LaShann M. DeArcy Hall
How Judge Hall decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She enforces hard limitations and standing bars strictly. A Social Security complaint filed even a handful of days past the 60-day 405(g) deadline is dismissed unless equitable tolling is earned, and 'bad legal advice' short of an attorney's total abandonment (Torres) is not an extraordinary circumstance; the limitations period 'must be strictly construed' as a condition on the United States' sovereign immunity.
“absent circumstances necessitating equitable tolling, courts in this circuit have found that a complaint filed even one or two days late must be dismissed as untimely. ... Here, dismissal is warranted due to untimely filing because Plaintiff commenced this proceeding four days after the 60-day period concluded.”
At summary judgment she rigorously enforces the expert-causation requirement where injuries have multiple potential etiologies: a plaintiff with a long history of overlapping prior injuries who fails to produce expert testimony cannot reach a jury on the complex injuries, though causally-simple injuries (bruises, abrasions) a lay juror could assess survive.
“Given the complexity of Plaintiff's overlapping injuries and medical history, the Court finds that there is simply no way a jury could reasonably conclude, without the aid of expert testimony, that these claimed injuries were caused or exacerbated by Defendant's alleged negligence.”
Procedural preferences
She will not grant a pre-discovery summary-judgment motion and enforces Local Rule 56.1 strictly. A defendant who moves for summary judgment without leave, before answering, with no discovery taken and no Rule 56.1 statement filed, will have the motion denied as premature (with leave to renew after targeted discovery).
“Defendants failed to submit a Statement of Undisputed Facts in support of the summary judgment motion, as required under Rule 56.1 ... The local and individual rules exist for a reason. ... Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied, with leave to renew after discovery.”
She applies the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard generously to pro se plaintiffs at the pleading stage, construing their papers (including facts raised in opposition letters) liberally. In an ADEA case she rejected a thin comparator theory but allowed the suit to proceed on the replacement-by-a-younger-worker theory, declining to apply McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting on a motion to dismiss.
“all that a plaintiff must plausibly allege to survive a motion to dismiss is that 'he would not have been terminated but for his age.' ... Here, Plaintiff pleads facts virtually indistinguishable from those pleaded in Gorzynki. ... Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a claim for age discrimination against JetBlue.”
She treats statutory coverage thresholds as merits elements rather than jurisdictional limits post-Arbaugh: a 12(b)(1) motion arguing the plaintiff has not established FLSA enterprise coverage ($500k gross revenue) is the wrong vehicle and will be denied, since coverage 'is an element of Plaintiffs' claim and is not determinative of the Court's jurisdiction.'
“there is nothing in the text of the FLSA that expresses a congressional intent to make the $500,000 requirement jurisdictional in nature. ... Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), is an inapplicable basis for dismissal on the grounds raised.”
Cautions
A motion for reconsideration that reargues an issue already decided will be denied; she applies the strict Shrader standard (controlling decisions or data overlooked) and will not reweigh a sanctions/bad-faith determination absent a genuine change of law or fact. An adverse inference, standing alone, is not enough to support a bad-faith sanctions award.
“a motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided. ... For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 4 |
Granted: 2Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants' motion to dismiss is therefore denied.”
“Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied, with leave to renew after discovery.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant JetBlue's motion to dismiss is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.”
“Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's renewed motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's request, under the Indemnification Agreement, for summary judgment in the amount of $650,025.86.”
“Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby granted, in part, and denied, in part. ... Defendant's motion is granted as to Plaintiff's negligence claim, in part, as it pertains to any claimed injuries that require expert testimony to establish causation. Plaintiff is permitted to pursue the remainder of her negligence claim with respect to any claimed injuries that a jury could find resulted from Defendant's negligent conduct without the aid of an expert.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 409 days (N = 7).
Active (non-senior) E.D.N.Y. district judge sitting in Brooklyn (docket suffix 'LDH'). The sampled civil docket spans a broad general-jurisdiction mix: civil-rights / fair-housing accommodations (FHA, ADA), FLSA/NYLL wage-and-hour, insurance and no-fault RICO (Allstate v. medical-provider fraud), Social Security disability appeals, trademark, and other statutory actions. Caseload mix is qualitative this build (10-case sample).