10 Del. Code Ann. § 3104

Section 3104(c)(1) permits jurisdiction when a nonresident’s Delaware-directed activity, including the filing of corporate instruments through an agent, gives rise to the claim.

Perry v. Neupert · filed 2017-12-06(c)(1)

The record plainly reflects that Neupert engaged in Delaware-directed activity sufficient to satisfy the third Istituto Bancario element and to provide the statutory prerequisite for jurisdiction under Section 3104(c)(1).

Section 3104(c)(1) requires an act in Delaware connected to the claim to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident; contracts governed by Delaware law alone do not suffice.

Highway to Health, Inc. v. Bohn · filed 2020-04-15(c)(1)

Critically, these factual allegations fail to demonstrate that any act actually occurred in Delaware with respect to the dispute in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to make a prima facie showing that Defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of this court under Section 3104(c)(1) of the Delaware long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires an act in Delaware before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.

Stone & Paper Investors, LLC v. Blanch · filed 2020-06-29(c)(1)

Without any factual allegations that an act occurred in Delaware, this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Diamond Carter Trading under Section 3104(c)(1).

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business or performs work or services in Delaware.

Zohar CDO 2003-1, Ltd. v. Patriarch Partners, LLC · filed 2020-09-18(c)(1)

Delaware’s long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over any nonresident who “[t]ransacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State [of Delaware].” 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1). ... Tilton’s actions fall squarely within the reach of these statutes. Accordingly, Delaware has personal jurisdiction over Tilton.

Section 3104(c)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on ownership of Delaware subsidiaries when the claim does not arise from their creation and operation.

Endowment Research Group, LLC v. Wildcat Venture Partners, LLC, and Bill Ericson · filed 2021-03-05(c)(1)

The totality of the circumstances show that Ericson has not engaged in sufficient conduct to constitute transacting business in this State within the meaning of Delaware’s Long Arm Statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because a defendant helped form a Delaware entity.

SC Botanicals, LLC v. Intragenix Holdings, LLC · filed 2021-05-27(c)(1)

Moreover, merely participating in the formation of a Delaware entity, without more, does not create a basis for jurisdiction in Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on a single business transaction in Delaware when the claim arises from that transaction.

CIBC Bank USA v. JH Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC · filed 2021-06-02(c)(1)

Section 3104(c)(1) is a “single act statute” that enables the Court to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents based on a single act or transaction engaged in by the nonresident within the state.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires relevant business activity by the defendant in Delaware; the plaintiff’s own Delaware connections do not establish jurisdiction.

Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network, LLC v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company · filed 2022-10-11(c)(1)

To prove that Hartford has transacted business in Delaware, a plaintiff must point to some relevant action that the defendant—not the plaintiff—has taken within the state of Delaware.

Forming a Delaware entity supports specific personal jurisdiction under Section 3104(c)(1) only when the formation has a meaningful connection to the alleged wrongdoing.

Lone Pine Resources, LP v. Dickey · filed 2021-06-07(c)(1)

The Delaware entities’ mere existence in Dickey’s scheme cannot support personal jurisdiction; he must have formed them as an integral component of that scheme.

Section 3104(c)(1) and (c)(2) permit specific jurisdiction when a seller conducts business with Delaware customers and the claim arises from those sales, even if the sales are a small share of its total revenue.

Rockwell Automation, Inc. v. EU Automation, Inc. · filed 2022-08-19(c)(1), (c)(2)

As noted above, there is no dispute that EU Illinois operates the website euautomation.com/us on which it advertises parts for sale in the U.S, that a three-step personal interaction takes place between EU Illinois and each customer before a purchase is completed, and EU Illinois has generated $465,000 in revenue from Delaware customers, including $19,000 worth of accused allegedly unauthorized Rockwell products. These actions satisfy 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(2).

Section 3104(c)(1) does not provide personal jurisdiction based on the formation of a Delaware entity when the nonresident neither formed it nor meaningfully participated in its formation.

