Diane Gujarati
How Judge Gujarati decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She will not grant leave to amend as a matter of course after dismissal. Where a plaintiff earlier told the court it saw no need to amend, never requested leave while briefing the motion to dismiss, and -- even after the issue is squarely raised -- never shows HOW it would cure the pleading defects, she denies leave despite Rule 15(a)(2)'s liberal standard, and dismissal of the failed claims is with prejudice. A litigant who wants a second chance must ask for it and proffer the proposed cure.
“While recognizing that the Complaint in this action is the first Complaint and that Rule 15(a)(2) ... provides that leave to amend should be 'freely give[n] ... when justice so requires,' on the record before the Court, the Court does not find that leave to amend is warranted here. ... Nor, to date, has Plaintiff -- even in light of the Manda Defendants' objection ... -- made any attempt to indicate how Plaintiff might cure the deficiencies.”
She does not rubber-stamp default judgments. Even when a defendant never appears, she (through an adopted R&R) tests whether the well-pleaded allegations actually establish liability as a matter of law on each claim and requires evidentiary proof of damages -- so a defaulting-defendant plaintiff can still LOSE on some claims (here the retaliation theories) while winning on others.
“Consistent with Judge Mann's R&R, default judgment is denied as to Plaintiff's retaliation claim brought under the NYCHRL (the Seventh Cause of Action) and as to the remaining retaliation claims against Defendant Stoupas (contained in the Third and Fifth Causes of Action).”
Procedural preferences
She makes heavy, structured use of magistrate judges: a large share of her dispositive rulings adopt a magistrate's Report & Recommendation. Her review standard tracks the objections precisely -- de novo for any portion a party properly objects to (and she will review the ENTIRE R&R de novo when both sides object), but only clear-error review for portions to which no timely objection was filed. Litigants who want a fresh look from her must file specific, timely objections.
“In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court has liberally construed Plaintiff's filings in this action. And, in light of the parties' objections to the R&R, the Court has reviewed de novo the entirety of the R&R.”
With pro se litigants she is patient but firm on prosecution: she grants repeated sua sponte extensions and issues explicit written warnings (including orders to show cause), but a plaintiff who then goes silent will have the case dismissed under Rule 41(b) after a structured five-factor analysis -- typically WITHOUT prejudice in deference to pro se status. Inaction, even by a pro se plaintiff, has consequences once notice has been given.
“The Court's January 12, 2022 Order put Plaintiff on notice that failure to respond to that Order may result in her case's dismissal, and the Court's February 28, 2022 Order ... expressly warned that if Plaintiff failed to respond ... 'Plaintiff's case will be dismissed.' ... this case is dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to prosecute and to comply with court orders.”
Cautions
Timeliness and judicial estoppel are live, dispositive defenses in her courtroom. She adopted a magistrate's recommendation to dismiss WITH PREJUDICE where the claims were time-barred (with equitable tolling unwarranted) and, alternatively, barred by judicial estoppel -- and she did so even though the pro se plaintiff filed no opposition to the motions to dismiss. Do not assume an unopposed motion or a pro se posture will save a stale or estopped claim.
“Judge Wicks properly concluded that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, with equitable tolling not being warranted; that additional grounds as set forth in the R&R also support dismissal of the Amended Complaint; and that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Involuntary dismissal rule 41b N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 39, is GRANTED and the Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED.”
“Accordingly, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 79 and 85, are GRANTED and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, ECF No. 19, is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“The Manda Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 99, the Morali Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 102, and the CRI Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 106, are GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED without leave to amend.”
“The Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 37, is granted in part and denied in part as specified in the R&R and Plaintiff is granted until March 25, 2026 to file an Amended Complaint that is consistent with the R&R.”
“The Motions to Dismiss in the above-captioned actions (No. 20-CV-03868, ECF No. 62; No. 20-CV-06348, ECF No. 48) are GRANTED to the extent that they seek dismissal of the Complaints in the above-captioned actions; the Complaints ... are DISMISSED without prejudice”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is granted to the extent set forth in Judge Mann's R&R ... in the amount of $228,933.33 ... Consistent with Judge Mann's R&R, default judgment is denied as to Plaintiff's retaliation claim brought under the NYCHRL (the Seventh Cause of Action) and as to the remaining retaliation claims against Defendant Stoupas”
EXCLUDED FROM MOTION STATS (order read, no party motion ruled on the merits). Pro se SSA disability appeal dismissed for failure to prosecute. Although the Commissioner had filed a 12(b)(6) motion, the court did not rule on that motion's merits; it dismissed under Rule 41(b) after the plaintiff failed to respond to the motion despite repeated sua sponte deadline extensions and two orders to show cause, and took no action on the case for nearly eighteen months. Dismissed without prejudice. Illustrates her pro se case-management practice (the same five-factor Rule 41(b) analysis she applied in Silver).
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 223 days (N = 6).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 289 days (N = 3).
Active (non-senior) E.D.N.Y. district judge sitting in Brooklyn (docket suffix 'DG'). The most-recent search sample (May 2026) is dominated by the 2026 alien-detainee habeas surge (28 U.S.C. 2241 -- nature-of-suit '463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee'), alongside FLSA labor (710), a criminal docket (e.g. United States v. Berko 1:20-cr-00328, United States v. Gertsik 1:24-cr-00149, United States v. Jane Doe 1:21-cr-00570), and general civil-rights matters. The 2020-2022 window shows SSA disability appeals, state-prisoner and general habeas, motor-vehicle tort, and FLSA. Mix is qualitative this build (case-level metadata only).