10 Del. Code Ann. § 3104

Section 3104(h)(2) prevents a defendant from avoiding service by refusing to claim a properly addressed registered letter.

Moberg v. 33T LLC · filed 2009-10-06(h)(2)

As contemplated by the Delaware service rules, a defendant cannot simply ignore a registered letter to avoid service of a complaint against him.

Section 3104(f) presumes that a refused delivery was refused by the defendant or the defendant’s agent.

Stevenson v. Swiggett · filed 2010-10-25(f)

Section 3104(f) of the 2006 long-arm statute creates a presumption that if delivery is refused, the refusal was made by the defendant or defendant’s agent. ... The evidence permits a reasonable fact finder to find that the Stevensons lived with their parents at the PA address and that service was refused by them or their agent.

Section 3104(h)(2) presumes notice for refused mail but does not make refusal the only way to prove notice when a mailing lacks a signed receipt.

The Freeman Foundation Charitable Lead Annuity Trust v. Richard N. Stutz and Linda M. Stutz · filed 2014-04-25(h)(2)

However, even though subsection (h)(2)gives an automatic presumption of notice only to “refused” un-receipted mailings, it does not mandate that the Court require “refusal” as the only proof of notice when a mailing lacks a signed return receipt.

Section 3104(e) requires a signed receipt or other evidence of personal delivery to prove service by mail; unclaimed certified mail does not suffice.

Fiorelli v. Bai. · filed 2015-01-12(e)

Plaintiff has made multiple attempts to serve Defendant by person and by mail at addresses in Delaware and Maryland. However, Plaintiff has not shown proof of service by a signed receipt or any other evidence.

Section 3104(e) allows proof of service by mail through evidence of personal delivery satisfactory to the court, even without a signed receipt.

Applied Bank v. JHL Brighton Design · filed 2018-01-17(e)

“When service is made by mail, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of personal delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court.”2 The Court finds that the undisputed evidence presented by Plaintiff constitutes “other evidence of` personal delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court.”

Section 3104(e) allows evidence of personal delivery satisfactory to the court to prove service by mail without a signed receipt.

Doherty & Associates, Inc. v. People First Insurance, Inc. · filed 2018-03-22(e)

In other words, evidence that the defendant in fact received service of the complaint could be sufficient to overcome a failure to obtain a signed receipt for a mailed complaint. The Court agrees with this interpretation of § 3104 and reviews the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in light of Mala'anado.

Section 3104(k) preserves other statutory methods of serving nonresidents, allowing a plaintiff with a claim covered by the long-arm statute to serve a registered foreign corporation through its registered agent.

Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec · filed 2016-04-18(k)

Moreover, a plaintiff who brings a cause of action fitting under the long-arm statute against a registered foreign corporation need not use cumbersome means of service of process, but instead can serve the foreign corporation‘s registered agent, as contemplated in the long-arm statute.

Section 3104(e) requires a return of service for service on a nonresident; certified-mail service requires a signed receipt or other satisfactory evidence of personal delivery.

Washington v. Sinina Talley, Wendy Scott and Danny Washington · filed 2017-02-15(e)

However, § 3104(e) and Rule 4(h) both require Theresa to file a return of service. ... At no point did Theresa file the requisite return of service.

Section 3104(d)(1) permits service outside Delaware using the methods prescribed for service within the state, including delivery at a defendant’s usual abode to a suitable resident.

Ricketts v. Brown · filed 2017-12-20(d)(1)

But section 3104(d)(1) authorizes service outside this State “[b]y personal delivery in the manner prescribed for service within this State.” ... The Court finds that Aniya Wright was of suitable age and discretion and that her averment that Defendant resided at the residence where service was effected is sufficient evidence of same.

Section 3104(d)(4) independently permits court-directed service outside Delaware when the method is reasonably calculated to give actual notice.

Skye Mineral Investors, LLC v. DXS Capital (U.S.) Limited · filed 2021-07-15(d)(4)

Like Federal Rule 4(f)(3), nothing in Section 3104(d)(4), or the corresponding Chancery Rule 4(d)(7), suggests a court’s order, entered on a well-supported motion by the plaintiff, cannot work as a standalone basis to prescribe a means for effective service of process.

Section 3104(e) requires proof of mailed service through a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of personal delivery satisfactory to the court; a receipt marked “Covid 19” did not establish service here.

MidFirst Bank v. Mullane · filed 2022-09-26(e)

For these reasons, the Court finds that the return receipt is not “signed by the addressee” within the meaning of the long-arm statute.

Section 3104(e) permits a court to find service sufficient when notice sent to a confirmed email address and the recipient’s timely response provide satisfactory evidence of personal delivery.

Ward v. Taylor · filed 2024-01-05(e)

Second, we find that service was sufficient under 10 Del. C. § 3104(e). Although the notice of the PFA hearing sent to Mother’s last known address was returned unclaimed, the court sent notice of the PFA hearing to Mother (who had also been actively participating in related child-custody proceedings in the Family Court) at her confirmed email address, and Mother filed a timely motion to participate remotely in the May 2, 2023 PFA hearing. Under the circumstances, there was “other evidence of personal delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court.”

Section 3104(d) permits service on a nonresident by mail requiring a signed receipt or as directed by the court.

Ward v. Taylor · filed 2024-02-15(d)

Under 10 Del. C. § 3104(d), a nonresident may be served by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt or as directed by the court. ... As to the petition for custody modification, the Family Court record includes the summons with the certified mail receipt signed by Mother on August 29, 2022. The certified mail green card was addressed to the Phoenix Address, but was ultimately delivered to the Tempe Address. Mother therefore has not shown that service of the petitions was improper.

Signed proof of delivery at a defendant’s last known address creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant or an agent received service.

TruMark Financial Credit Union v. Asumana · filed 2024-05-28(h)(3)

Plaintiff received signed proof of delivery at Defendant’s last known address and filed proof of delivery with this Court, which constitutes presumptive evidence that the Complaint was received by Defendant or Defendant’s agent under 10 Del. C. § 3104(h)(3).

Section 3104(d)(3) permits out-of-state service by mail addressed to the defendant and requiring a signed receipt; it does not require proof that the defendant personally received the mail.

VanGorder, Scott v. Aaron VanGorder and Pamela Bailey · filed 2026-06-17(d)(3)

Moreover, under Section 3104(d)(3), the defendants were subject to service “[b]y any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requiring a signed receipt.” ... We find no basis for the court’s determination that such proof was required.

Section 3104(e) allows proof of service by mail through evidence of delivery satisfactory to the court; properly addressed and mailed documents carry a presumption of receipt.

Rehoboth-by-the-Sea v. Baris. · filed 2015-06-10(e)

Delaware courts have found this presumption to qualify as satisfactory evidence delivery. ... Notices of the impending lease termination and the Complaint were properly addressed and mailed to Defendants with postage at the above listed Maryland address. As such, there is a presumption Defendants received the aforementioned documents.

Section 3104 applies to claims arising before its enactment against defendants who lived in Delaware when the alleged tort occurred but left the State before service.

Harmon Ex Rel. Harmon v. Eudaily · filed 1979-09-05

The Long-Arm Statute can, therefore, under the circumstances presented, be applied to a cause of action which arose prior to its passage, and to a defendant who departed the State after the alleged tort.

Section 3104(c)(4) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose out-of-state act causes injury when the nonresident does business in Delaware or derives substantial revenue from it.

Plumb v. Cottle · filed 1980-06-24(c)(4)

Because Cottle and Modern both do business in and derive substantial revenue from Delaware, they come within the terms of section 3104(c)(4). Personal jurisdiction was obtained by a valid service of process.

Section 3104(c)(4)’s substantial revenue requirement may be supported by circumstantial evidence of Delaware sales, warranting jurisdictional discovery.

Commissariat a L'Energie Atomique v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp. · filed 2005-01-19(c)(4)

The district court imposed too high a burden of proof on CEA. Based on the allegations in the complaint, the evidence submitted by CEA, and CMO’s failure to rebut the factual inference that devices incorporating its LCDs were sold in Delaware, the district court should have found CEA’s showing sufficient to establish that substantial revenues could be derived by CMO from the sales of products in Delaware incorporating CMO’s LCDs.

