Christopher A. dos Santos
How Judge Santos decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In prisoner Eighth Amendment medical claims he grants the defendant physician summary judgment / qualified immunity where the record shows the inmate was actually seen and treated: a documented course of examinations rebuts deliberate indifference, and an inmate's disagreement with the chosen treatment or the fact that treatment was unsuccessful does not establish a constitutional violation. A plaintiff must put forward evidence the provider knew of and disregarded an excessive risk, not merely a different medical opinion.
“Unsuccessful medical care does not demonstrate deliberate indifference ... [Dr. Fitts] did not act with deliberate indifference to Grimes' serious medical needs ... Dr. Fitts is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment in his favor.”
On a motion for default judgment he does not rubber-stamp the requested relief: he works through the multi-factor default analysis, confirms the well-pled allegations state a claim, and independently reviews damages and fees for reasonableness (e.g. trebling statutory damages only where the piracy facts justify enhancement, and checking that the attorney-fee rate is reasonable for the Southern District of Texas). A plaintiff seeking default judgment should fully document liability and damages, not assume default alone yields the demanded award.
“the Undersigned recommends awarding triple the [statutory damages] ... the Undersigned finds that this rate is reasonable in this case”
Procedural preferences
He distinguishes official-capacity from individual-capacity 1983 claims and applies Monell: a claim against a county officer in his official capacity is treated as a claim against the county and fails without an alleged policy/custom, while the same claim may survive against the officer individually. Plead capacity and (for any entity/official-capacity theory) a policymaker and policy with care, or the official-capacity slice will be dismissed even where the individual-capacity claim proceeds.
“Defendant Trevino's motion to dismiss claim two ... should be GRANTED regarding Defendant Trevino in his official capacity and DENIED regarding Defendant Trevino in his individual capacity”
Cautions
A prisoner First Amendment retaliation claim built on conclusory allegations will be recommended for dismissal: the inmate must allege (and ultimately show) a specific constitutional right, the defendant's intent to retaliate, a retaliatory adverse act, and causation -- producing either direct evidence of motive or a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred. A bare personal belief of being targeted, without that causation showing, fails.
“Mere conclusory allegations of retaliation will not withstand [summary judgment] ... [the inmate must] produce direct evidence of motivation or a chronology of events from which retaliation [may be inferred]”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Default judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 3 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to proceed ifp N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to reopen time to appeal N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Undersigned recommends Defendants' summary judgment motion, (Dkt. No. 116), be GRANTED in its entirety. The summary judgment evidence establishes that Grimes' claims against Dr. Fitts and Warden Marshall are subject to dismissal, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. [Adopted: 'the Court ADOPTS IN PART and MODIFIES IN PART the Report (Dkt. No. 138). Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 116) is GRANTED.' -- Marina Garcia Marmolejo, 2024-05-21, USCOURTS-txsd-5_22-cv-00012-2.pdf]”
“The Undersigned further recommends Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, (Dkt. No. 131), be DENIED. [Adopted: 'Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 131) is DENIED.' -- Marina Garcia Marmolejo, 2024-05-21]”
“On October 12, 2023, Judge dos Santos issued the report and recommendation on Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. No. 18) recommending that the motion for final default judgment be granted ... Finding no clear error, the Court adopts the report and recommendation in its entirety. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for final default judgment (Dkt. No. 16) is hereby GRANTED. [adopted Marina Garcia Marmolejo, 2023-11-07]”
“In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended denying Plaintiff's IFP application and allowing Plaintiff sixty days to pay the filing fee. ... The Court concludes that the Report and Recommendation should be and is hereby ADOPTED IN WHOLE. Therefore, Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, (Dkt. 2), is DENIED, and Plaintiff has sixty (60) days to pay the filing fee. [adopted Diana Saldana, 2026-02-06]”
“the Undersigned recommends the United States' motion for default judgment and entry of final order of forfeiture be GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 14). The Undersigned further recommends the Defendant firearm ... be ORDERED forfeited and all right, title, and interest in the Defendant firearm immediately vest in the United States.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned recommends Plaintiff's motion for default judgment be GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 11). ... the Undersigned recommends awarding triple the [statutory damages] ... the Undersigned recommends awarding attorney fees in the [requested] amount”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned recommends Petitioner's motion for leave to file notice of appeal, (Dkt. No. 48), should be DENIED.”
“the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant Trevino's motion to dismiss regarding claim one, Dkt No. 72, should be DENIED, that Defendant Trevino's motion to dismiss claim two, Dkt No. 72, should be GRANTED regarding Defendant Trevino in his official capacity and DENIED regarding Defendant Trevino in his individual capacity, and that Defendants' motions to dismiss claim three, Dkt. Nos. 71 and 72, should be GRANTED.”