In re Swervepay Acquisition, LLC · filed 2022-08-26(c)(1)

Where an individual such as Oshinsky had no role in forming a Delaware entity, either directly or indirectly, or did not otherwise “participate[] in the formation [of a Delaware entity] in a meaningful fashion,” this court will not find an adequate basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over that individual.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits service of process based on forming a Delaware entity when the claim has a nexus to that formation.

In re P3 Health Group Holdings, LLC · filed 2022-10-14(c)(1)

The creation of a Delaware entity constitutes the transaction of business in the state and is sufficient to support service of process under Section 3104(c)(1). ... Because Section 3104(c)(1) confers specific, not general, jurisdiction, there must be a nexus between the Delaware act and the conduct forming the basis of the suit.

Section 3104(c)(1) treats appointing a Delaware trustee and moving a trust’s situs to Delaware as transacting business in Delaware, supporting jurisdiction over sufficiently related claims.

Harris v. Harris · filed 2023-01-12(c)(1)

By appointing a Delaware trustee and moving the situs of a trust to Delaware, the parties taking those actions engage in Delaware-directed activity, purposefully avail themselves of Delaware’s laws, and engage in business within this state.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires an act in Delaware connected to the suit to support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.

Cargill, Inc. v. Rossi · filed 2023-10-16(c)(1)

Cargill does not contend that Rossi was ever physically present in Delaware or transacted any business here. Accordingly, no act actually occurred in Delaware, and the long-arm statute does not apply.

Section 3104(c)(1) treats filing an LLC’s certificate of cancellation as transacting business in Delaware, supporting specific jurisdiction for discovery related to that act once the nonresident is properly served.

In re Reinz Wisconsin Gasket, LLC · filed 2023-12-29(c)(1)

It would not violate due process to exercise jurisdiction over DCo for purposes of discovery into its cancellation of RWG when that is the very act that satisfied long-arm specific jurisdiction. There is a sufficient nexus between the jurisdictional act and the receiver’s request from DCo.

Section 3104(c)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over individuals who merely acquiesce in another party’s creation of Delaware entities as part of a sale.

Matrix Parent, Inc. v. Audax Management Company, LLC · filed 2024-06-27(c)(1)

The Individual Defendants’ acquiescence to H.I.G. creating the Matrix Entities as part of Mobile Acquisition Holdings’ sale of Mobileum did not amount to the Individual Defendants transacting business in Delaware. Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument pursuant to Section 3104(c)(1) fails to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident transacts business or performs work in Delaware and the claim arises from that conduct.

Taylor v. Killen · filed 2024-11-04(c)(1)

The Court, however, finds Plaintiff Taylor’s Second Amended Complaint failed to meet the burden established in § 3104(c)(1) that Mazda Motor Corporation “transacted any business or [performed]…work or service in the State [ of Delaware].”

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business in Delaware, including through involvement in a property sale.

CH Associates XI, LLC v. 1102 West Street, LP · filed 2025-03-03(c)(1)

The Court finds that ... Ciccone transacted business within the State.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires a Delaware-directed act to serve a nonresident.

Harris v. Harris · filed 2023-01-16(c)(1)

Proper service under Delaware’s Long-Arm Statute requires a Delaware-directed act.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific jurisdiction based on incorporating a Delaware subsidiary only when the claim arises from the subsidiary’s creation and operation.

Genzyme Corporation v. Novartis Gene Therapies, Inc. · filed 2023-02-13(c)(1)

As to the first, the incorporation of a subsidiary can only serve as a basis for personal jurisdiction “where the underlying cause of action arises from the creation and operation of the Delaware subsidiary.”

Section 3104(c) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an individual merely because the individual caused a merger governed by Delaware law.

Golden v. ShootProof Holdings, LP · filed 2023-02-28(c)

“Causing” a merger governed by Delaware law, by itself, does not satisfy Section 3104(c).

Section 3104(c)(1) provides specific jurisdiction, so incorporating a company in Delaware supports jurisdiction only for claims related to the incorporation.

Gurmessa v. Genocide Prevention in Ethiopia Inc. · filed 2023-03-29(c)(1)

| note that subsection (1) provides for specific jurisdiction, so incorporating a company in Delaware only provides for jurisdiction relating to the incorporation.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction based on a nonresident’s formation of a Delaware entity when the claim arises from that formation.

