Roslynn Renee Mauskopf
How Judge Mauskopf decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On summary judgment in a civil-rights case she will not make credibility calls: a section 1983 plaintiff's own sworn testimony (e.g. that evidence was planted), even where the court is openly skeptical, raises a triable issue that must go to the jury rather than be resolved on the papers.
“Even though the Court is skeptical of Drayton’s account of the events of his arrest and his theory of how the Detectives allegedly effectuated this scheme, Drayton has raised a triable issue of fact that must be resolved by the jury.”
Qualified immunity will be denied at summary judgment when the material facts establishing probable cause are themselves disputed -- she will not assume the officer's version to find 'arguable' probable cause as a matter of law.
“Here, the material facts leading up to Drayton’s arrest are in dispute. It cannot be determined as a matter of law that there was any degree of probable cause – “arguable” or otherwise.”
Personal involvement is a hard prerequisite to section 1983 liability: an officer whose only connection to an arrest is signing the arrest/charging paperwork is dismissed for lack of personal involvement.
“There are no disputed issues of fact as to Detective Toribio’s involvement in Drayton’s arrest, and signing arrest paperwork fails to establish personal involvement.”
On a Title VII retaliation claim she enforces the Second Circuit's temporal-proximity rule strictly: a gap of more than about three months between protected activity and the adverse action defeats causation when timing is the only evidence.
“More than 6 months passed between plaintiff’s EEO activity and her first alleged adverse employment action and nearly a year passed between plaintiff’s SDHR complaint and her termination. This is well above the three month period considered causal in the Second Circuit.”
Jurisdiction is policed sua sponte: federal courts cannot review a Social Security decision that was fully favorable to the claimant, so a claimant who already won benefits back to the application date cannot relitigate the onset date in district court.
“Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review Social Security administrative decisions that are fully favorable to the plaintiff.”
Procedural preferences
A former U.S. Attorney, she refers contested dispositive and default motions to a magistrate judge for an R&R and then adopts it -- de novo review of any specific objection, clear-error review where no (or only conclusory/reiterated) objections are filed. Even when adopting, she independently scrutinizes fee awards.
“However, if a party “simply reiterates [its] original arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error.” ... Moreover, portions to which no party has objected are reviewed for clear error.”
She independently polices the basis for a default judgment even when it is unopposed: a conclusory attorney declaration with no underlying records or first-hand affidavit is not enough, and the motion is denied (with leave to renew) until the movant proves the operative facts.
“Thus, the information presented is largely conclusory, and the Court has no basis to determine, inter alia, whether “the company ceased business operations in December 2008” ... the supporting information underlying the Secretary’s claim that this plan is abandoned – the central issue on this motion – is, as presented, wholly insufficient.”
Cautions
Pro se litigants get a liberal reading and an orderly schedule, but she enforces the limits: a pro se party cannot file submissions on behalf of anyone else (not even a spouse/co-defendant), and submissions made while represented by counsel will not be considered.
“The Court will not consider these submissions, since Ms. Dinerman, as a pro se litigant, cannot represent anyone else, not even her own husband.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Judgment on the pleadings N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for relief from judgment N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for voluntary dismissal N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 35), is granted in part and denied in part. The following claims are dismissed with prejudice: all claims against Sergeant Sinatra; Drayton’s false arrest claim against Detective Toribio; Drayton’s malicious prosecution claim against Detective Estrada. Summary judgment is denied in all other respects.”
“To the extent any submissions filed by Ms. Dinerman since she elected to proceed pro se in July 2018 can be construed as either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, those motions are denied.”
“Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that default judgment be entered in favor of the Trustees and against Bayway in the total amount of $88,192.87”
“For the reasons stated herein, the Secretary’s Motion for Default Judgment is DENIED with leave to renew.”
“Therefore, the Commissioner’s motion is granted, and Stora’s motions for summary judgment and for default judgment are denied.”
“Therefore, the Commissioner’s motion is granted, and Stora’s motions for summary judgment and for default judgment are denied.”
“Therefore, the Commissioner’s motion is granted, and Stora’s motions for summary judgment and for default judgment are denied.”
“Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants’ motions are granted and all of plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice.”
“For the reasons stated herein, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. Plaintiff’s request for relief from all pre-termination administrative decisions is denied.”
“Plaintiff’s request for relief from all pre-termination administrative decisions is denied.”
“it is hereby ORDERED that defendant’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the remaining counterclaim without prejudice in accordance with Rule 41(a)(2), (Doc. No. 30), is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 366 days (N = 8).
Former Brooklyn E.D.N.Y. district judge (suffix 'RRM'). Sampled terminated dockets are a broad civil mix plus a criminal docket and many sealed/miscellaneous matters (search warrants, grand-jury / Rule 17 subpoena disputes, e.g. In re Search of Sheldon Rabin M.D. and In re Dr. J. David Golub) -- consistent with a former U.S. Attorney's continued handling of criminal-adjacent miscellaneous matters. Civil mix observed: employment/civil-rights (442/440, Caramello v. City of NY, Elliot v. City of NY, Holley v. City of NY), prisoner civil rights (550, Summers v. Toulon, Johnson v. Pugh, Leckie v. Williams), FLSA/wage labor (710, Olmo v. Century 21, Wiggins v. Garden City Golf Club), plus the GovInfo-read matters (ERISA, FTCA-adjacent insurance/subrogation, SSA appeals, housing-employment). Mix is qualitative this build (case-level metadata only).