Edward Robert Korman
How Judge Korman rules, drawn from 18 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Korman
Edward Robert Korman is a judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Appointed by President Ronald Reagan, Judge Korman received a commission on November 4, 1985. Judge Korman assumed senior status on October 25, 2007.
Judge Korman's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Korman, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Motions
Do not file or send motion papers until the motion is fully briefed.
“No motion papers may be filed, either electronically or as courtesy copies, until the motion has been fully briefed.”
Motions
Arrange a briefing schedule without seeking court approval.
“Parties are to arrange their own briefing schedule, which does not require approval from the court.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 10, 2026).
How Judge Korman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In United States v. Martin, he granted early termination of supervised release after six violation-free years, new family caregiving duties, and the Probation Department's non-opposition.
“Mr. Martin's present circumstances are dramatically different than when he began supervision in 2019 because he undertook the responsibility of caring for his adult daughter ... after she became disabled in 2021. ... Moreover, the Probation Department, which has overseen the supervision, does not oppose early termination, a factor I weigh heavily.”
In Polito v. City of New York, he let an at-will employee's tortious-interference claim against third-party city officials proceed because the complaint plausibly alleged they used wrongful threats to cause her firing.
“An at-will employee may maintain a tortious interference claim under New York law if she can establish that a third party used wrongful means to effect the termination such as fraud, misrepresentation, or threats ... it is enough to ask whether the defendants caused Polito's firing using wrongful means.”
In an excessive-force case, testimony about officers’ proximity and disputed injury evidence was enough to leave claims against three officers for a jury. The same order dismissed false-arrest and medical-care claims and claims against two officers who were absent from the scene.
“A reasonable jury could therefore find that Calderon and Gonzalez had a realistic opportunity to prevent the use of excessive force against Samuel but failed to do so.”
In Kinard, disputed evidence of two officers’ personal involvement and intent kept the prolonged-detention claim alive on summary judgment, while the court granted judgment to other officers without evidence of involvement. A party resisting a similar motion needs evidence tying each officer to the detention and exculpatory information.
“Because issues of material fact remain as to the personal involvement of Officer Hall and Sergeant Smith in Kinard’s prolonged detention, see supra Part II-A, as well as with respect to the intentionality prong of Russo, their motion for summary judgment is denied.”
Procedural preferences
In In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, he denied UBS's request to clarify a settlement after UBS disclaimed enforcement and presented no adversarial claim, leaving no live dispute for an advisory ruling.
“UBS wants to use its disagreement with SWC to assert there is a case or controversy, without actually filing any motion or lawsuit with an adversarial posture. Under Article III, UBS cannot have it both ways.”
In Fernandez v. Namdar Realty Group LLC, he raised supplemental jurisdiction on his own and dismissed state discrimination claims that shared only an employment relationship with the federal wage claim.
“Although no party raised the issue, I 'have an independent obligation to determine whether federal jurisdiction exists in this case.' ... Courts have consistently held that there is no supplemental jurisdiction over state-law employment discrimination claims when the only common nucleus with the FLSA claim 'is the existence of a common employment relationship.'”
In Johnson v. MediSys Health Network, he enforced an executed settlement and denied reopening after the plaintiff refused tendered performance and sought new terms; the payment delay did not materially breach the agreement.
“Settlement agreements to end litigation are strongly favored by courts and are not lightly cast aside. ... A plaintiff's afterthought or change of mind are not sufficient to justify rejecting a settlement.”
In Windward Bora, LLC v. Allen, he deemed supported facts admitted after the defendant failed to file a Local Civil Rule 56.1 counterstatement despite a prompt, and granted foreclosure summary judgment.
“Those facts are deemed admitted for the purposes of resolving this motion for summary judgment because Powell failed to controvert them by filing its own statement, even after I prompted it to do so.”
Cautions
A federal suit that asks a district court to vacate or undo a state-court judgment (here, a foreclosure) is jurisdictionally barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Do not file in federal court to re-litigate or appeal a state judgment you lost; the avenue is the state appellate courts (and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court), not a federal trial court.
“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over cases that essentially amount to appeals of state court judgments. ... '[c]ourts in this Circuit have consistently held that any attack on a judgment of foreclosure is clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.'”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The motions of the defendants to enforce the settlement agreement and to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice are granted.”
“The plaintiff's motion to reopen the case is denied.”
