Raymond J. Dearie
How Judge Dearie decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In fraud pleading he applies Rule 9(b) pragmatically: a stark volume and pattern of false statements can itself supply the 'strong inference' of scienter, an insurer may rely on facially valid claim forms even if an expert later finds the discrepancies, and corporate officers can be on the hook on general knowledge allegations tied to their hands-on role.
“Plaintiff argues that the pattern of errors made across fifty-one separate medical reports were so stark and numerous that they could only be the product of intentional misrepresentation... These allegations suffice at the pleading stage to state a “strong inference” of fraudulent intent that is cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing, innocuous inference.”
Procedural preferences
He polices subject-matter jurisdiction strictly and will dismiss on it before reaching other grounds -- a contractual cap on recoverable fees can defeat diversity to a 'legal certainty', and an unwaived sovereign-immunity bar (no valid refund claim) ends a tax suit regardless of the equities.
“As it is a legal certainty that plaintiffs claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount, this action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
He will not let a brief expand the pleadings: arguments and broadened theories of relief raised for the first time in an opposition brief are disregarded, because 'the Complaint cannot be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.'
“Plaintiff never sought leave to amend its declaratory judgment claim... “[i]t is axiomatic that the Complaint cannot be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” ... the declaratory judgment claim is dismissed.”
Cautions
In employment-discrimination cases he holds plaintiffs to the McDonnell Douglas comparator rule: a comparator must be 'similarly situated in all material respects' and have engaged in the same conduct -- and once the employer offers a legitimate reason (even one based on an honest but mistaken belief in misconduct), conclusory allegations of animus won't show pretext.
“no reasonable juror could find that Thomson and Canto were similarly situated to her. First and foremost, neither Thomson nor Canto falsified an attorney signature in violation of the Bank's express policy regarding legal invoices, the conduct for which plaintiff was terminated.”
Causation timing is decisive in disability cases: if the decision to take the adverse action was made before the employer knew of the disability, the action cannot be 'because of' it, and temporal proximity alone cannot defeat summary judgment once a legitimate reason is shown.
“As in Spares, it is undisputed that Defendants decided to fire Francis before they knew anything about his claimed disability... Thus, the decision to fire Francis cannot have been made because of his disability.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 4 |
Granted: 3Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“As it is a legal certainty that plaintiffs claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount, this action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“The Government's motion for summary judgment is granted. UfCP's cross-motion is dismissed.”
“The Government's motion for summary judgment is granted. UfCP's cross-motion is dismissed.”
“respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred is denied.”
“defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment and for a declaratory judgment are dismissed. Defendants' motion is otherwise denied.”
“Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to each of plaintiff's claims, and the complaint is dismissed.”
“Because the undisputed evidence establishes that Francis was not fired on account of his disability. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 140.5 days (N = 10).
A senior judge (since 2011, formerly Chief Judge) on the Brooklyn/Long Island bench, still assigned new civil and criminal cases. The terminated-docket sample is dominated by FDCPA / consumer-credit (480) suits and immigration actions that close in a few months, plus miscellaneous (mc) matters and prisoner petitions; his published opinions also include tax, insurance-fraud, employment-discrimination, and habeas matters. Beyond the district docket he carried high-profile assignments: presiding judge of the FISA Court (2012-2019) and the Mar-a-Lago documents special master (2022).