Joan Marie Azrack

Strictly construes the FTCA's jurisdictional presentment requirement and the waiver of sovereign immunity against the claimant: a vague SF-95 injury description is inadequate, and the common-law mailbox rule does not apply, so a plaintiff must prove the agency actually received supporting records before suit.

“the mailbox rule is inapplicable to claims brought under the FTCA, and that therefore the mere mailing of a notice of claim does not satisfy the FTCA's presentment requirement. The statute and corresponding regulation make clear that actual receipt is required”

Treats substantive due process as unavailable where a more specific constitutional provision governs the same conduct -- a 'backup' Fourteenth Amendment theory will not survive a motion to dismiss alongside First/Fourth Amendment claims.

“a substantive due process analysis is inappropriate where a more specific constitutional standard is directly applicable.”

On summary judgment she declines to resolve genuinely fact-specific questions on the papers and sends them to a factfinder, even while granting the motion on the legally clear claim in the same order.

“where an accommodation is made, whether that accommodation is reasonable is a fact-specific question that often must be resolved by a factfinder.”

Reads insurance-policy terms by their ordinary meaning and refuses to stretch 'bodily injury' to cover bare physical contact or confinement absent an actual physical injury, defeating a duty-to-defend theory.

“The Court does not agree that unwanted physical contact or physical confinement, without more, constitutes a “bodily injury.” The Court also concludes that the term “bodily injury” is not ambiguous on this point.”