Frederic Block
How Judge Block decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Social Security appeals he will remand where the ALJ failed to reconcile conflicting consultative examiners or develop the record — a treating-source opinion is especially important in mental-health cases.
“the ALJ’s severity determination is not supported by substantial evidence. The record here, at 284 pages, is simply not robust enough for the ALJ to make a determination without a treating psychologist’s opinion or notes.”
In employment-discrimination/retaliation cases he readily sends motivation to the jury: temporal proximity between protected activity (e.g., filing grievances) and an adverse action -- measured in months, not years -- establishes a causal connection sufficient to defeat summary judgment, and a plaintiff need not show discrimination was the sole motivating factor. To win summary judgment for a defendant-employer, sever the timing link and the inference of pretext.
“A causal connection can be established 'indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse employment action.' ... Plaintiff's last grievance was filed in 2014, and he was fired in July of 2014.”
Procedural preferences
Demands strict compliance with state procedural prerequisites even when the merits favor the movant — a foreclosure plaintiff with a prima facie case still loses summary judgment on a notice-of-pendency defect.
“Without a valid notice of pendency filed twenty days before a final judgment, Church has not complied with the statutory requirements of RPAPL § 1331. Therefore, Church’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied without prejudice.”
He interprets contracts (including insurance policies) by the plain meaning of terms read in the context of the whole instrument, giving legal terms of art their established meaning and refusing readings that strain the language. He cabined a D&O policy's 'derivative or shareholder class action claims' carve-back to its common legal meaning (shareholder suits in the corporation's name), declining the insured's broad respondeat-superior reading even under the construe-against-the-insurer canon, because that canon applies only to genuine ambiguity.
“the broad definition of 'derivative claim' urged by Hollis Park is not reasonable. The Court agrees with Landmark that based on common legal usage, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, New York statutory law, and other Policy provisions, the phrase 'derivative or shareholder class action claims' only reasonably means derivative claims brought in the name of the corporation or direct shareholder class action claims brought by shareholders to enforce some other law.”
He is willing to follow binding precedent he disagrees with while openly criticizing it. On the Second Circuit's mandate he denied attorney's fees he had twice awarded, but wrote at length that the Farrar/Pino 'nominal damages' fee bar is a poor fit for a vindication of a fundamental due-process right and should be revisited. Practitioners reading his fee rulings should distinguish what he was compelled to do from what he believes the law should be.
“in compliance with my duty to abide by the appellate court's order, I am issuing this order today denying attorney's fees. But I take this opportunity to write that the Court should, if faced with the issue again, reconsider the probity of the precedent upon which it relied ... Why Knights' attorney should be penalized by not awarding any fees at all for his successful decades-long battle ... is simply beyond my comprehension.”
Cautions
A grand-jury indictment is a high hurdle for a §1983 malicious-prosecution plaintiff: it presumes probable cause, rebuttable only by fraud, perjury, or bad-faith suppression — and probable cause is a complete defense.
“the grand jury’s finding of probable cause (1) should not be disturbed and (2) operates as a complete defense to plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.”
He reads the FDCPA narrowly on both the 'debt' element and what counts as 'misleading': obligations framed as arising from theft/torts (not a consensual consumer transaction) fall outside the statute, and a collection letter that tracks 15 U.S.C. 1692g nearly verbatim, without overshadowing or contradiction, is not misleading to the least-sophisticated consumer. Generic statute-tracking-language FDCPA theories will be dismissed on the pleadings.
“Here, the letter tracks §1692 nearly verbatim and contains no overshadowing or contradicting statements. ... Therefore, it is not misleading. ... the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.”
In ADA/disability cases he enforces the requirement that the employee actually request a reasonable accommodation: a failure-to-accommodate theory (federal or state) fails if the plaintiff never sought accommodation -- even while related FMLA/state wrongful-termination claims survive to a jury on motivation.
“Delta's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Smallwood's ADA claims but DENIED as to her remaining claims. ... Smallwood's failure to seek accommodation is as fatal to her state-law 'failure to accommodate' claim as it was to her ADA claim.”
Post-dismissal motions face a steep climb: he denies reconsideration, treats a proposed amended complaint as futile, and will not impose Rule 11 sanctions where the opposing position had some chance of success.
“Plaintiff has not shown that the Federal Defendants’ and SFW’s legal positions lack some “‘chance of success[.]’””
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 8 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 2Denied: 4 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Judgment on the pleadings N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for attorney fees N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Landmark's motion for summary judgment is granted, Hollis Park's is denied, and the complaint is dismissed in it entirety.”
“Landmark's motion for summary judgment is granted, Hollis Park's is denied, and the complaint is dismissed in it entirety.”
“For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Because the letter is not misleading as to whether a dispute must be made in writing, the plaintiff cannot sustain claims under the FDCPA. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.”
“Delta's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Smallwood's ADA claims but DENIED as to her remaining claims.”
“The Mandate was issued on July 14, and, in compliance with my duty to abide by the appellate court's order, I am issuing this order today denying attorney's fees.”
“Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom issued a Report and Recommendation ('R&R') recommending that Plaintiff Freedom Mortgage Corporation's ('Freedom Mortgage') motion for default judgment be granted in part and denied in part. ... Accordingly, the Court adopts the R&R without de novo review and directs the Clerk to enter judgment in accordance with the R&R.”
“the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim is GRANTED.”
“Iaffaldano’s motion is GRANTED and Commissioner’s motion is DENIED.”
“Iaffaldano’s motion is GRANTED and Commissioner’s motion is DENIED.”
“Isreal’s motion to dismiss is granted and the complaint is dismissed.”
“Church’s motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to Knights’s deprivation of property claims, his deprivation of liberty claims against Carozza and Isekenegbe, and his CPLR § 7511 claim, and denied as to his deprivation of liberty claim against CUNY.”
“Knights’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration of and relief from the Decision, for leave to file the PTAC, and for sanctions against the Federal Defendants, SFW, and SFW’s counsel are all DENIED.”
“Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration of and relief from the Decision, for leave to file the PTAC, and for sanctions against the Federal Defendants, SFW, and SFW’s counsel are all DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s sanctions motion is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 157 days (N = 11).
A senior judge (since 2005) on the Brooklyn/Long Island bench who remains very active. Sampled 2018-2020 intake is dominated by ADA Title III public-accommodation suits (many serial-plaintiff filings, e.g. the 'Nixon v. ...' and 'Olsen v. The Meatball Shop' cluster) and 28 U.S.C. §2255 prisoner motions-to-vacate, mixed with criminal cases, employment/civil-rights, trademark, and APA matters; the 2026 assignment slice (above) adds immigration/mandamus, copyright, and contract. ADA Title III cases close fast (often ~2-3 months, settlement/dismissal); §2255 and contested civil cases run far longer.