B. Janice Ellington
How Judge Ellington rules, drawn from 18 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Ellington no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Ellington
B. Janice Ellington served as a United States Magistrate Judge in the Corpus Christi Division of the Southern District of Texas from November 1996 until January 2020. She handled referred civil and criminal matters as well as civil cases in which the parties consented to her jurisdiction.
How Judge Ellington decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Clark v. Strong, Magistrate Judge Ellington denied qualified immunity on summary judgment after finding that the official’s claim of limited information conflicted with her statement that she had reviewed every available resource before denying safekeeping.
“In her affidavit, however, Strong indicates that she 'reviewed every available resource' before she made her decision not to place Clark on safekeeping. ... Thus, the 'limited information' provided by the UCC would not explain or excuse Strong's decision to deny safekeeping status.”
In Brannon's Social Security appeal, Magistrate Judge Ellington reversed the disability denial and remanded because the administrative law judge did not adequately address the treating psychiatrist's opinion or the examining psychiatrist's functional findings.
“It is unclear why the ALJ did not analyze Dr. Maruvada's records and medical opinion as those of a treating physician, or discuss why he did not consider Dr. Maruvada to be Plaintiff's treating physician. ... the ALJ discussed only the consistency of Dr. Capitaine's opinion with the record, and his findings in that regard are not supported by substantial evidence.”
In Coronado v. Potter, Magistrate Judge Ellington granted summary judgment after finding that the employee’s unverified comparator document and inconsistent account did not rebut the employer’s documented performance concerns.
“The document does not identify any postal worker and although it appears to list time spent by a carrier in the office and on the street, no further explanation is given regarding its significance. Also the document is unverified. ... Plaintiff's meaning is unclear because he first describes his work on route 1528, then states that he was assigned to the route 'after a month.'”
Procedural preferences
In Dixon's civil-rights case, Magistrate Judge Ellington dismissed the suit without prejudice after the plaintiff failed to respond to a converted-summary-judgment notice or a show-cause order and did not provide a current mailing address.
“It is Plaintiff's responsibility to keep the court advised of his current mailing address. It is not the job of the Clerk to find him. It appears that Plaintiff has abandoned his lawsuit.”
In Clark's prisoner-safety case, Magistrate Judge Ellington held that earlier grievances exhausted a claim arising from a later denial of safekeeping because the grievances described a continuing need for protection across unit transfers.
“Fairly read, Plaintiff’s March 2003 Step 2 grievance is, in fact, a complaint about a continuing need for protection. ... Clark’s February and March 2003 grievances are sufficient to exhaust claims arising from the April 2003 decision of the Defendant to deny him safekeeping status.”
Cautions
In Garcia's excessive-force case, Magistrate Judge Ellington recommended summary judgment for failure to exhaust. She found the jail's grievance process available despite Garcia's account of contrary staff statements because earlier requests showed his knowledge of it and the handbook and posted notice described it.
“Even if officials told Garcia that there was no grievance process, the evidence indicates that the process was nonetheless available to him. ... The November and December 2015 ICFs show that Garcia actually knew about the existence of the grievance process before the incident with Defendant.”
In Stuart v. Burgin, Magistrate Judge Ellington recommended dismissal of a supervisory-liability claim because the plaintiff alleged no personal involvement and offered only a conclusory funding theory.
“Plaintiff has not alleged any personal involvement by Defendant Livingston. His allegation that Defendant Livingston did not provide sufficient funds for health care for inmates is conclusory and unsupported by any facts generally, and unsupported by any facts related to the Plaintiff in particular.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“it is respectfully recommended that the motion to dismiss by defendant the United States of America and United States District Judge Janis Graham Jack, (D.E. 5), be granted, and that Plaintiff's actions against those two defendants be dismissed with prejudice.”
“Respondent's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 11) is GRANTED, Petitioner's cross motion for summary judgment (D.E. 13) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Judge Ellington recommends that the Court grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. ... this Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff's objection to the finding that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 50) is DENIED.”
“Judge Ellington further recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and motion for sanctions. ... Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (D.E. 66) is DENIED.”
“the Court construes Plaintiff Emily Whipple's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal (D.E. 28) as a motion to withdraw and DENIES the motion (D.E. 28).”
“The Court GRANTS Defendant Carmen Avalos's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (D.E. 30) and DISMISSES Plaintiffs' claims against Carmen Avalos.”
“The Court GRANTS Defendant City of Corpus Christi's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6) (D.E. 34) and DISMISSES Plaintiffs' claims against the City of Corpus Christi.”
“the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 18) is GRANTED.”
“Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (D.E. 39) is DENIED.”
“it is respectfully recommended that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution.”
“it is respectfully recommended that defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 13) be GRANTED and that plaintiff's cause of action be dismissed in its entirety.”
“it is respectfully recommended that defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 14) be granted. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant should be entered on plaintiff's ADA, ADEA and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.”
“it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 30) be granted and Garcia's amended complaint (D.E. 11) be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”
“it is respectfully recommended that Respondent's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 14) be GRANTED and Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief be DENIED.”
“any claim based on a breach of contract should be DISMISSED.”
“Plaintiff's lawsuit is sua sponte dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. All other pending motions are denied as moot.”
“plaintiff's claims against defendants in their official capacities are dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and his claims arising prior to July 8, 2011 are dismissed as barred by limitations. ... Plaintiff's claims against Nurse Hudson are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- Ellington's enumerated civil docket (as distinct from her criminal-duty caseload) is a mix of prisoner Section 1983 and habeas litigation referred to her for report and recommendation, plus a smaller set of consent-civil cases (employment discrimination, Section 1983 municipal-liability, and one Social Security disability appeal) where she served as the final judge of record under 28 U.S.C.
- Section 636(c). No broader Social Security consent-appeal cohort appears on her docket, unlike some of the court's other consent magistrates.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 0 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
A historical record
Judge Ellington no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.