B. Janice Ellington

United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas magistrate Retired 2020 · served 1996–2020 18 signed orders read

Judge Ellington no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Ellington decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

On qualified immunity, will look past a state actor's stated reliance on 'limited information' when the record shows they said they reviewed 'every available resource' -- an official cannot both disclaim knowledge and claim to have reviewed everything.

“In her affidavit, however, Strong indicates that she 'reviewed every available resource' before she made her decision not to place Clark on safekeeping. ... Thus, the 'limited information' provided by the UCC would not explain or excuse Strong's decision to deny safekeeping status.”

In Social Security appeals, closely enforces the treating-physician and examining-physician weighting rules -- an ALJ who gives no weight to a treating source's disability opinion or an examining consultant's functional-limitation findings must actually apply the regulatory factors (treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization), not just assert inconsistency with 'normal' exam notes.

“It is unclear why the ALJ did not analyze Dr. Maruvada's records and medical opinion as those of a treating physician, or discuss why he did not consider Dr. Maruvada to be Plaintiff's treating physician. ... the ALJ discussed only the consistency of Dr. Capitaine's opinion with the record, and his findings in that regard are not supported by substantial evidence.”

On employment-discrimination pretext, will not credit a plaintiff's unverified, internally inconsistent comparator evidence over an employer's detailed, corroborated documentation of performance problems.

“The document does not identify any postal worker and although it appears to list time spent by a carrier in the office and on the street, no further explanation is given regarding its significance. Also the document is unverified. ... Plaintiff's meaning is unclear because he first describes his work on route 1528, then states that he was assigned to the route 'after a month.'”

Procedural preferences

Dismisses for failure to prosecute only after a plaintiff has ignored both a converted-summary-judgment notice and a subsequent show-cause order, and treats an unreturned change-of-address as the plaintiff's own responsibility, not the clerk's.

“It is Plaintiff's responsibility to keep the court advised of his current mailing address. It is not the job of the Clerk to find him. It appears that Plaintiff has abandoned his lawsuit.”

Reads a prisoner's earlier, differently-framed grievance generously where it fairly encompasses the later claim, following Fifth Circuit precedent that a continuing complaint (here, a continuing need for safekeeping) can exhaust later-arising instances of the same underlying issue.

“Fairly read, Plaintiff's March 2003 Step 2 grievance is, in fact, a complaint about a continuing need for protection. ... Clark's February and March 2003 grievances are sufficient to exhaust claims arising from the April 2003 decision of the Defendant to deny him safekeeping status.”

Cautions

Holds pro se prisoners to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement even where they claim jail staff told them no grievance process existed, if their own prior grievance filings or the posted handbook show they knew or should have known the process was available.

“Even if officials told Garcia that there was no grievance process, the evidence indicates that the process was nonetheless available to him. ... The November and December 2015 ICFs show that Garcia actually knew about the existence of the grievance process before the incident with Defendant.”

Will not extend Section 1983 supervisory liability on a conclusory funding/policy theory absent any allegation of personal involvement in the plaintiff's specific care.

“Plaintiff has not alleged any personal involvement by Defendant Livingston. His allegation that Defendant Livingston did not provide sufficient funds for health care for inmates is conclusory and unsupported by any facts generally, and unsupported by any facts related to the Plaintiff in particular.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Perez v. United States of America, et al.
2:10-cv-00246 · 2011-04-04
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“it is respectfully recommended that the motion to dismiss by defendant the United States of America and United States District Judge Janis Graham Jack, (D.E. 5), be granted, and that Plaintiff's actions against those two defendants be dismissed with prejudice.”

Ybarra Cantu v. Stephens
2:13-cv-00112 · 2014-02-18
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Respondent's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 11) is GRANTED, Petitioner's cross motion for summary judgment (D.E. 13) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”

Garrett v. Stephens
2:13-cv-00070 · 2016-01-05
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“Judge Ellington recommends that the Court grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. ... this Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff's objection to the finding that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 50) is DENIED.”

Motion for sanctions (plaintiff) Denied

“Judge Ellington further recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and motion for sanctions. ... Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (D.E. 66) is DENIED.”

Leclair, et al. v. Department of Family Protective Services, et al.
2:17-cv-00057 · 2018-01-08
Motion for voluntary dismissal (plaintiff) Denied

“the Court construes Plaintiff Emily Whipple's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal (D.E. 28) as a motion to withdraw and DENIES the motion (D.E. 28).”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The Court GRANTS Defendant Carmen Avalos's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (D.E. 30) and DISMISSES Plaintiffs' claims against Carmen Avalos.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The Court GRANTS Defendant City of Corpus Christi's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6) (D.E. 34) and DISMISSES Plaintiffs' claims against the City of Corpus Christi.”

Cooper v. Thaler
2:12-cv-00174 · 2013-03-18
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 18) is GRANTED.”

Motion for reconsideration (plaintiff) Denied

“Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (D.E. 39) is DENIED.”

Cooper v. Capt. Jamison, et al.
2:13-cv-00190 · 2013-12-19
Case ending dismissal (court_sua_sponte) Granted

“it is respectfully recommended that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution.”

Thompson v. City of Aransas Pass
2:04-cv-00444 · 2005-06-07
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“it is respectfully recommended that defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 13) be GRANTED and that plaintiff's cause of action be dismissed in its entirety.”

Russell v. Degussa Engineered Carbons
2:06-cv-00093 · 2007-02-06
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“it is respectfully recommended that defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 14) be granted. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant should be entered on plaintiff's ADA, ADEA and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.”

Garcia v. Lieutenant Hinojosa, et al.
2:18-cv-00060 · 2019-02-04
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 30) be granted and Garcia's amended complaint (D.E. 11) be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”

Cruz v. Chaffin, et al.
2:14-cv-00306 · 2015-03-12
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“it is respectfully recommended that Respondent's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 14) be GRANTED and Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief be DENIED.”

Case ending dismissal (court_sua_sponte) Granted

“any claim based on a breach of contract should be DISMISSED.”

Dixon v. Officer Gomez
2:14-cv-00134 · 2014-12-03
Case ending dismissal (court_sua_sponte) Granted

“Plaintiff's lawsuit is sua sponte dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. All other pending motions are denied as moot.”

Wilson v. McGinnis, et al.
2:13-cv-00204 · 2013-09-20
Case ending dismissal (court_sua_sponte) Granted in part

“plaintiff's claims against defendants in their official capacities are dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and his claims arising prior to July 8, 2011 are dismissed as barred by limitations. ... Plaintiff's claims against Nurse Hudson are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Ellington's enumerated civil docket (as distinct from her criminal-duty caseload) is a mix of prisoner Section 1983 and habeas litigation referred to her for report and recommendation, plus a smaller set of consent-civil cases (employment discrimination, Section 1983 municipal-liability, and one Social Security disability appeal) where she served as the final judge of record under 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c). No broader Social Security consent-appeal cohort appears on her docket, unlike some of the court's other consent magistrates.

A historical record

Judge Ellington no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.