“all of the Rooker-Feldman requirements are met by Lopa's attempt to vacate the judgment of the state court, and have his mortgage declared null and void. ... The complaint is dismissed.”
“The defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to Polito's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth claims. The motion is denied as to Polito's sixth claim, for tortious interference with employment.”
“Counts 1 and 2 of the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss is otherwise denied.”
“The motion to amend is granted on the condition that plaintiff remove counts 1 and 2 from the proposed Third Amended Complaint--along with the allegations relating to harassment and retaliation--and refile it within seven days.”
“This circumstance is a new, unforeseen, and exceptional one which, alongside Mr. Martin's conduct, justifies ending his supervision in the interests of justice. ... I therefore grant the motion for early termination of supervised release.”
“The Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.”
“Solomon's motion for permission to file a second amended complaint fails 'on the ground of futility.' ... None of his proposed claims would survive a motion to dismiss. ... Solomon's motion for permission to file a second amended complaint is denied.”
“Windward has established its prima facie case for foreclosure. Powell has failed to establish an affirmative defense or show the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Windward's motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“The § 1983 claims for deliberate indifference, denial of the right to a fair trial, and stigma plus may proceed against CPS defendants Clark, Heepe, Leto, Lantz, and Estrada in their individual capacities. The § 1983 municipal liability claim may proceed against Suffolk County. The rest of the claims against the CPS Defendants and Suffolk County are DISMISSED.”
“Buonatavola's motion for summary judgment is granted as to Rienzi's breach of contract claim pertaining to the Lot 1 Pecorino and as to Rienzi's breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim. The motion is denied as to Rienzi's breach of contract claim regarding the Lot 2 Pecorino.”
“Rienzi's motion to strike Exhibit A of the Bucci Declaration is granted. The motion to strike the Bucci Declaration is denied.”
“CouponCo's motion for default judgment is granted. Carter is permanently enjoined from continuing to display or use the Photograph ... I award Plaintiff a default judgment in the amount of $23,091.80, consisting of $20,000 in statutory damages, $2,617.50 in attorneys' fees, and $474.30 in costs.”
“UBS’s request for a ruling clarifying the scope of the Settlement Agreement and its release of claims is DENIED.”
“in light of UBS’s position that it does not seek to enforce the Settlement Agreement against SWC, UBS’s pending motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement is DENIED as moot.”
“Mr. Muschette and Mr. Ramsey’s Petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 487 days (N = 7).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 125 days (N = 3).
- Senior E.D.N.Y. district judge sitting in Brooklyn (suffix 'ERK'), still actively assigned despite senior status (2007).
- The sampled dockets show (a) a criminal docket (e.g. United States v. Cooper 1:17-cr-00296, United States v. Mantuano Holguin 1:19-cr-00226); (b) a steady stream of 28 U.S.C. 2255 prisoner petitions to vacate sentence that pair with it (Martinez-Rojas, Peng, Dobey v. United States); (c) Section 1983 / civil-rights suits against the City and County (Kelly v. County of Suffolk, Phillip v. City of New York, Mazzio v. City of New York); and (d) consumer/securities class actions (Foster v. Whole Foods, fraud/truth-in-lending; Patel v. Koninklijke Philips, securities).
- The caseload mix is qualitative, drawn from case-level metadata.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 15 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 8 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 15 | 8 |
| Sep 2025 | 13 | 8 |
| Mar 2025 | 5 | 11 |
| Sep 2024 | 5 | 12 |
| Mar 2024 | 7 | 13 |
| Sep 2023 | 5 | 9 |
| Mar 2023 | 3 | 8 |
| Sep 2022 | 1 | 8 |
| Mar 2022 | 2 | 5 |
| Sep 2021 | 1 | 6 |
| Mar 2021 | 2 | 7 |
| Sep 2020 | 1 | 8 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, not for Judge Korman: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 7,392 | 6.7 months |
| Closed with no court action | 1,485 | 3 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 5,022 | 6.9 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 835 | 13.9 months |
| Closed during trial | 50 | 49.6 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 7,392 | 6.7 months |
| Sep 2024 | 7,879 | 5.8 months |
| Sep 2023 | 7,746 | 5.1 months |
| Sep 2022 | 7,588 | 6.2 months |
| Sep 2021 | 6,709 | 7.9 months |
| Sep 2020 | 6,062 | 8.6 months |
| Sep 2019 | 6,858 | 8.1 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
Draft for Judge Korman with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Korman, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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