Ewing Werlein, Jr.
How Judge Jr. decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In employment-retaliation cases Werlein will not infer causation from timing alone when months separate the protected activity from the adverse action; a long temporal gap, plus an unrebutted legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, sinks the claim at summary judgment.
“Plaintiff's termination six or eight months after he alleged racial harassment and filed an EEOC complaint was too distant in time for the Court to infer retaliation on timing alone.”
Procedural preferences
Werlein favors giving a deficient pleading a chance to be cured: rather than dismiss outright, he provisionally grants a 12(b)(6)/more-definite-statement motion and sets a short window (14 days) for an amended complaint, with final dismissal only if the plaintiff declines.
“the Court finds that Plaintiffs should have the opportunity to file an amended complaint.”
Cautions
Sovereign immunity is enforced strictly against counterclaims by the United States: absent specific statutory consent (or matters in recoupment), declaratory-judgment and fee counterclaims against the government are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
“The United States must consent to be sued, and that consent is a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction.”
In capital habeas, AEDPA's limitations period is applied even where the stakes are death; Werlein found equitable tolling unavailable and additionally rejected the claim on the merits, declining a certificate of appealability.
“While it is particularly regrettable to find that a petition is time-barred in a capital case, reasonable jurists could not disagree that Johnson is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations under the circumstances of this case.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Respondent Doug Dretke's Motion to Dismiss as Time Barred (Document No. 9) is GRANTED;”
“In the alternative, Dretke's Motion For Summary Judgment (Document No. 10) is GRANTED;”
“ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 36) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims will be DISMISSED on the merits.”
“ORDERED that the United States's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims in Third Amended Answer (Document No. 31) is GRANTED, and Defendant Gregory L. Colson's counterclaims against the United States are DISMISSED.”
“ORDERED that Defendants HEB Grocery Company, LP's and Nikki Whitehead's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for a More Definite Statement (Document No. 3) is provisionally GRANTED, providing that Plaintiffs may file a more definite statement in the form of a First Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days after the entry of this Order.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 122 days (N = 10).
A cluster of 2018-filed civil cases terminated within days to a few weeks of filing (e.g. Pettie v. Owusu 4d, Grayson v. DSM 3d, Jenkins v. Colucci 1d), suggesting rapid administrative dispositions/transfers/screenings; not individually entry-read, so dispositions are NOT characterized here. Reported as caseload metadata only.