Section 3104(c)(4) can reach a nonresident that derives substantial revenue from goods used in Delaware even if the goods were sold elsewhere.

Mendelson v. Delaware River & Bay Authority · filed 1999-04-09(c)(4)

First, the plain language of subsection (c)(4) requires only that the products be “used or consumed” within the State. Nowhere does the statute explicitly state that the goods or services must also be sold in Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires business activity directed at Delaware, and (c)(4) requires substantial Delaware contacts; indirect sales of components that reach Delaware through other manufacturers satisfy neither provision.

Aktiengesellschaft v. LG Semicon Co., Ltd. · filed 1999-08-24(c)(1), (c)(4)

The court finds that the sale of defendant’s DRAM chips outside Delaware for use in electronic products sold by other manufacturers in Delaware is not sufficiently directed at residents of Delaware to constitute “transacting business” in Delaware for the purposes of § 3104(c)(1). ... The court finds that any revenue LG Semicon has generated through sales of DRAM chips to customers outside Delaware whose electronic devices are sold in Delaware is too remote and insubstantial to meet the requirements, of § 3104(c)(4).

Section 3104(c)(4) permits jurisdiction when a defendant regularly places products into a distribution network that sells them in Delaware, even if the defendant makes no direct sales there.

LG.Philips LCD Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics, Corp. · filed 2008-04-29(c)(4)

Secondly, the Court must determine if CMO regularly does or solicits business in Delaware. ... While CMO itself may not have sold its LCD modules to Dell Corporation and OEMs in the State of Delaware, CMO clearly acted in consort with Dell Corporation and OEMs to consistently place products containing its allegedly infringing LCD modules into a national distribution network, and, as a result of these efforts, these products were sold in Delaware. ... That CMO acted through Dell Corporation and OEMs to sell its products in Delaware does not insulate CMO from having purposefully availed itself of the forum state by generating substantial revenue in Delaware through its sales efforts.

Section 3104(c)(4) did not authorize service where the related Delaware charter filing was lawful and the alleged wrongful conduct and injury occurred in Europe.

Istituto Bancario Italiano SpA v. Hunter Engineering Co. · filed 1981-02-26(c)(4)

No doubt recognizing the constitutional deficiencies in the purported substituted service sought to be made on the defendants Niederer and Tools under the provisions of 10 Del.C. § 3114 and § 365, plaintiff has additionally sought to serve such non-residents under the provisions of 10 Del.C. § 3104(c)(4). However, such statute is concerned with an act or omission in Delaware which causes a tortious injury in this jurisdiction, and here it is clear that no tortious act took place in Delaware, the filing of the amendment to the certificate of incorporation of Hunter Engineering Company, Inc., increasing the total authorized shares of such corporation by 190,000 shares, not being an unlawful act per se, the mere fact that such amendment was required as a preliminary to the allegedly tortious act committed in Europe being irrelevant no injury having occurred in Delaware, Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., Del.Ch., 357 A.2d 105 (1975).

Section 3104(c)(4) treats an alleged breach of a legal duty under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as a tortious injury.

Magid v. Marcal Paper Mills, Inc. · filed 1981-07-06(c)(4)

Since Magid’s complaint alleges that Marcal breached its legal duty under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., the Court holds that plaintiff has alleged a tortious injury under the Delaware long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(3) requires an act in Delaware, while subsection (c)(4) requires regular business or persistent conduct in Delaware to support jurisdiction for an out-of-state act.

Compaq Computer Corp. v. Packard Bell Electronics, Inc. · filed 1996-02-02(c)(3), (c)(4)

Cooley did not commit an act “in Delaware” for the purpose of § 3104(c)(3). ... Even assuming that the Delaware AG Letter and Cooley’s visit to Computerland in Wilmington were to solicit business, two events five years apart cannot support the requirement that Cooley must regularly do or solicit business in Delaware. ... Thus, § 3104(c)(4) does not authorize this court to exercise jurisdiction over Cooley.

Section 3104(c)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a company based on a single alleged misrepresentation by its agent in Delaware.

E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhodia Fiber & Resin Intermediates · filed 2000-09-18(c)(3)

The court agrees with plaintiffs that under § 3104(c)(3) deSoyres’s single act of misrepresentation would be enough to establish jurisdiction over Rhodia Fiber.

Section 3104(c)(3) requires the defendant or its agent to be present in Delaware when committing the alleged tortious act; mailing material from outside Delaware does not qualify.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sears Plc · filed 1990-07-24(c)(3)

The “act” of mailing, for purposes of subsection (c)(3), is complete when the material is mailed. ... Simply put, in order for a defendant to commit an act in Delaware and be subject to subsection (c)(3), the defendant, or an agent of the defendant, must be present in Delaware when the deed is done.

Section 3104(c)(3) requires an act in Delaware by the defendant or the defendant’s agent that is related to the cause of action.

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Advanced Environmental Recycling Technologies, Inc. · filed 1993-09-28(c)(3)

By its unambiguous terms, subsection (c)(3) only applies when the defendant or an agent of the defendant performs some act in the state related to the cause of action.

Section 3104(c)(3) requires the defendant or an agent to be present in Delaware when committing the act on which personal jurisdiction rests.

Joint Stock Society "Trade House of Descendants of Peter Smirnoff, Official Purveyor to the Imperial Court" v. Heublein, · filed 1996-08-02(c)(3)

In order for a defendant to commit an act in Delaware and be subject to subsection (c)(3) of the Delaware long-arm statute, the defendant, or an agent of the defendant, must be present in Delaware when the deed is done.

Section 3104(c)(3) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident’s act and the resulting tortious injury occur in Delaware; nationwide email marketing that leads to sales and deliveries of allegedly infringing products in Delaware can satisfy those requirements.

TriStrata Technology, Inc. v. Emulgen Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2008-02-25(c)(3)

Section 3104(c)(3) requires that an act be committed in Delaware, and that the injury occur in Delaware. ... As a result of this nationwide campaign, Emul-gen received orders from Delaware residents, and delivered its products to Delaware. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over this matter under § 3104(c)(3).

Section 3104(c)(3) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant intentionally ships a product to Delaware and its use there causes the claimed injury.

Graphics Properties Holdings Inc. v. Asus Computer International, Inc. · filed 2013-06-28(c)(3)

For purpose of Section 3104(c)(3), the pertinent “act” is ACI’s intentional shipment of the accused product to Delaware. ... Therefore, personal jurisdiction over ACI is proper under the Delaware Long Arm Statute based on the “use” of the accused product in Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who causes tortious injury in Delaware by an act committed there.

Yossick-Cave v. Litton · filed 2015-02-05(c)(3)

§ 3104(c)(3) is most relevant to the case at bar, stating that jurisdiction is proper if the party “causes tortious injury in the State by an act...in this State.” Plaintiff’s allegations, if true, show that Defendant committed repeated acts of sexual abuse in the state of Delaware. This fits squarely within the ambit of the statue.

Section 3104(c)(3) requires a tortious act or omission in Delaware; allegations concerning Delaware assets alone do not establish jurisdiction.

Carvel Estate ex rel. Carvel v. Ross · filed 2008-07-17(c)(3)

With regard to § 3104(c)(3), while the Amended Complaint alleges fraudulent conversion of Carvel assets and that Defendant committed intentional acts or omissions over Delaware assets and effecting Delaware claim issues in collusion with co-conspirators in Delaware and elsewhere, it does not allege that Defendant was present in Delaware when the alleged tortious acts or omissions occurred.

Section 3104(c)(3) does not authorize personal jurisdiction for allegedly defamatory electronic postings unless the nonresident made them while in Delaware.

Kabbaj v. Simpson · filed 2013-11-20(c)(3)

Likewise, § 3104(c)(3) is inapplicable, as nothing in the record indicates that Simpson made any defamatory electronic postings while present in Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(1) and (c)(3) require an act or omission in Delaware to support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.

Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA · filed 2010-10-12(c)(1), (c)(3)

There is no indication that BioAlliance Group committed any act or omission in Delaware, either in connection with the Transfer Agreement or the TARA so as to permit jurisdiction to be asserted under subsections (c)(1) or (c)(3) of the Delaware long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(3) can support personal jurisdiction based on a single act in Delaware, but merely verifying a complaint filed there is insufficient.

