Statute Annotations › Alabama › Ala. Code § 8-19-1

Ala. Code § 8-19-1

Definitions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Case notes
6
Cited in passing
36
Citing cases indexed
30
Case dates
2017–2022
Screened through
2025-08-14
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

42 citing cases reviewed: 6 interpreted the section (annotated below), 36 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2025-08-14 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Ala. Code § 8-19-1?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Deceptive trade practices—reasonable consumer standard

The Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act requires a deceptive statement or practice to be likely to mislead a reasonable consumer; ambiguous product-label language may be cured by an accessible ingredient list.

In re 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation · filed 2017-08-24

Thus, for purposes of state consumer protection statutes, “a statement is deceptive if it creates a likelihood of deception or has the capacity to deceive.” ... Turning to the present suits, the description “100% Grated Parmesan Cheese” is ambiguous—as are the other, similar descriptions of Defendants’ products—so Plaintiffs’ claims are doomed by the readily accessible ingredient panels on the products that disclose the presence of non-cheese ingredients.
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Section 8-19-1 et seq. requires deceptive-advertising claims to be assessed under whether a substantial proportion of reasonable consumers are likely to be misled, and an accurate fine-print ingredient list does not defeat an ambiguous-label claim as a matter of law.

Bell v. Albertson Companies, Inc. · filed 2020-12-07

While these are all state statutes, the federal Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 has pushed many class actions under them into federal courts. ... The core prohibitions of these laws are interpreted for the most part interchangeably, and the parties have not identified any differences relevant to these appeals. We concentrate on the general prohibition against advertising that is likely to deceive a substantial proportion of reasonable consumers. ... What matters most is how real consumers understand and react to the advertising. We therefore join our colleagues in at least three other circuits in holding that an accurate fine-print list of ingredients does not foreclose as a matter of law a claim that an ambiguous front label deceives reasonable consumers.
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Causation—connection between deceptive conduct and injury

The Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act requires a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s injury.

In Re: 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation · filed 2018-11-01

The necessary implication is that Plaintiffs never consulted, let alone relied upon, the ingredient labels’ assertion that cellulose was added to prevent caking. This dooms Plaintiffs’ claims under the above-referenced statutes, all of which require some form of causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s alleged injury. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Anticaking claims under the ADTPA, CLRA, UCL, FDUTPA, NJCFA, NYGBL, MPCFA, MUTPA, and MFSAA are dismissed.
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Reliance not required for concealment or omission claims

The Alabama DTPA does not require a plaintiff to plead reliance when the claim is based on a misrepresentation by concealment or omission.

Robinson v. General Motors LLC · filed 2021-07-19

As Plaintiffs argue, they “need not plead reliance when they allege misrepresentations by concealment or omission” to state a claim under the Alabama DTPA. Jn re: EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & Antitrust Litig., 336 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1339-1340 (D. Kan. 2018) (citing Glenn v. Hyundai Motor Am., 2016 WL 3621280, at *12-13 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2016)).
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Omissions; duty to disclose

An omission-based ADTPA claim does not require a plaintiff to establish a duty to disclose.

COHEN v. SUBARU CORPORATION · filed 2022-03-10

Omissions are actionable under the ADTPA. See Barcal v. EMD Serono, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-01709-MHH, 2016 WL 1086028, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2016). However, the court’s research did not identify any case law showing that Plaintiffs alleging an omission-based ADTPA claim must establish a duty to disclose. See id. (discussing ADTPA claims based on omissions without mentioning a duty to disclose). Because Alabama does not recognize a duty to disclose, it conflicts with New Jersey law on this issue. Plaintiffs Griffin, Oakley, and Whitley reside and purchased their vehicles in Alabama law, so the Court will apply Alabama law to their claims. The Court declines to impose a duty to disclose where none exists under Alabama law.
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Causation

The ADTPA requires a causal connection between an alleged misrepresentation and the plaintiff's injury.

