Bernard Markovitz
How Judge Markovitz rules, drawn from 12 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Markovitz no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Markovitz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
The court adopted the statutory construction that preserved a meaningful fraud exception rather than reading that exception almost out of the statute.
“This Court also chooses the strict interpretation of such phrase because, if one were to do otherwise and instead choose the broad interpretation, then, as a practical matter, every fraudulent statement made by a debtor could conceivably respect such debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition, thereby rendering § 523(a)(2)(A) a virtual nullity.”
Procedural preferences
A party seeking extraordinary relief from an earlier fee award had to overcome finality, timeliness, and standing requirements.
“For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court must deny with prejudice Amicone’s Motion for Disgorgement of Fees.”
Cautions
Business debtors could lose a discharge when their records were too incomplete to verify their financial condition and transactions.
“That being the case, the Court must conclude that the records that Mr. Burrik has kept and preserved regarding the Art Galleries are simply not adequate within the meaning of § 727(a)(3).”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“judgment is GRANTED in favor of the Trustee, and against the Debtor and Mrs. Titus jointly and severally, in the Titus Fraudulent Transfer Action in the amount of $281,006.18;”
“The Court will also sustain the objection of the Trustee and TRZ to the Debtor’s exemption of the $74,412 that is listed on the Debtor’s Bankruptcy Schedule B as an interest in a capital account at the Schnader Law Firm. The Court will overrule the remainder of the exemption objections that have been made by the Trustee and TRZ.”
“Finally, the Court will overrule the objections to TRZ’s claim that have been made by the Debtor and the Schnader Law Firm.”
“Sherwood’s objection to the entry of Mrs. Burrik’s discharge is OVERRULED;”
“Sherwood’s objection to the entry of Mr. Burrik’s discharge is SUSTAINED pursuant to § 727(a)(3) and (a)(5);”
“Sherwood’s claim is discharged as to Mrs. Burrik, that is such claim is not excepted from her discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(4);”
“Sherwood’s § 523(a)(4) nondischarge-ability action against Mr. Burrik is moot because the Court denies the entry of his discharge.”
“Forde’s claim in the form of the State Court Judgment shall be nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A).”
“the Debtor’s motion seeking the entry of a discharge order (Doc. No. 22 in the Main Case Docket) is DENIED AS MOOT;”
“the Debtor’s motion to strike Forde’s post-trial brief as having been filed untimely (Doc. No. 54 in Adversary No. 09-2587-BM) is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Kegg’s claim cannot be declared nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2). Such debt, therefore, shall be discharged.”
“the objection by the Plaintiffs (hereafter ‘Ivory’) to the entry of the Debt- or s Chapter 7 discharge pursuant to § 727(a)(2)-(4) is OVERRULED;”
“Ivory’s claim is DISCHARGED, that is such claim is not excepted from the Debtor’s discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A);”
“Ivory’s objection to the Debtor’s amendments of her Bankruptcy Schedules B and C and her Statement of Financial Affairs is OVERRULED.”
“the summary judgment motion of Jane Renshaw, the instant debtor and plaintiff (hereafter ‘the Debtor’), is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE;”
“summary judgment in the instant adversary proceeding is ENTERED in favor of Clearview Federal Credit Union, the instant defendant (hereafter ‘Clearview’);”
“consequently grants Buschmeier’s summary judgment motion and denies that of the Trustee.”
“the instant Debtors may exempt $36,190.01 of the proceeds from the post-petition sale of their residence located at 633 Mountain View Drive, New Florence, PA 15944, less the value that the parties herein shall determine to assign to the Debtors’ mobile home.”
“Ru-ston’s claims cannot be declared nondis-chargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A). Such debts, therefore, shall be discharged.”
“For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court shall (a) dismiss the Debtor’s preference action in Count 1 on the basis that it fails to state a claim for relief, and (b) convert the Bank’s dismissal motion as the same pertains to Count 2 into a motion for summary judgment.”
“Amicone’s Application for Fees and Costs (i.e., Doc. No’s. 213 & 224) is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE;”
“Amicone’s Motion for Disgorgement of Fees (i.e., Doc. No. 229) is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“the motion for summary judgment by defendants Parkview Hospital, Inc and Parkview Hospital Physicians and against Charles 0. Zebley, chapter 7 trustee, be and hereby is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
All five sampled matters were terminated, and none retained a docket-entry stream.
A historical record
Judge Markovitz no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.