MIG Investments LLC v. Aetrex Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2012-03-30(c)(3)

Although a single act can support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 3104(c)(3), the Court concludes that Michalovski’s single of act of verifying the complaint is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.

Section 3104(c)(3) requires the tortious conduct causing an injury in Delaware to occur in Delaware.

Ciabattoni v. Teamsters Local 326 · filed 2016-08-22(c)(3)

Section § 3104(0)(3) is a specific jurisdiction provision which "requires the tortious activity to occur in Delaware" and authorizes personal jurisdiction over a non-resident actor who "cause[s] a tortious injury within the state by conduct occurring in the forum."

Section 3104(c)(3) requires an act or omission in Delaware that causes tortious injury there; injury in Delaware alone is insufficient.

Rotblut v. Terrapinn, Inc. · filed 2016-09-30(c)(3)

Because Plaintiffs have failed to offer sufficient evidence that Holdings committed an act or omission in Delaware, this Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over Holdings under Section 3104(c)(3).

Section 3104(c)(3) does not give Delaware courts specific jurisdiction over an insurer for a coverage dispute based solely on its insured’s accident in Delaware.

Sessoms v. Richmond · filed 2017-12-26(c)(3)

The Court, however, refuses to expand the holding of State Farm v. Dann, and find that Delaware has specific personal jurisdiction for matters that only related to the contract obligations between CURE and Richmond.

Section 3104(c)(3) requires an act or omission in Delaware connected to the claim; allegations about online content did not establish jurisdiction without evidence of such conduct.

Ciabattoni v. Teamsters Local 326 · filed 2020-02-12(c)(3)

The same applies here. Plaintiff fails to allege that any conduct related to the creation or deletion of the Facebook Pages and online content relevant to this case, were posted or affected by Buschmeier in Delaware, or in such a way that Buschmeier purposefully availed himself of doing business with Delaware specifically. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence that he committed an act or omission in Delaware to exercise personal jurisdiction over him.

Section 3104(c)(3) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s act or omission in Delaware causes tortious injury in Delaware.

Owens v. Lead Stories, LLC · filed 2021-07-20(c)(3)

I find that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Lead Stories caused tortious injury in Delaware by acts or omissions in Delaware under 10 Del. C. §3104(c)(3), which in and of itself provides a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction.

An equity interest in a Delaware entity alone does not establish business activity or tortious injury in Delaware under Section 3104(c)(1) or (c)(3).

Deutsche Bank AG v. Devon Park Bioventures, L.P. · filed 2021-06-30(c)(1), (c)(3)

Deutsche and Devon LP maintain that the Jurisdictional Defendants satisfy the statute, under either Sections 3104(c)(1) or 3104(c)(3), but neither the Amended Complaint nor the Interpleader Claim describes any act in Delaware from which this litigation could arise. ... The fact that the asset in question was equity in a Delaware entity does not equate to an injury in Delaware, nor, without more, to doing business in Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(3) does not establish injury in Delaware merely because the injured party is incorporated there.

Fortis Advisors LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, Ethicon, Inc., Alex Gorsky, Ashley McEvoy, Peter Shen and Susan Morano · filed 2021-12-13(c)(3)

Fortis cites no authority holding that an injured party’s incorporation in Delaware is sufficient to show an injury in this state for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

Section 3104(c)(3) requires both an act or omission in Delaware and a tortious injury in Delaware.

ADGS, LLC v. Emery Silfurtun, Inc. · filed 2022-05-11(c)(3)

ADGS cannot establish that Hartmann A/S acted in Delaware or that ADGS suffered an injury in Delaware. ADGS therefore cannot establish personal jurisdiction under Section 3104(c)(3).

Section 3104(c)(3) requires an act or omission in Delaware that causes tortious injury; economic harm to a Delaware corporation alone does not suffice.

SDF Funding LLC v. Fry · filed 2022-05-13(c)(3)

Without the requirement that the tortious injury be caused by an act or omission in Delaware, Section 3104(c)(3) would arguably permit the exercise of jurisdiction whenever a nonresident causes economic harm to a Delaware corporation. Such an interpretation sweeps too broadly and is contrary to Delaware law.

Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(3) require allegations that the nonresident acted or failed to act in Delaware; holding a position with a company that operates there is insufficient.

Tolliver v. Qlarant Quality Solutions, Inc. · filed 2022-11-21(c)(1), (c)(3)

In order to establish personal jurisdiction under either (c)(1) or (c)(3), a plaintiff is required to allege conduct, whether an act or an omission, by the nonresident that occurred in the state of Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(4) does not confer specific jurisdiction over an insurer when the claim concerns a contractual duty with no germane connection to Delaware.

Donaldson v. Progressive Advanced Insurance Company · filed 2022-03-29(c)(4)

10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(4) allows for personal jurisdiction of a non-resident when “causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission outside the State if the person regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from services, or things used or consumed in the State.” ... In this ... case, the only consideration is Progressive’s duty to perform under the contract, which does not have a germane connection to Delaware. For these reasons, the Court may not exercise specific jurisdiction over Progressive.

Section 3104(c)(3) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s act or omission in Delaware causes tortious injury in Delaware.

IMO: The Estate of Lawrence E. Mergenthaler · filed 2024-09-04(c)(3)

On that basis, Devon has established a prima facie case that Section 3104(c)(3) is satisfied.

Section 3104(c)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when an act in Delaware causes tortious injury there, including when a Delaware court filing has a sufficient nexus to an alleged defamation.

Feldman v. Marks · filed 2024-09-23(c)(3)

Consistent with Delaware’s practice of liberally construing the long arm statute, there is a sufficient nexus between the filing of the Statement in the Court of Chancery, in the very action Marks initiated, and the tort of defamation alleged here to confer personal jurisdiction over Marks.

Section 3104(c)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when allegations make a prima facie showing that an act in Delaware caused tortious injury there.

Desmond v. Desmond · filed 2024-11-21(c)(3)

Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Defendants tampered with Plaintiffs’ and Patricia’s mail in Delaware satisfies a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under § 3104(c).

Section 3104(c)(3) requires specific facts connecting a nonresident or an agent to the conduct causing tortious injury in Delaware.

Tisher v. INSYS Therapeutics, Inc. · filed 2024-11-22(c)(3)

Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to pursue evidence of this connection in jurisdictional discovery. Their inability to find that evidence now prevents this Court from exercising personal jurisdiction under §3104(c)(3).

Section 3104(c)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only when an act or omission in Delaware causes tortious injury in Delaware.

Irv Edwards, M.D. v. GigAcquisitions2, LLC · filed 2025-07-25(c)(3)

Nor do plaintiffs allege that Continental injured them through an act or omission taken in this State. “In order to find jurisdiction under [Section] 3104(c)(3), the defendant must have caused a tortious injury in Delaware by its acts or omissions in Delaware.”

Section 3104(c)(3) requires an individual to be physically present in Delaware when making an allegedly defamatory statement for that statement to support personal jurisdiction.

Cytotheryx Inc v. Castle Creek Biosciences Inc & paragon Biosciences LLC · filed 2025-11-10(c)(3)

For the second prong of Section 3104(c)(3) to be satisfied, Delaware courts require that an individual be physically present in Delaware while making defamatory statements.

Section 3104(c)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an insurer for its insured’s first-party underinsured motorist claim arising from a Delaware accident.

Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2025-12-18(c)(3)

Berry’s claim sounds in contract, not tort, and therefore falls outside § 3104(c)(3).

Section 3104(c)(3) requires an omission in Delaware that causes tortious injury there; an omitted filing with no causal connection to the injury does not support jurisdiction.

Zync, Inc. v. Porsche Investments Management, S.A. · filed 2026-05-26(c)(3)

The operative section requires an omission in Delaware that causes tortious injury in Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(4) does not require a tort claim to arise from the defendant’s qualifying Delaware business or other Delaware contacts.

Altech Industries, Inc. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. · filed 1981-12-11(c)(4)

The defendant argues that section 3104 authorizes long arm service only if a plaintiff’s claim for relief is based upon a defendant’s activities embraced within the quoted words. This is an erroneous interpretation of the statute. The cause of action plaintiff asserts is based upon a tortious injury arising out of a trade name violation. This is a cause of action arising from injuries specified in paragraph (c) of section 3104 of the statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires a nexus between the defendant’s Delaware contacts and the plaintiff’s claim for specific jurisdiction.

