Dora Lizette Irizarry
How Judge Irizarry decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Jurisdictional and threshold defenses are decided precisely and on their own terms before (and often instead of) the merits. She enforces the New York election-of-remedies doctrine as a hard jurisdictional bar: a plaintiff who took a discrimination charge to the NYSDHR and lost on 'no probable cause' cannot relitigate the same conduct in court, absent the narrow administrative-convenience or dual-filing exceptions. Counsel should resolve the administrative-forum choice before filing, because a prior agency election can be fatal.
“In the instant action, plaintiff filed an administrative charge with the NYSDHR. He had the opportunity to seek judicial review of the NYSDHR's determination, but failed to do so. ... Accordingly, he is barred from pursuing his claims in this Court or the courts of the State of New York by the election of remedies doctrine.”
She applies the Pennhurst Eleventh Amendment bar to its full reach: a federal suit seeking to compel a state official to comply with STATE law is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or prospective injunctive relief. A plaintiff suing a state university or its officers should anchor any claim for forward-looking relief in FEDERAL law, not state law, to survive a 12(b)(1) motion.
“First, 'as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.' ... they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”
Procedural preferences
Her standard of review on a magistrate's R&R is calibrated tightly to the quality of the objection. A specific, properly-framed objection gets de novo review; but a 'conclusory or general' objection -- or one that merely relitigates the arguments already made to the magistrate -- gets only CLEAR-ERROR review. To get a genuine second look from her, an objecting party must raise new, focused arguments, not repackage the original brief.
“Notably, Dollar Phone's objections raise the same arguments supported by the same legal authority it submitted in its original summary judgment brief. Thus, the Court conducted a clear error review of the R&R.”
She treats 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) interlocutory-appeal certification as the rare exception the Second Circuit describes, and construes its three requirements strictly. A mere claim that the prior ruling was wrong does not establish 'substantial ground for difference of opinion'; and where the underlying issue is fact-intensive (here, the ministerial exception), she finds an immediate appeal would not materially advance termination. Do not expect her to certify a fact-bound interlocutory ruling for appeal.
“A mere claim that a district court's decision was incorrect does not suffice to establish substantial ground for a difference of opinion. ... defendant has not cited any conflicting legal authority to persuade the court that doubt exists, much less substantial doubt”
Objections to a magistrate's R&R must be specific and must be the SAME arguments already made to the magistrate. A new theory of liability raised for the first time in objections 'may not be deemed objections at all' and gets no de novo review; rehashed arguments get only clear-error review. And leave to amend that was never requested before the magistrate will be refused -- she does not give a plaintiff an advisory opinion on the complaint's defects plus a fresh chance to cure. Make every argument, and any amendment request, to the magistrate in the first instance.
“It is well established that '[n]ew arguments and factual assertions cannot properly be raised for the first time in objections to the [R & R], and indeed may not be deemed objections at all.' ... Relator could have requested leave to amend before the magistrate judge, but did not do so. Accordingly, this Court will not consider his request now.”
Cautions
In immigration-delay mandamus/APA suits she will entertain jurisdiction but dismiss on the merits: the INA creates no enforceable right to a particular asylum-adjudication timeline, and an applicant for a discretionary benefit has no Fifth Amendment due-process interest. A plaintiff pressing an unreasonable-delay theory needs concrete, well-pleaded facts about the delay and a cognizable interest, not a generalized demand for adjudication within a set number of days.
“The INA makes clear that it does not 'create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party' against the government regarding asylum application timelines. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for denial of due process.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 8 |
Granted: 5Granted in part: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 4 |
Granted: 3Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for certification interlocutory appeal N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to recuse N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice and plaintiff's motion for remand is DENIED.”
“The court is satisfied that the amount in controversy in the instant action exceeds $75,000 and the removal was proper. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for remand is denied.”
“As claims five through seven 'seek[] solely to secure compliance with state law by a state official,' in contrast to claims that 'seek[] to secure compliance with federal law by a state official,' they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ... Therefore, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims is granted.”
“In light of the federal policy against piecemeal or premature appellate review and given that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is ordinarily not appealable, defendant's motion requesting certification of this court's order dated July 26, 2006 so that defendant may seek an interlocutory appeal is denied.”
“Upon due consideration, and after finding no clear error, the R & R is adopted in its entirety. Accordingly, St. Paul's motion for summary judgment is granted and Dollar Phone's cross-motion for summary judgment is denied. The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.”
“Accordingly, St. Paul's motion for summary judgment is granted and Dollar Phone's cross-motion for summary judgment is denied. The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.”
“For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is denied. Accordingly, Plaintiff is awarded a judgment of foreclosure against the Subject Property located in Kings County known as 135 Ross Street, Brooklyn, NY, 11211, and default interest pursuant to the Mortgage and reasonable attorney's fees and costs.”
“For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is denied.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied and the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted. This action is dismissed in its entirety.”
“In the instant motions, Spitz, the Plan and the Trust move pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Second Claim for Relief... while Schultz, Zucker and McDonough move, also pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Third, Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief... For the reasons set forth below, the motions are denied.”
“ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff's action is summarily dismissed.”
“For the reasons set forth above, Local 79's motion to dismiss is granted. The complaint is dismissed without prejudice, with leave to file an amended complaint in accordance with this Order no later than April 28, 2014.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that all of Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the Montreal Convention and Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is granted in its entirety.”
“Accordingly, Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted and this action is dismissed with prejudice.”
“Accordingly, the court denies Defendant's motion seeking to disqualify this judge from presiding over the instant action.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 218 days (N = 7).
Senior E.D.N.Y. district judge sitting in Brooklyn (suffix 'DLI'), still actively assigned despite senior status (2020). The most-recent (2026) sample is dominated by FLSA wage-and-hour labor suits (710) and a heavy criminal docket (e.g. United States v. Norwood 1:26-cr-00111, United States v. Nass 1:26-cr-00108), plus ADA Title III access cases and 'Other Contract' matters. Older windows show truth-in-lending/FDCPA/consumer-credit (371/480), immigration actions (465), medical malpractice/FTCA (362), and a steady criminal trial docket (she presided over the 2010-2011 JFK Airport terror-plot trial). Mix is qualitative this build (case-level metadata only).