claiming or threatening to enforce non-existent rights, or use of communications giving the appearance of judicial or governmental authority. Plaintiffs have not alleged any such conduct by Wells Fargo, nor does the MCDCA otherwise appear to have any application.

Section 14-202(1) does not treat mere repossession of collateral as collecting or attempting to collect a debt.

Davis v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. · filed 2017-04-17(1)

When applying these definitions to the instant case, it is obvious that the debt owed by Davis to TMCC falls within the definition of “debt” as used in Commercial Law § 14-202(1). However, the repossession of the vehicle at issue here was neither the collection of Davis’s debt nor an attempt to collect it.

Section 14-202 requires debt collection activity by the defendant for a claim under the MCDCA to proceed.

Diamond v. U.S. Bank N.A. · filed 2020-05-11

Where the Diamonds have failed to allege any debt collection activity by the FHFA, the Court will dismiss the MCDCA claim against it.

Section 14-202(8) permits recovery when a creditor attempts to collect a debt it has no right to collect, but not for errors in collecting a legitimate, undisputed debt.

Marchese v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-01-08(8)

Although Mr. Márchese takes issue with the methods used by the Substitute Trustees on Chase’s behalf, including alleged missing signatures and improper notarizations, the MCDCA only allows for recovery against creditors that attempt to collect debts when there is no right to do so. It does not, as Mr. Marchese contends, allow for recovery based on errors or disputes in the process or procedure of collecting legitimate, undisputed debts.

Section 14-202(8) does not impose liability for alleged defects in foreclosure paperwork when the borrower’s default gave the collector the right to foreclose.

Currie v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-05-23(8)

Pertinently, the MCDCA provides that, in collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt, a collector may not “[cjlaim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist.” Md.Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-202(8). ... Although Plaintiffs’ allegations are more specific than those in Stovall, this argument is still meritless. Here, as in Stovall, Plaintiffs’ allegations lead ineluctably to the inference that they defaulted on their home loan due to their financial woes and voluntary decision to stop making mortgage payments. ... As a result, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ MCDCA claim.

Section 14-202(8) permits a claim when a debt collector knowingly schedules a foreclosure sale it has no right to hold; subsection (11) permits a claim when the scheduling plausibly violates the FDCPA.

Best v. Newrez, LLC · filed 2020-09-11(8), (11)

Plaintiff need not allege more to make out a claim under § 14-202(8), premised on Shellpoint’s known lack of a right to foreclose given the requirements of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41. ... Because that provision prohibits “conduct that violates §§ 804 through 812 of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,” codified at 15 U.S.C §§ 1692c through 1692k, and because Plaintiff has already plausibly alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e with respect to the foreclosure sales, Plaintiff’s claim under § 14-202(11) may proceed.

Section 14-202(8) prohibits a debt collector from knowingly trying to enforce a right that does not exist; a dispute over the amount owed alone does not state a claim.

McClain v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2021-08-27(8)

It specifically provides that a debt collector may not “[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist.” Com. Law § 14-202(8). It is well settled in this Court that disputes over the amount owed do not give rise to an MCDCA claim, but that is exactly what Ms. McClain has alleged.

Section 14-202(8) does not provide a claim based solely on a dispute over the amount owed when the collector was authorized to assess the charges.

Keen v. LoanCare, LLC · filed 2023-10-30(8)

As Defendant correctly notes, “Plaintiff’s MCDCA claim is premised exclusively on a dispute about the amount of debt he owes and not its validity.” (ECF No. 51 at 9.) Plaintiff does not contend that LoanCare was not authorized to assess interest and other charges under the promissory note and deed of trust. Therefore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether LoanCare violated the MCDCA, and LoanCare is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff’s MCDCA claim.

Section 14-202 does not support a claim when the plaintiff incurred no debt and did not allege that the defendants were debt collectors.