Estate of Sybil Jayson v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2025-10-20(c)(1)

Forming a Delaware entity constitutes a transaction of business within Delaware to establish specific personal jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1) if the cause of action arises from the formation.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when plausible allegations show that the person transacted business or performed work in Delaware related to the claims.

Duvall Espresso IP Enforcement, LLC v. Meticulous Home · filed 2026-03-02(c)(1)

And so the above amounts to plausible allegations that Mr. Pendas transacted business or performed work or services in Delaware that is related to the claims at issue in this case, satisfying Subsection (c)(1).

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a nonresident that knowingly sells and ships products to Delaware residents.

L'Athene, Inc. v. EARTHSPRING LLC · filed 2008-08-07(c)(1)

Delaware’s long arm statute provides, in relevant part, that personal jurisdiction is proper over any nonresident who, in person or through an agent: ... (1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State; ... Defendants purposefully availed themselves of doing business with Delaware, which is shown through their conducting business with Delaware residents and knowingly shipping products to the State. Therefore, specific jurisdiction is proper and defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.

Section 3104(c)(1) and (c)(3) require acts in Delaware for specific jurisdiction, while (c)(4) requires the defendant or an agent to be generally present in Delaware for general jurisdiction.

TriStrata Technology, Inc. v. Neoteric Cosmetics, Inc. · filed 1997-03-31(c)(1), (c)(3), (c)(4)

In order for a court to exercise jurisdiction under subsections (e)(1) and (c)(3), some act must actually occur in Delaware. ... Unlike Subsection (c)(1) and (e)(3), Subsection (c)(4) provides for general jurisdiction. Although, this section authorizes jurisdiction even when the tortious acts and the injury occurred outside of Delaware, the defendant or its agent must still be “generally present” in the state. ... Therefore, based upon the allegations in the Complaint and the facts provided in the accompanying affidavits, the Court concludes that jurisdiction over Dr. Murad pursuant to Subsection (c)(4) has not been established.

Section 3104(c)(4) does not confer general jurisdiction when a nonresident’s Delaware business contacts and revenue are minimal.

Merck & Co., Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2002-01-02(c)(4)

In conclusion, the Court concludes that Barr’s contacts and revenue in Delaware are minimal, and accordingly, insufficient to satisfy the requirements for jurisdiction under § 3104(c)(4) of the Delaware long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(4) requires a persistent course of conduct in Delaware for general jurisdiction; regularly driving through the state does not suffice.

Kee v. Blue Line Distributing, Inc. · filed 2008-04-18(c)(4)

However, even if Kee had set forth facts demonstrating that Blue Line employees had driven through Delaware with regularity, more is required to meet the high standard required under subsection (c)(4) of “persistent course of conduct.”

Section 3104(c)(4) does not confer general jurisdiction over a defendant merely because the defendant has an insurance policy with a company that does business in Delaware.

Shoemaker v. McConnell · filed 2008-06-02(c)(4)

The possession of an insurance policy is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements for general jurisdiction under subsection (c)(4).

Section 3104(c)(4) permits jurisdiction for tortious injury caused by an out-of-state act when the nonresident regularly does business in Delaware, engages in persistent conduct there, or derives substantial revenue from services or things used or consumed there.

ESTATE OF CARVEL EX REL. CARVEL v. Ross · filed 2008-07-17(c)(4)

Section 3104(c)(4) is considered as a general jurisdiction provision. ... The Amended Complaint fails to allege that Defendant Ross regularly conducted business in Delaware, engaged in a persistent course of conduct within Delaware, or derived substantial revenue for services or things used or consumed in Delaware to support an assertion of general jurisdiction over him in Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(2) permits specific jurisdiction over a nonresident who contracts to provide services or things in Delaware.

Kloth v. Southern Christian University · filed 2008-08-05(c)(2)

Subsection (c)(2) allows a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over defendants if they contracted to provide services or things in Delaware. However, as previously noted, there is no evidence that SCU intended to provide educational services specific to Delaware citizens.

