Kenneth M. Hoyt
How Judge Hoyt decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Across summary-judgment motions in different substantive areas (Title VII/ADEA employment, FDCPA debt collection), the dispositive fact is whether the non-movant put actual evidence in the record. Where 'the record is devoid of any evidence' for a required element, or the plaintiff offers 'insufficient evidence' of a similarly-situated comparator, he grants the defendant's MSJ. Bring evidence, not allegations.
“The record is devoid of any evidence to support the plaintiff's claim that ERS reported materially deceptive, misleading or false information to the CRAs concerning the medical debt or that it failed to report the debt as disputed. Accordingly, ERS has shown that no genuine issues of material fact remain and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's FDCPA claim.”
On insurance policy construction he will NOT grant summary judgment to a movant who fails to support its reading of the policy: where the insurer offered no authority or alternative construction for cutting off a loss payee/mortgagee's right to sue for proceeds, summary judgment on that issue was 'improper.' The party seeking SJ on a contract-construction point must actually brief the construction.
“Beazley does not cite to any cases or proffer a construction of the policy that would hold otherwise. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue is improper.”
Procedural preferences
He holds a 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) venue-transfer movant strictly to its burden: a disparity in the number of related filings between two districts, without evidence of judicial delay, disproportionate per-judge load, or concrete public-interest harm, is not enough to establish the propriety of transfer, and the motion is denied.
“Curves has not met its burden to establish the propriety of its requested transfer. Accordingly, Curves' motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) is denied.”
Cautions
He enforces AEDPA's one-year habeas limitations period strictly: a state habeas application filed after the federal limitations period has already run cannot toll it (there is nothing left to toll), and a petition filed many months late is time-barred and dismissed with prejudice, with no certificate of appealability because the time-bar is not debatable.
“Because the limitations period expired over a month before that filing, there was no limitations period left for the application to toll. Crotts's federal habeas petition, filed more than 18 months after the limitations period expired, is therefore barred by the statute of limitations.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to transfer venue N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Habeas petition N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Based on the following, the Court hereby GRANTS Beazley's motions in part and DENIES these motions in part.”
“Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court hereby DENIES Curves' motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(3) or, in the alternative, to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).”
“Even assuming, arguendo, the correctness of Curves' last point (that there would be no delay because of a transfer), Curves has not met its burden to establish the propriety of its requested transfer. Accordingly, Curves' motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) is denied.”
“Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court GRANTS the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's ADEA claim and otherwise GRANTS the defendant's motion for summary judgment.”
“Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court GRANTS the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's ADEA claim and otherwise GRANTS the defendant's motion for summary judgment.”
“Based on the foregoing analysis and discussion, ERS's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.”
“Alan Nelson Crotts's Petition for Writ Of Habeas Corpus, (Doc. # 1), is DENIED and is dismissed with prejudice. No certificate of appealability is issued.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 483 days (N = 3).
Senior judge still carrying an active Houston-division docket in 2026, DOMINATED by the 2025-2026 alien-detainee 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas surge (nature of suit '463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee' -- e.g. Saravia-Urquia, Ramos-Cruz v. Frink, Perez Lopez v. Tate, and ~14 more filed May-June 2026, almost all still pending), plus 'Contract: Other' commercial matters (Organic Industries v. Reflow/Pyrock Chemical; Pearce v. P.A.-Max Imports) and a Houston criminal docket. Historically (the cases read here) his civil docket spanned insurance-coverage, employment-discrimination (Title VII/ADEA/Equal Pay), FDCPA consumer, declaratory-judgment/franchise, and 2254/2255 habeas. Marquee: Wilson v. Houston Community College System (4:18-cv-00744, docket 6768730), the First Amendment board-censure case ultimately decided his way by a unanimous Supreme Court in 2022.