George P. Kazen

United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas district Retired 2018 · served 1979–2018 Appointed by Jimmy Carter (Democratic) 28 signed orders read

Judge Kazen no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Kazen decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

On summary judgment Kazen holds the nonmovant to its burden of pointing to specific, competent record evidence; conclusory assertions or an unsupported affidavit do not raise a genuine fact issue. In MFC he rejected a lost-profits counterclaim because the affidavit asserting past profitability and that all product would have sold was not backed by objective facts (no lost contracts, no profit figures).

“Wright-Bernet has produced no objective facts to establish this claim. There has been ample time for Wright-Bernet to produce the evidence necessary to establish this claim. Accordingly, the claim for lost profits will be dismissed.”

In Texas mortgage-foreclosure suits Kazen follows the Fifth Circuit's Miller/Massey line: loan-modification or trial-payment discussions are not actionable TDCA misrepresentations of the debt's character/amount, and a mortgagor pursuing only a post-default loan modification is not a DTPA 'consumer.' A borrower who concededly knew of the debt, the amount, and the default cannot state these claims.

“At all times, Plaintiff knew that she had a mortgage debt, the amount that she owed, and that she had defaulted. The alleged misrepresentations do not constitute a claim under the TDCA and accordingly must be DISMISSED.”

Procedural preferences

Kazen confines a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to the pleadings and pushes back on movants who try to inject affidavits and limitations/ripeness arguments not contained in the motion; where outside evidence is offered with a combined 12(b)(6)/Rule 56 motion he exercises his discretion to exclude it and decide on the pleadings rather than convert. He adopts magistrate-judge R&Rs (here Diana Saldana's) but independently checks how the motion was framed.

“these Defendants are reminded that Judge Saldana was considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and also a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. The latter type motion is to be decided entirely on the pleadings.”

Cautions

Even when granting most of a defendant's summary-judgment motion, Kazen will withhold judgment on a discrete issue where the movant has not carried its initial burden, and instead order the nonmovant to come forward with specific evidence by a date -- so a partial SJ win does not necessarily end the case. In Leza he declined to grant on the Monell municipal-liability claim and gave the plaintiff a deadline to produce policy evidence.

“While the Court considers Detective Rodriguez's deposition testimony alone as insufficient to satisfy the City's initial burden on summary judgment, there remains a serious question whether Leza has a viable claim against the City. ... Leza is ORDERED to produce some colorable evidence of an official policy capable of subjecting the City to liability under 1983.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Hinojosa v. CCA Properties of America, LLC
5:07-cv-00097 · 2010-01-12
Summary judgment (defendant (employer)) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS CCA's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 45.)”

Velasquez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
5:13-cv-00196 · 2014-05-09
Motions to dismiss (defendant (mortgagee)) Granted

“Defendant Wells Fargo Bank's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 (Dkt. 4) is GRANTED as to all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant's request for attorneys' fees is DENIED.”

Leza v. City of Laredo
5:09-cv-00065 · 2011-05-26
Summary judgment (defendant (municipality + city manager)) Granted in part

“Having considered the parties' briefs, the evidence, and the applicable law, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part. ... Leza's due process claims against the City of Laredo and Carlos Villarreal are DISMISSED. Leza's Fourth Amendment claims against Villarreal are also DISMISSED. With respect to the Fourth Amendment claims against the City, Leza is ORDERED to produce some colorable evidence of an official policy capable of subjecting the City to liability under 1983.”

Eliserio v. Floydada Housing Authorities
5:05-cv-00004 · 2008-03-31
Motions to dismiss (defendant (federal / USDA)) Granted in part

“Magistrate Judge Saldana's Report and Recommendation is ACCEPTED. The Federal Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket No. 78) is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs 'enforcement claim' and 'loan approval claim' but otherwise DENIED.”

MFC Ltd. v. Wright-Bernet, Inc.
5:00-cv-00022 · 2005-09-28
Summary judgment (plaintiff (movant on defendant's counterclaim)) Granted in part

“MFC's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED to the extent discussed in this Memorandum. ... Accordingly, the claim for lost profits will be dismissed. ... Accordingly, the unjust enrichment claim will be dismissed.”

Garcia v. City of Laredo, Texas
5:12-cv-00117 · 2014-01-16
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“1) The following causes of action are DISMISSED without prejudice: - The First Cause of Action against both Defendants; - The Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action against Maldonado. 2) The following causes of action are not dismissed and therefore will proceed for now: - The Second through Sixth Causes of Action against the City. 3) For the following causes of action, the Court defers a decision: - The Second, Third, and Fifth Causes of Action against Maldonado; - The Seventh Cause of Action against both Defendants.”

Harvest Credit Management, L.L.C. v. Galindo
5:06-cv-00174 · 2007-01-15
Motions to remand (third-party defendant) Granted

“As removal of this case was untimely, the Motion to Remand is GRANTED. The Court therefore need not address Galindo's second contention, that filing motions in state court also constituted waiver of the right to remove.”

U.S.A. v. $43,133.00 (Forty-Three Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars) United States Currency
5:08-cv-00097 · 2010-02-03
Default judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Government's motion for default judgment (Dkt. 18).”

Thomas v. United States of America
5:09-cv-00140 · 2009-05-02
Habeas petition (petitioner) Denied

“Accordingly, his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, now construed as a petition under §2241, shall be DISMISSED.”

Pena v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
5:13-cv-00029 · 2013-08-30
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“For the reasons given above, the Court GRANTS the Bank's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Accordingly, the case shall be dismissed.”

Gonzalez Martinez, et al. v. Servicios de Transportacion, M.G., S.A. de C.V., et al.
5:05-cv-00060 · 2007-02-15
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The Court finds it does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant Servicios de Transportacion, M.G., S.A. de C.V., and will order that it be dismissed from this case.”

United States v. Robert K. Kirkland
5:05-cr-00456 · 2007-01-24
Motion to withdraw guilty plea (defendant) Denied

“Weighing the foregoing factors, and for all the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the motion to withdraw the guilty plea in this case.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 154.0 days (N = 14).

Median motion-to-ruling time: 257.5 days (N = 2).

Several 2017-filed cases terminated exactly on 2018-03-09, Kazen's retirement date (e.g. Gonzalez v. State Farm, both Carmona matters), consistent with administrative closure/reassignment of his remaining docket at retirement rather than merits dispositions; these are reported as caseload metadata only, not characterized as rulings.

A historical record

Judge Kazen no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.