Statute Annotations › Maryland › Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401

Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401

Payment of wages: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Maryland
Case notes
17
Cited in passing
65
Citing cases indexed
73
Case dates
2016–2025
Screened through
2026-03-09
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

82 citing cases reviewed: 17 interpreted the section (annotated below), 65 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-03-09 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Employee or independent contractor

Section 3-401’s Maryland wage-and-hour protections apply to workers who are employees rather than independent contractors, with employee status determined by the economic realities of the relationship.

McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entertainment · filed 2016-06-08

We agree with the district court that, based on the totality of the circumstances presented here, the dancers at Fuego and Extasy were employees covered by the FLSA and analogous state laws. They were not independent contractors. Because plaintiffs’ claims under Maryland labor laws run parallel to their claims under the FLSA, our analysis of federal law extends as well to the state law claims.
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Employer—Definition

Section 3-401(b) includes as an employer a person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of another employer with an employee, so the FLSA joint-employment analysis applies to Maryland Wage and Hour Law claims.

Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc. · filed 2017-01-25(b)

Our resolution of the FLSA joint employment question also resolves Plaintiffs’ claims under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, which defines “employer” consistently with the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (defining employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee”); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401(b) (defining “employer” as including “a person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of another employer with an employee”).
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Section 3-401(b)'s definition of “employer” does not include governmental employers for purposes of the MWHL's overtime requirements.

Strange v. Prince George's County, Maryland · filed 2020-07-29(b)

Although Plaintiffs correctly note that the plain language of the applicable definition of “employer” does not foreclose the inclusion of governmental employers, their arguments overlook the fact that another part of the MWHL—not applicable to the overtime pay requirement—expressly includes governmental employers within its reach. Section 3-413 requires employers to pay at or above applicable minimum wage requirements and, in so doing, provides that for purposes of that section only, “‘Employer’ includes a governmental unit.” Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-413(a)(2). If the MWHL’s general definition of employer were read to include governmental employers, then this explicit inclusion of “governmental unit” within the definition of employer would be redundant. ... In line with these decisions, and based on the analysis set forth above, this Court finds that the County is not covered by the provisions of the MWHL and MWPCL relating to overtime requirements.
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Section 3-401(a) defines an employer under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law the same way as the FLSA, and employer status is determined using the economic-realities test.

Lee v. Solar Energy World, LLC · filed 2020-09-30(a)

The MWHL provides the same definition. Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401(a). Accordingly, courts apply the same analysis when considering whether a party is an “employer” under the FLSA and MWHL.
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Section 3-401(b) defines an employer to include any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.

Aguilar v. David E. Harvey Builders, Inc. · filed 2023-10-31(b)

An employer is defined under the FLSA and Maryland law to “include[e] any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (e); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-401(b), 3-501(b).
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Section 3-401's definition of employer covers corporate entities that hire a worker through their principals.

Portillo v. H Restaurant and Night Club, LLC · filed 2024-03-25

Wheaton Lounge and El Tipico, the corporate entities which hired Portillo through their principals Reyes and Lopez, are each considered an “employer” under the broad definition of the statute.
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Section 3-401’s definition of employer is analogous to the FLSA’s and differs from the definitions in Maryland’s Workplace Fraud Act and Wage Payment and Collection Law.

Marlon Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC · filed 2017-01-25

In fact, it is the Workplace Fraud Act and Wage Payment and Collection Law that share a substantially similar definition, which diverges slightly from the definitions included in the FLSA and the analogous Wage and Hour Law.
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Concurrent FLSA and Maryland wage-and-hour claims

Section 3-401 permits employees to pursue Maryland wage-and-hour overtime claims alongside FLSA claims for the same overtime violation.

