Jesse M. Furman

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York district Appointed by Barack Obama (Democratic) 14 signed orders read

How Judge Furman decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He reads commercial contracts on their plain language and enforces the parties' chosen dispute-resolution channel: where an agreement commits a category of dispute to a named expert (an independent accounting firm 'functioning as an expert and not as an arbitrator'), he routes it there rather than to arbitration, even on cross-motions. A party invoking a broad arbitration clause must reckon with a more specific carve-out elsewhere in the contract.

“In light of the plain language of the parties' agreement, the Court agrees with Alstom that the dispute must be submitted, in the first instance at least, to the independent accounting firm.”

On a copyright claim he is willing to decide substantial similarity at the pleading stage by comparing the works themselves: where the protectable elements of the plaintiff's work are not substantially similar to the accused work, he grants a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal rather than sending the comparison to a jury, and the works control over contrary allegations in the complaint.

“Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges copyright infringement, the works themselves supersede and control contrary descriptions of them, including any contrary allegations, conclusions or descriptions of the works contained in the pleadings.”

Procedural preferences

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion he applies the conventional Iqbal/Twombly frame -- construing the complaint and the documents it references in the light most favorable to the plaintiff -- and is careful to keep extrinsic material out unless it is incorporated by reference or integral to the claims.

“The following facts, which are taken from the Complaint and documents it references, are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.”

On a post-discovery FLSA conditional-certification motion he applies a heightened 'modest plus' factual showing rather than the lenient first-stage standard, and will deny certification where the declarations cluster around a single sub-group and do not show the sweeping proposed collective is similarly situated.

“Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification of an FLSA collective action. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED in its entirety.”

Cautions

He will dismiss on a threshold constitutional or jurisdictional bar before reaching the merits: a defamation claim that cannot be adjudicated without the court interpreting internal religious proceedings is barred by the First Amendment's religion clauses, regardless of the claim's factual strength. Plaintiffs whose theory requires a civil court to second-guess a church tribunal face dismissal.

“Their principal argument is that adjudicating Kavanagh's claims would require the Court or a jury to "interpret canonical procedure, standards, and decisions ... and thereby impermissibly entangle itself in matters of the ecclesiastical hiring and firing of a church's ministers, all of which would violate the religious liberty clauses to the First Amendment." ... The Court agrees that proceeding with Plaintiffs primary claim would violate the First Amendment.”

On a petition to confirm an arbitration award he gives the arbitrators substantial deference and demands cognizable, non-waived evidence for vacatur: even 'far from frivolous' and 'troubling' allegations of arbitrator partiality fail where the challenger waived them or did not support them with sufficient evidence -- the court will not review the award de novo.

“If the Court were reviewing the award de novo or deciding the parties' disputes in the first instance, the Kleins' allegations might well warrant a different result. But the Court is required to give substantial deference to the arbitrators ... the Kleins either waived their challenges to the neutral arbitrator or have failed to present sufficient cognizable evidence to support vacatur.”

Motion outcomes

Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.

Motions to dismiss
N = 9
Granted: 3Granted in part: 4Denied: 2 counts only
Summary judgment
N = 7
Granted: 5Denied: 2 counts only
Motion to compel arbitration
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Motion to confirm arbitration award
N = 1
Granted: 1 counts only
Motion to vacate arbitration award
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Motions to remand
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Motion for conditional certification
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Motion for sanctions
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Motion for attorney fees
N = 1
Granted in part: 1 counts only

A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Kavanagh v. Zwilling
997 F. Supp. 2d 241 · 2014-02-14
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The Court agrees that proceeding with Plaintiffs primary claim would violate the First Amendment. For that reason, and for the other reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.”

Fixed Income Shares: Series M v. Citibank N.A.
130 F. Supp. 3d 842 · 2015-09-08
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“For the reasons explained below, Citibank's motion is granted in part and denied in part.”

Alstom v. General Electric Co.
228 F. Supp. 3d 244 · 2017-01-10
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“Accordingly, Alstom's motions for summary judgment and to compel submission of the parties' dispute to the independent accounting firm are GRANTED, and GE's cross-motions for summary judgment and to compel arbitration before the ICC are DENIED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“GE's cross-motions for summary judgment and to compel arbitration before the ICC are DENIED.”

Motion to compel arbitration (defendant) Denied

“GE's cross-motions for summary judgment and to compel arbitration before the ICC are DENIED.”

Antic v. City of New York
273 F. Supp. 3d 445 · 2017-07-27
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“By "bottom-line" Order entered on June 28, 2017, the Court granted Defendants' motion "[f]or reasons to be provided in a forthcoming opinion."”

Lockhart v. Long Island Railroad
266 F. Supp. 3d 659 · 2017-08-02
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“The LIRR now moves, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for summary judgment. (Docket No. 16). For the reasons that follow, the motion for summary judgment is granted.”

Saleem v. Corporate Transportation Group, Ltd.
52 F. Supp. 3d 526 · 2014-09-16
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“the Court finds that all Plaintiffs in this suit—both named Plaintiffs and opt-in Plaintiffs—are independent contractors for purposes of the FLSA and the NYLL. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is granted, and the case is dismissed.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that the twelve named Plaintiffs are "employees" for purposes of the FLSA ... the Court finds that all Plaintiffs in this suit—both named Plaintiffs and opt-in Plaintiffs—are independent contractors for purposes of the FLSA and the NYLL. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is granted, and the case is dismissed.”

Ge Dandong v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd.
966 F. Supp. 2d 374 · 2013-08-22
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“For the reasons stated below, Pinnacle's motion to dismiss is DENIED, and Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”

Dean v. Cameron
53 F. Supp. 3d 641 · 2014-09-17
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint. ... The Court agrees. Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED, and the Amended Complaint is dismissed.”

Stern v. Regency Towers, LLC
886 F. Supp. 2d 317 · 2012-08-10
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“the Court converts Defendants' motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and grants those motions.”

Motion for sanctions (plaintiff) Denied

“the Court denies Plaintiffs motion for sanctions and grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees and costs.”

Motion for attorney fees (plaintiff) Granted in part

“the Court ... grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees and costs.”

Morales v. City of New York
59 F. Supp. 3d 573 · 2014-10-06
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants now move to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 24). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.”

City of Perry v. Procter & Gamble Co.
188 F. Supp. 3d 276 · 2016-05-19
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”

McBeth v. Porges
171 F. Supp. 3d 216 · 2016-03-21
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendants move, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss all of McBeth's claims. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Sample from search_dockets(assigned_judge='Jesse Matthew Furman'). The visible docket is current and 2025-2026-heavy: a wave of alien-detainee habeas petitions (463), Schedule-A trademark enforcement, a qui tam (False Claims Act) action, a copyright suit, a federal criminal case, a Celsius Network bankruptcy appeal, and a foreign-sovereign matter (Republic of Niger). Reflects current assignments, not a tenure-wide caseload; no case durations were computable (all sampled dockets are pending).