Marina Garcia Marmolejo
How Judge Marmolejo decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a qualified-immunity summary-judgment motion the burden SHIFTS to the plaintiff to show the defense is unavailable, and a failure to oppose lets the Court treat the movant's facts as undisputed. The plaintiff must come forward with significant probative evidence creating a genuine fact issue AND identify clearly established law (controlling authority or a robust consensus) putting the constitutional question 'beyond debate'; out-of-circuit, unpublished, or factually-distinguishable cases do not clearly establish a right. To beat QI before her, marshal evidence and on-point binding precedent.
“qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available. ... When a party does not file an opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court is permitted to consider the facts listed in support of the motion as undisputed and grant summary judgment if they show that the movant is entitled to judgment in his favor.”
On a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim, probable cause for ANY offense -- even a very minor one committed in the officer's presence -- defeats the claim entirely, regardless of the validity of the other charges. She analyzes probable cause on the objective totality of the circumstances and extends immunity to officers who 'reasonably but mistakenly' find probable cause. A false-arrest plaintiff must negate probable cause for every charge, not just the one they think is weakest.
“A false arrest § 1983 claim does not cast its primary focus on the validity of each individual charge. Rather, if there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.”
Procedural preferences
She uses Magistrate Judges heavily (the Laredo division's Kazen, Diana Song Quiroga, Christopher Dos Santos) and disposes of much of her docket by adopting their Reports & Recommendations. Where no party objects she reviews only for PLAIN ERROR and adopts; where a party files SPECIFIC objections she reviews de novo and will adopt-in-part / modify-in-part. General, conclusory, or frivolous objections are disregarded -- to preserve a point you must identify the specific portion of the R&R and the basis for the objection.
“Plaintiff filed objections to the Report within the fourteen-day objection period. ... The Court thus reviews the Report de novo. ... After a careful review of the filings, the Report, and applicable authorities, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and MODIFIES IN PART the Report.”
A Monell municipal-liability claim (unconstitutional policy or failure-to-train) requires a PATTERN of similar prior incidents; a single incident -- even a death -- ordinarily cannot establish a custom, and the narrow single-incident exception applies only where the specific injury is the 'highly predictable consequence' of the failure. She separately requires the policy to be the 'moving force' behind the injury. Plaintiffs suing a county/city should plead specific, similar prior violations, not just the incident in suit.
“A customary policy cannot ordinarily be inferred from a single constitutional violation. ... Because it cannot reasonably be inferred that an inadequate intake policy was the 'moving force' leading to Barrientos' sickness and death, this unconstitutional policy claim is DISMISSED.”
Cautions
Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference (prisoner medical care) is 'an extremely high standard': a plaintiff must show officials refused to treat, ignored complaints, or intentionally treated him incorrectly with wanton disregard. Disagreement with diagnoses or treatment, negligence, or malpractice is NOT a constitutional claim, and a documented record of prompt, repeated medical attention defeats the claim. For pretrial detainees she applies the Fifth Circuit's SUBJECTIVE deliberate-indifference test and declines to extend Kingsley's objective standard beyond excessive-force claims.
“Deliberate indifference is 'an extremely high standard to meet.' ... Plaintiff's disagreement with Dr. Fitts' medical opinion does not establish deliberate indifference. ... 'Disagreement with medical treatment does not state a claim for Eighth Amendment indifference to medical needs.'”
She actively polices abusive pro-se litigation: serial filers who 'clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation' are warned and then sanctioned under Rule 11 and the court's inherent power, up to dismissal of the suit; repeated frivolous motions are summarily denied and partitioned into a separate miscellaneous action. She also flags apparent fabrications made under penalty of perjury (e.g. a late-invented allegation tailored to match precedent). A pro-se plaintiff should file sparingly and truthfully.
“Plaintiff 'is not entitled to monopolize this Court's time and resources, disrupt the disposition of this case, and subject Defendant to unnecessary litigation costs by filing frivolous motions in bad faith.' ... Plaintiff's contumacious conduct warrants sanctions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11(b)(1), 11(c), and the Court's inherent power.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 4 |
Granted: 3Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to withdraw admission N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Sheriff Cuellar in his official and individual capacity, Section 1983 unconstitutional policy claim and failure-to-train-or-supervise claim against Webb County, and wrongful death claim under the TWDS are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. However, the following claims remain pending: Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the Jailer Defendants in their individual capacities and her TTCA wrongful death claim against Webb County.”
“the Court GRANTS Officers Ibarra and Jalomo's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 113) ... Officers Ibarra and Jalomo are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's false arrest claim and unreasonable search and seizure claim.”
“the Court GRANTS ... Sergeant Fernandez's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 115). ... Sergeant Fernandez is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's unreasonable search and seizure claim.”
“Because the Court did not rest its decision on Plaintiff's alleged failure to respond to Sergeant Fernandez's Requests for Admissions, Plaintiff's Motion for Withdrawal of Admission Pursuant to FRCP 36(b) (Dkt. No. 126) is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 116) is GRANTED in its entirety. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 131) is DENIED.”
“Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 131) is DENIED.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice or alternatively without prejudice (Dkt. No. 43) is GRANTED. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).”
“The Commissioner's Unopposed Motion to Reverse and Remand (Dkt. No. 17) is GRANTED, judgment is ENTERED in Plaintiff's favor, and this action is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).”
EXCLUDED from motion stats: this is a minor-settlement-approval order that rules on NO contested party motion. After a settlement hearing, MJ John A. Kazen issued an R&R recommending approval of the proposed settlement as to a minor plaintiff (T.V.); the parties waived objection on the record. Marmolejo reviewed for plain error, ADOPTED the R&R, APPROVED the settlement, and ordered the funds deposited in an interest-bearing account until the minor turns 18. Grounding quote: 'the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 62) as the findings and opinion of the Court. The Court hereby APPROVES the proposed settlement as it pertains to Minor Plaintiff T.V.' Counts as an order read, not toward motion stats.
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 104 days (N = 2).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 126 days (N = 2).
Laredo-division docket. CURRENT (2026) caseload is dominated by alien-detainee 2241 habeas petitions (Laredo Processing Center / Rio Grande / CoreCivic), all recently filed and pending. Across the 6 GovInfo orders read: prisoner s1983 (deliberate indifference, retaliation), Fourth Amendment civil-rights (false arrest / search), jail-death wrongful death (s1983 + Texas TTCA/TWDS), Social Security appeal, FLSA/consumer mortgage, and minor-settlement approval. Nature-of-suit observed in the 2018-2019 terminated civil sample: insurance, immigration/APA, motor-vehicle tort. A border-division mix heavy on immigration, criminal, and pro-se prisoner matters.