Charles Robert Eskridge III

How Judge Eskridge rules, drawn from 34 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Position
District judge
Appointed by
Donald Trump (Republican)
Commissioned
October 17, 2019
ABA rating
Unanimously Well Qualified
Education
Trinity University, B.S., magna cum laude, 1985; Pepperdine University School of Law, J.D., summa cum laude, 1990
Signed orders read
34

About Judge Eskridge

Charles R. Eskridge, III is a judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Eskridge received a commission on October 17, 2019.

Judge Eskridge's practices and standing orders

Rules for cases before Judge Eskridge, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.

Key rules

Filing

Plaintiffs must serve these procedures and the interested-persons disclosure order with the summons and complaint or removal papers.

“When serving the summons and complaint or removal papers, Plaintiff must serve these procedures together with the Order for Conference and Disclosure of Interested Persons.”

Discovery

Lead counsel must personally confer about discovery and scheduling disputes before involving the court.

“Lead counsel must personally confer on all discovery and scheduling disputes as a final attempt at resolution prior to involving the Court.”

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Eskridge decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In a choice-of-law dispute, he applied Texas law’s preference for enforcing contractual choice-of-law provisions and found that Morton had offered no authority showing a fundamental California policy requiring its usury law to govern the Texas bank’s commercial loan.

“Generally speaking, ‘Texas law favors the enforcement of contractual choice-of-law provisions.’ ... Morton provides the Court with no authority suggesting that it is a fundamental policy of California to apply its usury law to a commercial loan provided by a Texas bank to a Louisiana corporation and guaranteed by a Louisiana citizen.”

In a personal-jurisdiction dispute, he declined to consider a theory involving Klonopin or benzodiazepines because the complaint did not mention either.

“A reader of the complaint will nowhere discern this attenuated theory. The complaint doesn't mention either Klonopin specifically or benzodiazepines generally.”

Procedural preferences

On review of a magistrate judge’s recommendation, he sustained the plaintiffs’ objections in this case.

“The objections by Plaintiffs to the Memorandum and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are SUSTAINED.”

In Armstrong's ladder-injury suit, Eskridge denied the motion to exclude Peter Poczynok because the identified inconsistencies could affect his credibility before the jury but did not make his testimony inadmissible.

“inconsistencies between the testimony of Poczynok, the evidence, and expert testimony proffered by Wing Enterprises may affect Poczynok's credibility before the jury. But they don't render his testimony inadmissible.”

After dismissing Shenton’s complaint, he permitted a motion for leave to amend but required any proposed amendment to address the identified deficiencies and comply with Rule 11(b).

“Shenton will thus be permitted to seek leave to amend his complaint. But any such motion for leave must address the deficiencies and concerns identified above and will be subject to the dictates of Rule 11(b).”

Cautions

In a dismissal dispute, he declined to read into the complaint a new Klonopin theory that the plaintiffs first raised in their response brief.

“But only in their response to this motion -- and not in their complaint -- do they attempt to connect that claim to HLR via Klonopin. The request by the Rosens to read this new theory into the complaint isn't well-taken.”

In this case, he deemed Vanunu’s summary-judgment motion unopposed after Hunter failed to respond on time and granted the motion.

“The motion for summary judgment by Defendant Uval Vanunu is deemed to be unopposed for failure by Plaintiff Eric Hunter to timely respond. As such, it is granted.”

In Shenton’s case, he held that the complaint was facially time-barred because it pleaded no facts supporting equitable tolling beyond the conceded 779 days.

“Shenton here pleads no facts that would entitle him to equitable tolling apart from the conceded 779 days. It's therefore evident from the face of the complaint that the action is barred.”

In a summary-judgment dispute, he found Morton had waived a challenge by failing to identify supporting record evidence, applying the Fifth Circuit rule that courts need not sift the record for a party.

“The Fifth Circuit ‘has regularly reminded litigants that Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court ... a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.’ The Court thus finds Morton to have waived challenge in this regard.”

In the August 2026 Jackson insurance ruling, pre-suit emails did not preserve attorney-fee recovery because they omitted the specific damage amount and accrued fees required by Texas Insurance Code §542A.003(b). A settlement demand alone did not fill those gaps.

“emails don’t constitute adequate presuit notice under §542A.003(b).”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Group 1 Automotive Inc v. Aetna Life Insurance Inc
4:20-cv-01290 · 2022-05-20
Motion for leave to amend (plaintiff) Granted

“The motion by Plaintiff Group 1 Automotive Inc for leave to amend is GRANTED. Dkt 51.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“The motion by Defendant Aetna Life Insurance Company to strike or dismiss is DENIED. Dkt 55.”