Sterling v. Ourisman Chevrolet of Bowie Inc. · filed 2013-05-02(3), (5), (8)

A careful review of the Complaint reveals that Plaintiff has not alleged that any Defendant was a debt collector, i.e., “a person collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt arising out of a consumer transaction,” Com. Law § 14-201 (b), or *597that any debt existed, for that matter. ... Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the MCDCA for which relief can be granted. See Com. Law §§ 14-201(b) & 14-202(3), (5) & (8).

Section 14-202(8) does not support a claim by a person who is not a consumer of goods, services, realty, or credit.

Britt v. Seledee Law Group, LLC · filed 2020-04-27(8)

The MCDCA defines “consumer” as “an actual or prospective purchaser, lessee, or recipient of consumer goods, consumer services, consumer realty, or consumer credit.” Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-101(c)(1) (West 2020). Plaintiff qualifies as none of these. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim under the MCDCA must also be dismissed.

Section 14-202 covers a collector’s request for payment of a consumer debt even when the request is phrased politely.

Roberts v. Equian, LLC · filed 2025-07-29

But there is no politeness exception in the MCDCA; a “collector” who says “please” is still a “collector.”

Section 14-202(11) applies the specified FDCPA conduct prohibitions to MCDCA collectors, including creditors collecting debts they originated.

Armstead v. Feldman · filed 2020-08-17(11)

As a matter of the plain language of section 14-202, while the MCDCA incorporates prohibited conduct under the FDCPA, the statute explicitly applies to the actions of a “collector,” which is defined broadly under the MCDCA as a “person collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt arising out of a consumer transaction.” Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-201(b). This term encompasses a broader range of actors than the term “debt collector” under the FDCPA and would include a creditor such as NASA FCU that does not meet the federal definition of “debt collector.”

Section 14-202 applies to a mortgage servicer only when it engages in debt collection; receiving regular payments on a loan that is not in default does not qualify.

Austin v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2020-12-10(8), (11)

However, a loan servicer does not exclusively engage in debt collection, and only when it does engage in such activity is it subject to § 14-202.

Section 14-202 applies to a loan servicer only when it engages in debt collection; routine collection of monthly loan payments does not qualify.

Alexander v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC · filed 2020-12-11

However, a loan servicer does not exclusively engage in debt collection, and only when it does engage in such activity is it subject to § 14-202.

Section 14-202(8) does not provide a remedy for defective signatures in foreclosure filings when the debt and the right to foreclose are undisputed.

Lembach v. Bierman · filed 2013-06-12(8)

The MCDCA allows recovery for abusive practices, or when the debt collector seeks to collect on a debt when he or she knows (or should know) that he or she does not have a right to do so. Here, the Lembachs dispute only the signatures on the documents, and the MCDCA does not allow for recovery for an error in the process of collecting this legitimate and undisputed debt.

Section 14-202(8) requires the debt collector to know, or be deliberately indifferent to, its lack of a right to enforce the debt.

Bey v. Shapiro Brown & Alt, LLP · filed 2014-02-20(8)

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendants were not holders, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-21, but not that Defendants knew, or were deliberately indifferent to, the fact that they did not possess the right to enforce the Note.

Section 14-202(8) requires a debt collector to know or recklessly disregard that a claimed right does not exist; losing a request for an affidavit judgment alone does not establish that knowledge.

Olson v. Midland Funding LLC · filed 2014-07-15(8)

The fact that Midland Funding was ultimately denied an affidavit judgment does not establish that it knew or should have known at the time it filed suit that it could not seek to collect the debt.

Section 14-202(8) requires proof that a collector knew or recklessly disregarded that a right it sought to enforce did not exist.

Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC · filed 2014-12-18(8)

Unlike the FDCPA, the MCDCA contains a “with knowledge” element, which Powell did not establish. ... Because we agree with the district court that “the Defendants did not attempt to enforce a right with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the non-existence of that right,” we affirm its judgment on Powell’s state-law claims.

