Robert Randall "Randy" Crane
How Judge Crane rules, drawn from 27 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Crane
Randy Crane is a judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Crane received a commission on March 19, 2002.
Judge Crane's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Crane, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Contacting chambers
Copy all written communications to the court to all parties or their attorneys.
“Ex parte communications with the Court are prohibited. All written communication to the Court must be copied to all parties or their attorneys.”
Conferences
Joint continuance motions are granted only at the court’s discretion, and witness unavailability will not continue a trial.
“Motions for Continuance will be granted only at the Court’s discretion. The Court will respect attorneys’ reasonable requests for vacation if made well in advance of a trial setting. A trial will NOT be continued because of the unavailability of a witness. Counsel are expected to anticipate such possibilities and should be prepared to present testimony by written deposition, video deposition, or by stipulation.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).
How Judge Crane decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Scalise v. Allstate Texas Lloyds, he granted the insurer summary judgment after it paid the appraisal award under the homeowner policy. He held that payment defeated the insured's breach-of-contract claim and related statutory claims in that case.
“an insurer does not breach the insurance contract where, as here, it pays all damages determined by the appraisal.”
In Gonzalez Garza v. Starr County, Texas, he denied summary judgment on a First Amendment retaliation claim because evidence about the unexplained termination and the absence of documented performance concerns left a factual dispute about causation.
“the fact that Canales gave no reason to Plaintiff for her termination, when considered against Plaintiff's testimony that her alleged deficient work performance was neither addressed in her July 18 conversation with Canales or in her personnel file, constitutes additional evidence that her expressed desire to run for office served as a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to terminate her.”
In a do-not-call text-message suit, Crane treated text messages as covered telephone calls under the statute, allowing the damages claim to continue. He required pleaded facts showing a likely future injury before allowing the request for an injunction.
“Specifically, considering the ordinary language of the statute, the Court finds that ‘telephone calls’ in the context of § 227(c)(5) include text messages; Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of capacity to sue is DENIED. Otherwise, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient facts to establish that there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer the same injury in the future.”
Procedural preferences
In McZeal v. MOHELA, he excused unnumbered complaint paragraphs because the claims remained clear enough for the defendant to understand and answer. He denied dismissal on the Rule 8 and Rule 10 form challenge.
“Because the form of the Complaint does not impair MOHELA's ability to understand or respond to the claims, Plaintiff's nonconformity with Rule 10(b) is excused.”
In Marroquin v. Kijakazi, he reviewed the plaintiff's specific objections to a magistrate judge's recommendation de novo, adopted the recommendation, and dismissed the Social Security appeal.
“The Court has conducted a de novo review of the record in this matter as it pertained to the specific objections raised by Plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1).”
Cautions
In Ruiz v. Edcouch-Elsa Independent School District, he dismissed gender-discrimination claims for lack of administrative exhaustion. The plaintiff's EEOC charge neither checked the sex-discrimination box nor alleged facts about gender discrimination.
“Other than identifying herself as 'Mrs. Sandra Ruiz' at the top of the charge, Plaintiff makes no reference to her gender in the charge, and, more importantly, makes no allegations of gender discrimination. ... she did not exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her gender discrimination claims”
In McZeal v. MOHELA, he rejected the plaintiff's attempt to recast a pleaded negligence claim as negligent misrepresentation in briefing. He explained that the new claim required an amended complaint.
“He cannot amend his Complaint through briefing; new claims must be pleaded by amendment.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
“the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's due process-based 1983 claims ... and Plaintiff's conspiracy claims ... and ... all of Plaintiff's 1983 claims against the Defendant County ...; and The Motion is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendant Canales in his individual capacity ...”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 5).”
“For the reasons explained above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. ... Plaintiff's disability by association discrimination claim under the ADA and her FMLA retaliation claim are not dismissed.”
“Almanza's Partial Motion to Dismiss Texas Labor Code Claims Based on Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. No. 43) is construed as a motion under Rule 12(c) and GRANTED.”
“Almanza's Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff's Associational Disability Claim (Dkt. No. 49) ... [is] DENIED.”
“Almanza's ... Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as To Plaintiff's ADA Claims (Dkt. No. 52), [is] DENIED.”
“Almanza's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's ADA Claims (Dkt. No. 55) is DENIED.”
“the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART MOHELA'S Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 9) as follows: 1) The Court DENIES MOHELA's motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) and 10(b), and 2) The Court GRANTS MOHELA'S motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for violations of the FDCA ... (Count 1); violation of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. 1681s-(2)(a) (Count 2a); and common law negligence (Count 3).”
42 U.S.C. 405(g) Social Security appeal. After de novo review of the plaintiff's specific objections (treating-source opinion under 20 C.F.R. 404.1520c), Crane adopted Magistrate Judge J. Scott Hacker's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the action: effectively affirming the Commissioner's denial of benefits. The order rules on no named party motion.
42 U.S.C. 405(g) Social Security appeal. No objections filed; finding no clear error, Crane adopted the Magistrate Judge's R&R in full, denied the complaint, affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits, and dismissed the action. The order rules on no named party motion. It states: 'Finding no clear error, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation ... Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the complaint is DENIED, the Commissioner's final decision to deny benefits is AFFIRMED, and this civil action is DISMISSED.'
Pro se civil-rights action. No objections filed; Crane adopted Magistrate Judge J. Scott Hacker's R&R and dismissed the action under Rule 41(b) (failure to prosecute), closing the case. The order rules on no party motion. It states: 'the Court ... is of the opinion that Plaintiff's civil rights action should be DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that this case be CLOSED.'
Pro se civil-rights action. No objections filed; Crane adopted Magistrate Judge J. Scott Hacker's R&R and dismissed the action under Rule 41(b) (failure to prosecute), closing the case. The order rules on no party motion. It states: 'the Court ... is of the opinion that Plaintiff's civil rights action should be DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that this case be CLOSED.'
“the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the case and hereby ORDERS that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is hereby GRANTED and the case hereby REMANDED to the state district court from which it came.”
“the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendants Evanston's and Carrington's respective Motions to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are hereby GRANTED and all claims against Defendants are hereby DISMISSED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 113 days (N = 5).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 112 days (N = 4).
- Active Chief U.S. District Judge, McAllen Division (also handles Houston-Division cases, e.g. 4:25-cv-02343).
- His current docket intake (sampled 2026) is heavily Social Security appeals (Zamora, Marroquin-type 405(g) cases), insurance/hail-damage suits (State Farm Lloyds, Lloyds of London, DLT Development), consumer/FDCPA cases (Corral v. Jefferson Capital), slip-and-fall premises cases against national retailers (Corkill/Ruiz v. Target), plus a steady criminal and sealed-miscellaneous (grand-jury) load reflecting the border district.
- Historically known for major Gulf Cartel and South Texas public-corruption criminal trials.
- The mix above is descriptive; this record does not include a quantitative nature-of-suit breakdown.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, not for Judge Crane: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 5,742 | 7.6 months |
| Closed with no court action | 2,442 | 6 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 2,371 | 7.4 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 871 | 11.4 months |
| Closed during trial | 58 | 31.6 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 5,742 | 7.6 months |
| Sep 2024 | 5,086 | 7.5 months |
| Sep 2023 | 4,762 | 7.9 months |
| Sep 2022 | 4,595 | 8.8 months |
| Sep 2021 | 4,745 | 8.8 months |
| Sep 2020 | 5,009 | 8.1 months |
| Sep 2019 | 5,233 | 7.5 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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