Reena Andrea Raggi
How Judge Raggi rules, drawn from 23 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Raggi no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Raggi decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Raggi entered summary judgment when a civil-rights plaintiff could not connect a private defendant to state action, even after allowing an opportunity to identify admissible evidence of joint conduct.
“they are insufficient to support a jury finding that Writsel acted jointly or conspired with any state official in a common scheme to violate plaintiffs Fourth Amendment and due process rights”
She applied the rule of lenity to a capital-sentencing notice where Congress had not made clear which meaning of a statutory phrase governed.
“the rule of lenity compels this court to interpret the phrase in its strictest sense”
Procedural preferences
Raggi required a party seeking relief under Title VII's fee provision to have pursued an action or proceeding under Title VII, rather than treating a successful state-law case as enough.
“Because Paz never commenced any action or proceeding under Title VII, he cannot now invoke that statute to recover attorney’s fees incurred in a suit under state law.”
She stayed a federal action when related state proceedings could resolve overlapping factual and constitutional questions, while preserving the federal forum for any remaining claims.
“Resolution of plaintiffs’ federal claims are stayed pending the outcome of related pending state proceedings.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons here stated, the court grants the motion to abstain and stays this action until the conclusion of the related state proceedings.”
“the court hereby denies without prejudice plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment and New York University’s cross motion for discovery and sanctions.”
“this court hereby directs the Clerk of the Court to enter default judgment in favor of the United States as to all such property.”
“His motions are, accordingly, dismissed.”
“The bankruptcy court’s denial of debtors’ request to reopen proceedings to allow the addition of an omitted creditor, to the extent it was based on a legal finding that such debt was no longer dischargeable, is hereby reversed.”
“Defendants’ motions for dismissal or summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 1981 claims are granted as to allegations of discriminatory discharge and job evaluations and as to allegations of retaliatory discharge. The motions are denied as to the claim of discriminatory denial of promotion.”
“The motion to dismiss this action is granted in light of Feres v. United States, supra, and its progeny.”
“the motion to amend the capital notice is denied.”
“this court hereby certifies to the Secretary of State that David Montiel Garcia is - extraditable to Mexico to answer charges of violating Articles 234 and 179 of the Mexican Penal Law.”
“the court hereby adopts in full the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Zachary W. Carter, dated October 23, 1992 (‘Report and Recommendation’), and grants summary judgment in favor of defendants United States of America, Internal Revenue Service, United States Department of the Treasury, and United States Department of Education (‘DOE’).”
“Summary judgment is, therefore, granted in favor of the United States against Anthony and Mildred Comparato.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count Four is denied.”
“the court hereby grants Rutherford’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs claim of express warranty, but denies the motion in all other respects.”
“It grants the motions of Daley-Hodkin and Pyramid Equipment Leasing and enters summary judgment in their favor on Rutherford’s third-party claim.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The five sampled terminated matters included employment, contract, and other civil disputes. Their filing-to-termination intervals were 1,078, 1,106, 1,421, 1,798, and 2,059 days, with a median of 1,421 days. This small early-tenure sample does not represent the full caseload.
A historical record
Judge Raggi no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.