Sanitec Industries, Inc. v. Sanitec Worldwide, Ltd. · filed 2005-07-07(c)(1)

Because Sanitec Industries has not asserted there is any nexus between those acts in Delaware and the conduct which is the basis of this lawsuit— the alleged infringement of a patent and trademarks, and violation of Delaware’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act—the Court concludes that such contacts are insufficient to give rise to specific jurisdiction over Mr. Weinsten.

Section 3104(c)(1)-(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when a Delaware transaction gives rise to the claim; a single related act can suffice.

CC Investors Corp. v. Raytheon Co. · filed 2003-11-25(c)(1)-(2)

According to the relevant portions of Delaware’s Long-Arm Statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104, a court may exercise jurisdiction over any nonresident who (1) transacts business in Delaware or (2) contracts to supply services or things in the state. ... The LLC was formed in Delaware, and the breach of contract claim was a direct result of that act. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support personal jurisdiction over Travel Air.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific jurisdiction only when the claim arises from the nonresident’s Delaware business transaction.

EBP Lifestyle Brands Holdings, Inc. v. Boulbain · filed 2017-08-04(c)(1)

To reiterate, Section 3104(c)(1) is a specific jurisdiction statute. This means that the transactions EBP points to as bases to confer personal jurisdiction over Boulbain must be the transactions out of which its causes of action as alleged in the Complaint arise.

Section 3104(c) requires the alleged wrong to arise from the acts that establish jurisdiction; ownership of Delaware companies alone does not establish jurisdiction over an unrelated claim.

Ascenda Biosciences, LLC v. Little · filed 2020-08-04(c)

This argument fails because § 3104(c) requires that “the wrong alleged must arise from the ‘acts enumerated.’” ... Here, the wrong alleged does not have anything to do with Strategic Group’s ownership of Ascenda or Provista. Thus, § 3104(c)(1) and (2) do not apply directly to Strategic Group.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires a close connection between a nonresident’s Delaware business transaction and the claim; signing a certificate for an unchallenged earlier merger did not establish jurisdiction over the later fraud claims.

LVI Group Investments, LLC v. NCM Group Holdings, LLC · filed 2017-09-07(c)(1)

Under those facts, I do not find a sufficient nexus to exist between Cutrone’s signing the Certificate and the claims before me to support jurisdiction. Accordingly, I find that Cutrone is not subject to personal jurisdiction under Section 3104(c)(1).

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on a Delaware act only when that act has a sufficient nexus to the alleged wrongful conduct.

SPCP Group, LLC v. Svalbard Holdings Limited · filed 2025-08-15(c)(1)

Because Section 3104(c)(1) confers specific, not general, jurisdiction, a Delaware act may only serve as the basis for personal jurisdiction where there is a sufficient nexus between that act and the alleged wrongful conduct.

Subsection (c)(1) requires the plaintiff’s claim to arise from the nonresident defendant’s business or services in Delaware; unrelated contacts do not suffice.

Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network LLC v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co · filed 2023-09-27(c)(1)

But Hartford’s relationships with Delaware entities unrelated to this action are not the basis for YES’s claims, so they do not satisfy Subsection (c)(1).

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific jurisdiction based on business conducted in Delaware only when the claim has a nexus to that conduct.

Cohen · filed 2026-03-05(c)(1)

Cohen simply asserts that these actions create specific jurisdiction under Section 3104(c)(1), but there is no attempt to show how any of these actions have led to the underlying wrongful ownership allegations.

Section 3104(c)(3) permits jurisdiction for an alleged act in Delaware that causes injury there, while (c)(4) permits jurisdiction for an alleged act outside Delaware when the defendant persistently engages in conduct in the state.

ALTECH Industries, Inc. v. AL TECH Specialty Steel Corp. · filed 1982-06-25(c)(3), (c)(4)

The complaint fails to allege whether it was in Delaware or elsewhere that GATX directed and controlled defendant Al Tech in infringing plaintiff’s trade name. If it occurred in Delaware, the injury to plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, occurred in Delaware. In these circumstances jurisdiction existed under subparagraph (3) of paragraph (c). If, on the other hand, the direction and control which GATX is alleged to have exercised over defendant Al Tech occurred outside of Delaware, then jurisdiction existed under subparagraph (4) of paragraph (c) inasmuch as GATX has persistently engaged in a course of conduct in the State of Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(1), (c)(3), and (c)(4) require a basis for personal jurisdiction tied to Delaware; sales into North America alone do not establish Delaware business, an in-state tortious act, or substantial Delaware revenue.

Commissariat À L'Energie Atomique v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp. · filed 2003-09-22(c)(1), (c)(3), (c)(4)

Neither § 3104(c)(1), (c)(3), nor (c)(4) of the Delaware long-arm statute authorize this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over CMO, nor does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

Section 3104(c) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation without alleged Delaware business, services, persistent conduct, or substantial revenue from Delaware.

Resource Ventures, Inc. v. Resources Management International, Inc. · filed 1999-03-23(c)(1), (c)(4)

Applying the requirements of the Delaware long arm statute, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant SDK. The Amended Complaint does not include any allegations that Defendant SDK transacts any business or performs any type of work or service in Delaware. Further, there are no allegations that Defendant SDK regularly does or solicits business in Delaware or that it engages in persistent conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from services or things used or consumed in the State.

Section 3104(c)(1), (3), and (4) permit personal jurisdiction based on Delaware business or work, an in-state act causing tortious injury, or qualifying ongoing business or conduct connected to Delaware.

Physician Endorsed LLC v. Clark · filed 2005-06-27

First, the Court concludes that section 3104(c)(1) of the Delaware Long-Arm statute is inapplicable in these circumstances because Physician Endorsed has offered no evidence that Mr. Clark transacts any business in Delaware or performs any type of work or service in the state. ... Next, the Court concludes that Physician Endorsed has failed to allege facts that Mr. Clark committed a tortious act or omission in the state of Delaware as section 3104(c)(3) of the long-arm statute requires. ... Finally, the Court concludes that the exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 3104(c)(4) of Delaware’s Long-Arm statute is not proper. Mr. Clark as an individual is not alleged to have engaged in any conduct in Delaware, let alone the high standard of a “persistent course of conduct” required under Subsection (c)(4).

Section 3104 permits Delaware courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who meets one of its listed grounds; without such a ground, the nonresident cannot be served under the statute.

UNIFUND CCR PARTNERS v. Sunde · filed 2011-09-07

It is undisputed that Sunde is a Washington resident with no contacts with Delaware. Nothing in the record before this court indicates Sunde satisfies any of the enumerated actions in the long-arm statute permitting Unifund to serve Sunde with process for the Chase Account claim in Delaware courts.

Section 3104(c)(1)–(4) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents based on specified business, contractual, or tortious contacts with Delaware.

Pazuniak Law Office, LLC v. Pi-Net International, Inc. · filed 2016-07-07(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4)

Delaware’s long-arm statute provides for specific and general jurisdiction over Pi-Net and Dr. Arunachalam here.

Section 3104 does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident officer based solely on the officer’s role at a Delaware corporation.

Turf Nation, Inc. v. UBU Sports, Inc. · filed 2017-10-11

The Court also does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Vrankin under 10 Del. C. § 3104 (“Section 3104”). Other than being an officer of UBU, Mr. Vrankin has no other contacts with Delaware. Turf Nation fails to plead sufficient grounds for the exercise of specific or general jurisdiction.

Section 3104 does not provide personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose only alleged Delaware connection is indirect ownership of a Delaware LLC, with no alleged act or business in the state.

IMO Dissolution of Arctic Ease · filed 2016-12-09(c)(1), (3)

The only alleged connection Cohen has with Delaware is his indirect ownership of a Delaware limited liability company interest. The Court, therefore, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Cohen under the long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c) lists the Delaware connections that can support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Techview Investments Limited v. Amstar Poland Property Fund I, L.P. · filed 2021-08-31(c)

The Court also has no basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over Amstar Group independent of the Subscription Agreements.

Subsections (c)(1) through (4) require affirmative proof that the nonresident defendant took an act in Delaware.

