Denis Reagan Hurley
How Judge Hurley decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a premises-negligence case he will deny a defendant's summary-judgment motion where the plaintiff produces an expert opinion creating a triable issue on proximate cause and on whether a hazard was 'open and obvious.' An expert report that a curb-ramp slope exceeded code and that the missing yellow warning paint turned a steep slope into a 'hidden hazard' was enough to send the case to a jury, despite the defendant's argument that the plaintiff would have tripped at any slope. Come to a Rule 56 motion in a slip/fall case with a qualified expert, not just argument.
“Based on Berkenfeld's report, however, reasonable minds could differ as to whether defendants' failure to provide yellow warning paint at the base of the curb would have prevented plaintiff's accident by making the curb ramp noticeable to plaintiff. ... Therefore, her claim survives summary judgment.”
Procedural preferences
He polices subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte and is exacting about diversity pleading for unincorporated entities: an LLC's citizenship is the citizenship of EACH of its members, so alleging only the state of organization and principal place of business is insufficient. He will give the plaintiff a dated opportunity to amend, but if the defect is not cured he dismisses for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction -- even after nearly two years of litigation and even though a summary-judgment motion is pending. Plead LLC member citizenship correctly at the outset.
“the allegation that Encompass is 'a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of State of Delaware and maintains a principal place of business at 615 Macon Street, McDonough, Georgia 30253' is insufficient to allege its citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. ... this action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that raises qualified immunity and relies on matters outside the pleadings (e.g., a plaintiff's guilty-plea minutes), he will not consider the extrinsic material on the pleadings; instead he converts the motion to one for summary judgment and sets a briefing schedule, reasoning that qualified immunity is an immunity from suit that should be resolved as early as possible on a proper Rule 56 record. Expect a 12(b)(6) that depends on outside evidence to be converted, not decided on the complaint.
“Defendants' motion to dismiss is converted to one for summary judgment and the Court shall establish a briefing schedule so that all parties are 'given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.'”
Where a single federal claim is dropped (here by an amendment of right that withdrew an ERISA count), he declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3) and remands to state court, citing comity and the plaintiff's choice of forum -- especially early in the case before much has been litigated. If your only federal hook disappears, expect a remand rather than continued federal litigation.
“This case now involves only state law claims, rendering remand consistent with the comity interest that informs the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. ... the appropriate exercise of its discretion requires remand of this case to the state court.”
Docket-practice note (grounded in docket, Kabil v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, 2:22-cv-00989): when a premotion-conference dispute is fully framed by the parties' letters, he will treat the premotion letters as the briefing on the motion itself rather than requiring formal motion papers, giving any party a deadline to object or add authorities. Take premotion letters seriously -- they may BE your brief.
“In the Court's view, the issue is fully framed such that the premotion conference letters should be treated as the briefing on the motion itself. To the extent that any party (1) objects to converting the premotion conference letter to the motion itself and/or (2) wishes to put additional arguments or authorities before the Court, it may do so by letter ... Ordered by Judge Denis R. Hurley on 3/22/2022.”
Cautions
Repeatedly delaying your opposition to a dispositive motion is dangerous, even pro se: after a pro se defendant sought a year of extensions and then filed an untimely opposition with no meritorious arguments, he granted summary judgment against him. He will review an untimely opposition but is not obliged to, and will grant a well-supported motion the non-movant failed to rebut on time.
“Defendant Lisi had ample opportunity to oppose Plaintiff's motion but repeatedly delayed doing so over the course of a year ... a review of the opposition reveals that Defendant Lisi does not present any meritorious arguments. ... the Court grants Plaintiff's motion as to Defendant Lisi.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Moot / procedural: 2 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for attorney fees N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to quash subpoena N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to strike is denied in its entirety.”
“The filing of the amended complaint rendered the motion to dismiss the original complaint moot.”
“This matter is hereby remanded to the New York State Supreme Court, County of Kings.”
“The motion for sanctions is denied.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the defendant=s motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and this action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“Defendants' motion for attorneys' fees is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the judgment and award Defendants $245.00 in costs.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the motion of Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor Gregory Blue (Docket No. 68) is denied.”
“the motion to dismiss is hereby converted to a motion for summary judgment and the following briefing schedule is established.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for default judgment against the defendants Northwell Staffing Agency, LLC, and Veronica Woods also known as Vernica Woods also known as Vertissha Woods, is granted”
“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted as to Defendant Lisi.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED (1) the government's motion for a default judgment be granted in its entirety;”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 114 days (N = 10).
Senior E.D.N.Y. district judge sitting in Central Islip on Long Island (suffix 'DRH'), still assigned cases despite senior status (2004). The docket sample splits into two clusters: a mid-2000s contested-civil group (Marchand v. County of Nassau -- 440 civil rights; Richardt v. Suffolk County Police Department -- 440 civil rights; Bennett v. Labcorp; Salesmaster Associates v. Goodling -- 190 Contract; United States Life Insurance v. Catarelli) and a 2022 fast-disposition consumer/FDCPA group (Kabil v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau -- 480 Consumer Credit / FDCPA; Batista v. MRS BPO; Ginsburg v. JPMorgan Chase; Plastik v. Cox Media; plus Cai v. Mayorkas, an immigration/mandamus matter). Mix is qualitative this build (case-level metadata only); many older dockets carry zero docket entries (metadata-only).