Armstrong v. Wing Enterprises Inc
4:18-cv-01238 · 2022-03-30
Motion to exclude expert (defendant) Denied

“The motion by Defendant Wing Enterprises Inc to exclude the testimony of Peter Francis is DENIED. Dkt 97.”

Motion to exclude expert (defendant) Denied

“The motion by Defendant Wing Enterprises Inc to exclude the testimony of Peter Poczynok is DENIED. Dkt 98.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“The motion by Defendant Wing Enterprises Inc for summary judgment is DENIED. Dkt 96.”

Shenton v. EnSite USA Inc
4:21-cv-02104 · 2022-06-03
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The motion by Defendant EnSite USA Inc to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is GRANTED. Dkt 16.”

Rosen v. CVS Health Corp (Hoffman-La Roche Inc)
4:21-cv-02734 · 2021-12-08
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The motion by Defendant Hoffman-La Roche to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. Dkt 4.”

Phan VM Holding LLC v. Evanston Insurance Company
4:21-cv-03081 · 2022-07-15
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“The motion by Defendant Evanston Insurance Company for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt 13.”

Pierce Partners III LLC v. Morton
4:19-cv-00335 · 2020-02-21
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment brought by Pierce Partners. As such, Morton must pay Pierce Partners: The full amount of the note, one million dollars; Interest calculated at eighteen percent; and Pierce Partners' reasonable attorney fees and costs.”

Luna-Vides v. Carpenter (UMG Recordings Inc / Island Def Jam)
4:24-cv-03215 · 2025-08-15
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The motion to dismiss by Defendants is GRANTED. Dkt 26. Defendant Sabrina Carpenter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant UMG Recordings, Inc, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.”

Hunter v. City of Houston (Uval Vanunu)
4:19-cv-02521 · 2021-03-30
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“The motion for summary judgment by Defendant Uval Vanunu is GRANTED. Dkt 38.”

Fender v. Biden
4:23-cv-01312 · 2023-10-16
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The related motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Dkt 31. A final judgment will enter separately dismissing this case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”

Motion to vacate (plaintiff) Denied

“The Rule 54(b) motion by Plaintiff to vacate is DENIED. Dkt 48.”

Carley v. Tomball Independent School District
4:19-cv-03446 · 2020-05-11
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Dkt 5. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”

Motion for leave to amend (plaintiff) Denied

“She there seeks to amend her complaint to add additional defendants from a prior state court action. ... The motion to enjoin all other entities from original state cases is DENIED. Dkt 10.”

Jones v. U.S. Bank N.A.
4:21-cv-03612 · 2022-05-31
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“The motion by Defendants US Bank NA and Select Portfolio Servicing Inc for summary judgment on all claims by Plaintiff Carole A. Jones is GRANTED. Dkt 10. The claims brought by Plaintiff Carole A. Jones are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”

United States ex rel. Walden-Bing v. Horne, LLP
4:23-cv-01792 · 2026-03-31
Motions to dismiss (government) Granted

“The motion by the United States of America to intervene and to dismiss is GRANTED. Dkt 46. The complaint by Plaintiff Amy C. Walden-Bing is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 347 days (N = 3).

Median motion-to-ruling time: 210 days (N = 13).

  • Judge Eskridge's sampled docket spans employment, consumer, insurance, contract, personal-injury, and civil-rights matters, along with an FTC merger challenge.
  • In a targeted 15-case 2023-2024 filing sample, twelve cases had ended and three remained pending when reviewed.
  • Recent assignments also include immigration habeas petitions.
  • These selected cases illustrate case mix without measuring the full caseload.

Pending matters in the official report

Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.

Motions pending more than six months0
Bench trials submitted more than six months0
Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months2
Social Security appeals pending more than six months1
Civil cases pending more than three years13
ReportMotions over six monthsCases over three years
Mar 2026013
Sep 2025319
Mar 2025019
Sep 2024012
Mar 2024010
Sep 202306
Mar 2023214
Sep 2022414
Mar 20222419
Sep 20212912
Mar 2021197
Sep 2020244

A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.

How long civil cases take in this court

For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, not for Judge Eskridge: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

CasesMedian time
All civil cases closed5,7427.6 months
Closed with no court action2,4426 months
Closed before pretrial2,3717.4 months
Closed during or after pretrial87111.4 months
Closed during trial5831.6 months
12 months endingCases closedMedian time
Sep 20255,7427.6 months
Sep 20245,0867.5 months
Sep 20234,7627.9 months
Sep 20224,5958.8 months
Sep 20214,7458.8 months
Sep 20205,0098.1 months
Sep 20195,2337.5 months

The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).

Draft for Judge Eskridge with the record in hand

Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Eskridge, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.

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