Jones v. Fidelity Resources, Incorporated · filed 2019-08-30

Unanimous federal court authority forecloses Fidelity’s position. Fidelity acknowledges that “various decisions of this Court hold that a plaintiff can simultaneously assert claims under both the FLSA and the MWHL for the same overtime violation.” ... Banks adheres to the unanimous view of the federal courts that the FLSA does not preempt the MWHL. ... The Attorney General emphatically did not state that employees may only pursue claims under the FLSA or the MWHL, but not both. ... Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III (ECF No. 82) is DENIED.
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Definition of wages

Section 3-401(d) defines wages as all compensation due to an employee for employment, supporting an employee’s MWHL action to recover unpaid wages.

Jahn v. Tiffin Holdings, Inc. · filed 2020-03-18(d)

The MWHL is essentially the state equivalent of the FLSA, and permits an employee to bring an action against an employer to recover unpaid wages, defined as “all compensation that is due to an employee for employment.” Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl. § 3-401(d); see Friolo v. Frankel, 373 Md. 501, 513 (2005) (noting that the MWHL is the “State parallel to the [FSLA]”).
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Compensability of on-call time

Section 3-401's Maryland Wage and Hour Law does not make on-call sleep time compensable when it is time spent waiting to be engaged, because the MWHL tracks the FLSA on that issue.

Clayton v. Delmarva Community Services, Inc. · filed 2020-03-23

Accordingly, for the same reasons that Plaintiffs’ time is not compensable under the FLSA because it was time spent “waiting to be engaged,” so too is that time not compensable under the MWHL and the MWPCL.
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The Maryland Wage and Hour Law treats on-call time like the FLSA: time spent “engaged to be waiting” is compensable, while “waiting to be engaged” and qualifying sleep time are not.

Watkins v. United Needs & Abilities, Inc. · filed 2021-07-12

Just as in Clayton, the Plaintiff’s state law claims in this case under Maryland Wage and Hour Law, Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401, et seq. (“MWHL”), and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501, et seq. (“MWPCL”) fail for the same reasons as his claims under the FLSA. ... Both the FLSA and Maryland law distinguish between time “engaged to be waiting,” which is compensable, and “waiting to be engaged,” which is not. ... Accordingly, for the reasons detailed above, as the Plaintiff’s time was not compensable under the FLSA because it was time spent “waiting to be engaged” or, alternatively, “sleep time,” so too was that time not compensable under the MWHL and the MWPCL.
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Employer status under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law

The Maryland Wage and Hour Law mirrors the FLSA, and an individual's employer status under the statute is assessed under the economic-realities test.

Carmona v. EBRR Logistics, LLC · filed 2024-03-12

The requirements of the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”) mirror those of the FLSA. See Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401 et. seq. “Thus, Plaintiff[’s] claim under the MWHL ‘stands or falls on the success of [his] claim under the FLSA.’” ... An individual’s liability as an “employer” for overtime and minimum wage violations is assessed under the economic realities test, under which courts consider “the ‘economic realities of the individual’s relationship with the putative employee.’” ... As President of EBRR, Bilo received distribution of profits from the company and exercises control over business records. ... Rather, he had a direct interest in the management and success of his company, and he controlled Carmona’s work to a sufficient degree to rise to employer status under the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL. ... Bilo and Carmona therefore had an employer-employee relationship under the FLSA, MWHL, and MWCPL.
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Minimum wage and overtime

Section 3-401 requires employers to pay employees the required minimum wage and overtime rate.

Carmona v. EBRR Logistics, LLC · filed 2024-05-10

Defendants failed to pay Carmona a proper minimum wage and overtime rate in violation of the Maryland Wage & Hour Law (“MWHL”), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401.
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The Maryland Wage and Hour Law provides a state wage baseline, and its pleading requirements mirror those of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.

Cook v. Superior Assisted Living, LLC · filed 2025-08-11

Ms. Cook alleges that Defendants undercompensated her for her regular and overtime work, see I.A., supra, and thus has pleaded a plausible violation of the FLSA and MWHL.
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Employee status and coverage

Section 3-401's employee coverage under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law includes employees regardless of immigration status.