In re 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. · filed 2018-11-01

This dooms Plaintiffs' claims under the above-referenced statutes, all of which require some form of causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the plaintiff's alleged injury.
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36 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Plath v. Schonrock, the court cites Ala. Code §§ 8-19-1, et seq. only as an example in a string cite of state consumer-protection legislation paralleling the FTC Act; it does not interpret or apply § 8-19-1. opinion →
Jackson v. Farmers Insurance Group/Fire Insurance Exchange, the statute appears only in the plaintiff’s list of alleged claims. The court decided the appeal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and did not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Sua Insurance v. Classic Home Builders, LLC, the court merely identifies one pleaded claim as arising under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act. It does not interpret or apply § 8-19-1; the attorney-fee point is tied to Ala. Code § 8-19-10(a)(3). opinion →
Berkson v. Gogo LLC, Ala. Code § 8-19-1 appears only in a footnote listing state consumer-protection statutes; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about this statute. opinion →
In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, the citation to § 8-19-1 merely identifies the statute underlying Glenn’s claim. The court does not interpret or apply § 8-19-1; its substantive discussion addresses the ADTPA’s savings clause in § 8-19-15 and the unlawful-trade-practices provision in § 8-19-5. opinion →
Jones v. Coty Inc., section 8-19-1 is cited only as the beginning of an et-seq. citation identifying the ADTPA. The court's substantive analysis concerns the class-action bar in § 8-19-10(f) and the deceptive-practice provision in § 8-19-5(27), not § 8-19-1. opinion →
McClendon v. North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company, the statute appears only in a procedural-history sentence reporting that the court previously dismissed the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim; this opinion does not interpret or apply § 8-19-1. opinion →
Nelson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, the opinion mentions § 8-19-1 only in a chapter-wide et-seq. citation identifying the ADTPA. Its substantive analysis and ruling concern §§ 8-19-5(27) and 8-19-10(e), not § 8-19-1 itself. opinion →
Bell v. Albertson Companies, Inc., the Alabama statute appears in a footnote listing the statutes invoked. The court describes the statutes collectively and applies a generalized reasonable-consumer standard, but does not interpret or specifically decide anything about Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Pistorio v. FCA US LLC, the statute is mentioned only to identify the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim in the complaint. The court does not construe, explain, or apply Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Montgomery v. Central Loan Administration & Reporting, the opinion identifies the ADTPA claim and then records that Montgomery abandoned it; the court expressly does not address the claim and does not interpret or apply Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Counts v. General Motors, LLC, the statute is listed only in a table identifying Count II under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act, whose merits were not addressed; the court did not interpret or apply Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Morton v. D.R. Horton, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the background to identify an alternative claim pleaded by the plaintiffs; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Bulls Construction Group LLC v. Bulls Construction Co LLC, the statute appears only in the complaint's list of claims. The court does not interpret § 8-19-1, decide its requirements or coverage, or apply it to the facts; the opinion instead resolves the motion to dismiss on procedural and pleading grounds. opinion →
ESTATE OF WILLIAM D. PILGRIM v. General Motors LLC, the statute appears only in the proposed Alabama class definition as part of a list of claims; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Whitney v. Family Dollar Inc., the Alabama statute appears only in a footnote listing the statutes asserted in the consolidated complaint. The court's analysis and ruling concern whether the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act permits class settlements; it does not interpret or apply Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Southern Oil Company Inc v. Lehigh Gas Wholesale Services Inc, the court mentioned § 8-19-1 only in the introductory description of the plaintiffs’ ADTPA claim. Its actual analysis and holding concerned the private right of action in § 8-19-10 and the consumer definition in § 8-19-3(4), not the meaning or application of § 8-19-1. opinion →