Section 3104(c)(4) does not confer general jurisdiction based on four warranties covering less than $2,000 in Delaware sales over three years.

Belden Technologies, Inc. v. LS Corp. · filed 2010-09-30(c)(4)

Four warranties on products valued at less than $2000 sold over the course of three years to Delaware residents under these circumstances do not rise to the level of “regular [] business” or a “persistent course of conduct” in the State sufficient to justify an exercise of general jurisdiction over LS Korea.

Section 3104(c) does not authorize personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when the claim does not arise from its Delaware conduct and it does not regularly and continuously conduct business in Delaware.

Tani v. FPL/Next Era Energy · filed 2011-09-15(c)

In short, none of the sections under Delaware’s long-arm statute provide justification for service upon FPL. Notably, Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence to show that his cause of action arises from FPL’s conduct within Delaware or that FPL regularly and continuously conducted business within Delaware. Thus, this Court has neither specific nor general jurisdiction over FPL, and the Delaware long-arm statute cannot lawfully be used as a basis to serve FPL.

Section 3104(c)(4) covers a nonresident that solicits business nationwide and earns substantial revenue from sustained sales in Delaware, subject to due process limits.

Ali v. Beechcraft Corp. · filed 2014-06-30(c)(4)

Having found Delaware’s long-arm statute covers Beechcraft’s Delaware business, the court turns to due process.

Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(3) provide specific jurisdiction over a nonresident when the claims arise from acts or omissions in Delaware; unrelated incorporation is insufficient.

Marnavi S.p.A. v. Keehan · filed 2012-10-25(c)(1), (c)(3)

Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(3)— on which Plaintiff relies — confer “specific” jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. ... Mere incorporation in Delaware does not give rise to specific jurisdiction.

Section 3104(c)(1)–(3) does not confer specific jurisdiction based on a website that merely invites customers to deal, without a Delaware transaction or injury.

M2M Solutions LLC v. Simcom Wireless Solutions Co. · filed 2013-03-29(c)(1)-(3)

Under the relevant specific jurisdiction provisions of the long-arm statute, M2M must show one of the following in relation to its infringement allegations: (1) Micron transacted business or performed work in Delaware; (2) Micron contracted to supply services or things in Delaware; or (3) Micron caused tortious injury by an act or omission in Delaware. ... An on-line invitation to deal does not show that Micron entered a contract, transacted business, or caused tortious harm in Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(4) can provide a facial basis for general jurisdiction when a complaint alleges that a nonresident defendant does business in Delaware.

Hedger v. Medline Industries, Inc. · filed 2017-01-27(c)(4)

While not addressing whether Allmed “regularly” does business within the State, this allegation is facially sufficient to provide a statutory basis for general jurisdiction.

Section 3104(c)(3) permits specific jurisdiction over claims arising directly from a tort in Delaware, but the accident alone does not establish jurisdiction over a related dispute about insurance coverage.

Sessoms v. Richmond · filed 2017-12-08(c)(3)

The Court, however, refuses to expand the holding of State Farm v. Dann, and find that Delaware has specific personal jurisdiction for matters that only related to the contract obligations between CURE and Richmond. ... The Court finds CURE’s denial of coverage is contractually related and only indirectly arises from Richmond’s alleged negligence.

Section 3104(c)(4) authorizes general jurisdiction in an exceptional case supported by sufficient pleaded facts.

Cuppels v. Mountaire Corporation · filed 2019-08-01(c)(4)

The Plaintiffs, having failed to plead sufficient facts to suggest an exceptional case existed so as to subject MC to this Court’s general jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. § 3104 (c) (4), were prohibited from pursuing discovery towards that end.

Section 3104(c) provides specific jurisdiction for claims arising from the enumerated acts connected to Delaware; it does not confer general jurisdiction over unrelated disputes.

Rosado v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2020-07-09(c)

Those enumerated acts all relate to events or things having a relationship to this state; in other words, specific jurisdiction. Thus, Plaintiff’s reading of the long arm statute to confer general jurisdiction over non-forum related activity is overly broad to the extent she seeks to confer upon the Court an authority not granted by the U.S. Constitution or even the language of the statute itself.

