Hector Gonzalez
How Judge Gonzalez decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Ratification and waiver are powerful tools in his contract cases. A party that accepts and keeps the consideration under a contract -- and litigates for years treating the contract as valid (moving to compel arbitration under it, pleading affirmative defenses and counterclaims that assume it, testifying it was 'in full force') -- cannot raise an invalidity defense for the first time in opposition to summary judgment. He will not let a litigant 'retain the benefits received under a contract and at the same time escape the obligations.'
“SMF ratified the Licensing Agreements and is precluded from challenging their validity. Moreover, SMF cannot selectively seek to enforce portions of the Licensing Agreements when doing so benefits it, while also challenging the validity of those agreements when it does not.”
He follows the Second Circuit's view that qualified immunity is 'almost always a procedural mismatch' on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: the facts supporting the defense must appear on the face of the complaint (or incorporated materials), and the plaintiff gets every reasonable inference, including those that defeat immunity. A defendant who wants to win on qualified immunity should expect to wait for summary judgment, not the pleadings.
“The individual Defendants' argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity must also await summary judgment or trial. ... advancing qualified immunity as grounds for a motion to dismiss is almost always a procedural mismatch.”
Procedural preferences
He will decide a contemplated motion to dismiss directly on the parties' pre-motion letters when those letters lay out the arguments in sufficient detail with case citations -- at least where he is DENYING the motion (and thus not disposing of any claim). This is an efficiency lever: a well-developed pre-motion exchange can get a fast merits ruling without full briefing. He also writes his own merits opinions rather than routinely adopting magistrate R&Rs.
“The Court finds it appropriate to decide Defendants' proposed motion to dismiss based solely on the parties' pre-motion letters because the letters describe the parties' arguments in sufficient detail, with accompanying citations to case law, and the Court is denying Defendants' request to dismiss Plaintiff's claims rather than disposing of any party's claims.”
He dismisses declaratory-judgment counterclaims that are the 'mirror image' of claims already in the case, because resolving the existing claim will necessarily settle the same issue and the counterclaim does not broaden the dispute. Where a defendant files an answer and then an untimely motion to dismiss a counterclaim, he construes it as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings (same standard as 12(b)(6)).
“courts will dismiss a declaratory judgment [claim] if it is the mirror image of a claim asserted in the complaint. ... resolution of Peleus's claims will necessarily settle the identical issues raised in the counterclaims, which do not broaden the scope of the dispute.”
Cautions
He has little patience for over-litigation. In a 'standard coverage dispute' he openly criticized both sides' 'scorched-earth approach' and 'file-now-and-figure-it-out-later strategy' as 'needlessly bloating the docket and wasting Court resources,' invoking Rule 1's command of a 'just, speedy, and inexpensive' determination. Counsel before him should avoid an 'avalanche of papers' and procedural fencing.
“The parties are directed to cease their scorched-earth approach to this standard coverage dispute before both this Court and Magistrate Judge Kuo. Their file-now-and-figure-it-out-later strategy is needlessly bloating the docket and wasting Court resources.”
On FTCA medical-malpractice and similar expert-dependent claims he requires concrete pleading of the applicable local standard of care AND a plausible causal link to the injury; boilerplate 'deviated from acceptable standards' allegations will not survive a motion to dismiss, and a plaintiff's own admissions (e.g., that surgery was already anticipated pre-incarceration) can defeat the causation inference.
“boilerplate statements that [the] defendant[s] deviated from the acceptable standards of medical care, and that those acts were the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, are not sufficient to state a claim.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to stay discovery N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is GRANTED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Peleus's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 56, is granted, and The Hallet's motion to strike, ECF No. 59, is denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Peleus's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 56, is granted, and The Hallet's motion to strike, ECF No. 59, is denied.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the Court takes Defendants' pre-motion letter under consideration as Defendants' proposed motion to dismiss and DENIES Defendants' motion.”
“The Court also DENIES Defendants' request to stay discovery. ECF No. 31. The parties shall continue conducting discovery in accordance with the deadlines in the Court's scheduling order.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with respect to liability on its breach of contract claims under the three Licensing Agreements is GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with respect to liability on its unjust enrichment claim is DENIED and Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is dismissed.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 87 days (N = 9).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 309 days (N = 1).
Active (non-senior) E.D.N.Y. district judge sitting in Brooklyn (docket suffix 'HG'), on the bench since April 2022. The most-recent search sample (May-June 2026) is dominated by the 2026 alien-detainee habeas surge (28 U.S.C. 2241 -- nature-of-suit '463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee'), alongside SSA disability appeals, USCIS mandamus, and copyright. The 2023 window shows a similar general-jurisdiction trial mix: immigration/USCIS mandamus (Pan, Chen, Li v. Mayorkas), prisoner civil rights (Carter, Wilburn), copyright (Wareka v. Bare Skin; Strike 3 Holdings), employment civil rights (Byam v. NYC DOE), FTCA (Mallay), and criminal (United States v. Fernandez). Mix is qualitative this build (case-level metadata only).