Gary Richard Brown
How Judge Brown decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a Daubert motion he applies liberal Rule 702 admissibility and routinely refuses to exclude an opponent's expert for imperfect methodology -- gaps like not reading a deposition or testing a slightly different model go to weight for cross-examination, not admissibility. And in a products case, an expert need NOT test her proposed safer alternative design if she can point to an existing design already in the marketplace. To win exclusion, show the flaw is so large the expert lacks 'good grounds'; otherwise expect denial.
“This appears to be, as seems often to be the case, a situation in which the movant confuses a challenge to admissibility under Daubert with circumstances that go to the weight of the evidence. ... 'Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.'”
He holds securities-fraud plaintiffs to the PSLRA's exacting strong-inference standard for scienter and will not infer knowledge from an officer's title, signature on SOX certifications, or a 'suspicious' resignation alone. To plead scienter against an individual, allege concrete, non-conclusory facts placing that person in the fraud (e.g., presence where the scheme was discussed), not generalized 'innuendo.'
“plaintiffs 'must do more than allege that the individual defendants . . . had or should have had knowledge of certain facts contrary to their public statements simply by virtue of their high-level positions' ... any additional boost added by the circumstances of Pan's resignation fails to cross the threshold.”
Procedural preferences
When the first-filed rule applies, he prefers TRANSFER over a stay or dismissal -- transfer best serves judicial efficiency and the interest of justice and avoids substantive prejudice. Do not file a duplicative second action in EDNY hoping to escape unfavorable rulings in an earlier-filed parallel case; he will read the procedural history and transfer you to the first court (and call out forum-driven relitigation).
“In bringing this action, plaintiffs transparently attempt to relitigate rulings in from the Louisiana action that are unfavorable to them. ... The many issues that have been litigated and reconsidered in Louisiana should not be shuttled through this Court for an attempted end-run.”
On unsettled questions of New York law he follows the Erie duty to predict how the NY Court of Appeals would rule and aligns with the prevailing weight of authority in the Circuit rather than seizing on a single contrary intermediate-appellate decision. Note: a federal district court in New York CANNOT certify a state-law question to the Court of Appeals (only federal courts of appeals and courts of last resort may), so argue the merits and the weight of authority, not certification.
“Since there are now contradicting intermediate appellate decisions among the state courts, this Court is tasked with the duty of predicting how the New York Court of Appeals would decide the issue. ... this Court concludes that the New York Court of Appeals would agree with the holding of Vega.”
Cautions
He construes the removal statute narrowly and resolves doubts against removability; mass or tactical removals draw a sharp response. Removing many state cases on attenuated bankruptcy 'related to' jurisdiction -- especially as a pass-through to seek transfer elsewhere -- risks not just remand but mandatory abstention where a dedicated state forum can timely adjudicate. Do not use removal as a procedural device to delay or relocate state-law claims.
“defendants appear to seek tacit approval from this Court ... of the dubious procedural devices they have unleashed. Because the plaintiffs are entitled to timely consideration of their claims, and defendants' arguments are without basis in law, the request to defer decision is rejected as unlawful and unfair.”
Under New York Labor Law 240(1) (the strict-liability 'scaffold law'), liability attaches only where the harm flows directly from the application of the force of gravity AND from the absence of a required protective device. An elevation-related injury that is not gravity-driven (e.g., a hand-powered hoist) falls outside the statute, no matter how high the worker was. Plead and prove the gravity-driven mechanism and the proximate-cause link to a missing safety device.
“Plaintiff was injured during an ascent powered by the pull of the shipyard owner. Gravity played no role in the accident. ... this case, which involves an injury resulting from a hand-powered ascent, did not result from the application of gravity to a person or object, and is therefore outside the ambit of the statute.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 8 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 2Denied: 2Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 4 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to transfer venue N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judgment on pleadings N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to exclude expert N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to amend N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Based on the foregoing, defendants' motion is GRANTED, and the action shall be transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana where a parallel action is pending.”
“Based on the foregoing, defendant's summary judgment motion is granted.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby adopts the R&R in its entirety, and the case is dismissed.”
“plaintiffs' motions to remand these cases prove meritorious and should be granted. ... the cases listed in the Appendix are hereby immediately REMANDED to state court.”
“Based on the foregoing, defendant's motion is DENIED. The parties are directed to proceed with discovery with the assigned Magistrate Judge.”
“Defendant's motions to exclude expert testimony and for summary judgment are DENIED.”
“Defendant's motions to exclude expert testimony and for summary judgment are DENIED.”
“Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action must be GRANTED in its entirety.”
“Based on the foregoing, defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.”
“plaintiff’s claim for trademark infringement is dismissed with prejudice, while its claims for unfair competition under state and federal law are dismissed without prejudice.”
“Defendant’s motions to amend its answer and for summary judgment are denied as moot.”
“Defendant’s motions to amend its answer and for summary judgment are denied as moot.”
“the Officer Defendants’ summary judgment motion is GRANTED except for the deliberate indifference and failure to intervene claims against Martingano.”
“The Medical Defendants’ summary judgment motion is GRANTED in its entirety.”
“plaintiff’s motion is DENIED and defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“plaintiff’s motion is DENIED and defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The result of that motion practice is significant: as described herein, plaintiff is left solely with a claim for nominal damages.”
“defendants’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED and the case is dismissed. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and close the case.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 35 days (N = 5).
Active E.D.N.Y. district judge sitting in Central Islip (Long Island; suffix 'GRB'). The most-recent assigned cases (May-June 2026) are dominated by a 463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee surge (B.P.S. v. Genalo, Laminia Guachambala v. Blanche, Singh v. Blanche, Jiang v. Genalo) alongside FLSA wage suits (Vasquez Zacarias v. Benitez Landscaping; 710 Labor: Fair Standards), ADA/civil-rights accommodation and employment suits (Gates Jr. v. Whitney Court Plaza; Bernet v. NY State Parks - 445/443 Civil Rights), and ERISA/Taft-Hartley fund collections (Gesualdi v. Triboro Trucking). An older (2020-2021-filed) terminated sample mixes criminal cases (United States v. Gamarra/Soto), an FLSA suit (Jackson v. Enterprise Asphalt Paving), a products/Truth-in-Lending case (Allen v. Robert Bosch Tool), a government action (US v. Firstcare Urgent & Primary Care), and contract/diversity matters (D&G Construction v. Scohn; Beltran v. Smith). Mix is qualitative this build (case-level metadata only).