William Francis Kuntz II
How Judge II decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In SSA appeals he applies the treating-physician rule pragmatically: the ALJ is free to discount even a treating physician's opinion when it is inconsistent with the other substantial medical evidence in the record, so long as the ALJ gives good reasons. If your only favorable opinion comes from the treating physician and several consultative/expert opinions contradict it, expect the denial to be affirmed on substantial-evidence review -- the dispositive issue is whether the ALJ adequately explained the weight assigned.
“Given the [inconsistency of Dr. Packer's findings], the ALJ was free to discount [Dr. Packer's] opinions in favor of a broader view of the medical evidence, notwithstanding [Dr. Packer's] status as the 'treating physician.'”
In contract disputes (here an insurance policy under New York law) he decides cross-motions by reading the instrument as a whole and giving unambiguous clauses their plain, ordinary meaning, resolving ambiguities against the drafter and (for insurance) in favor of the insured. A clause that by its terms applies only to a specific situation (insurer cancellation for nonpayment) will not be stretched to govern a different situation (insured-initiated cancellation). Anchor your reading in the clause's text and structural context, not isolated sentences.
“The plain, unambiguous language of the contract makes clear the Cancellation Clause, not the Payment Clause, governs the parties' rights to the premiums. ... A plain reading of the Payment Clause, taken in the context of the entire agreement, makes clear that it only applies where the insured has failed to pay the entirety of the premiums owed within thirty days of the inception of the agreement.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces docket discipline: a pro se plaintiff who fails to respond to a dispositive motion and then ignores a show-cause order will have the case dismissed under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute (without prejudice given pro se status) rather than have the court reach the unopposed motion's merits. Respond to motions and comply with court orders, or risk a 41(b) dismissal.
“By failing to respond to Defendant's motion, thereby contravening the Court's February 16, 2018 Order, and further failing to comply with the Court's May 17, 2019 Order directing her to file her response, Plaintiff has failed to pursue her claim. ... the above-captioned action is hereby DISMISSED for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b).”
Rule 12(f) motions to strike are disfavored in his court and rarely granted: the movant must show (1) no admissible evidence supports the allegations, (2) they have no bearing on the issues, and (3) prejudice from letting them stand -- and a motion to strike filed well after the answer (here, more than two months) without an explanation of prejudice will be denied as untimely. Do not rely on a motion to strike to clean up a pleading.
“Defendant's Motion to Strike was filed on March 30, 2022, more than two months after Defendant filed an Answer on January 10, 2022. ... Defendant has not explained how it would be prejudiced by their inclusion. ... the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Strike, as well.”
Cautions
On a motion to dismiss prospective-relief claims for lack of standing, he distinguishes one-off past injuries (insufficient) from genuinely ongoing, forward-looking harms (sufficient). An alleged lifetime ban is, by its nature, a continuing harm that establishes standing to seek an injunction or declaratory judgment, and only one plaintiff need have standing for the claim to proceed. To defeat prospective relief, show the harm was a discrete past act with no likelihood of recurrence; to preserve it, plead an ongoing or certainly-impending future injury.
“Despite the lack of allegations demonstrating Frontier's explicit discriminatory policies, or Plaintiffs' imminent travel plans, the alleged lifetime ban in place against some Plaintiffs makes the threat of future, similar harm against those individuals certain should they ever attempt to patronize Frontier again. ... A lifetime ban is inherently an ongoing and forward-looking consequence.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motion for judgment on pleadings N = 3 |
Granted: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Bankruptcy appeal N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Compassionate release N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. 8, is DENIED, and Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. 12, is GRANTED. This matter is hereby dismissed.”
“Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. 12, is GRANTED. This matter is hereby dismissed.”
EXCLUDED FROM MOTION STATS (recorded as an order read). A pro se SSA plaintiff never responded to the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings and ignored a show-cause order. Rather than rule on the (unopposed) defense motion, Kuntz dismissed the action sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute, without prejudice given the plaintiff's pro se status. No party motion was adjudicated on the merits, so this is counted as an order read, not a motion. Grounding quote: 'the above-captioned action is hereby DISMISSED for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b).'
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.”
“Thus, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Strike, as well.”
“Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment.”
“this Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment.”
“For the reasons stated above, Defendant Union's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied in its entirety.”
“The Court therefore ADOPTS Judge Wick's Report ... in its entirety; and DENIES Appellant's briefs at 21-CV-382, ECF No. 9 and 21-CV-1152, ECF No. 4. Accordingly, the Court also DISMISSES the cases captioned Bernardin v. EXR LLC, et al.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion as moot without prejudice to filing a new motion for compassionate release should he be returned to a federal correctional facility.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 344 days (N = 2).
Senior E.D.N.Y. district judge sitting in Brooklyn (suffix 'WFK'), senior since 2022. His current docket-assigned docket is dominated by federal CRIMINAL matters (United States v. Rawi, John Doe, Jafferakos, Martino, Huaccha Toscano, Dixon -- all 2023-2026, most still pending) and 28 U.S.C. 2255 habeas petitions by federal prisoners (Thompson v. United States, Watson v. United States, Pagett v. United States), consistent with a senior judge carrying a criminal-weighted calendar. Few terminated contested civil dockets appear in the recent sample. Mix is qualitative this build (case-level metadata only).