Section 3104(c)(4) confers general jurisdiction when a defendant has sufficiently extensive contacts with Delaware, even if the claim is unrelated to those contacts.

Arunachalam v. Gordon · filed 2021-12-29(c)(4)

Subsection (c)(4) of Delaware’s long-arm statute confers general jurisdiction, which requires a greater extent of contacts with Delaware than does specific jurisdiction. General jutisdiction allows the exetcise of personal jurisdiction even when the claim is untelated to the forum contacts.

Section 3104(c)(4) does not establish general jurisdiction based on foreign licensing revenue when the services or things are not used or consumed in Delaware.

Roe v. Wyndham Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2023-08-21(c)(4)

But Wyndham UK’s revenue from licensing the brand abroad does not involve the provision of services or things consumed in Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(1) does not establish specific jurisdiction merely because a defendant solicits clients incorporated or operating in Delaware; the defendant’s conduct and the claim must be connected to a Delaware business transaction.

Xactus, LLC v. Mark Sike and CIC Mortgage Credit, Inc. · filed 2024-08-27(c)(1)

The mere fact that some of the clients that Sike solicited happen to be incorporated in Delaware or have a presence here does not show he “transacted some sort of business in the state” or that Xactus’s claims “arose out of that specific transaction” as required to establish specific jurisdiction under Section 3104(c)(1).

Subsection (c)(4) does not permit general personal jurisdiction based only on a nonresident’s Delaware sales and offers to ship products there.

ACCO Brands USA LLC v. Performance Designed Products LLC · filed 2024-01-17(c)(4)

Subsection (c)(4) of the Delaware long-arm statute provides for the exercise of general jurisdiction. ... Since ACCO failed to show a basis for general personal jurisdiction, this Court finds that it does not have a basis to exercise general personal jurisdiction over PDP.

Section 3104 cannot support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when the contacts relevant to the claim are entirely outside Delaware and exercising jurisdiction would offend due process.

North American Fire Ultimate Holdings, LP v. Doorly · filed 2025-03-07

Moreover, applying Delaware’s long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104, against Defendant to exercise personal jurisdiction over him would offend due process because Defendant’s contacts relevant to the tortious interference claim are entirely divorced from Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a trustee merely because its tax filings affect a Delaware resident’s tax liability.

Walker v. West Michigan National Bank & Trust · filed 2004-07-01(c)(2)

Mere effect on plaintiffs tax liability does not establish personal jurisdiction under § 3104(c)(2).

Section 3104(c)(2) requires a nexus between a defendant’s contract to supply services or things in Delaware and the claim asserted.

Parker v. Learn the Skills Corp. · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

Moreover, the allegations that LTSC, a Delaware corporation, co-authored a marketing technique or sells products provided by Ross and/or Straightforward, do not satisfy the required nexus for specific jurisdiction under § 3104(c)(2).

Section 3104 does not govern personal jurisdiction in bankruptcy court; Bankruptcy Rule 7004(f) governs instead.

Astropower Liquidating Trust v. Xantrex Technology, Inc. (In Re Astropower Liquidating Trust) · filed 2005-12-22

Accordingly, the Court need not look to the Delaware long-arm statute, or the case law interpreting it, to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over RJL and Umedaly.

Section 3104(c) does not govern personal jurisdiction in a federal securities action with nationwide service of process.

Snowstorm Acquisition Corp. v. Tecumseh Products Co. · filed 2010-09-21(c)

Neither the Delaware long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c), nor Fourteenth Amendment Due Process concerns are invoked in this federal question action.

Section 3104 reaches as far as due process permits, so a plaintiff need not separately prove that the statute authorizes personal jurisdiction.

E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. NV · filed 2018-08-15

The Delaware long-arm statute is construed broadly "to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the Due Process Clause," thus DuPont need not put forward any additional evidence that the long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over the Parent and Belgian Subsidiary.

Section 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4) require evidence that the defendant intended to serve the Delaware market and that the product entered that market and caused the claimed injury to establish dual jurisdiction.

