Keith Paty Ellison
How Judge Ellison decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In first-party insurance cases he closely tracks Texas Supreme Court authority: paying an appraisal award (even with estimated interest) does NOT defeat a Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act interest claim without the insured's mutual intent to settle, and statutory interest is fixed only at the date of judgment.
“State Farm is not entitled to summary judgment absent evidence of Jordan's intent to accept that payment as a settlement of her TPPCA claim. ... a question of fact remains as to what the interest rate will be at the time of judgment.”
He enforces arbitration agreements (and delegation clauses that send arbitrability itself to the arbitrator) once the movant shows the parties are covered and the resisting party fails to show the agreement is invalid -- compelling arbitration and dismissing the case. A party resisting arbitration must attack the agreement's validity, not merely the scope, where a broad delegation clause is present.
“Because Plaintiff has demonstrated that the Parties are subject to the arbitration agreement and Defendant has failed to show that the Agreement is invalid, Plaintiff's Motions to Compel Arbitration are GRANTED. This civil action is hereby DISMISSED pending arbitration.”
In multi-plaintiff institutional civil-rights cases he favors keeping plaintiffs joined and intervention open: where the injuries flow from a common set of policies or practices, Rule 20's same-transaction test is met, the pattern evidence needed for Monell liability will be before the jury regardless of severance, and trying the claims once serves judicial economy. A defendant seeking to fracture such a case into many trials will struggle.
“Because Plaintiffs' injuries were allegedly caused by a common set of policies or practices, the Court finds that Plaintiffs satisfy the same transaction test. ... allowing the parties to proceed in the same suit will serve judicial economy, as it will permit the Court to assess the legal viability of Plaintiffs' claims once instead of 27 times.”
He will certify a prisoner civil-rights class for systemic injunctive relief: in the flagship Pack Unit prison-heat case (Cole v. Collier) he certified a General Class and two subclasses of TDCJ inmates challenging dangerous summer heat indices under the Eighth Amendment and the ADA/Rehabilitation Act -- a certification the Fifth Circuit ultimately let stand and which drove a settlement installing air conditioning. But he polices class boundaries: inmates at OTHER units cannot bootstrap in by intervention, because their facilities present different facts and intervention would delay the existing class's relief.
“On June 14, 2016, the Court certified one General Class and two subclasses. ... None of the Movants are incarcerated at the Wallace Pack Unit, which is the facility housing all named Plaintiffs and class members. ... permitting intervention would cause undue delay and prejudice to the existing parties.”
Procedural preferences
On a Rule 12(b)(6)/alternative-MSJ motion he decides the case on 12(b)(6) where the pleadings suffice, declining to convert to summary judgment or reach the attached evidence -- keeping the ruling at the pleading stage.
“As the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), it does not consider Defendant's alternative arguments for summary judgment or the evidence attached to the motion.”
He enforces AEDPA's one-year limitations strictly in Section 2254 habeas cases -- a late-filed state habeas application gets no tolling, and he denies a certificate of appealability when the petition is time-barred -- but he reaches the limitations merits whether or not the petitioner responds.
“a state habeas application filed after expiration of federal limitations has no tolling effect ... The motion for summary judgment ... is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by limitations.”
Cautions
Leave to amend is not automatic: filing for leave late (especially after the opposing party has moved for summary judgment), on a new factual basis the movant already knew, with no explanation for the delay, draws a denial on Rule 15(a) delay/prejudice/futility grounds.
“the fact that a defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment is significant in the determination whether a plaintiff's subsequent motion to amend is timely. ... Plaintiff has not offered any explanation for the delay in filing for leave to amend, despite waiting over one year”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 12 |
Granted: 8Granted in part: 3Denied: 1 | 92% granted |
| Motions to dismiss N = 4 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 1Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to intervene N = 3 |
Granted: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for voluntary dismissal N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to sever N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to consolidate N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to disqualify N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The Court finds that State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Jordan's claims for breach of contract and bad faith. The Motion is DENIED with respect to Jordan's TPPCA claim for interest and attorney's fees.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED. ... Plaintiff's claims against Defendant are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Plaintiff's Motion and Memorandum in Support for Leave to File Amended Second Petition and Jury Demand (Doc. No. 26) is DENIED.”
