William Francis Kuntz II
How Judge Kuntz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In SSA appeals he applies the treating-physician rule pragmatically: the ALJ is free to discount even a treating physician's opinion when it is inconsistent with the other substantial medical evidence in the record, so long as the ALJ gives good reasons. If your only favorable opinion comes from the treating physician and several consultative/expert opinions contradict it, expect the denial to be affirmed on substantial-evidence review -- the dispositive issue is whether the ALJ adequately explained the weight assigned.
“Given the [inconsistency of Dr. Packer's findings], the ALJ was free to discount [Dr. Packer's] opinions in favor of a broader view of the medical evidence, notwithstanding [Dr. Packer's] status as the 'treating physician.'”
In contract disputes (here an insurance policy under New York law) he decides cross-motions by reading the instrument as a whole and giving unambiguous clauses their plain, ordinary meaning, resolving ambiguities against the drafter and (for insurance) in favor of the insured. A clause that by its terms applies only to a specific situation (insurer cancellation for nonpayment) will not be stretched to govern a different situation (insured-initiated cancellation). Anchor your reading in the clause's text and structural context, not isolated sentences.
“The plain, unambiguous language of the contract makes clear the Cancellation Clause, not the Payment Clause, governs the parties' rights to the premiums. ... A plain reading of the Payment Clause, taken in the context of the entire agreement, makes clear that it only applies where the insured has failed to pay the entirety of the premiums owed within thirty days of the inception of the agreement.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces docket discipline: a pro se plaintiff who fails to respond to a dispositive motion and then ignores a show-cause order will have the case dismissed under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute (without prejudice given pro se status) rather than have the court reach the unopposed motion's merits. Respond to motions and comply with court orders, or risk a 41(b) dismissal.
“By failing to respond to Defendant's motion, thereby contravening the Court's February 16, 2018 Order, and further failing to comply with the Court's May 17, 2019 Order directing her to file her response, Plaintiff has failed to pursue her claim. ... the above-captioned action is hereby DISMISSED for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b).”
Rule 12(f) motions to strike are disfavored in his court and rarely granted: the movant must show (1) no admissible evidence supports the allegations, (2) they have no bearing on the issues, and (3) prejudice from letting them stand -- and a motion to strike filed well after the answer (here, more than two months) without an explanation of prejudice will be denied as untimely. Do not rely on a motion to strike to clean up a pleading.
“Defendant's Motion to Strike was filed on March 30, 2022, more than two months after Defendant filed an Answer on January 10, 2022. ... Defendant has not explained how it would be prejudiced by their inclusion. ... the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Strike, as well.”
When no party objects to a magistrate judge's recommendation, he reviews for clear error and may adopt a detailed, subpoena-by-subpoena resolution in full. In discovery disputes, expect practical sequencing: document production and a privilege log first, followed by conferral and a renewed deposition subpoena only if issues remain.
“Finding no such error here, the Court adopts the R&R in its entirety. ... The Court ORDERS Hom to provide any non-privileged documents responsive to Plaintiff's document requests and a categorical privilege log”
Cautions
On a motion to dismiss prospective-relief claims for lack of standing, he distinguishes one-off past injuries (insufficient) from genuinely ongoing, forward-looking harms (sufficient). An alleged lifetime ban is, by its nature, a continuing harm that establishes standing to seek an injunction or declaratory judgment, and only one plaintiff need have standing for the claim to proceed. To defeat prospective relief, show the harm was a discrete past act with no likelihood of recurrence; to preserve it, plead an ongoing or certainly-impending future injury.
“Despite the lack of allegations demonstrating Frontier's explicit discriminatory policies, or Plaintiffs' imminent travel plans, the alleged lifetime ban in place against some Plaintiffs makes the threat of future, similar harm against those individuals certain should they ever attempt to patronize Frontier again. ... A lifetime ban is inherently an ongoing and forward-looking consequence.”
For release after conviction and before sentencing, he applies the statutory presumption of detention strictly. A short requested release period, a large secured bond, and an offer to pay for marshal supervision did not overcome evidence of wealth, overseas ties, false identification, private transportation, and a substantial potential sentence.
“Defendant fails to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence he is not likely to flee during his proposed period of release. Consequently, Defendant fails to rebut the presumption of detention pending sentencing.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. 8, is DENIED, and Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. 12, is GRANTED. This matter is hereby dismissed.”
“Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. 12, is GRANTED. This matter is hereby dismissed.”
A pro se SSA plaintiff never responded to the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings and ignored a show-cause order. Rather than rule on the (unopposed) defense motion, Kuntz dismissed the action sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute, without prejudice given the plaintiff's pro se status. No party motion was adjudicated on the merits. The order states: 'the above-captioned action is hereby DISMISSED for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b).'
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.”
“Thus, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Strike, as well.”
“Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment.”
“this Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment.”
“For the reasons stated above, Defendant Union's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied in its entirety.”
“The Court therefore ADOPTS Judge Wick's Report ... in its entirety; and DENIES Appellant's briefs at 21-CV-382, ECF No. 9 and 21-CV-1152, ECF No. 4. Accordingly, the Court also DISMISSES the cases captioned Bernardin v. EXR LLC, et al.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion as moot without prejudice to filing a new motion for compassionate release should he be returned to a federal correctional facility.”
“Accordingly, on the basis of the record and law as set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety.”
“For the reasons set forth above. Petitioner's Section 2255 motion is DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close this case.”
“The Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety and DENIES Futerman's motion to vacate default judgment.”
“Plaintiffs Jones Act claim against the County fails as a matter of law ... Plaintiffs claims against the County are therefore dismissed with prejudice.”
“having dismissed Plaintiffs federal claims against the County and finding no independent basis to exercise admiralty jurisdiction, this Court declines, in its discretion, to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim ... Plaintiffs claim against the Town is dismissed without prejudice.”
“It is therefore ORDERED that Ramisir's motion for default judgment and for disbursement of funds is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 344 days (N = 2).
A senior Eastern District of New York judge sitting in Brooklyn, senior since 2022. His current assigned docket is dominated by federal criminal matters (United States v. Rawi, Jafferakos, Martino, Huaccha Toscano, Dixon -- mostly recent and still pending) and habeas petitions by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. 2255 (Thompson, Watson, and Pagett v. United States), consistent with a senior judge carrying a criminal-weighted calendar; few terminated contested civil dockets appear in the recent sample. The mix is qualitative, drawn from case-level records.
Put Judge Kuntz's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Kuntz actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Kuntz's own signed orders and cites them.