Green America Recycling, LLC v. Clean Earth, Inc. · filed 2021-06-01(c)(1)-(4)

Read charitably, Clean Earth’s allusions to section 3104(c) implicate subsections (1), (2), (3), and (4). At bottom, each of these requires Clean Earth to ... demonstrate with affirmative proof that EBAD took “an act” in Delaware.

Section 3104 does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident attorney when the representation and underlying injury occurred in Pennsylvania and none of the statute’s grounds for jurisdiction is satisfied.

Oliver v. Galerman · filed 2022-01-31(c)

With these factors in mind, the Court finds none of the six circumstances which would allow this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Delaware’s long-arm statute to be satisfied. Therefore, this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Mr. Galerman and the instant case must be dismissed.

Section 3104(c) extends personal jurisdiction as far as the Due Process Clause permits.

International Business Machines Corporation v. Rakuten, Inc. · filed 2022-12-22(c)

“The Delaware long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c), is to be broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the Due Process Clause.”

Section 3104(c) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full extent allowed by due process.

Deloitte Consulting LLP v. Sagitec Solutions LLC · filed 2023-09-15(c)

The Supreme Court of Delaware has recognized that section 3104(c) “has been broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the due process clause.” ... Accordingly, the exercise of jurisdiction over Sagitec is permissible if doing so would comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

At the pleading stage, facts supporting a reasonable inference that a nonresident was subject to Delaware jurisdiction can sufficiently allege compliance with Section 3104’s service requirements.

Goal Acquisitions Corp., a Delaware Corporation v. Aman Sharma, Esquire · filed 2025-06-17

Together, as pled, they allege a reasonably conceivable basis to infer that Goal could have met both the Long Arm Statute’s requirements for service of process and the Due Process Clause’s requirements for minimum contacts.

Section 3104(c) requires a plaintiff to show a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants; the plaintiff’s Delaware residence and allegations of a New Jersey traffic stop did not establish one.

Happle v. Sweeney · filed 2024-03-13(c)

The Court must, therefore, determine whether there is a statutory basis for jurisdiction under the Delaware long-arm statute. /d. (citing 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)). ... Neither Plaintiff's complaint nor his briefing in response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss have alleged a cognizable basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction, let alone shown the same by affidavits or other competent evidence.

Section 3104(c)(1)-(4) requires a basis in the nonresident’s or its agent’s Delaware business, contracts, or tortious injury contacts before a Delaware court may exercise personal jurisdiction.

Estate of Nicholas A. Mastroianni, Sr. v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2026-02-04(c)(1)-(4)

Accordingly, there is no basis for a Delaware state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over FCI Cayman under section 3104(c)(1)-+(4).

Section 3104(c)(4) requires regular business or other persistent conduct in Delaware to establish jurisdiction for tortious injury caused by an act outside the state.

Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener University · filed 1985-12-23(c)(4)

Although Plaintiff has alleged that Philhaven’s acts in Pennsylvania caused tortious injury in Delaware, he has not alleged, and Philhaven has affirmatively denied, that Philhaven has engaged in any regular course of activity in Delaware, as required under subsection (c)(4) of the Longarm Statute.

Section 3104(c)(4) permits jurisdiction based on a persistent course of conduct in Delaware even when revenue from the state is insubstantial.

United States v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1987-11-06(c)(4)

For at least the past four years Globe has had advertising and subscription accounts with Delaware residents. As was conceded by counsel for Globe in oral argument on its motion to dismiss, Globe's contacts with Delaware have been regular and persistent. Because substantial revenue need not also be present, the Court finds that jurisdiction exists under subsection (c)(4) of section 3104.

Section 3104(c)(4) does not treat a company’s general informational website as a persistent course of conduct in Delaware.

C.R. Bard Inc. v. Guidant Corp. · filed 1998-02-27(c)(4)

The court also rejects the argument that Guidant’s maintenance of a website, where it provided the entire nation with general information about its company and product line, justifies a finding that Guidant has engaged in a persistent course of conduct in Delaware. ... The court concludes that § 3104(c)(4) does not authorize the exercise of jurisdiction over Guidant, and that there is no other such statutory authority.

Section 3104(c)(4) requires a pattern of regular solicitation or continuous and substantial activity in Delaware; national magazine advertising alone does not establish jurisdiction.

Intel Corp. v. Silicon Storage Technology, Inc. · filed 1998-08-05(c)(4)

Intel has not cited, nor can the court find, any ease showing that advertising in national magazines alone is sufficient to establish a “pattern of regular solicitation” or “continuous and substantial” activity within the forum. Gerber, 1987 WL 9670 at *2; Sears, 744 F.Supp. at 1304. Therefore, SST does not “regularly do or solicit business” in Delaware and is not subject to jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(4).

Section 3104(c)(4) permits personal jurisdiction for injury caused by an out-of-state act when the defendant has the specified business ties to Delaware, and the court interprets it to reach the limits of due process.

Motorola, Inc. v. PC-Tel, Inc. · filed 1999-07-12(c)(4)

Following the guidance of other federal courts in this district, the court will interpret this language broadly, as reaching the “maximum parameters of the due process clause.”

Section 3104 does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because a defendant communicates from outside Delaware with employees of a Delaware corporation who also work outside the state, absent continuous and systematic Delaware contacts.

Roadsafe Traffic Systems, Inc. v. Ameriseal Northeast Florida, Inc. · filed 2010-04-08(c)(1)-(4)

Absent evidence of continuous and systematic contacts with Delaware (as contemplated under § 3104(c)(4)), ... transacting business with a Delaware corporation outside of Delaware satisfies neither Delaware’s long-arm statute ... nor due ... process, as there is no support for the proposition that activity directed to a Delaware corporation that conducts its business elsewhere is “constitutionally cognizable contact with the State” of Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(1)-(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on Delaware corporate clients served only in Nevada and unanswered solicitations mailed into Delaware from Nevada.

Registered Agents, Ltd. v. Registered Agents, Ltd. · filed 2012-07-31(c)(1)-(3)

In sum, defendant’s solicitations do not bring it within reach of Delaware’s long-arm statute, and plaintiff has failed to present any facts showing that defendant transacts, or has contracted to transact, any business within Delaware. Therefore, even broadly construing 10 Del. C. § 3104(c) as “[conferring] jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the due process clause[,]” plaintiff has failed to bring defendant within reach of Delaware’s personal jurisdiction.

Section 3104(c)(4) does not permit general jurisdiction based solely on a website accessible in Delaware when the defendant has no other Delaware contacts.

Inno360, Inc. v. Zakta, LLC · filed 2014-06-19(c)(4)

Because defendant maintains no other contacts with Delaware, its passive internet contacts are insufficient to warrant general personal jurisdiction under subsection (c)(4) of the Delaware long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1)-(4) provides grounds for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, but a plaintiff must show sufficient Delaware contacts to establish specific or general jurisdiction.

Smith v. Tipsord · filed 2021-09-15(c)(1)-(4)

Under Delawate’s long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1)-(4), a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant or its agent: ... Even taking Plaintiff's averments as true, the Amended Complaint makes no mention of any action taken by Tipsotd in Delaware. ... By failing to respond to Defendants’ argument, Plaintiff did not provide this court with any additional information to watrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Tipsord; thus, he fails to meet his burden to establish that either specific or general petsonal jurisdiction exists.

Section 3104(c) requires a sufficient Delaware contact; an unfulfilled contractual obligation to file a certificate of cancellation in Delaware does not establish one.

Mehra v. Teller · filed 2023-02-28(c)

The mere contractual obligation to file a certificate of cancellation in Delaware does not create a sufficient contact with Delaware to satisfy the long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) and (2) require a Delaware contact giving rise to the claim, while subsection (c)(4) requires a defendant’s general presence in Delaware to reach an out-of-state act.

Applied Energetics, Inc. v. Gusrae Kaplan Nusbaum PLLC · filed 2024-04-16(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(4)

For these reasons, the Court finds that AEI has alleged no Delaware-specific contact under Section 3104(c)(1) and (2), or the general presence factors in Section 3104(c)(4), to establish personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

Section 3104(c) permits a court to consider an agent’s qualifying Delaware acts when deciding jurisdiction over a nonresident principal, but an agency relationship alone does not establish jurisdiction.