Ruano v. Scratch Kitchen & Bistro, LLC · filed 2024-07-24

The FLSA and MWHL cover all employees regardless of immigration status. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s immigration status is not a basis to dismiss Plaintiff’s overtime wage claims.
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Employer

Section 3-401(b) treats a person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of another employer with an employee as an employer under the Maryland Wage and Hour Law.

Sparks v. BlackDiamond Restaurant LLC · filed 2025-02-10(b)

The MWHL and MWPCL have similar definitions for “employer.” See Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401(b) (defining “employer” under the MWHL as “any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of another employer with an employee”); Md. Code. Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(b) (defining “employer” under the MWPCL as “any person who employs an individual in the State [of Maryland] or a successor of the person”). ... In sum, I find that BlackDiamond and Mr. Mbah were employers within the meaning of the FLSA, the MWHL, and the MWPCL. Thus, I recommend that the district court so find.
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Pleading requirements

The Maryland Wage and Hour Law parallels the FLSA, so pleading a violation generally follows federal pleading requirements; allegations that an employer paid no direct wages for regular and overtime work can plausibly state a claim.

Marsh v. Bottoms Up Gentlemen's Club, LLC · filed 2025-03-07

“The MWHL is the ‘state parallel’ to the FLSA, and the requirements for pleading a claim under the MWHL ‘mirror those of the federal law.’” ... In support of their FLSA and MWHL claims, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did not directly pay them wages as compensation for their regular and overtime work,” see supra I.A., and thus have pleaded a plausible violation of the FLSA and MWHL.
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65 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Stephens v. Farmers Restaurant Group, the statute is mentioned only in the background as one of the laws underlying Plaintiffs’ claims. The court expressly states that Plaintiffs’ Maryland-law claims are not relevant to the motion, so it does not interpret or apply § 3-401. opinion →
Peterson v. M.J.J., Inc., the opinion merely identifies the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, including § 3-401, as one of the statutes underlying the plaintiffs’ claims. It does not construe or apply § 3-401; the court affirms for the reasons stated by the district court without discussing the statute. opinion →
Stephens v. Farmers Restaurant Group, the statute is cited only to identify one category of claims pleaded by the plaintiffs. The court does not interpret, explain, or decide any requirement under § 3-401; its ruling concerns provisional class certification and preliminary approval of a settlement. opinion →
Stephens v. Farmers Restaurant Group, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify one set of claims in the amended complaint. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401. opinion →
Melendez v. Spilled Milk Catering, LLC, section 3-401 appears only in a string citation identifying the Maryland Wage and Hour Law in the procedural history. The court applied §§ 3-415 and 3-420 to the overtime claim and did not construe or decide anything about § 3-401. opinion →
Randolph v. Powercomm Construction, Inc., the court mentions § 3-401 only to identify the Maryland Wage and Hour Law as one of the statutes invoked in the lawsuit. The appeal addressed the calculation of attorney’s fees and did not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement or coverage question under § 3-401. opinion →
Lee v. JLN Construction Services, LLC, the statute appears in the opinion only as part of the description of Plaintiffs’ wage claims and the class-certification dispute. The court decided whether the Rule 23 requirements were met, not what § 3-401 means or requires. opinion →
Guerra v. Teixeira, section 3-401 appears only in a footnote as part of a range citation identifying the Maryland Wage and Hour Law. The report does not interpret or apply § 3-401; its fee-shifting discussion cites § 3-427(d)(1)(iii) instead. opinion →
Mendez v. Kuhlman, the opinion references the Maryland Wage and Hour Law and state overtime requirements in the context of the parties’ settled claims, but the court’s decision approves an FLSA settlement and does not construe, explain, or decide anything about Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401. opinion →
Bowen v. Athelas Institute, Inc., section 3-401 appears only as the beginning of a range citation identifying the Maryland Wage and Hour Law underlying the plaintiffs' claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3-401. opinion →
