Andrew Miller

United States District Court for the District of North Dakota district Retired 1960 · served 1922–1960 Appointed by Warren G. Harding (Republican) 15 signed orders read

Judge Miller no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Miller decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Miller treated a school-attending child as resident with the supporting parent for exemption purposes despite physical absence during the school term.

“It follows, therefore, that at the time of the claimed exemptions Stearns was the head of a family within the meaning of section 5626 and section 7729.”

He rejected farm-debt relief where the proposal lacked capital, seed, feed, or a realistic route to rehabilitation and merely postponed liquidation.

“From the whole picture of his financial condition there is no reasonable probability or hope of his financial rehabilitation within the three-year moratorium period or at any time, and, therefore, could only postpone the date of inevitable liquidation.”

He held a trustee potentially liable for a misleading statement when it knew the deposited papers did not create the lien they appeared to represent.

“But if the bank knew at the time it made the statement that these papers, though perfect in form, did not carry a first lien and, in fact, were unenforceable, it was its duty not to make a statement for the purpose of inducing action on the idea that the papers were, so far as it knew, at least what they purported to be.”

Procedural preferences

Miller treated directly conflicting jury instructions as reversible because jurors could follow the erroneous statement even if other instructions were correct.

“that is not the rule where two instructions are directly in conflict and one of them clearly erroneous and prejudicial, such as is presented here, for the jury will assume that the instructions are all correct and will as likely follow the incorrect as the correct instruction.”

He would not consider a fact-dependent appellate argument that had not been raised and proved in the trial court.

“The contention is dependent upon proof of a fact, and such proof, before the matter could be presented here, must have been presented to and passed upon by the lower court.”

He required a claimant challenging agency disposition of public land to establish both agency error and the claimant's own entitlement.

“the complainant must establish not only that the action of the Secretary was wrong in approving the other lease, but that the complainant was himself entitled to an approval of his lease”

Cautions

Miller viewed ex parte statements used to bolster trial testimony as prejudicial evidence rather than harmless corroboration.

“The admission of this affidavit was violative of the most elementary rules of evidence.”

He distinguished incremental improvement from patentable invention when the claimed change remained within ordinary skill in the art.

“a mere carrying forward of an original thought, the substitution of an equivalent, a more thorough doing of what has already been done, a more perfect result by carrying forward an old idea, is not such an invention as will sustain a patent.”

He required a party raising a constitutional challenge to show that the challenged provision actually injured it.

“Not having brought itself within the class authorized to attack the constitutionality of the statute, that question is not properly before us.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

In re Stearns
· 1922-11-10
Petition for review (bankrupt) Granted

“Accordingly, the petition for review herein will be sustained, and the matter remanded to the referee for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.”

Drossos v. United States
· 1924-11-07
Appeal (Drossos) Granted

“Because of the errors in the instructions pointed out and affecting the substantial right of plaintiff in error, the case is reversed and remanded, with instructions to grant a new trial.”

Bell v. United States
· 1924-11-03
Appeal (Bell and Houston) Denied

“In view of what we have already said, we are of the opinion that the case should be, and is, affirmed.”

Jacobs v. United States
· 1924-11-15
Appeal (Jacobs) Denied

“The case is affirmed.”

Sarkisian v. United States
· 1924-12-09
Appeal (Sarkisian in No. 6511) Moot / procedural

“The writs numbered 6511 and 6512 are therefore hereby dismissed. Nos. 6582 and 6583 are affirmed.”

Appeal (Sarkisian in No. 6512) Moot / procedural
Appeal (Sarkisian in No. 6582) Denied
Appeal (Sarkisian in No. 6583) Denied
Lehman v. Ripley
· 1925-01-21
Appeal (Lehman) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Greeley National Bank v. Wolf
· 1925-01-31
Appeal (Greeley National Bank) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Hodgson v. Federal Oil & Development Co.
· 1925-03-28
Appeal (Hodgson) Denied

“The order of the lower court is affirmed.”

Standard Oil Co. v. Martin
· 1927-10-13
Appeal (Standard Oil Company) Granted

“Clearly the motion for a directed verdiet should have been granted, and for that error this case is reversed and remanded, with instructions that a new trial be granted.”

Rutledge v. United States
· 1927-10-13
Appeal (Rutledge) Denied

“The judgment of the lower court should be, and is, affirmed.”

Bartlett Trust Co. v. Elliott
· 1930-04-07
Appeal (Bartlett Trust Company) Denied

“For the reasons above stated, this case must be affirmed”

Stewart v. Nebraska Tire & Rubber Co.
· 1930-02-27
Appeal (Stewart) Denied

“For reasons above stated, this case must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The fifteen reviewed decisions do not establish the distribution of Miller's full federal caseload.

A historical record

Judge Miller no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.