Simeon Timothy Lake III
How Judge III decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He decides agency-power and jurisdiction-stripping questions by close textual comparison of the specific statute against controlling precedent rather than by analogy. In Kinder Morgan he distinguished the FDIC bar in Burgess/Bank of Louisiana (which 'explicitly' stripped jurisdiction over 'any' order) from the narrower PSIA bar (only DOL orders after an on-the-record hearing), then applied the Thunder Basin factors to find the constitutional claims wholly collateral and outside agency expertise.
“Unlike 12 U.S.C. 1818(i)(1), which refers to suspending any order of the FDIC, the PSIA refers only to orders that have been issued by the Department of Labor after a hearing on the record has been held by an ALJ. Therefore, the PSIA does not explicitly strip district courts of their 1331 jurisdiction.”
He follows the prevailing Fifth Circuit Article II line (Jarkesy I) that two layers of for-cause removal for ALJs are unconstitutional, and grants preliminary injunctive relief against ongoing agency adjudication on that basis, treating subjection to an unaccountable ALJ as a here-and-now irreparable injury (Axon).
“Because the Fifth Circuit has held that statutory removal restrictions that create two layers of for-cause removal are unconstitutional, Plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces threshold standing/capacity rules strictly: an individual LLC member has no standing to sue for torts belonging to the company, entitling the opposing party to summary judgment on that member's claims under Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code 101.113.
“Plaintiff Yaseen Khan has no standing to sue, and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to all claims by Yaseen Khan.”
Cautions
In prisoner/habeas matters he insists on exhaustion and the correct vehicle: Section 2241 sentence-calculation claims are dismissed without prejudice if administrative remedies are not exhausted, and conditions-of-confinement claims are not cognizable in habeas and must be refiled as a separate PLRA-governed civil action. Exhaust and file in the right posture.
“The claims challenging the petitioner's sentence calculation contained in the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. 2241 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of exhaustion.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 5 |
Granted: 3Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for attorney fees N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 33) is DENIED”
“Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry No. 4) is GRANTED. Defendants ... are hereby enjoined from proceeding any further with OALJ case number 2021-PSI-000002”
“The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 14) is GRANTED.”
“In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“In accordance with the court's Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant Resurgent Capital Services, L.P.'s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees as Costs (Docket Entry No. 84) is DENIED.”
“Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 86) is DENIED.”
“Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 89) is GRANTED.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Plea in Abatement (Docket Entry No. 92) is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 348 days (N = 2).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 82 days (N = 1).
Senior USDJ, Houston Division. Recent (2021-2025) newly-assigned docket skews criminal (drug/firearm/fraud) with a smaller set of civil cases: administrative/APA (Kinder Morgan v. DOL 4:25-cv-03651; Kinetica Partners v. Dept. of Interior 4:19-cv-03758), trade secrets (Universal Plant Services v. Adams 4:22-cv-02364), plus the dismissed FLSA (Johnson v. MHMR) and consumer (Woodley v. Resurgent) suits read for the reasoning layer. No quantitative nature-of-suit census computed this pass. Historically he handled the Enron criminal prosecutions (2004-2006).