Applied Biosystems, Inc. v. Cruachem, Ltd. · filed 1991-09-06(c)

Thus, a finding of agency does not render the long-arm statute inapplicable, but simply implicates its “or through an agent” provision.

Section 3104(c) does not confer jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation merely because its affiliates conduct business in Delaware; attributing their conduct requires a sufficient connection between them.

ICT Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2001-06-22(c)

In the absence of direct authority supporting ICT’s position, and without facts that warrant the extraordinary remedy of piercing the corporate veil, the court concludes that BI and BI Pharma are not subject to jurisdiction in Delaware under either § 3104 or the constitutional notions of due process.

Section 3104(c)(1) does not permit jurisdiction over a foreign parent based solely on its subsidiary’s Delaware incorporation when the transaction at issue occurred outside Delaware.

ACE & Co., Inc. v. Balfour Beatty PLC · filed 2001-06-28(c)(1)

Because BICC owned no assets in Delaware and the sale of its assets was negotiated and consummated outside of Delaware, there is no jurisdictional conduct to attribute to Balfour. Therefore, Balfour is not subject to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by this court pursuant to § 3104(c)(1).

Section 3104(c)(4) does not confer general jurisdiction over a foreign parent merely because it has incorporated a Delaware subsidiary, absent a pattern of corporate dealings under Delaware law.

Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. · filed 2006-08-04(c)(4)

The act of incorporating a subsidiary in Delaware is not enough to confer general jurisdiction in this instance because it does not appear that Syngenta AG and Participations have engaged in a pattern of corporate dealings under Delaware law.

Section 3104(c)(3) permits jurisdiction based on an agent’s tortious act in Delaware only when the act was within the scope of the agent’s employment and directed by the principal.

Elliott v. the Marist Bros. of the Schools, Inc. · filed 2009-12-21(c)(3)

Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(3), plaintiff must assert facts sufficient to establish that moving defendants should be held accountable for Galligan’s alleged tortious conduct in Delaware by virtue of the relationship that existed between moving defendants and Galligan. Plaintiff has failed to do so. ... Even if the court were to assume that Galligan was an agent of moving defendants, when an act is offered as a basis for jurisdiction, Delaware law requires the act to have occurred within the scope of the agent’s (here, Galligan’s) employment and the principal (here, moving defendants) to have directed the act.

Section 3104(c)(3) requires facts connecting a defendant to an agent’s alleged tortious conduct in Delaware before that conduct can support personal jurisdiction.

Jane Voe 2 Ex Rel. the Estate of Voe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee · filed 2010-03-31(c)(3)

Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(3), plaintiff at bar must assert facts sufficient to establish that moving defendants should be held accountable for Nickerson’s alleged tortious conduct in Delaware by virtue of the relationship that existed between them and Nickerson. Plaintiff has failed to do so.

Section 3104(c)(3) requires an agent’s act offered as a basis for jurisdiction to be within the scope of employment and directed by the principal.

Thompson v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF WASHINGTON · filed 2010-08-26(c)(3)

When an act is offered as the basis for jurisdiction, Delaware law requires the act to have occurred within the scope of the agent’s employment and the principal to have directed the act.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on business transacted in Delaware by a defendant or the defendant’s agent.

Reid v. Siniscalchi · filed 2014-11-20(c)(1)

Siniscalchi is subject to the long-arm statute due to his formation of USRT Holdings in Delaware as Capra’s agent. Capra is also subject to long-arm jurisdiction under the theory that Siniscalchi acted as his agent.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits Delaware acts by a coconspirator to be attributed to a nonresident defendant for personal jurisdiction.

Virtus Capital L.P. v. Eastman Chemical Company · filed 2015-02-11(c)(1)

Under the conspiracy theory, acts taken in the State of Delaware in connection with the Sterling Transaction can be attributed to Sass for purposes of Section 3104(c)(1), and it is consistent with due process for the plaintiff to have sued him in Delaware in connection with the Sterling Transaction.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state conspirator when the conspiracy theory’s five factors establish a basis for attributing an in-state act to that conspirator.

Caspian Select Credit Master Fund Ltd. v. Gohl · filed 2015-09-28(c)(1)

Here, Plaintiffs have satisfied Istituto Bancario’s five factors, rendering Wayzata Offshore subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware.

Section 3104’s requirements may be satisfied through the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction, which attributes a conspirator’s qualifying Delaware acts to other conspirators.

Konstantino v. AngioScore, Inc. · filed 2015-10-02

Because I find that AngioScore has made a prima facie showing to establish personal jurisdiction over each of the Singapore entities under the conspiracy theory, I do not address its other jurisdictional theories. ... The conspiracy theory is not an independent basis for jurisdiction, but rather an alternative way to satisfy the requirements of the long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104.

Section 3104 permits conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only when the plaintiff provides specific facts supporting the required conspiracy factors; speculation is insufficient.

Ciabattoni v. Eby · filed 2017-03-28

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate specific facts entitling him to an application of the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction over Eby.

Section 3104 permits a Delaware act by a conspirator to be attributed to a nonresident co-conspirator when the nonresident knew or had reason to know of the act and it was a direct, foreseeable result of the conspiracy.

Reid v. Siniscalchi · filed 2018-01-30(c)(1), (c)(3)

Thus, a substantial Delaware act by a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy may be attributed to nonresident co-conspirators if the co-conspirators knew or had reason to know of that act and the act “in [Delaware] was a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy.”

Section 3104(c) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident under a conspiracy theory when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the conspiracy jurisdiction requirements are met.

iBio, Inc. v. Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft · filed 2018-12-10(c)

For the reasons explained above, I conclude that iBio has made a prima facie showing that all of the Istituto Bancario elements are met and, thus, that this Court has personal jurisdiction over FhG under the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction.

Section 3104(c)(1)–(3) can be satisfied when a substantial act or effect of a conspiracy in Delaware amounts to in-state business, work, or tortious injury.

Lilly Lea Perry v. Dieter Walter Neupert · filed 2019-02-15(c)(1)–(3)

Satisfying the third Istituto Bancario element—whether a “substantial act or substantial effect in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred in the forum state”—therefore satisfies the statutory requirement that a party have transacted business in the state, performed work in the state, or caused tortious injury in the state through an act or omission in the state.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits jurisdiction based on Delaware business transacted through an agent, including a co-conspirator whose acts are attributable to the defendant.

Clark v. Davenport · filed 2019-07-18(c)(1)

Under the plain language of the Delaware Long-Arm Statute, forum-directed activity can occur “through an agent.”

Section 3104(c)(1) permits service based on forum-directed activity done in person or through an agent; agency status can expand jurisdiction but does not shield the agent from it.

Metro Storage International LLC v. Harron · filed 2019-07-19(c)(1)

The Delaware Long-Arm Statute explicitly authorizes service on a party who engages in forum-directed activity “in person or through an agent.” 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1). Under the plain language of the Delaware Long-Arm Statute, agency status expands jurisdiction; it does not limit it.

Section 3104(c) does not support conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction when no substantial act or effect occurred in Delaware and the defendant had no reason to foresee a direct effect there.

Schubert v. Lumileds LLC · filed 2020-11-24(c)

The Delaware long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c), allows the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a number of instances. ... No substantial act or substantial effect in furtherance of the conspiracy is alleged to have occurred in Delaware. ... Thus, Lumileds has not alleged or shown that BU knew or had reason to know that its conspiratorial acts would have direct and foreseeable effects in Delaware.

Section 3104(c) requires a claim to arise from a Delaware act attributable to the nonresident; a later records production that did not give rise to the alleged wrongs cannot support conspiracy jurisdiction.

Altabef v. Neugarten · filed 2021-12-15(c)

On these facts, missing 220 documents do not serve as a jurisdictional hook for the very wrongs that inspired the demand. This Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Rainbow Medical under Section 3104 based on a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction.

Section 3104(c) permits jurisdiction based on a coconspirator’s Delaware conduct only when the claimant adequately alleges that a conspiracy existed.

HUMC Holdco, LLC v. MPT of Hoboken, TRS · filed 2022-07-29(c)

In this case, J.C.’s theory of personal jurisdiction fails because J.C. has failed to adequately allege that a conspiracy existed. None of the Counterclaims state a claim. There is thus no basis for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Sequoia.