Section 14-202(8) is not violated when a debt collector’s letter does not improperly claim a right to enforce a deed of trust and the collector is exempt from the asserted licensing requirement.

Best v. Federal National Mortgage Association · filed 2020-03-30(8)

First, the Court assumes that Plaintiff refers to B&S’s February 2, 2016 letter in claiming that B&S improperly asserted rights to enforce the Deed of Trust and that it lacked the appropriate license. Summary judgment is warranted as to these aspects of Plaintiff’s claim for the same reasons that it is appropriate for Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims: the February 2 letter did not improperly claim rights to enforce the Deed of Trust and B&S is exempt from the Maryland licensing requirement.

Section 14-202(8) requires a debt collector to know it lacks the right to collect a debt or recklessly disregard whether that right exists.

Ramirez v. LVNV Funding · filed 2025-06-12(8)

Here, Plaintiff has not adequately pled that LVNV sought to collect a debt knowing that it had no right to do so or with reckless disregard to the claim’s validity.

Section 14-202(8) prohibits a collector from claiming or attempting to enforce a right it knows does not exist; a claim based on disputed debt ownership needs facts supporting both the lack of ownership and the collector’s knowledge.

Queen v. LVNV Funding LLC · filed 2025-09-03(8)

Without such factual allegations, the amended complaint simply does not plausibly allege that LVNV violated Section 14-202(8), by claiming that the Plaintiff owed LVNV for the Alleged Debts, even though LVNV knew or should have known that he did not.

Section 14-202(8) prohibits a debt collector from knowingly trying to enforce a right that does not exist; a claim does not require threats or force.

Ayres v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2015-09-08(8)

Although using threats and force are also prohibited acts under § 14-202 of the MCDCA, they’ are not the only acts. Here, the Plaintiffs have alleged that Ocwen knowingly tried to enforce a right that it did not have, which is sufficient to state a claim.

Section 14-202(8) prohibits a collector from attempting to enforce a right it knows does not exist.

Horowitz v. Continental Casualty Company · filed 2017-03-07(8)

The Horowitzes also sought to plead a violation of Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-202(8), which prohibits a collector from collecting an alleged debt by “claim[ing], attempt[ing], or threaten[ing] to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist.” The complaint explicitly conceded that the Horowitzes were indebted to the law firm that they sued for legal malpractice. Thus, by the Horowitzes’ admission, Continental and Eccleston did not attempt to enforce a nonexistent right. Thus, the district court correctly ruled that the complaint did not adequately plead a claim under the MCDCA.

Section 14-202(8) prohibits a collector from attempting to enforce a debt collection right it knows does not exist.

Davis v. PNC Mortgage, a division of PNC Bank, N.A. · filed 2021-01-29(8)

The Davises argue that the various collection attempts by PNC after their Prior Case was dismissed on March 11, 2016 violated the MCDCA. The Court agrees.

Section 14-202(8) requires knowledge that the right being enforced does not exist; facts showing that a collector’s retained agent received payment can support an inference that the collector knew the debt was satisfied.

Ellis v. Palisades Acquisition XVI LLC · filed 2019-07-26(8)

It is reasonable to infer that, because Defendant Palisades retained Asset Acceptance to collect the debt, Defendant Palisades knew, or should have known, when the debt was collected. However, because it appears that Defendant Palisades retained Defendant Protas after its dealings with Asset Acceptance, there are not sufficient facts to infer that Defendant Protas had any knowledge that the debt was collected.

Section 14-202(8) requires factual allegations that a debt collector knew the claimed debt was invalid or recklessly disregarded its validity.

Roos v. Seterus, Inc. · filed 2019-09-30(8)

Merely reciting the statutory language is insufficient, and Plaintiffs have made no allegations regarding statements or actions taken by Seterus that would indicate that it knew its accounting was inaccurate or that it was attempting to collect despite this knowledge. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a plausible cause of action under the MCDCA.

Section 14-202(8) prohibits a debt collector from trying to enforce a right it knows does not exist.

