Melinda Harmon

How Judge Harmon rules, drawn from 6 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Harmon no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Position
District judge
Status
No longer serving
Appointed by
George H. W. Bush (Republican)
Commissioned
May 22, 1989
Education
Radcliffe College, A.B., 1969; University of Texas School of Law, J.D., 1972
Signed orders read
6

About Judge Harmon

Melinda Harmon is a senior judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Appointed by President George H.W. Bush, Judge Harmon received a commission on May 22, 1989. Judge Harmon assumed senior status on March 31, 2018. The court lists Melinda Harmon on inactive senior status since March 31, 2018.

How Judge Harmon decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Evans v. PEMEX, Harmon dismissed a personal injury suit against Mexican state entities under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The plaintiff alleged no specific facts establishing an applicable commercial activity exception.

“Plaintiff has failed to come forward with sufficiently specific allegations -- or, consequently, with any evidence -- to establish that any exception to Defendants' claims of sovereign immunity under the FSIA are applicable in this action. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.”

In Atwood Oceanics' cargo-damage suit, Harmon enforced the freight forwarder's signed limitation-of-liability terms and found they were also incorporated through the parties' prior course of dealing.

“Under Texas law, a party is bound by the terms of the contract it signs. ... Alternatively, through their prior course of dealings, Zust and Atwood incorporated the Terms and Conditions into the contract for the shipment of the DCM.”

Procedural preferences

In Aduddle v. Fort Bend County, Harmon denied the defendants' summary judgment motion without prejudice because they had not produced the prisoner's complete medical records. She allowed reconsideration after production.

“Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket Entries No.15, No.16) is DENIED, without prejudice, subject to reconsideration by the Court upon production of all of plaintiff's medical records.”

In United States v. Garcia-Lozano, Harmon adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and dismissed an unauthorized successive Section 2255 motion. The movant had not obtained Fifth Circuit authorization, leaving the district court without jurisdiction.

“Movant must obtain authorization for the Fifth Circuit before this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain Movant Garcia-Lozano's successive sec 2255 motion. ... the Court ADOPTS her memorandum and order as its own and ORDERS that the government's motion to dismiss is GRANTED”

Cautions

Pin the right claim to the right charge and the right defendant: a Title VII plaintiff must plead within the timely EEOC charge's scope (a retaliation theory must actually be pleaded, not just asserted later) and must sue a suable entity: claims against a sheriff's department (non sui juris) or against individual employees go nowhere even when the underlying conduct is serious.

“As it now stands, Hamilton's complaint does not state a claim for retaliation, and she has made no effort to amend her complaint to state such a claim. ... Defendant HISD's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) is GRANTED.”

In Jones v. Harris County Sheriff's Department, Harmon denied summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim because an adverse employment action was not an element of that claim and factual disputes required a jury to weigh witness credibility.

“This case turns on a myriad of factors that are not suited to the dry analysis of a summary judgment record. To determine whether the Plaintiffs were the victims of unlawful discrimination, a jury will have to listen to the testimony and weigh the credibility of the witness on both sides.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Hamilton v. Houston Independent School District
4:05-cv-00480 · 2006-01-18
Motions to dismiss (defendants (individual)) Granted

“the court therefore orders that the claims against the Individual Defendants are dismissed. ... Defendants Abelardo Saavedra, Linda Llorente, Eva Silva, Arthur Petteway, Veronica Barrera and Laura Alaniz's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED.”

Summary judgment (defendant (HISD)) Granted

“Defendant HISD's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) is GRANTED.”

Jones v. Harris County Sheriff's Department
4:04-cv-02452 · 2006-03-02
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“Accordingly, the only issue remaining is whether summary judgment should be granted on Plaintiffs’ Title VII hostile work environment claims. After considering the pleadings, evidence, and relevant law the Court has determined that it should not. Therefore, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ motion is GRANTED-IN-PART AND DENIED-IN-PART.”

Atwood Oceanics, Inc. v. Zust Bachmeier of Switzerland, Inc.
4:04-cv-04028 · 2006-03-21
Summary judgment (defendant (Zust Bachmeier)) Granted

“(1) Zust's motion for summary judgment on Atwood's negligence claim is GRANTED; (2) Zust's motion for summary judgment on limitation of liability is GRANTED”

Summary judgment (third-party defendant (Cargo Shipping)) Granted in part

“(3) Cargo Shipping's motion for summary judgement on Zust's negligence claim is GRANTED; and (4) Cargo Shipping's motion for summary judgement on Zust's contract claim is DENIED.”

Evans v. PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos)
4:04-cv-01510 · 2005-05-11
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“the Court ORDERS that Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.”

United States v. Garcia-Lozano (28 U.S.C. 2255)
4:12-cv-02411 · 2013-03-20
Motions to dismiss (respondent (government)) Granted

“the Court ADOPTS her memorandum and order as its own and ORDERS that the government's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Movant Garcia-Lozano's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255(f)(3) is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”

Aduddle v. Fort Bend County
4:04-cv-02867 · 2005-12-15
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket Entries No.15, No.16) is DENIED, without prejudice, subject to reconsideration by the Court upon production of all of plaintiff's medical records.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 486 days (N = 7).

  • Inactive senior judge (senior since 2018); historical Houston-division civil docket.
  • Her terminated dockets skew to securities/commodities class actions (her hallmark: consolidated energy-company securities cases such as Jacobs/Manzoor v. Houston American Energy Corp. and Davidson v. Key Energy Services, alongside the Enron civil class actions noted in her bio), EEOC employment/civil-rights actions (EEOC v. Houston Fast Foods, Mundy Support Services, Kenexa Technology), maritime/energy contract disputes (Atwood Oceanics, Fry v. Northstar Marine Services), FSIA foreign-sovereign cases (Evans v. PEMEX), immigration (Glavee v. Holder), and habeas/prisoner matters (Woodard v. Quarterman).
  • She was also the criminal trial judge in United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP.

A historical record

Judge Harmon no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.