Section 3104(c) permits conspiracy-based jurisdiction over a nonresident whose alleged co-conspirators acted in Delaware, but incorporation in Delaware alone does not establish the required substantial act or effect in the state.

Dan Dee International, LLC v. Global New Ventures Group LC · filed 2024-06-18(c)

The Delaware Long-Arm Statute provides that, “[a]s to a cause of action brought by any person arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident . . . who in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State... .” 10 Del. C. § 3104(c). ... Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim that GNV’s conduct targeted companies incorporated in the state, without more, is insufficient to satisfy the third Istituto Bancario factor.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires a nonresident parent’s attributable conduct to be sufficiently connected to Delaware and to the claim before it supports personal jurisdiction.

Choe and Floris Tutti International, Inc. v. Sono America, Inc · filed 2025-08-05(c)(1)

But that alone isn’t sufficient; the actions at issue must also be acts in Delaware that satisfy the long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent when its alter ego subsidiary’s Delaware contacts are connected to the claims against the parent.

TFI Tutti LLC v. Sono America, Inc. · filed 2025-12-19(c)

No matter the avenue, a plaintiff must still establish that a challenging defendant’s contacts with Delaware are sufficiently connected to the claims asserted in the complaint through its agent or subsidiary under § 3104 to establish indirect personal jurisdiction. ... Given all this—at least, at this preliminary step of litigation—Sono International is subject to Delaware jurisdiction under its long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits jurisdiction based on a single Delaware business transaction when the claim arises from that transaction; the transaction may be carried out through an agent.

Arxada Holdings NA Inc. v. Harvey · filed 2026-01-28(c)(1)

“[A] single transaction is sufficient to confer jurisdiction where the claim is based on that transaction.” ... The forum-directed activity can be accomplished “through an agent.”

Section 3104(c)(1) permits conspiracy-based jurisdiction over a nonresident when a substantial act or effect in Delaware furthers the conspiracy and is attributable to that person.

MacLaughlan v. Einheiber · filed 2026-02-26(c)(1)

The conspiracy theory thus may not be an independent basis for establishing personal jurisdiction, but meeting the first, second, and third elements meets the Long-Arm Statute’s requirements.

Section 3104(c)(1) allows a co-conspirator’s Delaware corporate filing to count as an in-state act for personal jurisdiction.

In re Tilray, Inc. Reorganization Litigation · filed 2021-06-01(c)(1)

Blue filed Privateer’s charter amendment, a corporate instrument, in Delaware and that filing is attributable to Blue’s co-conspirators.

Section 3104(c)(5) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose mortgage gives him an interest in Delaware real property.

Jeffreys v. Exten · filed 1992-01-15(c)(5)

It is unnecessary to address each of the Plaintiff’s contentions individually as the Court is satisfied that Nucci “has an interest in, uses or possesses real property, in the State” of Delaware and thus meets the requirements of section 3104(c)(5).

Section 3104(c)(5) permits personal jurisdiction based on a nonresident’s interest in Delaware real property, including a house it bought for a subsidiary’s president.

Cuppels v. Corportation · filed 2020-06-18(c)(5)

MC decided to buy the house and paid for the house. I view this as an interest in, use or possession of Delaware real property as a basis for personal jurisdiction under §3104(c)(5) of the Delaware long arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident that transacts business in Delaware, including through patent licensing meetings and negotiations there.

Capitol Records, Inc. v. Optical Recording Corp. · filed 1992-11-20(c)(1)

Under the Delaware long-arm statute, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-resident who “[tjransacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State....” 10 Del.C. § 3104(c)(1). ... ORC retains patent counsel in Delaware, has conducted licensing-related meetings, and negotiated licenses for the patents in suit in Delaware. Such meetings and negotiations occurred with DuPont and Phillips corporations. Thus, jurisdiction exists over ORC in Delaware.

Section 3104(c)(1) treats Delaware solicitation, product shipments, and free sample deliveries as transacting business when they are part of a coordinated plan to serve Delaware customers.

Thorn EMI North America, Inc. v. Micron Technology, Inc. · filed 1993-05-18(c)(1)

In order to meet the requirements of transacting business under § 3104(c)(1), an act must be directed at residents of the state of Delaware and the protection of its laws. ... It is sufficient that the solicitations (which Micron Semi admits to have been business transactions), shipment of products, or delivery of free samples are part of this business plan such that each may be considered an act of business within Delaware.

Section 3104 does not authorize service on a defendant that transacts no business and supplies no services in Delaware.

CFMT, Inc. v. Steag Microtech, Inc. · filed 1997-04-28

Likewise, plaintiffs do not assert that service of SMTD is authorized by the Delaware long-arm statute, Del.Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3104 (1996). The record before the Court establishes that SMTD transacts no business and supplies no services in the State of Delaware. Accordingly, the Court concludes that service of SMTD is not authorized by the Delaware long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires more contact with Delaware than an out-of-state agreement contingent on a merger of Delaware corporations.

Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner · filed 2000-09-29(c)(1)

There must be more contact with Delaware than simply entering into an agreement outside Delaware and the purview of Delaware law which happens to be contingent upon a merger of two Delaware corporations.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident’s direct sales, offers, and other contacts amount to transacting business in Delaware.

Intel Corp. v. Broadcom Corp. · filed 2001-10-09(c)(1)

The court finds that Broadcom’s contacts with Delaware are sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction under section 3104(c)(1) of the Delaware long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a Delaware joint venture when the defendant had no connection to its formation or capitalization.

Virgin Wireless, Inc. v. Virgin Enterprises Ltd. · filed 2002-04-26(c)(1)

Plaintiffs contend that the court may assert jurisdiction over VGL pursuant to § 3104(c)(1) because VGL entered into a joint venture with the Sprint companies to create Virgin Mobile USA, a Delaware corporation. Plaintiffs base their arguments on a sole press release which they attribute to VGL. The court finds that plaintiffs’ arguments fail to justify submitting VGL to suit in this judicial district. The press release that is the foundation of plaintiffs’ trademark infringement claim indicates that “Virgin Group,” and not VGL, entered into the joint venture at issue. Furthermore, affidavits submitted by defendants confirm that VGL has no connection to the formation or intended capitalization of Virgin Mobile USA.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident transacts business in Delaware through a subsidiary and the claim arises from the subsidiary’s creation and operation.

Aeroglobal Capital Management, LLC v. Cirrus Industries, Inc. · filed 2005-03-23(c)(1)

However, as is the case here, the ownership of a Delaware subsidiary may constitute the transaction of business under Delaware’s Long Arm Statute where the underlying cause of action arises from the creation and operation of the Delaware subsidiary.

Section 3104(c)(1) reaches a nonresident who obtains professional services performed in Delaware and uses Delaware contacts to promote his business there.

Traynor v. Liu · filed 2007-07-17(c)(1)

Defendant sought and received the benefit of professional services performed by plaintiff while she was residing in the State of Delaware; he likewise took advantage of plaintiffs Delaware residency, including some of the professional contacts she made while teaching there, in order to promote his business to other citizens of Delaware, who could then purchase artwork from defendant’s interactive website. Having considered plaintiffs allegations of jurisdictional fact and the exhibits submitted in connection with her affidavit, the court finds that, during the time period in question, defendant transacted business within the State of Delaware sufficient to bring him within the reach of 10 Del. G. § 3104(c)(1).

Section 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4) together permit jurisdiction over a manufacturer that intends to serve the Delaware market when its product enters the State and causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Boone v. Ab · filed 1997-09-04(c)(1), (c)(4)

It is not important that the indicia of activity under § 3104(c)(4) rise to a level of “general presence” as usually required. Instead, the enumerated activities in this section should be analyzed to determine whether there is an intent or purpose on the part of the manufacturer to serve the Delaware market with its product. Likewise, when analyzing § 3104(c)(1) it is not important that the manufacturer itself act in Delaware. Instead, if the intent or purpose on behalf of the manufacturer to serve the Delaware market results in the introduction of the product to this State and plaintiffs cause of action arises from injuries caused by that product, this section is satisfied.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose participation in forming Delaware entities is connected to the claims against them.

