Gray H. Miller
How Judge Miller decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a summary-judgment / Title VII pretext record, the dispositive question is whether the non-movant actually RESPONDED with evidence. Where the plaintiff fails to answer the defendant's arguments and produces no evidence on a required element (here, similarly-situated comparators) and none on pretext, the defendant's mere pointing to the absence of evidence carries the motion. He also follows the rule that the pretext inquiry is not whether the employer's reason was correct, only whether it was the real reason.
“Plaintiff simply does not answer defendant's arguments. ... Importantly, plaintiff does not argue, and provides no evidence, that any other similarly situated employee was treated any differently than she was. Nor does plaintiff make any showing that the defendant's asserted reason for firing her was a mere pretext to hide its discriminatory intent.”
In ERISA benefit-denial cases he applies the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard to the plan administrator's interpretation (Wildbur factors) and will not disturb a reasonable construction -- so the persuasive move is to attack the administrator's discretion, not to re-argue the plan de novo. He also enforces ERISA's statutory text strictly: a s1132(c)(1) disclosure-penalty claim must name the plan-designated administrator, and naming the plan sponsor instead is fatal.
“The court agrees with Shell that the plan administrator did not abuse her discretion and that Crowell cannot recover in his nondisclosure claim against any of the named defendants, none of whom is liable under the applicable ERISA provisions.”
Procedural preferences
Distinctive case-management move: when a case accumulates a thicket of dispositive and Daubert motions whose resolution would consume large court resources, he will ORDER mediation BEFORE ruling on any of them -- and will name a specific retired magistrate familiar with the case as the recommended mediator. Expect a mediation referral, not an immediate dispositive ruling, on a heavily-motioned commercial case.
“Because a ruling [on] the pending motions will require significant additional resources of the Court, the Court will require the parties to mediate prior to the Court ruling on the motions. It is therefore ORDERED that the parties must participate in a mediation within 60 days of entry of this Order.”
He uses Magistrate Judges heavily -- referring cases for full pretrial management and adopting their Reports & Recommendations. On a dispositive motion he reviews de novo any part properly objected to (Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)) and, finding the M&R sound, adopts it 'IN FULL' as the court's ruling. To preserve a point, file specific objections.
“the court, having reviewed de novo the motions, M&R, pleadings, objections, and applicable law, finds that, for the reasons stated in the M&R, the motions to dismiss (Dkts. 10, 11) should be GRANTED ... The court ADOPTS IN FULL the M&R.”
He construes pro se pleadings liberally and with 'common sense,' but holds pro se litigants to the Federal Rules: liberal construction does not excuse the failure to make a legal argument. On a declaratory-judgment abstention request he identifies the correct doctrine himself (Brillhart-Wilton for diversity declaratory actions, not Colorado River) and works the multi-factor test on the record.
“Even so, Lamell “must still adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and make some legal argument.””
Cautions
On AEDPA 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas he applies strict deference: conclusory and speculative ineffective-assistance allegations are 'subject to summary dismissal'; an uncalled-witness IAC claim must name the witness and set out the favorable testimony; re-litigated state-law evidentiary rulings are not cognizable on federal habeas; and a sufficiency/no-evidence claim must clear Jackson v. Virginia. Bald assertions do not move him.
“A speculative or conclusory allegation does not raise a constitutional issue in a habeas proceeding and is subject to summary dismissal.”
On Texas-law negligence-adjacent claims he draws precise lines that defeat over-pleaded theories: driving without a license on PRIVATE property is not negligence per se and a long, accident-free employment record defeats negligent entrustment/hiring; and 'cleaning' a vehicle is not a 'repair or modification,' so there is no implied warranty of good-and-workmanlike performance and a DTPA claim built on it fails as a matter of law.
“no reasonable jury would find the cleaning of a vehicle to be a “repair or modification” under the Texas Supreme Court's definition. Thus, there is no warranty. Rogers's implied warranty claim and the related DTPA violation claim accordingly fail.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 7 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 1Denied: 1Moot / procedural: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to abstain N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for attorney fees N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For these reasons, the court DENIES Lamell's motion to dismiss and his motion to abstain.”
“Accordingly, all factors weigh in favor of this court deciding this action. For that reason, the motion to abstain should be denied.”
“Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is DENIED with regards to Rogers's negligence claim. The court DEFERS ruling on attorneys' fees. It is otherwise GRANTED.”
“Rogers's motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED.”
“Shell's motions for summary judgment (Dkt. 39; Siegel Dkt. 32) are GRANTED.”
“Plaintiff Crowell's partial motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 35) is DENIED as moot, and plaintiff Siegel's motion for summary judgment (Siegel Dkt. 34) is DENIED as moot.”
“plaintiff Siegel's motion for summary judgment (Siegel Dkt. 34) is DENIED as moot.”
“Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees under § 1132(g)(1) are DENIED.”
“the court, having reviewed de novo the motions, M&R, pleadings, objections, and applicable law, finds that, for the reasons stated in the M&R, the motions to dismiss (Dkts. 10, 11) should be GRANTED and plaintiff's claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The court ADOPTS IN FULL the M&R.”
“The motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 12) is GRANTED and this habeas lawsuit is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Any and all other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. A certificate of appealability is DENIED.”
EXCLUDED from motion stats: this is an 'ORDER FOR MEDIATION' that rules on NO pending party motion. It catalogs fourteen pending motions in the BMC/IBM Master Licensing Agreement dispute -- six summary-judgment motions (4 by BMC, 2 by IBM), seven Daubert motions, and a renewed motion to compel -- involving 'well over fifteen thousand pages of exhibits,' and DEFERS ruling on all of them, ordering mediation within 60 days. Grounding quote: 'Because a ruling [on] the pending motions will require significant additional resources of the Court, the Court will require the parties to mediate prior to the Court ruling on the motions. It is therefore ORDERED that the parties must participate in a mediation within 60 days of entry of this Order.' He also made a non-binding recommendation that the parties mediate before retired U.S. Magistrate Judge Nancy Johnson, who had overseen the case for years. Counts as an order read, not toward motion stats; captured as a procedural-preference pattern.
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 531 days (N = 2).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 109 days (N = 4).
Caseload enumeration deferred (see coverage note: the assigned_judge index returns pre-tenure namesake cases + post-departure reassignments). Nature-of-suit OBSERVED across the 7 orders read + 2 dockets analyzed this session: contract/declaratory-judgment (mortgage foreclosure), motor-vehicle tort, Title VII employment, ERISA benefits, AEDPA 2254 habeas, intra-family dispute, and complex commercial contract (BMC v. IBM software-licensing). Houston-division civil docket.