Mitchell v. Brock & Scott, PLLC · filed 2020-06-08(8)

Mitchell has thus alleged ample facts to support the conclusion that Defendants knew that they lacked the right to enforce the debt at the time of PHH Letters.

Section 14-202(8)’s knowledge requirement includes reckless disregard of whether a claimed right exists.

Harris v. NationStar Mortgage LLC · filed 2020-08-13(8)

The court finds that Seterus/Nationstar’s alleged failure to take any steps to confirm that Harris still, in fact, owed $16,402.91 to the City suffices to show recklessness under the MCDCA. Accordingly, Nationstar’s motion to dismiss the claim will be denied.

Section 14-202(8) prohibits a debt collector from attempting to enforce a right it knows does not exist; alleging excess charges without an unauthorized charge or a challenge to the debt’s validity does not state a claim.

Howes v. SN Servicing Corporation · filed 2021-03-09(8)

So too here, where the Howes’s complaint does not contain any allegations of unauthorized charges (even if it does contain allegations of excess charges) or any allegations that challenge the validity of the underlying debt. Accordingly, the Howes have failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the MCDCA.

Section 14-202(8) prohibits a debt collector from trying to enforce a right it knows does not exist; a claim requires facts supporting actual knowledge or reckless disregard.

Ayres v. MC · filed 2022-09-19(8)

In addition, a plaintiff must show the defendant had “actual knowledge” or “reckless disregard” that it is trying to enforce a right that does not exist. ... Because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to support actual knowledge or reckless disregard of any alleged issues with the amounts in the LMA or surrounding documentation, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim under the MDCDA arising from the LMA is granted.

Section 14-202(8) prohibits a collector from enforcing a right it knows does not exist; allegations of knowledge may suffice at the pleading stage when recklessness requires discovery.

Sullivan v. YES Energy Management · filed 2022-09-30(8)

Thus, while Plaintiff provides relatively thin allegations with regard to Yardi’s knowledge, the Court finds these assertions sufficient in light of the considerations described here. As such, the Court will permit the section 14-202(8) claim to proceed.

Section 14-202(8) does not apply to debt collection filings and service in Virginia against a Virginia resident merely because the collector operates from Maryland.

Elyazidi v. SunTrust Bank · filed 2015-03-05(8)

The critical point, however, is not whether Appellees conduct business in Maryland, but whether some significant portion of the challenged activity occurred there. Here, Appellant was a Virginia resident who incurred a debt in Virginia. The allegedly offensive representations appeared in Virginia court documents, and any harm they might have inflicted could have occurred only in Appellant’s home state of Virginia. ... We hold that the MCDCA and MCPA have no application here.

A claim under § 14-202(6) requires a harassing communication and accrues when that communication occurs.

Peete-Bey v. Educational Credit Management Corp. · filed 2015-09-14(6)

That cause of action requires Peete-Bey to prove that ECMC communicated with her in a harassing manner, among other things.' Accordingly, the tort remains incomplete until such a communication occurs.

Under § 14-202(6), filing a writ of execution does not constitute harassment; under § 14-202(8), a claim may proceed when an inflated writ may include a charge the judgment did not authorize.

Conteh v. Shamrock Community Ass'n · filed 2016-05-19(6), (8)

As with Conteh’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, we conclude that a debt collector’s resort to state court proceedings and the filing of a writ of execution cannot legally constitute a communication that harasses or abuses the debtor. ... Although the writ of execution allegedly sought an amount in excess of what Conteh owed, because the magistrate judge dismissed the case prior to discovery, it is not apparent from the record whether the alleged misstatement of the amount owed was the result of a typographical or mathematical error by Nagle or whether it was the result of Nagle and Shamrock including a type of charge not authorized by the underlying judgment on which they sought satisfaction.

Section 14-202(3) prohibits a collector from threatening to disclose damaging credit information it knows is false; actual knowledge or reckless disregard satisfies the knowledge requirement.