Belden Technologies, Inc. v. LS CORP. · filed 2009-06-17(c)(1) and (c)(4)

While it is possible that the accused products penetrated Delaware’s market, plaintiff presents no competent evidence to substantiate this conclusion. Therefore, because plaintiff fails to meet its burden with respect to the second prong, its argument for personal jurisdiction under the dual jurisdiction theory fails.

Section 3104 does not confer dual jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary merely because its products are sold in Delaware when the subsidiary lacks intent to serve that market.

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Nikon Corp. · filed 2013-04-01(c)(1), (c)(4)

There is no indication in the record, however, that Sendai has the requisite intent to sell the products it manufactures to Delaware. ... The court has not heretofore exerted dual jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary based on such attenuated facts, and declines to do so in this case.

Section 3104 does not confer personal jurisdiction by combining partial satisfaction of subsections (c)(1) and (c)(4) under a dual jurisdiction theory.

Round Rock Research LLC v. Asustek Computer Inc. · filed 2013-08-20(c)(1), (c)(4)

Thus, I cannot agree, or predict, that the Delaware Supreme Court would recognize “dual jurisdiction.” ... Looking at the Delaware long-arm statute, and applying the above principles, but not the dual jurisdiction analysis, it seems clear to me that there is no jurisdiction over ASUSTeK.

Section 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4) do not support dual jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer without evidence that it intended to sell its products in Delaware.

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Ricoh Co. · filed 2014-09-12(c)(1), (c)(4)

There is no evidence in the record that RCL has the requisite .intent to sell Ricoh products in Delaware. RCL transfers title of the accused products to REI in Japan, prior to importation. Regardless of the precise functionality of the RCL website, there is no indication that Ricoh products can be directly purchased through it. Altogether, these facts as alleged by plaintiffs are insufficient to support a finding of dual jurisdiction.

Section 3104 permits personal jurisdiction under a stream-of-commerce theory when a defendant intends to serve the Delaware market, its product reaches that market, and the claim arises from the product.

Graphics Properties Holdings, Inc. v. Asus Computer International · filed 2014-09-29(c)(1), (c)(4)

Given this record, and particularly the fact that no Delaware state court has rejected the assertion of personal jurisdiction under the dual jurisdiction theory, the Court concludes that the Delaware Supreme Court, if faced with the issue, would hold that the “stream-of-commerce” theory does provide a basis for personal jurisdiction under Delaware law, even though the theory is not expressly authorized by Delaware’s long-arm statute.

Section 3104 permits personal jurisdiction under a stream-of-commerce theory when a defendant intends to serve the Delaware market and the resulting product enters that market and causes the claimed injury.

Robert Bosch LLC v. Alberee Products, Inc. · filed 2014-09-29(c)(1) and (c)(4)

Given this record, and particularly the fact that no Delaware state court has rejected the assertion of personal jurisdiction under the dual jurisdiction theory, the Court concludes that the Delaware Supreme Court, if faced with the issue, would hold that the “stream-of-commerce” theory does provide a basis for personal jurisdiction under Delaware law, even though the theory is not expressly authorized by Delaware’s long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c) permits personal jurisdiction under Delaware’s dual jurisdiction theory through partial satisfaction of subsections (c)(1) and (c)(4), without a showing of general jurisdiction.

Polar Electro Oy v. Oy · filed 2016-07-20(c)(1), (c)(4)

The dual jurisdiction theory is based on at least partial satisfaction of § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4). ... We also agree with Polar that the dual jurisdiction theory as articulated in Boone does not require a showing of general jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that personal jurisdiction over Suunto is proper under the Delaware long arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4) together permit jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer that intends to serve the Delaware market and whose product enters Delaware and injures the plaintiff.

Cardona v. Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd. · filed 2019-02-05(c)(1), (c)(4)

Plaintiff argues that this case fits into Boone’s “dual jurisdiction” scenario. The Court agrees. ... Hence, the facts in this case satisfy the “dual jurisdiction” requirements established in Boone. The first prong of the jurisdiction analysis, the long-arm statute, is met.

