Anita Marie Boor
How Judge Boor decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a Rule 36 dispute she favors deciding cases on the merits: she will let a party rescind deemed admissions where the opponent knew substantive (if unsigned) responses were coming and the admissions are not case-dispositive, and she faults a party that curtails discovery and banks on a technical admission instead of simply asking for the missing signature.
“These would be fair and persuasive points but for the fact that defendants knew from counsel's July 21, 2025, email that plaintiff intended to provide substantive responses, and did provide those substantive responses, albeit unsigned. ... the prudent approach was to ask for it. Curtailing deposition questions and relying on technically admitted requests at the summary judgment stage was not reasonable under these circumstances.”
On a Title VII religious-accommodation claim she holds that an employer satisfies its duty by offering any reasonable accommodation that eliminates the conflict with the employee's religious practice -- it need not be the employee's preferred option -- and that once such an alternative is offered the statutory inquiry ends. An employee who objects to the alternative only on secular grounds cannot defeat summary judgment.
“Once the employer has offered an alternative that reasonably accommodates the employee's religious needs . . . 'the statutory inquiry is at an end[.]' ... At bottom, Romzek has not created a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Baldwin met its lawful duty to propose reasonable accommodations. The court therefore GRANTS summary judgment in Baldwin's favor on Romzek's Title VII claims.”
Procedural preferences
Before authorizing alternative service, she expects the requesting party to pursue the entity’s registered agent and exhaust other leads reasonably calculated to permit personal service. A request may be renewed after those options have actually been tried.
“Reasonable diligence requires a plaintiff to ‘exhaust . . . any leads or information reasonably calculated to make personal service possible.’”
She respects the line between federal and state courts: she will not order a state court (or its clerk) to produce records, directing the requesting party to the state clerk instead, on comity grounds.
“The federal court system respects the sovereignty of state courts, meaning that this federal court cannot order the state court to produce the requested documents.”
When discovery implicates classified material she does not simply deny it: she conducts the in camera review, grants production of what is discoverable, but stays release and orders CIPA-governed supplemental briefing (permitting ex parte, under-seal filings) before anything is turned over.
“I will GRANT defendant's motion. But there is a complication. The reports also contain classified information, the production and use of which is governed by the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) ... so I will STAY production of the documents and ORDER supplemental briefing on how to proceed.”
Cautions
A plaintiff seeking damages for specific psychological conditions should expect proportionate mental-health discovery. She permits a tailored lookback when the claimed conditions are placed at issue, while narrowing categories that sweep beyond the claims.
“In light of plaintiff’s claims of specific psychological harms, defendants’ request to review plaintiff’s mental health records reaching back two years before her arrest is a proportional request for relevant records that is not unduly burdensome on plaintiff given that defendants will obtain the records from plaintiff’s providers.”
At summary judgment she expects evidence, not allegations: a plaintiff resting on speculation (here, that a younger surgeon was hired to replace him) will lose, because summary judgment is the point at which a party must come forward with proof a jury could credit.
“summary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.’ ... Romzek's speculation about Baldwin's motives in hiring a younger surgeon is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact for a jury to resolve.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“In a report and recommendation entered on July 9, 2025, Judge Boor ... recommended that the court deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because defendant's newly accepted expert testimony created a genuine dispute of material fact on whether plaintiff's roof suffered hail damage.”
“Judge Boor granted defendant's motion for retroactive extension and recommended that the court deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment”
“Plaintiff's motion for evidentiary relief, Dkt. 59, is GRANTED in line with this opinion.”
“Defendant Gregory P. Robinson, Jr.'s request for copies of filings, Dkt. 54, is GRANTED. The court will send him with this order a copy of the docket for his review along with copies of all of his filings to date.”
“Defendant's motion to compel, Dkt. 55, is DENIED.”
“I have determined that they do contain some discoverable information. So, I will GRANT defendant's motion. But there is a complication. The reports also contain classified information, the production and use of which is governed by the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) ... so I will STAY production of the documents and ORDER supplemental briefing on how to proceed.”
Following a conviction, Boor directed that the defendant's passport be transferred to the U.S. Department of State and not reissued during supervision without probation approval. The administrative order did not resolve a party motion.
“For these reasons, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion without prejudice to its renewal if necessary after plaintiff has exhausted its full range of options.”
“IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Marcin Staszak’s motion for guidance, Dkt. 68, is GRANTED.”
“Defendants’ motion to compel, Dkt. 70, is GRANTED in part as follows:”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and this matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of Section 205 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings as set forth in that motion.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and this matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of Section 205 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings as set forth in that motion.”
“Having reviewed the materials submitted in support of the motion and hearing no objection from either party, the court GRANTS the motion. Plaintiff is awarded fees and expenses in the amount of $7,000.00.”
“In light of this order, plaintiff’s original motion for fees, Dkt. 13, is denied as moot.”
“IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation, Dkt. 40, is adopted, and defendant’s motion to suppress, Dkt. 22, is denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 27 days (N = 2).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 180 days (N = 1).
The reviewed assignments include intellectual-property, insurance, contract, benefits, product-liability, civil-rights, Social Security, immigration, and criminal pretrial matters. The mix is descriptive rather than a complete caseload census.
Put Judge Boor's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Boor actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Boor's own signed orders and cites them.