Shamrock Holdings of California, Inc. v. Arenson · filed 2006-03-14(c)(1)

Because the causes of action at issue in the suit arise from, and relate to, the incorporation and formation of ALH and ALH II, the court agrees that defendants’ participation in the incorporation of ALH and ALH II is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under § 3104(c)(1).

Section 3104(c)(1) does not permit specific jurisdiction based on a university website that is neither directed at Delaware residents nor sufficiently commercial.

Kloth v. Southern Christian University · filed 2007-07-16(c)(1)

In the case at bar, no evidence before the court suggests that defendants purposefully availed themselves of doing business with Delaware citizens or targeted the contents of their website toward Delaware. Furthermore, the contents of the website are not sufficiently “commercial” for § 3104(c)(1) to allow for specific jurisdiction over defendants.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a nonresident’s participation in a Delaware merger is connected to the plaintiff’s claims.

G & G LLC v. White · filed 2008-01-25(c)(1)

Taking as true all factual allegations in the amended complaint and granting all factual inferences in G & G’s favor, the court concludes that specific jurisdiction exists over Millevere pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1). ... Specifically, Millevere’s alleged insistence on and participation in the Merger confers this court with jurisdiction over it.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business or performs work in Delaware when the claim arises from that activity.

Chase Bank USA N.A. v. Hess Kennedy Chartered LLC · filed 2008-12-12(c)(1)

Furthermore, given that these actions constitute the very conduct giving rise to Chase’s claims, there is a clear “nexus” between Defendants’ conduct and Chase’s cause of action. ... Thus, although Defendants are physically centered in Florida, the Court concludes that jurisdiction is proper under the Delaware long arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires the defendant’s business activity to take place in Delaware.

Boston Scientific Corp. v. Wall Cardiovascular Technologies, LLC · filed 2009-08-24(c)(1)

The record demonstrates that, although the above activities were directed at Delaware residents, none of them actually took place in Delaware, as required by § 3104(c)(1).

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on business solicitation directed to and received in Delaware, even if no transaction is completed.

Sustainable Energy v. Photon Energy · filed 2014-05-30(c)(1)

Moreover, a “transaction” need not actually be consummated for the Long Arm Statute to apply; the solicitation of business can satisfy the requirements of Section 3104(c)(1), particularly in situations where the solicitation “is directed to and received in Delaware.”

Section 3104(c)(1) requires a claim based on a nonresident’s Delaware business activities to arise from those activities.

Uribe v. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund. · filed 2014-09-30(c)(1)

MAIF’s filings with the Recorder of Deeds, actions against Delaware residents in Delaware courts, or adjusting and inspecting claims in Delaware do not amount to the specific jurisdiction required to constitute the transaction of business under § 3104(c)(1). In other words, Appellants did not show that those acts gave rise to this cause of action.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business in Delaware by managing a Delaware entity through another company, even if the nonresident did not personally form the Delaware entity.

2009 Caiola Family Trust v. PWA, LLC · filed 2014-12-18(c)(1)

Thus, on the record before me, I am satisfied that Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Katz by virtue of his transacting business under Section 3104(c) of the long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) does not confer specific jurisdiction merely because a nonresident contracts with a Delaware corporation and agrees to a Delaware choice of law provision when the business transactions take place outside Delaware.

Herman v. BRP, Inc. · filed 2015-04-13(c)(1)

Thus, Kongsberg Holding merely entering three contracts with a Delaware corporation, which contain Delaware choice of law provisions, without more, is not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over Kongsberg Holding.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires an act in Delaware; dealing with a Delaware corporation outside the state does not satisfy it.

Phunware, Inc. v. Excelmind Group Ltd. · filed 2015-07-30(c)(1)

Subsection (c)(1) “requires that some act must actually have occurred in Delaware.” ... Ultimately, plaintiffs do not assert that Sea-wood did anything more than transact business with a Delaware corporation outside of Delaware. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ allegations do not satisfy Delaware’s long-arm statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a nonresident transacts business in Delaware and the claim arises from that business.

Israel Discount Bank of New York v. Higgins · filed 2015-08-31(c)(1)

Because these actions all related to Republic‟s loans to CAMI and the Collateral that secured those loans, I find that they constituted the transaction of business in Delaware, as required under Section 3104(c)(1).

Section 3104(c)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a defendant’s patent consulting work when the defendant did not control the patent owner’s decision to sue in Delaware.

Microsoft Corporation v. Patent Revue Partners · filed 2015-10-15(c)(1)

Therefore, even if Fung reasonably could have foreseen St. Clair filing the Patent Action in Delaware, his level of involvement does not rise to the level of conduct necessary to constitute a transaction of business in Delaware for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction under the Long Arm Statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a nonresident sends staff and materials to perform a contract in Delaware, along with substantial correspondence and shipments tied to the claim.

Pats Aircraft, LLC v. Vedder Munich GmbH · filed 2016-07-14(c)(1)

However, Vedder Munich’s conduct in sending staff and materials to Delaware to perform the agreement, combined with the voluminous and systematic correspondence and its shipment of goods directly to Delaware, is sufficient to demonstrate that it transacted business and performed any character of work in the state.

Section 3104(c)(1) requires a plaintiff to identify specific business activity in Delaware to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.

Murphy v. Pentwater Capital Management, LP · filed 2017-10-31(c)(1)

As such, the Court agrees with the Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing to fit Halbower’s conduct under Delaware’s Long-Arm Statute.

Section 3104(c)(1) does not treat calls and emails into Delaware about a single contract performed outside the state as transacting business in Delaware.

Delmarva Pole Building Supply, Inc. v. Richardson · filed 2019-05-28(c)(1)

In the case at hand, there is no meaningful difference between a telephone solicitation regarding an isolated contract and an email solicitation regarding one. Notwithstanding Mr. Richardson’s calls and emails in this case, the center of gravity of the Maryland construction job was in Maryland. ... As a consequence, the Court does not find that Mr. Richardson transacted business in the State of Delaware.

Advertisements support personal jurisdiction under Section 3104 only when they are specifically directed toward Delaware residents.

Adtile Technologies Inc. v. Perion Network Ltd. · filed 2016-06-24

For advertisements to grant personal jurisdiction under Delaware’s long arm statute, they “must be specifically directed toward Delaware residents.”

Section 3104(c) reaches a nonresident drug applicant that plans to market its product in Delaware after approval, even if it has not yet acted in Delaware.

Pfizer. Inc. v. Mylan Inc. · filed 2016-08-12(c)

Although MLL has not yet taken any activity in Delaware in this regard, it is undisputable that Delaware is a “State where [MLL and/or defendants] will engage in that marketing if the [NDA is] approved.” ... For the same reasons, Delaware’s long-arm statute reaches MLL.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction based on forming a Delaware entity when the claim has a sufficient nexus to that formation, including a claim to enforce the entity’s operating agreement.

Terramar Retail Centers, LLC v. Marion 2 Seaport Trust U/A/D/ June 21, 2002 · filed 2017-08-18(c)(1)

Because § 3104(c)(1) confers specific, not general, jurisdiction, there must be a nexus between the formation of the Delaware entity and the cause of action asserted in the lawsuit. ... Under Papendick and its progeny, a nexus exists between the formation of the Company and Terramar’s claims to enforce the Operating Agreement that is sufficient to permit this court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Trust.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a nonresident forms a Delaware entity as part of an alleged wrongful scheme, subject to constitutional due process.

BrandRep, LLC v. Ruskey · filed 2019-01-07(c)(1)

Mammano’s act of forming a Delaware entity ... as a contribution toward that scheme allows the Court to exercise jurisdiction over her under Section 3104, so long as jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible.

Section 3104(c)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident whose formation of a Delaware entity was integral to the alleged wrongful scheme giving rise to the claim.

The Dow Chemical Company v. Organik Kimya Holding A.S. · filed 2017-10-19(c)(1)

Following Papendick, this Court has held that “a single act of incorporation, if done as part of a wrongful scheme, will suffice to confer personal jurisdiction under § 3104(c)(1).”... Based on the evidence presented, and giving the Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences, I conclude that personal jurisdiction extends to Organik Kimya Turkey—Organik Kimya US’s parent.