Brian Mark Cogan
How Judge Cogan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Unopposed dispositive motions are still decided on the merits, not granted by default — a non-opposing party does not automatically lose.
“Plaintiff has not opposed the motion, but the Court has reviewed its merits independently and determines that the motion should be granted.”
In a Title VII religious-accommodation case he will rule for the employee where the employer concedes the exemption request was adequate and cannot show real undue hardship (Groff) — a high bar for the employer once 'undue hardship' is invoked.
“there would have been no undue hardship in granting plaintiff’s religious accommodation request. First, defendant granted 555 religious accommodation requests (out of 937 applications)”
He treats a statute-of-limitations defense as ill-suited to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: it is granted only if the plaintiff has 'pleaded itself out of court,' and well-pleaded extraordinary circumstances (here, torture and death threats supporting equitable estoppel/tolling) are reserved for the jury rather than resolved on the pleadings.
“It is far from clear from the second amended complaint that plaintiffs' claims are time barred, as they have alleged extraordinary circumstances that could warrant the application of equitable tolling ... Because plaintiffs did not plead themselves out of court here, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.”
On NYLL wage-timing claims he recognizes Article III standing from the loss of the time value of late-paid wages, and follows the First Department's Vega (express private right of action under 191/198(1-a)) notwithstanding doubts after Konkur — while holding constitutional-excessiveness challenges to the liquidated-damages penalty premature before any award.
“the deprivation of money to which one is legally entitled is an actual and concrete injury per se. ‘Money later is not the same as money now.’ ... I will therefore follow Vega to hold that plaintiff has a private right of action under §§ 191 and 198(1-a)”
Procedural preferences
He runs premotion conferences (per his Individual Practice Rules) as effective oral argument on the contemplated motion, requiring detailed advance letters — and treats concessions made there as binding under Rule 16. Do not say something at the premotion conference you are not prepared to live with.
“as I advised the parties at the premotion conference, the conference was effectively oral argument on defendant’s motion.”
A claim withdrawn or narrowed at the premotion conference stays withdrawn; counsel cannot resurrect it in the summary-judgment opposition.
“concessions made at the conference for the purpose of narrowing the issues in a case are fully binding in subsequent proceedings.”
Cautions
Temporal proximity alone will rarely defeat summary judgment on a retaliation claim — bring concrete evidence of pretext or retaliatory motive, not just timing.
“temporal proximity alone is rarely if ever enough to raise a factual issue of retaliation sufficient to prevent summary judgment.”
An unpleasant or abusive supervisor is not, by itself, a federal claim — incivility must be tied to a protected characteristic with admissible evidence.
“It remains the case that the “boss from hell” has not, without more, violated federal law.”
Against an insurer/sender invoking the mailbox rule, a bare denial of receipt is not enough — you need proof the regular mailing procedure was not followed.
“once defendants demonstrate that they properly mailed the notice, plaintiff’s denial of receipt is immaterial.”
On APA/mandamus suits to compel adjudication of a delayed visa or immigration benefit, he generally will not intervene absent arbitrary singling-out — multi-year delays are treated as not unreasonable.
“courts in this Circuit have repeatedly found that delays of as long as five years in [the] adjudication of immigration benefits are not unreasonable.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 11 |
Granted: 5Granted in part: 1Denied: 5 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 8 |
Granted: 6Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to suppress N = 2 |
Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion in limine N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss the streamlined complaint is GRANTED.”
“Sun's motion to suppress [77] is granted in part and denied in part; Hu's motion to suppress [80] is denied.”
“Hu's motion to suppress [80] is denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment and for postponement of agency action are granted.”
“The Government's motion to dismiss is denied in part. Plaintiffs are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within 14 days why their remaining claims should not be dismissed as moot.”
“For these reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.”
“Defendants' [231] motion to dismiss is denied and defendants' [233] motion in limine is granted in part and denied in part.”
“Defendants' [231] motion to dismiss is denied and defendants' [233] motion in limine is granted in part and denied in part.”
“Defendants’ [6] motion to dismiss is therefore granted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint is granted. Further leave to amend is denied. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and to close the case.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [26] is granted and defendant’s motion for summary judgment [27] is denied.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [26] is granted and defendant’s motion for summary judgment [27] is denied.”
“the City’s motion for summary judgment on Pastrana’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is granted.”
“Defendants’ motion [24] motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the complaint.”
“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [32] is granted, and the case is dismissed.”
“Plaintiffs’ motion [47] for partial summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 45 days (N = 19).
As a senior judge (since 2020-06-12) his current docket intake is dominated by a 2026 alien-detainee habeas (28 U.S.C. 2241) surge, mixed with SSA, FDCPA/consumer-credit, ADA Title III, FLSA, product-liability, foreclosure, and insurance matters, plus criminal cases. A sampled 2018-2019 cohort of terminated civil dockets resolved very fast (many pro se/IFP cases closed within ~6 weeks).