Lancaster v. FQSR LLC, section 3-401 appears only in the introductory description of the statutes plaintiffs alleged were violated; the opinion does not construe, interpret, or apply that statute. opinion →
Rios v. Potomac Restaurant Group, Inc., the court merely identifies § 3-401 et seq. as part of the statutes plaintiffs alleged defendants violated. It does not interpret, define, or apply that statute; the ruling approves the settlement under FLSA standards. opinion →
Baxter v. Burns & McDonnell Engineering Company, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the background as part of the claims alleged in the complaint. The court's ruling addresses discovery relevant to FLSA regulations and does not interpret or apply Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401. opinion →
Hunt v. ALDI, Inc., section 3-401 appears only in a footnote recounting the claims initially filed; the opinion states that the Maryland claims were later dismissed and the settlement concerned solely the FLSA claim. The court did not interpret or apply § 3-401. opinion →
McKenzie-El v. American Sugar Refinery, Inc., the court mentions § 3-401 et seq. while describing the plaintiff’s claims, but does not construe or apply the statute. It dismisses the wage claims for pleading deficiencies and LMRA preemption. opinion →
White v. LLPD LLC, the opinion cites § 3-401 only as part of the statutory range for the Maryland Wage and Hour Law in describing plaintiffs’ claims. The court does not interpret, define, or apply § 3-401; it approves the settlement under FLSA standards. opinion →
Lee v. Solar Energy World, LLC, the opinion mentions § 3-401 only as the statutory basis for claims asserted in the complaint; the court's conditional-certification analysis and ruling address the FLSA, not the meaning or application of the Maryland statute. opinion →
Gaske v. Satellite Restaurants Inc. Crabcake Factory USA, the statute appears only in the opinion’s procedural background as one of the laws underlying claims filed in a stayed District Court action. The Bankruptcy Court did not interpret or apply Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401. opinion →
Lee v. Ex-Exec Lube, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in describing the plaintiff's asserted MWHL overtime claim. The court analyzes and approves the settlement under the FLSA and does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3-401. opinion →
Gutierrez v. Cooper Foods, Inc. d/b/a McDonalds Ellicott City, the statute appears only in the opinion's introductory description of the plaintiff's claims. The court decided whether to approve an FLSA settlement and did not interpret, apply, or make any holding about Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401. opinion →
Drummond v. David's Loft Clinical Programs, Inc., the court merely identifies §§ 3-401 to 3-430 as provisions invoked in plaintiffs’ complaint. Its decision approves the settlement under FLSA settlement standards and does not interpret or apply § 3-401. opinion →
Ibn-Queen v. The T.I.M.E. Organization, Inc., the opinion mentions §§ 3-401 to 3-430 only in describing the statutory claims asserted in the complaint. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3-401. opinion →
Osorio v. 5 Star Cleaning Service, LLC, the statute appears in the procedural background only as one of the laws invoked in the plaintiff’s complaint. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 3-401; its ruling concerns jurisdiction and whether the defendants’ proposed counterclaims were compulsory or permissive. opinion →
Orellana v. Don Pollo of Bethesda, Inc., the statute appears only in the complaint’s description of the legal claims. The court analyzed and approved the settlement under FLSA standards and did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401. opinion →
Gue v. Shree Pashuapati Corp, the statute is cited only to identify the Maryland Wage and Hour Law claims alleged in the complaint. The court's decision approves a settlement under the FLSA and does not interpret, apply, or decide what Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401 means or requires. opinion →
Graham v. Famous Daves of America, Inc., the statute is cited only in the procedural/background description of the claims asserted. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401. opinion →
Pang v. Adult Day Health, Inc., the opinion mentions § 3-401 et seq. only when identifying the statutes Pang asserted in his complaint. The court does not construe or apply § 3-401; its MWHL analysis instead cites § 3-415(a) and § 3-403(1). opinion →
