Richard J. Arcara
How Judge Arcara rules, drawn from 12 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Arcara decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Social Security appeals, the judge remands when an ALJ ignores or fails to explain the rejection of medical evidence bearing on a claimant's functional limitations, even where the agency is no longer required to give a treating source's opinion controlling weight: a bare 'purely speculative' dismissal of an opinion on absenteeism, without addressing the supportability and consistency factors, is legal error requiring remand.
“The ALJ's summary rejection of Dr. Rawal's opinion regarding absenteeism 'precludes the Court from undertaking meaningful review' of the ALJ's decision to reject it... Accordingly, remand is also required on this basis. On remand, the ALJ must articulate in a more detailed fashion her assessment of Dr. Rawal's opinion, including how she considered the 'supportability' and 'consistency' factors.”
Conversely, where an ALJ's residual-functional-capacity finding draws on a partially-credited state-agency opinion combined with the claimant's own treatment notes, and imposes restrictions more favorable to the claimant than the opinion evidence required, the judge affirms: he does not re-weigh conflicting evidence himself.
“[S]ubstantial evidence supports the mental RFC finding because the ALJ utilized Plaintiff's treatment notes in conjunction with portions of the state agency consultant's opinion. Therefore, the ALJ did not solely rely on his lay opinion... It is not the duty of this Court to re-weigh any conflicting evidence and evaluate the proper weight that should be allocated to each piece.”
Procedural preferences
The judge enforces the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement strictly against pro se prisoner plaintiffs: filing suit even a few days before an administrative appeal is due to be decided defeats the claim, and the prison grievance body's own delay in deciding the appeal does not excuse the prisoner's early filing.
“It is well-settled that exhausting available remedies after a lawsuit is filed is insufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(a)... [T]he plaintiff can point to no circumstance in opposing the defendants' motion to dismiss that existed at the time he filed this action that might be sufficient to warrant pretrial discovery on whether there is a viable excuse... for his premature filing.”
On de novo review of a magistrate judge's suppression recommendation, the judge treats a defendant's failure to make specific, authority-backed objections as a waiver, and will adopt the magistrate judge's findings on issues raised only by incorporating earlier arguments rather than briefing them anew.
“Defendant Pennick purports to object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to deny his motion to suppress his post-arrest oral statements by incorporating arguments he made before the Magistrate Judge, without specifically identifying any proposed finding or recommendation to which he objects and without citation to legal authority. As a result, the defendant's purported objections failed to preserve an issue on this subject.”
Cautions
A prisoner-civil-rights claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an unreversed conviction is dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey without regard to the merits of the underlying evidence-concealment allegations, and a claim's statute of limitations runs from when the plaintiff first learned the operative facts, not from later follow-up correspondence confirming the same facts.
“The Complaint is dismissed on the ground that it is untimely or barred by the favorable termination rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)... This was merely confirmation of the information that was revealed on September 29, 2017.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
The judge accepted a guilty plea to a one-count information taken by a magistrate judge on referral, adopting the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis. This ruling accepts a plea rather than deciding a party motion, so it is not counted toward motion statistics.
The judge accepted a guilty plea to a conspiracy count taken by a magistrate judge on referral, adopting the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis. This ruling accepts a plea rather than deciding a party motion, so it is not counted toward motion statistics.
“For the reasons stated, plaintiffs motion to remand is denied.”
“ORDERED, that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge Foschio’s Report and Recommendation, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.”
“ORDERED, that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge Bianchini’s Report and Recommendation, petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed with prejudice.”
“ORDERED, that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge McCarthy’s Report and Recommendation, defendant’s motion to suppress is granted in part and denied in part.”
“For the reasons stated, the EEOC’s motion to bifurcate trial and discovery is granted in part, but denied to the extent that it seeks a punitive damages determination at Stage I.”
“In sum, (1) plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction are denied, (2) enforcement of the New York tax law amendments is stayed pending appeal, and (3) the motions for court-ordered mediation and to opt out of court-ordered mediation are denied without prejudice to renew after appeal.”
“For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby grants plaintiffs motion (Dkt. No. 51) in part with respect to plaintiffs claims under Sections 1692b(2) and 1692c(b) of the FDCPA. The Court accordingly vacates the judgment (Dkt. No. 50) and directs the Clerk of the Court to file a new judgment reflecting that plaintiff has established a violation of the above sections of the FDCPA as a matter of law.”
“The Court denies defendant’s motion (Dkt. No. 67) in its entirety.”
“Upon such review and after hearing argument from counsel, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Foschio’s Decision and Order is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. Accordingly, the Court affirms the Decision and Order.”
“For the reasons stated, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the State under the ASA, and denies plaintiffs motion for a salvage award.”
“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge Foschio’s Report and Recommendation, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied and the case is remanded to the Commissioner for a rehearing pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- Now a senior judge, his current docket is dominated by criminal cases (largely resolved through magistrate-judge Rule 11 plea proceedings he then approves) alongside Social Security disability appeals decided on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.
- His older docket, drawn on for this sample's habeas and prisoner-litigation motions, includes a substantial volume of state-prisoner Section 2254 habeas petitions and federal prisoner Section 2255 motions to vacate sentence, most resolved by adopting a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation.
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