Section 3104 permits jurisdiction under a stream of commerce theory when the defendant intends to serve Delaware, that intent brings the product into Delaware, and the claim arises from injury caused by its sale there.

DNA Genotek Inc. v. Spectrum DNA · filed 2016-02-04(c)(1), (c)(4)

Under this theory, it is DNAG’s burden to demonstrate that: (1) Spectrum has an intent to serve the Delaware market; (2) this intent results in the introduction of the accused product into Delaware; and (3) DNAG’s cause of action arises from injuries caused by sale of the accused product in Delaware.

Section 3104(c) permits specific jurisdiction under the stream-of-commerce theory when a defendant intends to serve the Delaware market, its product enters Delaware as a result, and the claim arises from the resulting injury.

Segway Inc. v. Inventist, Inc. · filed 2016-04-25(c)

I have recognized the “dual jurisdiction” or “stream-of-commerce” analytical framework as a basis for specific personal jurisdiction under Delaware law. ... The record presented by plaintiffs demonstrates that defendant has an intent to serve the Delaware market, the accused products have been introduced into the Delaware market through the stream of commerce, and the cause of action at bar is related to injuries caused by the introduction of such products into the Delaware market.

Section 3104(c) does not permit dual jurisdiction over a nonresident that had no business or other conduct directed at Delaware merely because a truck it sold elsewhere later reached the state.

Ross v. Earth Movers, LLC. · filed 2023-01-19(c)(1), (c)(4)

Specific, general, and dual jurisdiction are not met under Delaware’s Long Arm Statute.

Section 3104 does not authorize personal jurisdiction by combining partial satisfaction of its specific and general jurisdiction provisions under a “dual jurisdiction” theory.

Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Air Vent v. PowerMax · filed 2025-07-30

Therefore, the Court finds that the “dual jurisdiction” concept does not justify exercise of jurisdiction.

Section 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4) permit jurisdiction under the dual-jurisdiction theory when a nonresident intends to serve the Delaware market, its product enters that market, and the claim arises from injuries caused by the product.

Sonos, Inc. v. Linkplay Technology Inc. · filed 2024-10-29(c)(1), (c)(4)

“[T]he dual jurisdiction analysis requires a showing of both: (1) an intent to serve the Delaware market; and (2) that this intent results in the introduction of the product into the market and that plaintiff’s cause of action arises from injuries caused by that product.” ... Thus, Sonos has met its burden on the statutory aspect of the jurisdiction test.

Section 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4) can together support personal jurisdiction in a patent infringement case involving imported manufactured goods when the defendant intended to serve the Delaware market.

Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. Reed Semiconductor Corp. · filed 2026-04-28(c)(1), (c)(4)

But for a patent infringement case about imported manufactured goods, we are persuaded that personal jurisdiction can be established by showing facts satisfying both §§ 3104(c)(1) and (4).

A plaintiff may pursue discovery on a general jurisdiction theory under § 3104(c) despite first raising that theory at argument on a motion to dismiss, when the procedural circumstances do not warrant finding waiver.

Carlyle Investment Management, LLC · filed 2014-08-21(c)

In retrospect, it might have been more efficient for Plaintiffs to have raised in the opposition to the Motion to Dismiss all grounds they might have had for asserting the existence of personal jurisdiction over Plaza and Reijtenbagh, including any arguments under 10 Del. C. § 3104(c) independent of the alleged consent to jurisdiction. Nevertheless, I do not consider Plaintiffs’ failure to allude to those alternative contentions until the argument before me on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss to be sufficient grounds for concluding that Plaintiffs have waived any argument as to general jurisdiction over Defendants or the right to seek discovery pertaining to such argument.

Section 3104(g) does not apply to the deadline for appealing a Justice of the Peace Court judgment.

Ortiz v. Warfield · filed 2016-04-12(g)

However, this argument appears to rely on 10 Del. C. § 3104(g) and Rule 6(e), neither of which apply to the strict time limitation on appeals.

Section 3104 permits limited jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff’s asserted basis for jurisdiction is minimally plausible.

