Edward Robert Korman
How Judge Korman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Early termination of supervised release is 'not lightly granted' and unblemished conduct alone is not 'exceptional,' but Korman will grant it where a violation-free record combines with a genuinely new, unforeseen, and exceptional circumstance -- and a non-opposition from the Probation Department is weighed heavily. A movant should pair a clean compliance record with concrete post-sentencing changes (here, assuming caregiving for a disabled family member) and try to get Probation on board.
“Mr. Martin's present circumstances are dramatically different than when he began supervision in 2019 because he undertook the responsibility of caring for his adult daughter ... after she became disabled in 2021. ... Moreover, the Probation Department, which has overseen the supervision, does not oppose early termination, a factor I weigh heavily.”
An at-will employee CAN maintain a tortious-interference claim against a THIRD party (not the employer) under New York law if the third party used 'wrongful means' -- fraud, misrepresentation, threats, or a violation of a duty owed -- so a defendant cannot defeat such a claim merely by pointing to the at-will employment relationship. Allege the specific wrongful means (e.g., threats of economic ruin to the employer).
“An at-will employee may maintain a tortious interference claim under New York law if she can establish that a third party used wrongful means to effect the termination such as fraud, misrepresentation, or threats ... it is enough to ask whether the defendants caused Polito's firing using wrongful means.”
Procedural preferences
He independently polices subject-matter and supplemental jurisdiction, raising it sua sponte. Do NOT bolt state-law discrimination/retaliation claims onto a federal FLSA wage-and-hour case: a shared employment relationship is not a 'common nucleus of operative fact,' so the state claims will be dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction unless the wage and the discrimination facts genuinely overlap. Plead an actual factual connection or bring the state claims in state court.
“Although no party raised the issue, I 'have an independent obligation to determine whether federal jurisdiction exists in this case.' ... Courts have consistently held that there is no supplemental jurisdiction over state-law employment discrimination claims when the only common nucleus with the FLSA claim 'is the existence of a common employment relationship.'”
Settlement agreements are 'strongly favored' and binding once reached; a party's later 'afterthought or change of mind' will not undo one, and a delay in payment is not a 'material breach' unless it defeats the purpose of the deal -- especially where the complaining party itself refused tendered performance. Do not sign a settlement and then try to renegotiate or manufacture a breach.
“Settlement agreements to end litigation are strongly favored by courts and are not lightly cast aside. ... A plaintiff's afterthought or change of mind are not sufficient to justify rejecting a settlement.”
On summary judgment he enforces E.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 56.1 strictly: if you oppose a motion and fail to file a numbered counterstatement controverting the movant's statement of material facts, those facts are deemed admitted -- and he will prompt you once before doing so. File a proper Rule 56.1 counterstatement with record citations.
“Those facts are deemed admitted for the purposes of resolving this motion for summary judgment because Powell failed to controvert them by filing its own statement, even after I prompted it to do so.”
Cautions
A federal suit that asks a district court to vacate or undo a state-court judgment (here, a foreclosure) is jurisdictionally barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Do not file in federal court to re-litigate or appeal a state judgment you lost; the avenue is the state appellate courts (and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court), not a federal trial court.
“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over cases that essentially amount to appeals of state court judgments. ... '[c]ourts in this Circuit have consistently held that any attack on a judgment of foreclosure is clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.'”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 5 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 3 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to amend N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for early termination supervised release N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to enforce settlement N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to reopen N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The motions of the defendants to enforce the settlement agreement and to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice are granted.”
“The plaintiff's motion to reopen the case is denied.”
“all of the Rooker-Feldman requirements are met by Lopa's attempt to vacate the judgment of the state court, and have his mortgage declared null and void. ... The complaint is dismissed.”
“The defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to Polito's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth claims. The motion is denied as to Polito's sixth claim, for tortious interference with employment.”
“Counts 1 and 2 of the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss is otherwise denied.”
“The motion to amend is granted on the condition that plaintiff remove counts 1 and 2 from the proposed Third Amended Complaint--along with the allegations relating to harassment and retaliation--and refile it within seven days.”
“This circumstance is a new, unforeseen, and exceptional one which, alongside Mr. Martin's conduct, justifies ending his supervision in the interests of justice. ... I therefore grant the motion for early termination of supervised release.”
“The Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.”
“Solomon's motion for permission to file a second amended complaint fails 'on the ground of futility.' ... None of his proposed claims would survive a motion to dismiss. ... Solomon's motion for permission to file a second amended complaint is denied.”
“Windward has established its prima facie case for foreclosure. Powell has failed to establish an affirmative defense or show the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Windward's motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“The § 1983 claims for deliberate indifference, denial of the right to a fair trial, and stigma plus may proceed against CPS defendants Clark, Heepe, Leto, Lantz, and Estrada in their individual capacities. The § 1983 municipal liability claim may proceed against Suffolk County. The rest of the claims against the CPS Defendants and Suffolk County are DISMISSED.”
“Buonatavola's motion for summary judgment is granted as to Rienzi's breach of contract claim pertaining to the Lot 1 Pecorino and as to Rienzi's breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim. The motion is denied as to Rienzi's breach of contract claim regarding the Lot 2 Pecorino.”
“Rienzi's motion to strike Exhibit A of the Bucci Declaration is granted. The motion to strike the Bucci Declaration is denied.”
“CouponCo's motion for default judgment is granted. Carter is permanently enjoined from continuing to display or use the Photograph ... I award Plaintiff a default judgment in the amount of $23,091.80, consisting of $20,000 in statutory damages, $2,617.50 in attorneys' fees, and $474.30 in costs.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 487 days (N = 7).
Senior E.D.N.Y. district judge sitting in Brooklyn (suffix 'ERK'), still actively assigned despite senior status (2007). The sampled dockets show (a) a criminal docket (e.g. United States v. Cooper 1:17-cr-00296, United States v. Mantuano Holguin 1:19-cr-00226); (b) a steady stream of 28 U.S.C. 2255 prisoner petitions to vacate sentence that pair with it (Martinez-Rojas, Peng, Dobey v. United States); (c) Section 1983 / civil-rights suits against the City and County (Kelly v. County of Suffolk, Phillip v. City of New York, Mazzio v. City of New York); and (d) consumer/securities class actions (Foster v. Whole Foods -- fraud/truth-in-lending; Patel v. Koninklijke Philips -- securities). Mix is qualitative this build (case-level metadata only).