Hobson v. Local 689, Amalgamated Transit Union AFL-CIO, section 3-401 appears only in the introductory range citation identifying the MWHL provisions invoked. The court analyzes other MWHL provisions, including §§ 3-403(1), 3-415(a), and 3-420(a), and does not decide what § 3-401 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Graham v. Famous Daves of America, Inc., the court cites § 3-401 et seq. only in the procedural background to identify one set of claims plaintiff alleges. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement or coverage question under § 3-401. opinion →
Juarez v. A.M.C Construction, LLC, the statute appears only in a summary of the plaintiff’s complaint alleging that defendants were employers. The court did not construe or independently analyze § 3-401; it merely accepted the well-pleaded allegations for purposes of default judgment and decided liability under the wage-payment and overtime provisions. opinion →
Lorenzo v. Slattery, the statute appears only in the background as one of the laws Plaintiff alleged was violated. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3-401; it ruled on vacating default and denying default judgment without prejudice. opinion →
Carmona v. EBRR Logistics, LLC, the statute is cited only to identify Count One as a Maryland Wage & Hour Law claim; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3-401. opinion →
Avila v. Marlin Lighting LLC, section 3-401 appears only in a string citation identifying the Maryland Wage and Hour Law provisions plaintiffs alleged were violated. The court did not interpret, explain, or apply § 3-401; its fee discussion addressed §§ 3-427(d)(1)(iii) and 3-507(b)(1) instead. opinion →
Altes v. The Pride Center of Maryland, Inc., section 3-401 is cited only as part of the range of provisions comprising the MWHL in the procedural description of Plaintiff's claim. The court does not interpret or independently apply § 3-401; its later MWHL discussion merely states that the proposed MWHL claim stands or falls with the FLSA claim. opinion →
Guevara v. United Buffet & Grill, Inc., section 3-401 appears only in the introductory procedural history as one of the statutes invoked in the plaintiff's complaint. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 3-401; its fee ruling concerned other MWHL provisions, including § 3-427. opinion →
Flores v. Elite Commercial Cleaning, LLC, the court mentions § 3-401 only in the procedural history as one of several statutes invoked in the complaint. Its substantive ruling concerns attorney’s fees under § 3-427(d)(1)(iii), not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 3-401. opinion →
Mendoza v. Filo Cafe, LLC, the opinion mentions § 3-401 only in describing the statutes invoked in the complaint. The court decides whether to approve an FLSA settlement and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about § 3-401. opinion →
Prudencio v. Triple R Construction Corporation, the court mentions § 3-401 only as part of the MWHL statutory-range citation in the case description; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about that section. opinion →
Chavarria v. Pipinos, Inc., the statute is cited only in the background to identify a claim the plaintiff alleged; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3-401. opinion →
Hernandez v. Villa Building Group, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background as one of the state-law claims plaintiffs alleged. The court's holding concerns approval of a fair and reasonable FLSA settlement and does not interpret or apply § 3-401. opinion →
Carmona v. EBRR Logistics, LLC, the opinion merely recounts the prior judgment's finding that defendants violated the MWHL; it does not interpret, explain, or independently apply § 3-401. opinion →
Berman v. Mid-Atlantic Eateries, Inc., the statute appears only in the background as one of the laws under which Plaintiff asserted claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3-401. opinion →
Fowler v. Tenth Planet, Inc., the opinion mentions § 3-401 et seq. only in the procedural background while describing the statutes Plaintiff alleged Defendants violated. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3-401. opinion →
Sama v. Turning Point, Inc, the statute is cited only in the background to identify claims Plaintiffs alleged; the court does not construe or decide anything about Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-401. opinion →
Rueda v. Gilbane Building Company, the court mentions § 3-401 et seq. only when identifying the statutory basis of Plaintiffs’ claims. It does not construe, explain, or decide anything about the Maryland Wage and Hour Law; the settlement ruling rests on FLSA standards. opinion →
Onslager v. Paradigm Collection, LCC, the opinion identifies § 3-401 et seq. only as the statutory basis for Count 3 and later reports that the plaintiff established an MWHL violation on default; it does not interpret, explain, or decide any requirement or application of § 3-401 itself. opinion →