“The motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 15) is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by limitations. ... A certificate of appealability is DENIED.”
“The motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 9) is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by limitations. ... A certificate of appealability is DENIED.”
“the Court finds that Defendants' Motion (Doc. Nos. 27, 32) must be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. ... the Court GRANTS the Amended Motion to Dismiss as to the following claims: All negligent misstatement claims [and certain Hayward-speech-based claims] ... In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.”
“the Court finds that the Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED. ... Because Plaintiff has demonstrated that the Parties are subject to the arbitration agreement and Defendant has failed to show that the Agreement is invalid, Plaintiff's Motions to Compel Arbitration are GRANTED. This civil action is hereby DISMISSED pending arbitration.”
“Finding no clear error, the Court adopts both R&Rs in their entirety. Accordingly, Union's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27) is hereby GRANTED ... Bird's claims against Union and PAE are therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“PAE's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26) is hereby GRANTED. Bird's claims against Union and PAE are therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Union's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25) is DENIED AS MOOT”
“Defendant's Motions to Dismiss must be granted. ... there was a dismissal with prejudice that constituted a final judgment on the merits; and the complaint in the dismissed case raised the same claims ... claim preclusion prohibits a litigant from asserting any claim ... that was or could have been raised”
“as the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII and supplemental jurisdiction of the additional claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(a), the Court must deny Plaintiff's Motions to Remand.”
“the Court must deny Plaintiff's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. [proposed order improperly conditioned on refiling in state court, and movant misrepresented that defendant was unopposed]”
“the Court finds that Plaintiffs meet both the Rule 20 prerequisites for joinder. ... Because Plaintiffs' injuries were allegedly caused by a common set of policies or practices, the Court finds that Plaintiffs satisfy the same transaction test. ... Defendant's Motion to Sever is DENIED.”
“the Court finds that both Garcia and Jenkins have met the standard for permissive intervention. ... Garcia's Motion to Intervene is GRANTED. ... Jenkins's Motion to Intervene is similarly GRANTED.”
“Jenkins's Motion to Intervene is similarly GRANTED. The Clerk is likewise directed to file Plaintiff-Intervenor Jenkins's Complaint ... into this case as said party's pleading.”
“Because the Court has found that intervention is proper, Garcia's Motion to Consolidate is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Sony's Motion, Docket No. 30, is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against Sony are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. ... Plaintiff has introduced no evidence of an enforceable contract, implied or otherwise ... Plaintiff's copyright claims are also barred by the statute of limitations.”
“Because Ms. O'Hara has not adduced any new evidence and does not present any legal arguments that the Court has not already considered and rejected, her Motion must be denied. ... Ms. O'Hara's Motion simply revisits issues this Court has already decided ... The Court therefore DENIES her Motion for Reconsideration.”
“Defendants St. Joseph's et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Counterclaim for Litigation Expenses (Doc. # 201) and Physician Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 203) are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs' state law claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Defendants St. Joseph's et al.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Antitrust Claims (Doc. # 243) and Physician Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Antitrust Claims (Doc. # 248) are GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 552 days (N = 8).
Active judge. CURRENT (2026) assignments are dominated by the alien-detainee 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas surge (nature of suit '463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee'), all pending -- e.g. Castillo Marquez v. Thompson (4:26-cv-04355), Guillen-Carpio v. Tate (4:26-cv-04349). Terminated merits dockets sampled here are diverse: insurance/contract (Underwriters at Lloyds v. Turtle Creek; Safeco v. Kamat; American Reliable v. Weisinger), civil rights (Dierlam v. Obama -- an ACA challenge), condemnation (Gulf South Pipeline v. Hershey), APA review (Wells v. James), personal injury (Adiuku v. CVS), and foreclosure (Tran v. BAC Home Loans).