Daniel v. Sanofi S.A., the court merely identifies the ADTPA claim asserted by the plaintiff; it does not interpret, explain, or apply Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Whitney v. Family Dollar Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote listing the consumer-protection statutes under which claims were brought; the court does not interpret or apply Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Crommelin v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc., section 8-19-1 appears only in a general et-seq. citation identifying the ADTPA. The court applied and discussed other provisions, especially §§ 8-19-5 and 8-19-3(9), but did not interpret or decide anything about § 8-19-1 itself. opinion →
In Re: Lindt & Sprüngli Dark Chocolate Litigation, the opinion lists the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act as Count 9, but the Alabama authorities appear only in the defendant’s undeveloped string citations. The court expressly says that any intended dismissal arguments under non-New-York state laws were waived, so it does not construe or apply Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Boyd v. Target Corp., the court addresses the statutes of limitations for the Alabama and Arizona consumer-protection claims, but § 8-19-1 is cited only as the beginning of a range (“Ala. Code §§ 8-19-1, et seq.”) and is not interpreted or applied specifically. opinion →
Thelen v. HP Inc., the opinion mentions Ala. Code § 8-19-1 only in a descriptive list identifying the Alabama claim in Count VI; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
McCabe v. National Presto Industries, Inc., the opinion mentions § 8-19-1 only as part of a range of Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act provisions alleged in the complaint. Its analysis and ruling concern the separate class-action bar in § 8-19-10, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 8-19-1. opinion →
Edgar Alan Rickard, D/B/A Trader Publications of Alabama v. Auto Publisher, Inc., a Corporation, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of the legal bases asserted in Rickard's complaint. The appellate court did not construe or decide anything about Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Ed Zeagler and B.J. Zeagler v. Custom Auto, Inc., an Alabama Corporation, B.J. Kennamore, and Kennamore & Kennamore, the opinion cites § 8-19-1 only to identify the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Its analysis concerns the Act's definition of “consumer” in § 8-19-3 and whether the plaintiffs' status was a fact question; it does not construe or apply § 8-19-1 itself. opinion →
Deadwyler v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the discussion of § 8-19-1 is part of the defendants’ sanctions argument. The court denied sanctions on Claim No. 1 but did not decide the underlying applicability of the Alabama Act. opinion →
Gerald Duncan Auto Sales, Inc. v. Russell (In Re Russell), Ala. Code § 8-19-1 appears only as part of a statutory-range citation describing Russell’s pleaded claim. The court’s substantive discussion and rulings concern other provisions, including §§ 8-19-5(12), 8-19-5(23), and 8-19-10, not § 8-19-1. opinion →
Auto-Owners Insurance v. Toole, the statute is mentioned only as the basis of Count Six in the underlying complaint. The court did not interpret or apply § 8-19-1; it ruled instead that, under Alabama Rule 8, Count Six asserted no claim for relief against Toole. opinion →
Deerman v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., section 8-19-1 appears only in a citation to the Act’s full statutory range. The court’s analysis and ruling concern other provisions, especially the definitions, exemption, and pre-filing demand requirement, not the meaning or application of § 8-19-1 itself. opinion →
Rollins, Inc. v. Foster, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote's hypothetical discussion of a possible consumer remedy under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 8-19-1; its holding concerned whether the arbitration clause was enforceable. opinion →
Register v. Rus of Auburn, the court mentioned § 8-19-1 et seq. only as a comparable-penalty reference in its analysis of whether the proposed punitive damages violated due process and supported federal jurisdiction; it did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
In Re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litigation, the statute appears only in a footnote listing the statutes under which plaintiffs brought claims. The court addressed the consumer-protection arguments generically and did not interpret or apply Ala. Code § 8-19-1. opinion →
Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving, LLC, the court cites § 8-19-1 only as part of a general citation to the ADTPA; its analysis concerns the private class-action bar in § 8-19-10 and does not interpret or apply § 8-19-1. opinion →
Collins v. Davol, Inc., the court mentions § 8-19-1 only as part of an introductory string citation to the ADTPA. The court does not construe or apply § 8-19-1; its ADTPA analysis addresses § 8-19-14 and § 8-19-15 instead. opinion →
Reid v. Unilever United States, Inc., the court cites § 8-19-1 only as the starting point of a reference to the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act, without deciding the definitions in that section. opinion →

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