Long v. Pendrick Capital Partners II, LLC · filed 2019-03-18(3)

Actual knowledge or reckless disregard as to information's falsity satisfies the statute's "knowledge" requirement.

Section 14-202(8) treats post-judgment interest charged above the lawful rate as an unauthorized charge.

Ben-Davies v. Blibaum & Associates, P.A. · filed 2019-09-17(8)

The court finds that the plaintiffs are not challenging the underlying debt; rather, they are challenging the amount of interest added atop that debt. Blibaum’s use ofa ten percent post-Judgment interest rate—four percent higher than the legally permissible rate—is thus the type of unauthorized charge proscribed by the MCDCA.

Section 14-202(8) covers attempts to collect post-judgment interest above the lawful rate as unauthorized charges.

Moore v. Blibaum & Associates, P.A. · filed 2019-09-17(8)

Blibaum’s use ofa ten percent post- Judgment interest rate—four percent higher than the legally permissible rate—is thus the type of unauthorized charge proscribed by the MCDCA.

Section 14-202(8) covers interest added to a valid debt above the legally permitted rate as an unauthorized charge.

Chavis v. Blibaum & Associates, P.A. · filed 2019-09-17(8)

Blibaum’s use ofa ten percent post- Judgment interest rate—four percent higher than the legally permissible rate—is thus the type of unauthorized charge proscribed by the MCDCA.

Section 14-202(11) incorporates federal debt collection rules that prohibit collecting a fee unless the loan agreement expressly authorizes it or the law permits it.

Parker v. Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company Limited Partnership · filed 2022-03-31(11)

As previously noted, Section 14-202(11) of the MCDCA incorporates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, see id; Alexander, 23 F.4th at 372. ... For all of these reasons, and in light of the Fourth Circuit’s holdings in Alexander, the Court finds that Defendants are collectors who charged an amount, through the $105.00 property inspection fees, that was not “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, therefore “it violated the MCDCA.”

Section 14-202(11) prohibits a collector from charging a convenience fee that the agreement creating the debt does not expressly authorize and the law does not affirmatively permit.

Alexander v. Carrington Mortgage Services · filed 2022-01-19(11)

Because Carrington is a collector who charged an amount that was not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, it violated the MCDCA. We thus reverse the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ § 14-202(11) claim.

Section 14-202(11) incorporates the FDCPA’s substantive collection rules and permits a claim against a collector for an impermissible pay-to-pay fee.

DeSimone v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc · filed 2024-09-13(11)

Applying the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Alexander to the instant case, the Court finds that Snowden has adequately stated a claim under Section 14-202(11). Here, SPS does not dispute that it is a “collector” within the meaning of the MCDCA, and the Court has already found that the pay-to-pay fee qualifies as an “amount” under Section 1692f(1) of the FDCPA.

Section 14-202(9) prohibits debt collection communications that appear to have government approval; foreclosure following allegedly unlawful fees alone does not establish such an appearance.

Flournoy v. Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC · filed 2020-03-17(9)

The MCDCA forbids debt collectors from using “a communication which simulates a legal or judicial process or gives the appearance of being authorized, issued, or approved” by the government. Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-202(9). ... Simply because the imposition of supposedly unlawful fees led to foreclosure does not make the foreclosure court a co-conspirator in such alleged illegality. The claim fails to meet even minimal pleading standards and must be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 14-202(11) prohibits debt collection conduct that violates the FDCPA, so a plausible FDCPA claim can support an MCDCA claim.

Contee v. Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC · filed 2024-10-04(11)

Because Contee has pled facts sufficient to show plausibility of relief under § 1692e of the FDCPA, his MCDCA claim prevails.

Section 14-202(8) cannot be used to enforce a mortgage servicer’s duty to send monthly statements under the Truth in Lending Act.

Sellers · filed 2026-03-06(8)

The Plaintiff cannot rely upon the MCPA and the MCDCA to enforce an obligation arising under the TILA.