Andrew L. Carter Jr.
How Judge Jr. decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In trademark/unfair-competition suits over the use of a brand in an expressive work (here a feature film), he applies the Rogers v. Grimaldi First Amendment framework and will dismiss at the pleading stage where the artistic relevance is satisfied and the use is not explicitly misleading -- even granting dismissal with prejudice. A plaintiff suing over a brand's appearance in a movie or other expressive work should be prepared to meet the 'explicitly misleading' prong, not merely allege consumer confusion.
“On March 14, 2012, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). The court has fully considered the parties' arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces the Local Civil Rule 56.1 statement requirements but takes a 'practical approach' rather than mechanically deeming all of a movant's facts admitted when the non-movant fails to controvert them -- he will examine the underlying deposition testimony where appropriate. A summary-judgment litigant before him should still comply with Rule 56.1, but the Court will look past a technical default to the actual record.
“The Court will take a "practical approach," Jones v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 170 F.Supp.3d 420, (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted), and examine the underlying deposition testimony where appropriate.”
He honors contractual arbitration clauses and treats arbitrability under the summary-judgment standard: where parties have agreed to arbitrate in an agency agreement, he will compel arbitration of the cross-claim and deny a motion to stay it, rather than letting the dispute proceed in court. A party to a contract with an arbitration clause should expect him to enforce it.
“FFIC's motion to compel arbitration of CUA's cross-claim is GRANTED. Its motion to sever the cross-claim is denied in part and granted in part. CUA's motion to stay arbitration is DENIED.”
Cautions
On a Rule 12(c)/12(b)(6) motion in an employment-discrimination case he applies the conventional Iqbal/Twombly plausibility standard and will trim claims that rest only on labels and conclusions, granting judgment on the pleadings in part -- but he denies wholesale dismissal and lets adequately pleaded discrimination claims proceed. A defendant should not expect a discrimination complaint to be dismissed in its entirety on the pleadings where some claims are well-pleaded.
“For the reasons set forth below, this Court denies in part and grants in part Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Judgment on the pleadings N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to sever N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to stay arbitration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims, and Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on three discrete issues. As set forth more fully below, Defendants' motion is granted in full and Plaintiffs is denied, as the contract claim is barred by the lack of evidence of a written contract and the copyright claim is time-barred.”
“Defendants' motion is granted in full and Plaintiffs is denied, as the contract claim is barred by the lack of evidence of a written contract and the copyright claim is time-barred.”
“For the reasons set forth below, this Court denies in part and grants in part Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court denies in part and grants in part the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court denies the motion to dismiss and the motion for sanctions.”
“The Court denies the motion to dismiss and the motion for sanctions.”
“On March 14, 2012, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). The court has fully considered the parties' arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.”
“For the reasons set forth below, FFIC's motion to compel arbitration of CUA's cross-claim is GRANTED. Its motion to sever the cross-claim is denied in part and granted in part. CUA's motion to stay arbitration is DENIED.”
“Its motion to sever the cross-claim is denied in part and granted in part.”
“CUA's motion to stay arbitration is DENIED.”
“Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Sample from search_dockets(assigned_judge='Andrew Lamar Carter Jr.'). The visible docket is current and 2026-heavy: a wave of alien-detainee habeas petitions (463), civil-rights/jobs employment suits, an FDCPA consumer matter (Wilson v. Selip & Stylianou, filed 2024), and immigration/agency matters. Reflects current assignments, not a tenure-wide caseload; no terminated dockets appeared on the visible page, so no case durations were computed.