Filemon Bartolome Vela

United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas district Retired 2004 · served 1980–2004 Appointed by Jimmy Carter (Democratic) 20 signed orders read

Judge Vela no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Vela decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He enforced a negotiated forum-selection clause when the resisting party did not show fraud, overreaching, or serious inconvenience.

“the forum selection clause contained in the time charter party agreement is unaffected by fraud, overreaching or undue influence.”

When specialized agency expertise controlled tariff reasonableness, he referred that issue and stayed the court case pending the agency's determination.

“Only if the district court finds that it can resolve the issues before it, using the plain language of the tariffs and the ordinary rules of construction, should the court then proceed to resolve the issues without referral to the Commission.”

In preliminary-injunction analysis, he tied relief to concrete evidence of likely statutory success, irreparable harm, limited burden, and public benefit.

“the Court is convinced that sufficient grounds exist to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction.”

Cautions

He applied habeas filing deadlines strictly and rejected equitable tolling where counsel's workload and the petitioner's failure to preserve the claim did not amount to extraordinary circumstances.

“the hectic schedule of counsel is not sufficiently unusual to constitute grounds for equitable tolling.”

He treated the amount-in-controversy requirement as a real evidentiary threshold and dismissed when the claimed damages could not legally reach it.

“This court thus finds that the amount in controversy in this case falls short of the threshold jurisdictional limit”

He required polygraph evidence to satisfy reliability safeguards and emphasized the risk of misleading or prejudicing the jury.

“this Court is confronted with a ‘legal Pandora’s box’ with the prospect of admitting future polygraph test results.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Giraldi
· 1994-06-16

The court preserved restrictions on direct juror contact while creating an opt-in process: "The Court will immediately, by certified mail, notify all jurors in writing ... of the Herald’s wish to interview them regarding the Giraldi case."

United States v. Dominguez
· 1995-10-27
Motion to admit polygraph evidence (defendant) Denied

“It is therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Polygraph Results and Motion for Pretrial Determination of the Admissibility Thereof, should be Denied.”

Casiano v. United States
· 1997-01-30

The court adopted a magistrate judge's screening recommendation and ordered: "Santiago Casiano’s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as a frivolous action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A."

United States v. Central National Bank
· 1988-05-31
Motion to dismiss indictment (defendants Central National Bank and Alamo Bank of Texas) Denied

“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss are hereby DENIED.”

Motion to dismiss indictment (defendants Central National Bank and Alamo Bank of Texas) Denied
Bur-Cold Express, Inc. v. Parker Hannifin Corp.
· 1992-12-11
Motion for leave to amend (defendant Parker Hannifin Corporation) Granted

“ORDERS that the Defendant be GRANTED leave to file an amended answer and counterclaims in this action.”

Motion to dismiss counterclaims (plaintiff Bur-Cold Express, Inc.) Denied

“Accordingly, this Court ORDERS that both the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims for Failure to State Sufficient Claims and Motion for More Definite Statement be DENIED.”

Motion for more definite statement (plaintiff Bur-Cold Express, Inc.) Denied
Motion to refer to agency (defendant Parker Hannifin Corporation) Granted

“this Court hereby ORDERS the issue be transferred to the ICC pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.”

Motions to stay (defendant Parker Hannifin Corporation) Granted

“Accordingly, his Court further ORDERS that all other proceedings in this action are STAYED pending a determination of the reasonableness of Plaintiffs filed tariff.”

Zavala v. Contreras
· 1984-03-16
Preliminary injunction (plaintiffs) Granted

“Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that all eligible migrant children who registered after October 17, 1983 at H.I.S.D. be given the opportunity to make-up work and earn credit for the fall semester.”

Hupp v. Port Brownsville Shipyard, Inc.
· 1981-06-01
Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (defendants) Granted

“This case is therefore DISMISSED and the controversy accordingly should be presented to the appropriate state court.”

Jimenez v. Garza
· 1981-03-06

After federal funding ended, the court found the federal issues moot and stated: "the preliminary injunction issued on January 5, 1981, is DISSOLVED."

Broadway v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc.
· 1986-09-17

The court dismissed the federal claim without prejudice and remanded the remaining state claims: "the Court hereby REMANDS Plaintiffs FIRST, SECOND and THIRD causes of action and Defendant’s FIRST and THIRD counterclaims."

United States v. Medina-Pena
· 1981-08-19
Motion to suppress (defendant) Denied

“For the aforesaid reasons, this Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.”

Motion for judgment of acquittal (defendant) Denied
Queen Noor, Inc. v. McGinn
· 1984-01-10
Motion for leave to amend (plaintiff Queen Noor, Inc.) Granted

“The Court, after considering the same, hereby grants Plaintiff leave to amend.”

Motion to transfer venue (defendants) Granted

“Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the Motion to Transfer is GRANTED. The case is hereby transferred to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Charleston Division.”

McAllen State Bank v. Saenz
· 1982-08-24
Default judgment (plaintiff McAllen State Bank) Granted

“ORDERED that Judgment of Default be entered against defendant Jesse Garcia, d/b/a Prarca Construction Company and that Judgment be entered foreclosing the liens of McAllen State Bank, Simon Diaz, d/b/a Texas Tool Company, the United States of America and the Texas Employment Commission”

Default judgment (cross-plaintiff Simon Diaz, doing business as Texas Tool Company) Granted

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 105 days (N = 17).

Median motion-to-ruling time: 40 days (N = 9).

The bounded 2002-2003 enumeration contains eighteen unique cases, seventeen terminated and one pending. It is a narrow late-career slice, not a career-wide caseload measure.

A historical record

Judge Vela no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.