Munoz v. Vazquez-Cifuentez · filed 2019-02-18(c)(3)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ assertions of jurisdiction are at least minimally plausible, and that Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to limited discovery to aid in mounting proof for those assertions.

Section 3104(c) permits jurisdictional discovery into contacts supporting specific jurisdiction when the allegations provide no basis for general jurisdiction.

Cuppels v. Mountaire Corporation · filed 2019-05-29(c)

The starting point is 10 Del. C. § 3104(c), which specifies when a nonresident establishes legal presence within this State. ... Thus, plaintiffs must limit their discovery to determining if specific jurisdiction over MC exists.

A plaintiff who presents a non-frivolous basis for jurisdiction under Section 3104 may obtain jurisdictional discovery before the court decides whether it can exercise personal jurisdiction.

Harris v. Harris · filed 2023-01-19

The plaintiffs alternatively seek to serve Schwager under Delaware’s Long-Arm Statute. ... For Schwager, the plaintiffs have asserted a non-frivolous basis for personal jurisdiction, entitling them to jurisdictional discovery.

Section 3104(c)(6) requires the nonresident to contract to provide insurance for a Delaware matter; directing a Delaware subsidiary to obtain insurance does not suffice.

Otto Candies, LLC v. KPMG, LLP · filed 2019-02-28(c)(6)

A plain reading requires that the party allegedly subject to jurisdiction contract to provide insurance.

Section 3104(c)(6) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident insurers that contract to insure Delaware entities and their officers and directors.

Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co. · filed 2020-09-25(c)(6)

First, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(6) applies. The Moving Insurers issued insurance contracts to the Insureds. The Insureds are found in Delaware, i.e., the Insureds are organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware. The Policies at issue are D&O insurance policies insuring the actions of officers and directors of Delaware corporate entities. As such, the Moving Insurers are defendants who issued “contracts to insure” a person (the Insureds and their officers and directors) located and/or to be performed in Delaware at the time the Policies were issued.

Section 3104(c)(6) does not grant jurisdiction over an insurer merely because a Delaware LLC owns the insured property outside Delaware.

300 W 22 Realty, LLC v. Strathmore Insurance Company · filed 2023-03-01(c)(6)

The Court finds Defendant did not contract to insure a “person . . . located within Delaware at the time the contract was made” under Section 3104(c)(6). Therefore, this Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant under Section 3104(c)(6).

Section 3104(c)(6) authorizes personal jurisdiction over a nonresident insurer that contracts to insure a Delaware entity, subject to due process limits.

Varsity Brands Holding Co. LLC v. Arch Insurance Companyl. · filed 2025-02-19(c)(6)

The Court finds the plain language of Section 3104(c)(6) authorizes personal jurisdiction over the non-resident insurers who provide insurance to a Delaware entity, so long as their due process rights are not violated.

Section 3104(c) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident through a Delaware forum selection clause in an agreement the nonresident did not sign.

Curam, LLC v. Gray · filed 2025-03-06(c)

Because the Delaware forum selection clause does not convey personal jurisdiction over O’Connell “under § 3104(c)[,] it is “also not [a] ‘substantial act[] or effect[]’ in furtherance of the conspiracy that would support personal jurisdiction under the conspiracy theory.”

Section 3104(c)(6) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident who guarantees an obligation of a person located in Delaware when the guarantee is made, even if the agreement is signed elsewhere, subject to due process.

Now Plastics, Inc. v. JC Capital Partners LLC · filed 2025-08-14(c)(6)

Carlin, by contracting to guarantee the obligations of JCCP, a Delaware entity, created specific jurisdiction under Delaware’s Long-Arm statute for actions arising under the guarantee agreements. But this determination only carries the claim over the first obstacle; principles of due process must also be considered.

Section 3104(c)(6) permits jurisdiction over a guarantor only when the guaranteed person or obligation has the required connection to Delaware when the guaranty is made.

Kawneer Company v. Alliance Glazing Technologies · filed 2026-06-24(c)(6)

Section 3104(c)(6) only applies to obligations that are to be executed or performed “at the time the contract is made.”