Mary Kay Vyskocil
How Judge Vyskocil decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On summary judgment in fact-intensive areas (here a multi-factor trademark likelihood-of-confusion analysis), she will deny the motion where the non-movant raises genuine disputes across the governing factors rather than resolve confusion as a matter of law.
“Because Groq raises disputes of material fact as to virtually all of the factors set forth in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), and for all of the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”
Procedural preferences
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion she holds parties to the four corners of the pleadings: she denied a motion to dismiss outright where the defendant's only argument relied on a document outside the complaint, declining to convert or consider extrinsic material. A movant before her should ground a dismissal argument in the pleading itself, not in attached evidence.
“Defendant's sole argument for dismissal is based entirely on a document outside the pleadings that the Court cannot consider on a motion to dismiss.”
She enforces arbitration agreements and the delegation of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and where claims are arbitrable she stays the case pending arbitration rather than dismissing it.
“Defendants' motion to stay is GRANTED and this case is stayed pending arbitration.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 5 |
Granted in part: 3Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion to voluntarily dismiss N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to seal N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to stay pending arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“In light of that, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to Counts II and III of the complaint and Count I to the extent it relates to the Charity Program.”
“Plaintiff's request for dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is denied and the Court proceeds to consideration of all the parties' arguments.”
“For the reasons that follow, Pfizer's motion is denied, and Defendants' motion is granted.”
“For the reasons that follow, Pfizer's motion is denied, and Defendants' motion is granted.”
“For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.”
“The Court also denies Plaintiff's request to maintain under seal certain documents filed with Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.”
“As set forth herein, Target's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.”
“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED, and Plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions is DENIED.”
“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED, and Plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions is DENIED.”
“Defendants' motion to stay is GRANTED and this case is stayed pending arbitration.”
“Because Groq raises disputes of material fact as to virtually all of the factors set forth in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), and for all of the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Sample from search_dockets(assigned_judge='Mary Kay Vyskocil'), 21 dockets. The default page is dominated by very recent (2026) filings still PENDING, so this reflects her current intake, NOT a tenure-wide mix or grant context. A notable 2026 cluster is alien-detainee habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2241) and other immigration actions, which terminate fast: Arellano v. Warden (1:26-cv-03433, filed 2026-04-24, terminated 2026-05-06, ~12 days), Gomez-Gomez v. Mullin (1:26-cv-03427, filed 2026-04-26, terminated 2026-04-28, 2 days), Doe v. Borgen (1:26-cv-03718, filed 2026-05-05, terminated 2026-05-29, 24 days). These fast procedural terminations are not a basis for grounded dispositive-motion latency.