Marsh v. Bottoms Up Gentlemen's Club, LLC, the court cites § 3-401 et seq. only to identify the Maryland Wage Hour Law in describing the claims. It does not construe § 3-401, and the statute-specific discussion concerns other provisions and general pleading sufficiency. opinion →
Tala v. Seba, the opinion mentions § 3-401 only as part of identifying the MWHL claim and reports the parties’ dispute about whether Defendant was an employer; the court does not interpret or apply § 3-401. opinion →
Ruano v. Scratch Kitchen & Bistro, LLC, the statute is cited only in the procedural history to identify the Maryland Wage and Hour Law claim. The court does not construe or decide anything about § 3-401; the opinion addresses a motion to vacate entry of default. opinion →
Marsh v. Bottoms Up Gentlemen's Club, LLC, the court mentions § 3-401 et seq. only in identifying the MWHL claims in the procedural background. It does not construe or apply § 3-401; the substantive discussion concerns other MWHL provisions, including §§ 3-413, 3-419, and 3-427. opinion →
Aleman v. Marroquin, the opinion mentions § 3-401 et seq. only when recounting the statutes invoked in the complaint. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 3-401; its merits discussion addresses other provisions of the MWHL and MWPCL. opinion →
Bobb v. FinePoints Private Duty Healthcare, LLC, section 3-401 is mentioned only as part of a range identifying the MWHL claim in the procedural background. The court did not interpret or apply § 3-401; its substantive discussion cited other MWHL provisions, including §§ 3-415(a) and 3-420(a). opinion →
Nolet, the statute is mentioned only in the introductory description of the plaintiffs’ claims. The court did not interpret or apply § 3-401; its ruling concerned personal jurisdiction and reopening or vacating the default judgment. opinion →
Cook, the opinion cites § 3-401 et seq. only to identify the Maryland Wage Hour Law as one of the statutes invoked in the action. The court does not construe or apply § 3-401 itself; its wage-damages discussion concerns other MWHL provisions, including §§ 3-413 and 3-427. opinion →
Cledin Emilson Arredondo Esquivel v. East Coast Tree Care, Inc., Sharon Catherine Schmitt, and Michelle Marie Sheckells, the court mentions § 3-401 only as part of a range citation to the Maryland Wage and Hour Law in the procedural background; it does not interpret or apply § 3-401. opinion →
Amaya v. DGS Construction, LLC, section 3-401 appears only in the introductory statutory-range citation. The court’s substantive wage-law discussion addresses overtime under § 3-415(a) and related MWPCL claims, without construing § 3-401. opinion →
Johnson v. Helion Technologies, Inc., the statute appears only in the complaint's description of the claims and is not construed or applied by the court; the opinion analyzes approval of an FLSA settlement and attorneys' fees. opinion →
Cuenca-Vidarte v. Samuel, the opinion mentions § 3-401 only in the introductory list of claims. The court decides a motion to compel arbitration and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about the Maryland Wage and Hour Law. opinion →
Cuenca-Vidarte v. Samuel, the statute is cited only in the introductory list of laws allegedly violated. The court decided arbitration and settlement-jurisdiction issues and did not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement or coverage question under § 3-401. opinion →
Beltran v. Interexchange, Inc., the court cites § 3-401 only to identify Count III as a Maryland Wage and Hour Law claim. Its analysis decides whether that claim was released and precluded by the Beltran settlement, without construing the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Avila v. Affluent MD, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural background identifying Count II of the complaint. The court analyzes and approves an FLSA settlement, but does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 3-401. opinion →
Martinez v. Crystal Jewelry Clinton, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural background as the statutory basis for Count II; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 3-401. opinion →
Milton, the opinion mentions § 3-401 only to identify the Maryland Wage and Hour Law counts in the plaintiff’s complaint. The court decides whether to approve an FLSA settlement and does not construe or apply § 3-401. opinion →
Perez v. Cheng, the court cites § 3-401 only as the starting point of an et seq. reference to the Maryland Wage and Hour Law. opinion →
Nwankpah, the court cited § 3-401 only as the starting point of a reference to the Maryland Wage and Hour Law and dismissed the wage claim as abandoned. opinion →

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