Paul Adam Engelmayer
How Judge Engelmayer decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Rigorous plausibility screening on contract and statutory claims: he will reject a 12(b)(2) personal-jurisdiction challenge yet still dismiss under 12(b)(6) where the pleaded facts don't fit the contract's terms (Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Matrix -- sales outside the defined 'Territory' did not breach an immunity agreement that excluded Venezuela). Plead the contract's operative terms precisely.
“the Court finds that BMS has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. However, Matrix’s motion to dismiss is granted because the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim.”
Receptive to well-pled FLSA/NYLL wage theories at the pleading stage: he denied a franchisor's joint-employer 12(b)(6) (Olvera v. Bareburger) and denied a paving contractor's motion to dismiss prevailing-wage claims while granting FLSA conditional certification (Carlo Lizza). Wage plaintiffs who plead the economic-realities factors tend to survive the motion to dismiss before him.
“the Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss and grants plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification.”
Procedural preferences
Enforces contractual/CBA arbitration clauses: where a collective-bargaining agreement makes grievance/arbitration the sole and exclusive remedy for discrimination claims, he will stay the action and refer ALL claims to arbitration rather than let them proceed in court (Begonja v. Vornado).
“the Court stays this action, refers all claims brought in the Complaint to arbitration, and denies the request for fees.”
Disciplined about damages limits in commercial contracts: on summary judgment he enforced a consequential-damages bar in the parties' agreement, cutting off the damages theory PNC had pursued and requiring it to amend to a general-damages theory, with discovery costs partly shifted for the late pivot (PNC v. Wolters Kluwer). Identify a contractually permissible damages theory early.
“grants WKFS's motion for summary judgment as to the damages sought by PNC, on the grounds that the damages PNC has pursued to date are all consequential damages barred under the parties' agreements.”
Cautions
Precise about post-trial standards: an internally inconsistent jury verdict is grounds for a NEW TRIAL, not for judgment as a matter of law -- he denied the Rule 50(b) motion but vacated the verdict and ordered retrial (Johnson v. Burns). Frame post-trial relief to the correct standard; a Rule 50 motion fails if your real argument is verdict inconsistency.
“An inconsistent verdict is a possible ground for a new trial, but not for entry of judgment as a matter of law.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 10 |
Granted: 5Granted in part: 1Denied: 4 | 60% granted |
| Summary judgment N = 4 |
Granted in part: 1Denied: 3 | counts only |
| Motion for conditional certification N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Judgment on the pleadings N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for attorney fees N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judgment as a matter of law N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons that follow, the Court (1) denies in part, and grants in part, Braskem's and Fadigas's motion to dismiss; (2) grants Gradin's motion to dismiss; and (3) grants Odebrecht's motion to dismiss.”
“the Court (1) denies in part, and grants in part, Braskem's and Fadigas's motion to dismiss; (2) grants Gradin's motion to dismiss; and (3) grants Odebrecht's motion to dismiss.”
“the Court (1) denies in part, and grants in part, Braskem's and Fadigas's motion to dismiss; (2) grants Gradin's motion to dismiss; and (3) grants Odebrecht's motion to dismiss.”
“Vitro now moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). ... For the reasons that follow, Vitro's Rule 12(b)(1) motion is denied.”
“Separately, Vitro moves to dismiss Duff & Phelps' claim for unjust enrichment under Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons given below, that motion is also denied.”
“the Court (1) denies PNC's motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract and breach of warranty claims”
“(2) grants WKFS's motion for summary judgment on all of PNC's other claims, ie., its quasi-contract and non-contract claims, and (3) grants WKFS's motion for summary judgment as to the damages sought by PNC, on the grounds that the damages PNC has pursued to date are all consequential damages barred under the parties' agreements.”
“the Court (1) denies Pret's motion to strike; (2) grants conditional certification for plaintiffs' claims of overtime violations, limited to six Pret locations in New York City, but denies certification based on allegations of non-overtime off-the-clock work and alleged tip-pooling violations; and (3) approves court-facilitated notice for the six Pret locations”
“Several parties have now moved for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons that follow, the Court holds that the first offer to buy the collateral was not valid, and that Wells Fargo therefore is not required (or authorized) to sell the collateral in question in response to the second offer.”
“ABC has now moved to dismiss Taft’s whistleblower claim. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is granted with leave to replead.”
“the Court finds that BMS has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. However, Matrix’s motion to dismiss is granted because the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim.”
“Defendants John Sederakis and Sabrina Brown (collectively, “defendants”) again move to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants that motion.”
“the franchisor defendants moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss the First Amended Complaint as to them, asserting that the it had failed to plausibly plead that the franchisor defendants were “joint employers” for purposes of the FLSA or NYLL. For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied,”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss and grants plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification.”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss and grants plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification.”
“Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement; defendants also seek to recover attorneys’ fees. For the following reasons, the Court stays this action, refers all claims brought in the Complaint to arbitration, and denies the request for fees.”
“Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement; defendants also seek to recover attorneys’ fees. For the following reasons, the Court stays this action, refers all claims brought in the Complaint to arbitration, and denies the request for fees.”
“The parties have filed cross — motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons that follow, both motions are denied.”
“The parties have filed cross — motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons that follow, both motions are denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Sample from search_dockets(assigned_judge='Paul Adam Engelmayer'). The visible docket is current and 2026-heavy: a wave of alien-detainee habeas petitions (463), Schedule A trademark counterfeiting suits (840), an FLSA/labor matter, and other-fraud. Reflects current assignments, not a tenure-wide caseload; no terminated dockets appeared on the page.