Robert Randall "Randy" Crane
How Judge Crane decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In insurance coverage disputes he reads policy exclusions and 'independently of all other causes' language strictly and enforces the contractually-bargained appraisal mechanism: a timely-paid appraisal award estops the insured from a breach-of-contract claim and forecloses the attendant bad-faith / prompt-payment / DTPA claims as a matter of law. A plaintiff cannot invoke appraisal, see the estimates, then abandon the process and sue.
“an insurer does not breach the insurance contract where, as here, it pays all damages determined by the appraisal.”
On a Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim he lets causation reach the jury where a supervisor gave no stated reason for the firing and the alleged performance problems appear nowhere in the personnel file or the pre-termination conversation -- treating a later affidavit asserting poor performance as merely creating a fact question, not resolving it. He also reads 'protected activity' broadly: an expressed intent to run for office counts even before formal candidacy.
“the fact that Canales gave no reason to Plaintiff for her termination, when considered against Plaintiff's testimony that her alleged deficient work performance was neither addressed in her July 18 conversation with Canales or in her personnel file, constitutes additional evidence that her expressed desire to run for office served as a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to terminate her.”
Procedural preferences
He resists dismissing on pure form. Where a complaint has unnumbered paragraphs / narrative structure but its causes of action are 'clearly and separately stated,' he excuses the Rule 10(b)/8(a) 'shotgun pleading' defect rather than dismiss, so long as the defendant can understand and respond. Form challenges that do not impair the defense get denied.
“Because the form of the Complaint does not impair MOHELA's ability to understand or respond to the claims, Plaintiff's nonconformity with Rule 10(b) is excused.”
A large share of his McAllen civil docket is Social Security appeals and pro se prisoner/civil-rights cases referred to a magistrate judge (chiefly MJ J. Scott Hacker). He conducts de novo review of any specific objection but adopts the R&R where objections are overruled or none are filed, and dismisses pro se cases under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute. Filing specific, record-anchored objections is the only way to get more than clear-error review.
“The Court has conducted a de novo review of the record in this matter as it pertained to the specific objections raised by Plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1).”
Cautions
On a Title VII / ADA / TCHRA case he enforces administrative exhaustion mechanically against the EEOC charge as filed: a gender claim was dismissed because the plaintiff did not check the 'Sex' box and pleaded no gender facts, so the claim 'could not reasonably be expected to grow out of' the charge. Frame the EEOC charge to cover every theory you intend to litigate.
“Other than identifying herself as 'Mrs. Sandra Ruiz' at the top of the charge, Plaintiff makes no reference to her gender in the charge, and, more importantly, makes no allegations of gender discrimination. ... she did not exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her gender discrimination claims”
He will not let a party amend the pleadings through briefing: a negligence count cannot be salvaged by arguing negligent misrepresentation in a response, because they are distinct causes of action and new claims must be pleaded by amendment.
“He cannot amend his Complaint through briefing; new claims must be pleaded by amendment.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 7 |
Granted: 4Granted in part: 3 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 7 |
Granted: 4Granted in part: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judgment on pleadings N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
“the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's due process-based 1983 claims ... and Plaintiff's conspiracy claims ... and ... all of Plaintiff's 1983 claims against the Defendant County ...; and The Motion is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendant Canales in his individual capacity ...”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 5).”
“For the reasons explained above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. ... Plaintiff's disability by association discrimination claim under the ADA and her FMLA retaliation claim are not dismissed.”
“Almanza's Partial Motion to Dismiss Texas Labor Code Claims Based on Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. No. 43) is construed as a motion under Rule 12(c) and GRANTED.”
“Almanza's Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff's Associational Disability Claim (Dkt. No. 49) ... [is] DENIED.”
“Almanza's ... Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as To Plaintiff's ADA Claims (Dkt. No. 52), [is] DENIED.”
“Almanza's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's ADA Claims (Dkt. No. 55) is DENIED.”
“the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART MOHELA'S Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 9) as follows: 1) The Court DENIES MOHELA's motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) and 10(b), and 2) The Court GRANTS MOHELA'S motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for violations of the FDCA ... (Count 1); violation of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. 1681s-(2)(a) (Count 2a); and common law negligence (Count 3).”
42 U.S.C. 405(g) Social Security appeal. After de novo review of the plaintiff's specific objections (treating-source opinion under 20 C.F.R. 404.1520c), Crane adopted Magistrate Judge J. Scott Hacker's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the action -- effectively affirming the Commissioner's denial of benefits. Rules on no named party motion; recorded as an order read but excluded from motion stats.
42 U.S.C. 405(g) Social Security appeal. No objections filed; finding no clear error, Crane adopted the Magistrate Judge's R&R in full, denied the complaint, affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits, and dismissed the action. Rules on no named party motion; excluded from motion stats. Grounding quote: 'Finding no clear error, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation ... Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the complaint is DENIED, the Commissioner's final decision to deny benefits is AFFIRMED, and this civil action is DISMISSED.'
Pro se civil-rights action. No objections filed; Crane adopted Magistrate Judge J. Scott Hacker's R&R and dismissed the action under Rule 41(b) (failure to prosecute), closing the case. Rules on no party motion; excluded from motion stats. Grounding quote: 'the Court ... is of the opinion that Plaintiff's civil rights action should be DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that this case be CLOSED.'
Pro se civil-rights action. No objections filed; Crane adopted Magistrate Judge J. Scott Hacker's R&R and dismissed the action under Rule 41(b) (failure to prosecute), closing the case. Rules on no party motion; excluded from motion stats. Grounding quote: 'the Court ... is of the opinion that Plaintiff's civil rights action should be DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that this case be CLOSED.'
“the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the case and hereby ORDERS that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is hereby GRANTED and the case hereby REMANDED to the state district court from which it came.”
“the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendants Evanston's and Carrington's respective Motions to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are hereby GRANTED and all claims against Defendants are hereby DISMISSED.”
“the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendants Evanston's and Carrington's respective Motions to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are hereby GRANTED and all claims against Defendants are hereby DISMISSED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 113 days (N = 5).
Active Chief U.S. District Judge, McAllen Division (also handles Houston-Division cases, e.g. 4:25-cv-02343). His current docket intake (sampled 2026) is heavily Social Security appeals (Zamora, Marroquin-type 405(g) cases), insurance/hail-damage suits (State Farm Lloyds, Lloyds of London, DLT Development), consumer/FDCPA cases (Corral v. Jefferson Capital), slip-and-fall premises cases against national retailers (Corkill/Ruiz v. Target), plus a steady criminal and sealed-miscellaneous (grand-jury) load reflecting the border district. Historically known for major Gulf Cartel and South Texas public-corruption criminal trials. No quantitative nature-of-suit census computed this pass.