Kimba Maureen Wood
How Judge Wood decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Enforces oral agreements under New York law absent a clear expression of intent to be bound only by a writing; partial performance and complete negotiation of terms (Horn & Hardart factors) can carry a contract claim past the pleading stage.
“under New York law, oral agreements are binding and enforceable absent a clear expression of the parties' intent to be bound only by a writing.”
On a Daubert challenge she applies trial-level admissibility standards at the summary-judgment stage and will not exclude an expert merely because the retaining party collaborated in designing or implementing the study; objections to a study's probative value go to weight, not admissibility.
“The Court determines the admissibility of the challenged evidence based on the same principles as would apply at trial.”
Procedural preferences
At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage she confines review to the complaint and will not consider an extrinsic document (e.g. an unsigned draft agreement) unless the plaintiff solely relied on it and it is integral to the complaint.
“On a motion to dismiss, a court may consider a document other than an exhibit to a complaint only if it is one on which the plaintiff "solely relies and which is integral to the complaint."”
She resolves dispositive motions claim-by-claim, frequently granting summary judgment or dismissal on some claims/defendants while denying it on others (4 of the 5 sampled orders were order-level splits) -- expect a granular, per-claim ruling rather than an all-or-nothing outcome.
“the Court GRANTS Dollinger's motion for summary judgment with respect to its first and third claims. The motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to Stonewell's second claim.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 5 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 3Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to exclude expert N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the claim against LW of inducement of copyright infringement, and DENIES LW's motion for summary judgment on the claim”
“GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the claim against LW of inducement of copyright infringement, and DENIES LW's motion for summary judgment on the claim”
“the Court: (1) DENIES Defendants' motions to exclude evidence”
“the Court GRANTS Dollinger's motion for summary judgment with respect to its first and third claims. The motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to Stonewell's second claim.”
“For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion in part and DENIES it in part. The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion with respect to Plaintiffs' claims of (1) Breach of Contract and (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty. The Court DENIES Defendants' motion with respect to Plaintiffs' claims of (1) Unfair Competition, (2) Unjust Enrichment, and (3) Tortious Interference with Contract.”
“For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as to the District; and GRANTED as to the individual Defendants.”
“Defendants Manhattan Ensemble Theater, Inc., Golda Tour I, L.P., David Fishelson, and Fishelson Productions, Inc. move to dismiss this action by Plaintiff Anna Pearce, for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ... For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Sample from search_dockets(assigned_judge='Kimba Maureen Wood'). As a senior judge she carries a substantial pro se prisoner/habeas/civil-rights docket (the visible 2024-2025 slice), most cases terminated quickly on IFP/screening grounds. This reflects her current case-assignment mix, not a tenure-wide caseload, and is distinct from the counseled commercial/IP/employment matters in her published-opinion reasoning layer.